APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted review to determine whether summary judgment was properly granted to an architect firm seeking to recover its design fees from a development company. The architect firm designed a condominium project for the development company. The development company ran short of funds and was not able to pay the architect firm under their design contract. As a result, the architect firm’s president agreed to accept a condominium in the project instead of the fee. But the development company did not fulfill that agreement because the development company had pledged the condominium as collateral for a construction loan. The architect firm filed a mechanic’s lien for its unpaid fee under the parties’ design contract, and then filed this suit to enforce the lien. The trial court granted summary judgment to the architect firm, holding that the firm was entitled to its fee under the design contract, and there was insufficient evidence that the parties intended a novation by substituting the agreement to convey a condominium for the design contract. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We find that disputed questions of material fact exist about whether the architect firm and the development company intended a novation when they entered into the agreement for the condominium. Thus, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment to the architect firm. We reverse and remand to the trial court. 

The Defendant, Joshua Michael Ward, entered a guilty plea to reckless homicide, a Class D felony, after the all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) he was driving ran down an embankment, killing his passenger. The trial court denied the Defendant judicial diversion and sentenced him to three years, with ninety days to be served in confinement and the remainder on unsupervised probation. The Defendant appeals the denial of judicial diversion and the denial of full probation. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing, and we affirm the judgment.

Defendant, Michael Ray Howser, pled guilty to aggravated assault, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon with an agreed effective sentence of ten years as a Range II multiple offender with the trial court to determine the manner of service. A sentencing hearing was held, and the trial court ordered Defendant’s ten-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Paul Hayes, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis based on a victim recanting her identification of him as one of the perpetrators of a home invasion that took place over two decades ago. The petition was denied by the trial court both for having been untimely filed and because the new evidence was neither credible nor was likely to have changed the outcome of the trial. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court that the petition should be denied on the merits.

Appellant inmate filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the chancery court seeking redress for various errors involving the sentence he ultimately received following a plea of guilty to two felonies. Because we conclude that Appellant failed to show he had no other equally effective means to redress these alleged errors, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s petition.

Defendant in a debt collection case appeals the entry of judgment against him, contending that the court erred in setting the case for trial with only two days’ notice, in granting a motion in limine on the day of trial, and in its award of attorney’s fees to the Plaintiff. We modify the judgment to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded; in all other respects, we affirm the judgment.  

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning the defendant’s conduct, which impeded the plaintiffs’ use of a state right of way for ingress to and egress from the plaintiffs’ commercial property. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs following its determination that the defendant had created a nuisance and had intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs’ business relationships. The defendant has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Appellants filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County related to the city’s decision to allow a soccer stadium to be built at the fairgrounds. The complaint alleged that the action violated several provisions of the city’s charter intended to protect the fairgrounds for fair uses. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on the basis that the additional uses for the fairgrounds did not violate Metropolitan Charter section 11.602. Because the trial court’s order fails to adjudicate Appellants’ claims that the city’s action violated additional charter provisions, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to declare Old Stage Road a public road. Plaintiff sought to use the disputed road to access his property; his property does not abut the road. The plaintiff, asserting that he was also there on behalf of the public, also sought to have the road declared public in order to access defendants’ private property for recreation. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment. Defendants argued that absent a ruling related to defendants’ property rights, the plaintiff and those he represents were likely to interpret any ruling favorable to them as a declaration of their right to trespass upon defendants’ private property for recreational purposes, instead of a public road to gain access to some lawful destination. After a trial, the court held that defendants had shown that public use of the area in question had been abandoned. The disputed road was held to be the private property of defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Tory Blackmon, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; employing a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony; and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101(a)(1)-(3) (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-202(a) (2014) (subsequently amended) (first degree murder), 39-13-102(a) (2014) (subsequently amended) (aggravated assault), 39-17-1324(b)(2) (2014) (subsequently amended) (armed dangerous felonies). The court imposed a twenty-year sentence for attempted first degree murder, a six-year sentence for the employing a firearm conviction, and a four-year sentence for aggravated assault. The court merged the aggravated assault conviction with the attempted first degree murder conviction, and it ordered the firearm conviction to be served consecutively to the attempted murder conviction as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324(e)(1) (2014) (subsequently amended). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiffs, some of whom had an interest in property that had been subject to forfeiture proceedings, filed a quo warranto action alleging misconduct by public officials in the administration of the proceedings. The plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief and judicial review “from each final judgment of forfeiture during the period permitted by Tennessee law.” On The defendants’ motion, the trial court dismissed the case on various grounds, including lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of standing. In the case of one plaintiff, we conclude that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a petition for judicial review. We further conclude that the plaintiffs either failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted or lacked standing to pursue the claims. So we affirm the dismissal.

