APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns the denial of a valet parking permit. The Parking Guys, Inc. (“Parking Guys”) sought a permit for valet parking from the Traffic and Parking Commission (“the Commission”) of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”). Despite a study reflecting no traffic problems caused by Parking Guys’ activities, the Commission denied the permit. Parking Guys then filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court found that, notwithstanding the study, the Commission’s decision was supported by material evidence including the firsthand observations of local business owners. The Trial Court also denied a petition to intervene filed by Linda Schipani (“Schipani”), an individual sued by Parking Guys in federal court for allegedly conspiring to deny the permit. Parking Guys appeals to this Court, as does Schipani still seeking to intervene. Parking Guys argues that the Commission’s decision was based on politics rather than material evidence. Schipani, for her part, argues she has a special interest in this case warranting her intervention because of the federal suit filed against her even though it has been dismissed. We hold that the Commission’s decision was supported by material evidence. We further find no reversible error in the Trial Court’s decision to deny Schipani’s motion to intervene. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. 

The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants for trespass and sought a declaration of the boundary line between the two properties, among other things. Following discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that a prior case involving the plaintiffs and the prior owner of the defendants’ property had established the boundary line between the two properties. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the court’s decision and remand for it to hear evidence and to establish the boundary line between the two properties.

Defendant, Cedric Dante Harris, was convicted of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, simple possession of marijuana, and tampering with evidence. He appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The defendant, Bobby Lewis Parks, entered an open plea to two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, two counts of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, one count of sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and one count of delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Kelvin Dewayne Golden, of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years’ confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and argues the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Wilson County jury convicted the defendant, Danny D. Keen, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Luis A. Meza Olivera, was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and three counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102, -304. The trial court merged the convictions into one count of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court then imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of three prior incidents of domestic violence involving the Defendant and the victim; (3) the trial court erred in allowing a child witness to testify by closed circuit television; (4) the trial court erred in excluding a video recording taken after the offenses were committed; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the maximum sentence for each conviction; and (6) a new trial is warranted due to cumulative error.1 Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Eric Thomas, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his third petition for habeas corpus relief challenging his 1999 convictions for robbery and the resulting thirty-two-year and one-day sentence. He contends that he is being illegally detained because amended judgments of convictions were never entered following resentencing and that absent entry of valid judgment forms imposing his restraint, his six-year sentences have expired. The habeas corpus court concluded that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. We affirm.

This appeal concerns an incarcerated inmate’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari, claiming that the Tennessee Board of Paroles acted arbitrarily, fraudulently, illegally, and in excess of its authority in denying his request for parole. The trial court granted the petition but ultimately affirmed the denial of parole. We affirm.

Based on its bylaws, Appellant Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association denied three students, Appellees herein, permission to play football at a local high school. Appellees filed a petition for restraining order and for temporary and permanent injunctions asking the trial court to prohibit the Association from denying the Students permission to play football. The trial court immediately granted temporary injunctions; later, the trial court granted permanent injunctions. Appellant appeals. Based on the allegations contained in Appellees’ petition, the trial court did not have authority to interfere in the internal affairs of TSSAA concerning the Students’ eligibility to play football for the 2018-2019 school year. Therefore, we reverse and remand the case with instructions to the trial court to dismiss the case and collect the costs.

