APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter concerns judicial review of a motion to disqualify a city attorney and/or the entire Memphis City Attorney’s Office from appearing in administrative cases pending before the Memphis Civil Service Commission between May 18, 2015 and September 29, 2017. Appellants argue that an assistant city attorney created a conflict of interest for herself and/or the entire office after she filed a notice of appearance claiming she represented the civil service commission in a separate case appealed to Chancery Court. Appellees argue that, even if the notice of appearance created a representation, state statutes and case law would permit the representation. The Civil Service Commission denied the Appellants’ motion, and the Shelby County Chancery Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. After applying the review standards outlined in the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, we affirm the ruling of the Chancery Court.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Hamblen County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Chaunte G. (“Mother”) to her three minor children, Malik, Sean and Jaslene (“the Children,” collectively). After a hearing, the Juvenile Court found that DCS had proven the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume legal and physical custody of the Children, all by clear and convincing evidence. The Juvenile Court found also that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court, arguing mainly that terminating her parental rights is not in the Children’s best interest because she completed a number of her permanency plan tasks after the petition was filed. First, save for the ground of abandonment by failure to visit, which we reverse, we affirm the grounds for termination found by the Juvenile Court. As for the Children’s best interest, despite Mother’s tardy completion of some of her permanency plan tasks, the evidence nevertheless proves that it is unlikely she can safely parent the Children any time soon. Applying the standard of clear and convincing evidence, we find that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interest. While we reverse one ground for termination, we otherwise affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.

In this consolidated appeal, the Petitioner, Daniel G. Carr, appeals the Macon County Circuit Court’s dismissals of his petitions for post-conviction and habeas corpus relief from his 1999 convictions for rape, attempted rape, aggravated sexual battery, statutory rape, and two counts of sexual battery and his effective ten-year sentence. He contends that the court erred in denying post-conviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing and that the court erred by denying habeas corpus relief because the court lacked jurisdiction to amend the judgments. Because the Petitioner had completed his term of imprisonment prior to entry of the amended judgments, we agree with the Petitioner, and conclude that the court was without jurisdiction to enter the amended judgments. We reverse and vacate the court’s judgment relative to the habeas corpus claim, and we remand this matter with instructions to grant habeas corpus relief. In the event of further review, we also conclude that the court erred in dismissing the Petitioner’s post-conviction petition without a hearing, and we remand this case for consideration of whether due process requires tolling the post-conviction statute of limitations and, if so, whether the Petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief.

I concur with the majority’s conclusions to reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and to remand this case for consideration of whether due process requires tolling of the one-year statute of limitations and, if so, whether the Petitioner is entitled to
post-conviction relief. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief.

Wife filed for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The trial court granted husband a divorce on the grounds of wife’s adultery and other inappropriate marital conduct. Despite the many factors found by the trial court to be favorable to husband, the court awarded husband only 43% of the net marital estate. It also awarded husband one year of transitional alimony at $2,000 per month. We hold that the trial court erred in its division of the net marital assets and in its determination as to the duration of the transitional alimony awarded to husband. We modify the trial court’s judgment so as to provide husband five years of transitional alimony. We hold that the Roth IRA is a marital asset; it is awarded to husband and wife in equal share. Furthermore, we hold that the FERS pension account is to be divided between the parties as set forth in this opinion. As modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case involves a dispute between siblings, named as co-executors of their mother’s estate. Anthony Arrington (plaintiff) brought this action against his sister Barbara Bryant, alleging she engaged in “self-dealing, fraud, theft, and conversion” of the assets of their late mother, Nuffie Arrington (decedent). Ms. Bryant responded by alleging that the parties had mediated their dispute and entered into a settlement agreement disposing of all issues between them. She presented the settlement agreement and two checks she wrote to plaintiff in accordance with the agreement. The plaintiff had cashed the checks. Ms. Bryant asserted the defense of accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff admitted entering into the agreement, but argued that it should be rescinded because of fraudulent inducement and concealment. Ms. Bryant died while the action was pending in the trial court. Her children, Rachel Bryant Ramsey and Nathan Bryant (defendants) were substituted for her. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding the settlement agreement valid and enforceable. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant, Billy McCarty Amyx, of filing a false report and fabricating evidence, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the evidence does not support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve six years. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Rodney Jennings, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this delayed appeal, the defendant, Omari Shakir Davis, challenges the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of alternative sentencing for his guilty-pleaded conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver 15 grams or more of a substance containing heroin. The State contends that this appeal should be dismissed as untimely. Our review of the record indicates that the defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely. Because the interests of justice do not support our waiving the timely filing requirement, this appeal is dismissed.

