APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A commercial tenant transferred its interest in a lease to two individuals through a document called an assignment. The rental term set forth in the lease was fourteen months longer than the rental term set forth in the assignment. The transferees only paid rent for the term set forth in the assignment, and the landlord filed a complaint in an effort to collect the rent for the additional fourteen months. The trial court concluded that the document transferring the initial tenant’s interest was a sublease rather than an assignment because the term in the assignment was shorter than the term set forth in the lease. The transferor appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment because the assignment specified that in the event of a conflict between the lease and the assignment, the lease controlled.

Defendant, Bobby Lewis Parks, pled guilty to possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law regarding the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence found pursuant to a search warrant. Additionally, Defendant challenges the trial court’s imposition of a thirty-year sentence. Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that Defendant failed to properly preserve his certified question of law and dismiss that portion of his appeal. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arose from a claim filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission against the State of Tennessee (“the State”), seeking an award of damages for defamation allegedly committed by two attorneys employed by the State during the course of a separate federal litigation involving the claimant. The State filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the claimant filed, inter alia, a response objecting to the motion. Following a hearing, the Claims Commission dismissed the claim upon finding that the litigation privilege applied to protect the statements at issue and that the statements were not defamatory. The claimant has appealed. Having determined that the litigation privilege applies, we affirm.

Defendant, Shelby Isaac, was convicted of two counts of second degree murder, one count of reckless homicide, and one count of criminally negligent homicide after a jury found her guilty of killing three victims. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of thirty years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions, the admission of a photograph of an opened uterus, the admission of a witness’s gang affiliation, the admission of a witness’s jail phone call as a prior consistent statement, the admission of a photograph of Defendant standing next to a man making a hand gesture that Defendant claims is a gang sign, the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for a continuance, the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for mistrial, the propriety of the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing argument, and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s award of $30,000 in alimony in solido to Wife and its award of $30,000 for Wife’s attorney’s fees as additional alimony in solido. Discerning no errors, we affirm.

I concur with the majority opinion, but am writing separately in order to explain my analysis of why the evidence is sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain Defendant’s conviction for criminally negligent homicide of the unborn child of Ms. Thomas. I must admit that initially I was skeptical that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction in light of the specific facts of this case as they applied to the statutory definition of “criminal negligence” set forth in T.C.A. § 39-11-106(a)(5) (Supp. 2019).

In 2016, the Petitioner, Randy B. Dalton, pleaded guilty to offenses contained in three indictments: aggravated robbery, theft of a vehicle valued at more than $1,000, escape from a penal institution, harvesting ginseng out of season, and harvesting ginseng out of season with less than three prongs. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court imposed partial consecutive sentencing with a total effective sentence of eighteen years of confinement. In 2017, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the postconviction court denied the petition. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed this petition to terminate the parental rights of a father to his seven-year-old son. The father was incarcerated for most of the child’s life, and he was serving a three-year sentence in New Jersey at the time of the final hearing. The mother surrendered her parental rights after the child was found dependent and neglected and placed in foster care. Although the father was scheduled to be released from prison, he had not seen the child in over five years. The trial court found that the father had abandoned the child by failing to visit during the four months before his incarceration and exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare by engaging in criminal behavior. The trial court also found that the father’s conduct during the child’s life failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and that placing the child in the father’s custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the child. Moreover, the court found that terminating the father’s rights would be in the child’s best interests because there was no substantial relationship, and the father had no plans for employment or housing after his release. The father contends that the trial court’s findings did not constitute clear and convincing evidence that termination of his rights was in the child’s best interests. We find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact and affirm its conclusion that DCS proved its case by clear and convincing evidence.

The issue on appeal is whether a codicil to the decedent’s will was effective to revoke or amend two revocable trusts. Just hours prior to his death, the decedent got married and executed a fifth codicil to his will that purportedly devised two residential properties to his new wife. However, the decedent previously conveyed the properties to revocable trusts by deeds that were properly recorded. Therefore, the decedent did not own either of the properties at the time of his death. The principal beneficiary of each trust was the decedent’s minor son from a previous marriage. After the will and five codicils were admitted to probate, the court-appointed guardian ad litem for the decedent’s minor child filed a motion in the probate court to determine the ownership of the two properties. Following briefing of the parties and a hearing, the probate court determined that the method for amendment or revocation of the trusts as specified in the trusts was the exclusive method, and the fifth codicil failed to substantially comply with the method required by the trusts. Therefore, acting pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-602(c), which does not allow a codicil or any other method to revoke or amend a revocable trust if the terms provide an exclusive method, the court ruled that the codicil was ineffective to amend or revoke either trust. Accordingly, the properties were owned by and remained subject to the terms of each trust. We affirm.

