APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Tavaris Markee Golden, of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to merge the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and that the merger would have negated his conviction of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the six-year sentence he received for the offense. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The pro se Defendant, Tonica Alvarado aka Tonica Beckham, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct a clerical error on her probation revocation order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we remand the case for further findings.

The defendant, Blake Gregg, appeals from his Sullivan County Criminal Court guiltypleaded convictions in multiple case numbers of possession of methamphetamine, two counts of possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, possession of oxycodone, possession of buprenorphine, possession of clonazepam, introduction of contraband into a penal institution, domestic assault, aggravated domestic assault, evading arrest, driving under the influence (“DUI”), two counts of driving on a suspended license, one count of second or subsequent offense of driving on a suspended license, driving while in possession of methamphetamine, theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $2,500, four counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, running a stop sign, violating the vehicle light law, and two counts of violating the financial responsibility law. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the 10-year sentence imposed in case number S68680 in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Greg Patterson, was involved in dependent and neglect proceedings in juvenile court and tested positive for methamphetamine in a drug screen ordered by that court. He was, thereafter, charged with attempted aggravated child neglect for exposing his two-year-old child to methamphetamine. The trial court denied the Defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress the drug screen results, and a jury ultimately convicted the Defendant as charged. On appeal, the Defendant submits that the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion because he did not voluntarily consent to a search and, moreover, because the special needs exception to the warrant requirement does not apply. Following our review, we conclude that the search was constitutionally reasonable as a special needs exception. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant, George Ronald Perez, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 ounce or more of marijuana, simple possession of cocaine, simple possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant entered open guilty pleas to felony possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 ounce or more of marijuana, simple possession of cocaine, simple possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. A bench trial was conducted on the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and Defendant was found guilty. The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences of one year for possession with intent to sell 0.5 ounce or more of marijuana and three years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 11 months and 29 days for each of his remaining convictions and ordered those sentences to run concurrently with his three-year sentence. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Eugene Rutherford, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated assault, simple possession, driving under the influence (“DUI”), vandalism, and violating the financial responsibility law, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Aaron Frank Britton, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court guiltypleaded conviction of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a negligence lawsuit. TLD Logistics Services, Inc. (“TLD”), an interstate common carrier, sued Pilot Travel Centers, LLC (“Pilot”) in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). TLD was a customer of Comdata Network, Inc. (“Comdata”), and Pilot was a Comdata vendor. Upon request from TLD, Comdata issued codes for the creation of Comcheks, negotiable draft instruments TLD used to pay workers. Pilot would print and deliver the Comcheks. TLD alleged that Pilot breached its duty of care by failing to ascertain whether Comchek payees were legitimate, thus causing TLD monetary loss when a rogue TLD employee fraudulently caused numerous Comcheks to be issued that were negotiated by Pilot. Pilot filed a motion for summary judgment. Pilot argued in its motion that TLD should have kept better internal safeguards to prevent what happened with its employee, and that TLD was 50% or more at fault in this matter. The Trial Court granted Pilot’s motion for summary judgment. Great American Insurance Company (“Great American”), subrogee of TLD and substituted as plaintiff mid-proceedings below, appeals to this Court. We hold that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether TLD was 50% or more at fault. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This is a health care liability case. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion for summary judgment because, inter alia, Appellant failed to provide Appellee with the proper pre-suit notice under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1). Finding no error, we affirm.

A pro se defendant appeals a judgment entered against him on a promissory note. Because the defendant failed to file a transcript or statement of evidence, we presume that the trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence. In light of that presumption, we affirm the judgment.

