APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An organization of developers brought suit against Williamson County seeking a declaratory judgment that an impact fee imposed on new developments to fund improvements to schools throughout the county exceeded the authority granted to the county by the legislature, or alternatively, that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-3-413(b) exempted the organization’s members from paying the impact fee because their property rights vested prior to adoption of the impact fee. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county, concluding that the impact fee did not exceed the authority granted to the county and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-3-413(b) did not apply because the impact fee did not constitute a development standard. We affirm.   

The Petitioner, Samuel Gregory Dorsey, filed a post-conviction petition seeking relief from his conviction of attempted aggravated sexual battery, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his child for the purposes of adoption. The petitioners, the child’s mother and her new husband, alleged that the father had abandoned the child both by willfully failing to visit and by willfully failing to support. Following a trial, the court concluded that the petitioners had failed to show that the father’s failures to visit or to support were willful. So the court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the petitioners contend that the evidence was clear and convincing that the father willfully failed to support his child. After a review of the record, we affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, filed by M.E. Buck Dougherty (“Father”), seeking to recuse the trial judge in this case involving modification of a parenting plan. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Father we find that the order of the Chancery Court for Fayette County (“Trial Court”) did not sufficiently comply with Rule 10B. We, therefore, vacate the Trial Court’s January 30, 2020 order and remand this case to allow Father to amend his petition and for the Trial Court to either grant the motion or enter an order that states in writing all the grounds upon which the motion is denied.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Tyran Rollins, of aggravated robbery, and he was sentenced to serve eight and a half years in prison. The Defendant appeals his conviction, asserting that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict and that the composition of the jury violated his constitutional rights. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict and that the issue regarding the composition of the jury has been waived. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Toscar Smith, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s revocation of his nine-year probationary sentence for his conviction for aggravated assault. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering his sentence into execution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Jeffrey Van Garrett, was charged with one count of possession of oxycodone, a Schedule II substance, with intent to sell or deliver. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement under Rule 11(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which he pled guilty to the charge with an agreed four-year sentence as a Range I offender to be served on probation. Defendant attempted to reserve three certified questions of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified questions because the certification did not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

In this termination of parental rights action, the father has appealed the trial court’s final order terminating his parental rights based on several statutory grounds. The maternal grandparents of the minor child, Bentley Q. (“the Child”), filed a petition to terminate the mother’s and father’s parental rights and to allow the maternal grandparents to adopt the Child. As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the father had (1) abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit the Child and (2) failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court also found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest that the father’s parental rights be terminated. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

A plaintiff who developed tendonitis after taking medication prescribed by a nurse practitioner filed a malpractice action against the nurse practitioner and the pharmacy that filled the prescription. Two years later, the plaintiff amended her complaint to add the
nurse practitioner’s employer and supervising physician as defendants. The new defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and repose and that the plaintiff failed to provide them
with pre-suit notice of a potential medical malpractice claim. The plaintiff responded that fraudulent concealment tolled the statutes and constituted extraordinary cause to waive pre-suit notice. The trial court agreed and denied the motions. The defendants then moved for summary judgment on other grounds, which the court granted. It is undisputed that the plaintiff’s claims against these defendants were filed beyond the time allowed by the statute of repose for medical malpractice actions. Because we conclude that the plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of the fraudulent concealment exception, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the statute of repose. So we affirm the dismissal of the claims against these defendants on summary judgment but on different grounds.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey McCoy, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more and one count of burglary of a building other than a habitation. The trial court imposed a twelve-year effective sentence to be served consecutively to a previous sentence in South Carolina. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner maintains that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The State concedes error. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

In this post-divorce dispute, Appellant Mother and Appellee Father filed cross-petitions seeking modification of the permanent parenting plan for their minor child. Father sought a change in primary residential parent, and Mother sought modification of the parenting schedule and decision-making authority. On its finding that the parties stipulated to a material change in circumstance, the trial court granted Father’s petition and denied Mother’s petition. Because the trial court failed to delineate between the burden of proof for modification of custody and the burden of proof for modification of parenting schedule, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), (C), we vacate the trial court’s order and remand.

The Petitioner, William Boatwright, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and two aggravated assault convictions, for which he is serving a forty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel, reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, and remand this case for a limited motion for a new trial regarding the sufficiency of the evidence issues addressed in the appeal.

I concur with the majority opinion in its analysis that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s counsel failed to raise specific issues regarding the lack of sufficient evidence to sustain two convictions, and the issues had merit. However, I disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion as to the relief to which Petitioner is entitled. This is a unique post-conviction case. I am unable to recall ever before reviewing an appeal wherein the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief because, following a thorough review of the evidence at trial taken in the light most favorable to the State, it is clearly shown that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions of especially aggravated robbery of one victim and aggravated robbery of another victim. Petitioner’s counsel failed to make the appropriate argument for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case and failed to argue the issue in the direct appeal to this court. That failure established deficient performance. The review of the evidence at trial, the result of which is stated above, clearly established prejudice to Petitioner as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Reversing the judgment of the post-conviction court is appropriate. However, remanding the matter to the trial court for Petitioner to have the opportunity to file a motion for new trial denies Petitioner the relief to which he is entitled. As will be discussed herein, it may also be in violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights to be protected from double jeopardy.