Mother and father were divorced in 2013. They have four children together. Disputes regarding child custody have spanned four states and nearly six years. In this iteration, on June 9, 2017, mother filed a “Petition to Enroll Foreign Decree, For Immediate Injunctive Relief, for Sciare Facias, and Citation for Criminal and Civil Contempt, for Modification of Custody Order, and for Entry of Temporary Parenting Plan.” In his answer, father requested that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-103(c), he be reimbursed for the attorney’s fees incurred as a result of defending against mother’s petition. After nine months of litigation, mother voluntarily dismissed her petition without prejudice. As a result of mother’s voluntary dismissal prior to trial, father’s claim for attorney’s fees was not resolved. Following mother’s dismissal, another dispute arose regarding summer custody. On April 20, 2018, father filed a petition to resolve the summer custody issue; it was resolved by a consent order. Following the consent order, father filed a petition to recover the attorney’s fees and costs incurred in defending against mother’s voluntarily dismissed petition. Mother moved to dismiss father’s petition alleging that res judicata precluded father from seeking to recover his attorney’s fees in that matter, because he did not raise the issue in his summer custody petition. The trial court disagreed. Mother applied for an interlocutory appeal; this Court denied her application. The trial court subsequently awarded father $11,963.08 in attorney’s fees and costs. Mother appeals. We affirm.

The State of Tennessee appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress, which resulted in the dismissal of the case. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred because the warrantless search of the Defendant was conducted pursuant to probable cause and exigent circumstances. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s order of suppression of evidence. In particular, I would not have reviewed a theory of exigent circumstances in determining that the warrantless search of the defendant’s person was illegal. Rather, I believe that the search-incident-to-arrest rationale undergirds the search in this case and requires a reversal of the trial court’s ruling.

This wrongful death action arises from the tragic death of a state university student-athlete during football practice. The student’s parents filed a claim against the State of Tennessee in the Tennessee Claims Commission. After a trial, the Commissioner found that the parents had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the head athletic trainer violated the applicable standard of care after the student’s collapse; (2) the trainer’s negligence was the cause in fact of the student’s death; and (3) the university was otherwise negligent in caring for the student after his collapse. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the Commissioner’s causation findings, we affirm.

We granted this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal to consider whether the Trial Court erred in ordering disclosure of the representation file maintained by attorney Troy L. Bowlin, II, during his representation of Morristown Heart Consultants, PLLC (“MHC”) to a member of MHC. We find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in determining that MHC had not properly authorized the hiring of Mr. Bowlin and that attorney-client privilege did not apply to prevent disclosure of Mr. Bowlin’s legal file to a member of MHC with fifty percent financial rights and thirty-three percent governing rights to the company. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s order permitting the member to acquire Mr. Bowlin’s legal file concerning MHC and conduct relevant discovery concerning that representation.

This case involves a dispute regarding a trial court’s assessment of interest on a parcel of real property subject to a redemption action. The trial court required the redeeming party to pay interest to the tax sale purchasers for the time that elapsed during the redemption proceedings. The redeeming party appealed the trial court’s application of interest to any period after the redeeming party had filed its notice of redemption. Following our thorough review of this issue, we agree that assessment of interest beyond the date of the filing of redemption notice was improper. We therefore reverse the trial court’s assessment of interest and modify the trial court’s judgment accordingly.

A mother brought suit against White County and its Sheriff for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of a situation in which the Sheriff erroneously informed the mother that her son had been shot and killed by deputies. The trial court dismissed the suit, ruling that the Sheriff was immune from suit under the Governmental Tort Liability Act and White County was immune from suit by application of the public duty doctrine. Mother appeals, asserting that neither defendant is immune from suit. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on May 14, 2019. Because the defendants did not file their notice of appeal within thirty (30) days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Joshua Tweedy, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, and possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-101 (assault) (Supp. 2016) (subsequently amended), 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2017) (subsequently amended) (possession of a firearm by a convicted violent felon). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in imposing an effective eighteen-year sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted review to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted to an architect firm seeking to recover its design fees from a development company. The architect firm designed a condominium project for the development company. The development company ran short of funds and was not able to pay the architect firm under their design contract. As a result, the architect firm’s president agreed to accept a condominium in the project instead of the fee. But the development company did not fulfill that agreement because the development company had pledged the condominium as collateral for a construction loan. The architect firm filed a mechanic’s lien for its unpaid fee under the parties’ design contract, and then filed this suit to enforce the lien. The trial court granted summary judgment to the architect firm, holding that the firm was entitled to its fee under the design contract, and there was insufficient evidence that the parties intended a novation by substituting the agreement to convey a condominium for the design contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We find that disputed questions of material fact exist about whether the architect firm and the development company intended a novation when they entered into the agreement for the condominium. Thus, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment to the architect firm. We reverse and remand to the trial court. 