Foster parents brought a petition to terminate the parental rights of a biological mother on three grounds, and the trial court granted the petition on all three grounds. Because the foster parents failed to prove any of the grounds by clear and convincing evidence, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

Wife appeals the trial court’s judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in treating an obligation contained in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement as an alimony obligation rather than a division of marital debt that was extinguished upon the foreclosure of the subject property. In the alternative, Wife contends that the trial court erred in not further reducing or eliminating her alimony obligation. We conclude that Wife waived her arguments concerning the proper classification of this obligation as a marital debt by not raising this argument in the trial court. As to the trial court’s decision regarding modification of Wife’s alimony, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand for an order fully compliant with Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

This is an appeal from an order of partial summary judgment. Although the trial court attempted to certify its order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we hold that such certification was improvident. There being no final judgment before us, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This appeal involves a marriage of short duration. Following a bench trial, the court granted the wife a divorce and classified and divided the parties’ marital estate. The husband takes issue with the trial court’s classification and division of the marital property, as well as the award of alimony to the wife. The wife seeks attorney fees and costs. We affirm in part as modified and reverse in part.

The petitioner, James Burgess, appeals the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, which petition alleged that his judgments for first degree felony murder are illegal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Sedrick D. Williams, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his motion to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This action involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory ground of abandonment for failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume responsibility of the child. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the trial court.

The pro se Petitioner, William Antwain Burns, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court summarily dismissing the petition.

A Bedford County jury convicted the defendant, David Darrell Fletcher, of aggravated burglary (count 1), first degree premeditated murder (count 2), and first degree felony murder (count 3), and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of life plus 10 years. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his first degree murder conviction and several of the trial court’s rulings. The defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding a statement he made to Amber Fletcher during a recorded phone call, in failing to designate three witnesses as accomplices as a matter of law and in failing to charge the jury accordingly, and in denying the defendant’s motions for a change of venue and for a mistrial. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we note, in merging the defendant’s convictions in counts 2 and 3, the trial court failed to impose a sentence for the merged conviction of count 3. Because the conviction of count 3 carries a mandatory life sentence, a new sentencing hearing is not required, but we remand the case to the trial court for the entry of a completed judgment form as to count 3.

The Defendant, Joshua Fisher, appeals his conviction for first degree premeditated murder for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s prior threats and acts of violence against the victim pursuant to Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Edward Jerome Harbison, appeals from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his “Motion for Second Chance,” which the trial court considered as a Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Alfred R. Mason, Defendant, pled guilty to various drug offenses and received a sentence to be served on community corrections. After a violation warrant was filed and Defendant admitted to the violation, the trial court revoked community corrections and ordered Defendant to serve his sentence. Defendant appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) ordering Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence instead of resentencing him and (2) failing to award Defendant credit for time served on community corrections. After our review, we affirm the revocation of Defendant’s community corrections sentence and remand to the trial court. On remand, the trial court should enter amended judgment forms to reflect credit for time successfully served on community corrections prior to the issuance of revocation warrants.

We granted review in this case to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(f) violates the separation of powers clause in the Tennessee Constitution. The statutory provision allows defense counsel to conduct ex parte interviews with patients’ non-party treating healthcare providers in the course of discovery in a healthcare liability lawsuit. We hold that section 29-26-121(f) is unconstitutional as enacted, to the limited extent that it divests trial courts of their inherent discretion over discovery. We also conclude that the statute can be elided to make it permissive and not mandatory upon trial courts. As such, we hold that the elided statute is constitutional. We vacate the trial court’s qualified protective order entered in this case and remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration based on the guidance set forth in this opinion. 

I concur in much of the majority’s excellent analysis, in its framing of the issues, and in its stated decision to adopt a substantive-versus-procedural test for whether a statute violates the separation of powers clause. I write separately because I must dissent from the majority’s holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(f) is unconstitutional only to the limited extent that it makes ex parte interviews mandatory instead of permissive. I see no way to avoid holding that the statute is unconstitutional in its entirety.

Defendant, Jeannette Jives-Nealy, was convicted by a jury of theft over $60,000 and money laundering. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to sever the two counts of the indictment; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear evidence of prior bad acts under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (5) the trial court erred by ordering Defendant to pay restitution to a victim, who had been paid in a previous civil court settlement. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of an amended judgment for money laundering.