The is an appeal from an order terminating a father’s parental rights. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Over twenty-five years ago, William Matney Putman, Petitioner, pled guilty to first-degree felony murder, attempted robbery, and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. See William Matney Putman v. State, No. E2004-02192-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1996634, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2005), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005) (“Putman I”). The postconviction court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Mark A. Crites, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a multiple offender to twelve years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the conviction and sentence. See State v. Mark A. Crites, No. M2014-00383-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3508042 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 4, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2015). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals the denial, maintaining that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Carey R. Faught, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury trial convictions of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and his effective forty-eight-year sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to challenge an impermissibly suggestive photograph lineup. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Carrington Owens, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; twenty-three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; and twelve counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (Supp. 2007, 2010, Supp. 2011) (rape of a child), 39-17-1005 (2006) (subsequently amended) (especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery). He is serving an effective thirty-seven-year sentence for his convictions. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from a search of his home and that he was denied the right to confront his accuser face-to-face. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Freddie L. Smith, was convicted upon his guilty pleas of four counts of identity theft, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-150 (2018). The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range II offender and agreed to an effective eight-year sentence. The manner of service of his sentence was reserved for the trial court’s determination. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves questions of post-divorce child support. In the trial court proceedings, both parties prayed for a modification of support. Additionally, mother pursued an extension of support post-majority for two of her children. While the trial court dealt with the question of post-majority support, it did not address the parties’ requests for modification of the ordinary support owed, father for a decrease, or mother for an increase. Although the trial court addressed post-majority support issues, its order was incomplete even as to those matters, as a specific amount of support was never set. It follows that there is not a final judgment in this case, and we must therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This is the second appeal of a parenting plan. In the first appeal, Father successfully challenged the adoption of a plan that allocated him only 80 days parenting time; the case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to increase Father’s parenting time. Following a hearing, the trial court adopted Father’s proposed parenting plan which granted the parties equal parenting time, and in so doing, addressed other matters. Mother appeals. We affirm the award of equal parenting time and the adjustment to child support and income tax deductions that necessarily followed; we modify the plan to include certain provisions that were in the previous parenting plan.

A husband and wife executed a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) providing that the husband would pay the wife alimony in futuro even if she remarried. Following the wife’s remarriage, the husband sought to have his alimony obligation terminated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(3), which provides that an alimony in futuro award “shall terminate automatically and unconditionally upon the death or remarriage of the recipient.” The trial court terminated the husband’s alimony obligation, and the wife appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment because the parties voluntarily agreed to terms outside of the statute, and their contract is enforceable as written.

The Defendant, John C. Elrod, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding a violation of his probation. In two separate cases, the Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of seven years of probation. In May 2019, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant based upon allegations that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines on November 27, 2018 and January 24, 2019. After a hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a divorce case. Appellant Husband appeals the trial court’s: (1) classification of certain property; (2) imputation of income for purposes of child support; (3) denial of the parties’ proposed parenting plan; and (4) award of rehabilitative, transitional, and alimony in solido to Appellee Wife. We conclude that the trial court erred in: (1) the classification of certain marital property; (2) the amount of income imputed to the parties’; (3) denying the parties’ proposed parenting plan absent sufficient findings; (4) its award of rehabilitative alimony; and (5) in the amount of transitional alimony awarded.

This appeal concerns a plaintiff’s effort to amend a civil warrant. Brandon Burns (“Burns”) had homeowners insurance through State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“SFFCC”). When SFFCC did not repair the progressing damage to his home caused by a sinkhole, Burns sued “State Farm Insurance” in the Knox County General Sessions Court (“the General Sessions Court”). It was the wrong entity. Nevertheless, Burns obtained a $25,000 default judgment against it. SFFCC, a non-party, somehow and for some reason filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Circuit Court”). In the Circuit Court, Burns filed a motion to amend. SFFCC filed a motion to dismiss, which the Circuit Court granted as to SFFCC but not as to State Farm Insurance. SFFCC then dismissed its appeal, content to let the General Sessions Court judgment stand against State Farm Insurance. Some months later, Burns made an oral motion to amend in the General Sessions Court, which was granted. The parties agreed to remove the case back to the Circuit Court, which granted summary judgment to SFFCC. Burns appeals. We hold that the General Sessions Court lacked jurisdiction to grant Burns’ motion to amend or otherwise modify its judgment because its judgment became final months before Burns’ motion was noticed for hearing in the General Sessions Court. We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.