The petitioner, William Henry Smith, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2015 conviction of conspiracy to sell and deliver one-half grams or more of a Schedule II drug,1 alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This appeal arises from the redemption of a parcel of real property purchased at a delinquent taxpayer sale. The appellants were lienholders on a parcel of real property sold to a third party purchaser at a delinquent tax sale. Within days after the tax sale, the lienholders filed a petition for redemption of the property. In response, the purchaser filed a motion to protest the validity of the lien or, alternatively, a claim to recover the expenses that had been incurred to preserve the value of the property by clearing debris and personalty from the property. The lienholders then filed a cross-claim alleging conversion and trespass to chattels. After the purchaser withdrew his objection to the validity of the lien, a bench trial was conducted, and the trial court granted the lienholders’ petition for redemption upon the following conditions relevant to this appeal: that they reimburse the purchaser in the amounts of $8,579.60 for expenses incurred in cleaning up the property and an additional $600.00 for the storage of personalty. The lienholders’ conversion and trespass to chattels claims were subsequently dismissed. Having determined that the expenses were incurred to prevent permissive waste on the property—and concluding that such expenses are recoverable despite having been incurred prior to the entry of the order confirming the sale—we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In early January 2017, Defendant A. B. Price, Jr., attempted to plead nolo contendere to two counts of sexual battery, and Defendant Victor Sims attempted to plead guilty to three counts of aggravated assault. Both Defendants had reached plea bargains with the State, and each of the pleas included a term of probation. The trial court declined to accept the pleas and requested the parties to return for a later hearing to present proof and argument regarding the constitutionality of certain portions of the Public Safety Act of 2016 (“the PSA”), which has the practical effect of authorizing the Tennessee Department of Correction (“DOC”) to address at least some probation violations, a role up to this point reserved exclusively to trial courts. After the hearing, the trial court ruled portions of the PSA facially unconstitutional on grounds of separation of powers, due process, and equal protection. The trial court subsequently accepted the Defendants’ pleas and inserted in each judgment the following special condition: “The probated portion of the Defendant’s sentence is not subject to the Public Safety Act; rather, the Defendant shall be subject to the rules and regulations governing probation applicable through pre-existing law (law in effect prior to January 1, 2017).” The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments. We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal. We hold that the constitutionality of the PSA provisions at issue was not ripe for consideration by the trial court. Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals. We remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This consolidated appeal arises from a product liability action brought by Donald Coffman and his wife, Carolyn Coffman, after Mr. Coffman was diagnosed with mesothelioma. Plaintiffs asserted several claims against multiple defendants for their alleged involvement in Mr. Coffman’s exposure to asbestos at his workplace. The trial court dismissed their claims against some of the original defendants. The court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants. Specifically, the court found that: (1) plaintiffs’ claims against one defendant were time-barred by the four-year construction statute of repose set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 (2017); (2) plaintiffs’ claims against three defendants were time-barred by the ten-year statute of repose set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (2012); (3) ten defendants affirmatively negated their alleged duty to warn; and (4) plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence of causation with respect to seven defendants. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion to alter or amend certain summary judgment orders. Plaintiffs filed separate notices of appeal for each final judgment entered by the trial court. These cases were consolidated for the purpose of oral argument before the Court of Appeals. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we vacate all of the final judgments entered by the trial court.

Petitioner, Coy J. Cotham, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective. Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying his pro se motion to relieve post-conviction counsel, or in the alternative, his motion to continue the post-conviction hearing; that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately present his claims for post-conviction relief; and that the post-conviction court erred by denying his petition for
post-conviction relief. Having reviewed the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.