A Lincoln County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Walter Roy Chavez, Jr., of possession of one-half gram or more of methamphetamine with intent to resell, possession of one-half gram or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, simple possession of marijuana, and driving on a revoked license. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the convictions of possession of methamphetamine and ordered that he serve an effective twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of possession of methamphetamine and that the trial court erred by ordering an excessive sentence and by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Johnathan Robert Leonard, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child, two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to an effective term of ninety-six years. After this court affirmed the judgments on direct appeal, the Defendant sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. The post-conviction court granted the Defendant a delayed appeal to allow him to challenge his sentence. In this delayed appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence for each conviction and the trial court’s imposition of partial consecutive sentences. We conclude that counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the Defendant’s sentence in his direct appeal and that the post-conviction court, therefore, erred in granting the delayed appeal. Accordingly, we vacate the post-conviction court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant, Richard Earnest Williams, entered open pleas of guilty to the charges in three separate indictments. He pled guilty to three counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, four counts of theft over $10,000, a Class C felony, two counts of theft more than $2,500 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, three counts of vandalism, a Class E felony, and one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. In Case No. 17-CR-145, the trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years as a persistent offender for aggravated burglary, fifteen years as a persistent offender for each count of theft over $10,000, and twelve years as a career offender for vandalism, and twelve years as a career offender for reckless aggravated assault. In Case No. 17-CR-146, the trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years for aggravated burglary as a persistent offender, twelve years for each count of theft more than $2,500 but less than $10,000 as a career offender, and six years for vandalism as a career offender. In Case No. 17-CR-147, the trial court imposed a sentence of fifteen years as a persistent offender for aggravated burglary, twelve years as a career offender for each count of theft more than $2,500 but less than $10,000, and six years as a career offender for vandalism. The trial court merged the two theft convictions in each case into one count because they involved alternate theories of committing the offense. The trial court ordered the counts in each case to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other cases for an effective forty-five-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the length of his sentences. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this delayed appeal, the Defendant, Michael L. Caudle, appeals his convictions for two counts of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, two counts of the delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, and one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver, for which he received an effective sixty-year sentence as a career offender. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the delayed appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the delayed appeal.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children, B.A. and K.A. The trial court considered six grounds for termination: (1) persistent conditions, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3)(A); (2) severe child abuse, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4); (3) sentencing to more than two years for conduct against a child, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(5); (4) sentencing to ten years or more and child under eight years of age, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6); (5) non-compliance with a permanency plan, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2); and (6) abandonment, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1). The court did not find sufficient evidence to support termination of father’s parental rights for abandonment. The court found clear and convincing evidence on the other five grounds. By the same quantum of proof, the court also found that termination is in the children’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Shaun Michael Vincent, of aggravated robbery after he brandished a baseball bat and took property from the victim, who was attempting to pay the Defendant’s girlfriend for sexual contact. The Defendant was sentenced to serve eleven years in confinement. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and asserts that the trial court erred in limiting cross-examination of the victim, excluding evidence implicating the victim in prior sexual misconduct, and excluding a video of the victim’s interactions with police. The Defendant further argues that the court erred in denying him jury instructions regarding defense of a third person and special instructions on aggravated robbery and that he is entitled to relief pursuant to cumulative error. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this consolidated appeal, Defendant, Brian Marquince Long, challenges the trial court’s revocation of Community Corrections in three separate cases. After a review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his effective seventeen-year sentence in incarceration.

The Petitioner, Carlos D’Juan Campbell, Jr., appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions for attempted first degree murder and one conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, arguing (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel and (2) the post-conviction court erred in allowing the State to present proof and argument at the post-conviction hearing after the State failed to file a written response to his petition.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

The Defendant, Blake O. Swann, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for his aggravated assault conviction and ordering him to begin anew his four-year sentence on community corrections. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Shaun Royal Hill, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of rape. He was sentenced to fifteen years in confinement. Petitioner filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief and was appointed counsel. The post-conviction court entered an order dismissing the petition after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting a full review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Quinterrio Murrell, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that he serve his four-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Christopher Stephen Jones, was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and abuse of a corpse, for which he received a life sentence. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by this Court. State v. Christopher Jones, No. W2015-01028-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 192146, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2017), no perm. app. filed. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant-Appellant, Derek Wyche, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received a mandatory life sentence plus twenty years’ imprisonment. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions and the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon our review, the convictions of the trial court are affirmed. However, we remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing.

Appellant/Father appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to change the surnames of his minor children. The trial court held that Appellant failed to meet his burden to show that changing the children’s names is in their best interests. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Nearly three years after the court dismissed the plaintiff’s healthcare liability action against the defendant, Plaintiff filed this breach of contract action based on the same underlying facts and circumstances. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.

This appeal concerns a clerk and master’s petition for additional staff. Kay Solomon Armstrong, Clerk and Master of Greene County (“Petitioner”), filed a petition against the County Mayor (“Defendant”) in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) seeking additional staff for her office. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order replacing one half-time position in the office with one full-time position. The Trial Court also awarded Petitioner attorney’s fees and expenses to be paid from the fees of the Clerk and Master’s Office. Defendant appeals to this Court, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s decision to award additional funding for a new full-time assistant to replace a half-time assistant and that Petitioner was not entitled to recover any attorney’s fees. We hold that reasonable attorney’s fees were recoverable by Petitioner pursuant to statute. We hold further that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s factual findings, including the Trial Court’s core finding that Petitioner’s workspace is so structurally inefficient that her office requires more staff. We modify the Trial Court’s order on fees and expenses to the extent it failed to award Petitioner expenses she paid out of pocket. On remand, the Trial Court is to determine and enter an award including reimbursing Petitioner for her reasonable out-of-pocket fees and expenses. We affirm, as modified, the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.