Defendant, Cedrick Dewayne Whiteside, was found guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, criminal impersonation, driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked, license, and failure to exercise due care. On appeal, he argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient for the trier of fact to find him guilty of driving under the influence of an intoxicant and for failure to exercise due care. In light of the evidence presented, we uphold Defendant’s driving under the influence conviction but reverse and dismiss the jury’s finding of failure to exercise due care.

This appeal arises from a divorce between parties with no minor children. The husband appealed raising numerous issues related to property division. He also challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for alimony. The appellate record contains no transcript or statement of evidence that complies with Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Further the husband’s brief is woefully deficient. Because of the husband’s failure to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Rules of this Court, there is no basis upon which to conclude that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the chancery court and the rulings based thereon. We affirm the judgment of the chancery court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Appellant, Billy Eugene Cook, Jr., appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation for aggravated burglary, contending that the trial court erred by denying a continuance of the revocation hearing and by revoking his probation on his first violation. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Ashton Montrell Jones, appeals from the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 motion (“Rule 36 motion”) to correct a clerical error in a community corrections revocation order. The trial court summarily denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing on the sole basis of “lack of jurisdiction.” Under the particular circumstances of this case, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand to the trial court for proper consideration of the motion.

Following a bench trial in the Grundy County Circuit Court, the Defendant, Roger F. Johnson, was convicted as charged of indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenced to a six-month sentence, with service of forty-five days in jail prior to serving the remainder of the sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the indictment fails to charge an offense because it does not include the correct mens rea; (2) the indictment is duplicitous; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their four children on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and failure to manifest the ability and willingness to assume custody of the children. On appeal, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to support all three grounds as well as the trial court’s best interest determination. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s decision.

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed in chancery court by a prisoner after he was denied parole. The chancery court concluded that the petition was timely filed but found that the issues presented were moot and lacked substantive merit. The prisoner appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal on other grounds.

The Petitioner, Eddie Medlock, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (the Act), Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-30-301 to -313 (2018). The postconviction DNA court denied relief on the basis that DNA analysis of evidentiary items requested by the Petitioner had been performed previously and that the Petitioner’s request regarding various forms of scientific analysis of other items was not cognizable under the Act. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction DNA court.

Defendant, Eddie Readus, appeals the length of his effective sentence following a resentencing hearing that was granted by the trial court in response to Defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 36.1). The State responds that Defendant failed to state a colorable claim for relief in his Rule 36.1 motion, and therefore, the trial court should have dismissed the motion, rather than granting a new sentencing hearing. We agree with the State. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting relief pursuant to Rule 36.1, vacate the amended judgment as to the Class C felony conviction, and reinstate the original judgment.

The Defendant, Steven Michael Odom, was convicted of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The petitioner, Maurice McAllister, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2013 conviction of rape, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Shelby County jury convicted Willie Lewis, Petitioner, of second degree murder. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and Petitioner appealed. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court made insufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for this court to review its decision. Additionally, Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s representation during the sentencing phase was deficient for failing to ensure that Petitioner participated in the preparation of the presentence report. Petitioner contends that he was prejudiced by this deficiency because trial counsel did not present any mitigating circumstances to the trial court and Petitioner received the maximum sentence within the applicable range. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the
post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

Defendant, Ricky Jordan, was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated sexual battery of a victim less than thirteen years of age and was sentenced to serve eleven years at 100 percent. On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court committed plain error when it did not exclude evidence of other incidents of sexual contact between Defendant and the victim that occurred during the time period set forth in the indictment and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Emmanuel Deshawn Bowley, of conspiracy to distribute more than 300 grams of cocaine, possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell, simple possession of marijuana, attempted possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a dangerous felony, and attempted possession of illegal drug paraphernalia. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress based on an invalid wiretap; (3) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence seized from a co-defendant; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.