Petitioner, Douglas Marshall Mathis, appeals the denial of both his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 and his motion to withdraw his original, pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was granted in 2001. Because Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim for relief and because the life sentence imposed for his first degree murder conviction is legal, we affirm the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion. Because Petitioner’s original petition for post-conviction relief was heard and granted nearly two decades ago, we affirm the denial of Petitioner’s motion to withdraw that petition.

A Williamson County jury convicted Petitioner, Willie Lee Hughes, Jr., of aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration. Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, which was denied following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) explore racial bias during jury selection; (2) challenge the lack of diversity in the venire; (3) advise Petitioner of his right to allocution at sentencing; and (4) argue on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after being advised of an interaction between jurors and Petitioner’s son. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Darius Deshun Mitchell, was convicted by a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-403 (2018) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) (2010)(subsequently amended) (possession of a weapon by a person who has been convicted of a felony drug offense). The trial court merged the first degree murder convictions with respect to each of the two victims into a single judgment of conviction for first degree murder as to each victim and imposed concurrent life sentences, which were to be served concurrently with a federal sentence and consecutively to a sentence for which the Defendant was on parole. The court imposed twenty-five-year sentences for each of the two especially aggravated robbery convictions and ordered that they be served concurrently with each other and to federal sentence and consecutively to the first degree murder sentences and to a sentence for which the Defendant was on parole. The court imposed a six-year sentence for the firearm conviction and ordered that it be served concurrently with a federal sentence and consecutively to the first degree murder sentences and to a sentence for which the Defendant was on parole. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Randy Milligan (“Defendant”) pled guilty, as a Range III persistent offender, to delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance, a Class D felony. At a subsequent hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven years, with a forty-five percent release eligibility, to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s request for a suspended sentence. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In two consolidated cases, the Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of violating the sex offender registry, reserving two certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) regarding the validity of his original judgment and the validity of the reporting requirements. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. Wife sought the trial judge’s recusal on the ground of bias, alleging, among other things, that her husband—an attorney—appeared regularly in front of the trial judge and that the two men were friends. The trial judge’s order denied wife’s allegations and their factual basis and denied the motion to recuse. Finding no evidence of bias that would require the trial judge’s recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Jessica T. (“Mother”) appeals the April 3, 2019 order of the Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“Juvenile Court”) terminating her parental rights to the minor children, Deishun M. and Olivia M. (“the Children”). Upon petition of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), the Juvenile Court terminated Mother’s rights on the statutory grounds of severe child abuse and persistent conditions. The Juvenile Court further found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Children. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The parties divorced after a thirteen year marriage in which the family was initially solely supported by Wife’s $40,000.00 per year income, but ending with Husband earning approximately $850,000.00 per year. The trial court found that long-term alimony was appropriate given Wife’s contribution to Husband’s earning capacity, her inability to achieve his earning capacity despite her efforts at education, and the parties’ relatively high standard of living during the marriage. Both parties take issue with the trial court’s alimony award. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

After a trial, a Warren County jury found Defendant, Donald Lee Shields, Jr., guilty of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of attempted aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I standard offender to an effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the probation of Defendant, Justin Ryan Johnson, and ordered confinement for his remaining sentence. On appeal, Defendant alleges the trial court abused its discretion and requests the revocation be reversed and his sentence be returned to enhanced probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Anthony Todd Ghormley, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated burglary, and three counts of aggravated assault and resulting effective sentence of one hundred five years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court was impermissibly biased against him. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, John Simmons, pleaded guilty to first degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and alleging prosecutorial misconduct. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals the denial, maintaining that he received ineffective representation in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves many attempts to secure repayment of a loan. After the most recent hearing, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s request to revisit the prior rulings. We affirm as modified.

The Appellant, Todd Fawver, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and denial of his motion to reduce his sentence, arguing that his violation was merely “technical” and that he should have been given a second chance at alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Brandon Johnson, was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus ten years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to suppress three lineup identifications that were unduly suggestive; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to sever the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon offense from the first-degree murder count, thereby preventing him from receiving a fair trial; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

A commercial tenant transferred its interest in a lease to two individuals through a document called an assignment. The rental term set forth in the lease was fourteen months longer than the rental term set forth in the assignment. The transferees only paid rent for the term set forth in the assignment, and the landlord filed a complaint in an effort to collect the rent for the additional fourteen months. The trial court concluded that the document transferring the initial tenant’s interest was a sublease rather than an assignment because the term in the assignment was shorter than the term set forth in the lease. The transferor appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment because the assignment specified that in the event of a conflict between the lease and the assignment, the lease controlled.