APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This case concerns whether a parcel of real property is subject to certain restrictions contained in a previously recorded declaration of restrictive covenants. In the proceedings below, the trial court dismissed a homeowner’s association’s lawsuit which sought to enforce the declaration’s architectural review restrictions against the owners of the property. Upon review, we determine that the declaration did not expressly include the property at issue, nor was the property validly made subject to the restrictions within the declaration. Additionally, we reject the homeowner’s association’s arguments that the property was restricted to the terms of the declaration by way of an implied negative reciprocal easement or by waiver. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Defendant, Christopher Joseph Riley, was convicted by a jury of felony murder by aggravated child abuse (count one), felony murder by aggravated child neglect (count two), two counts of aggravated child abuse (counts three and five), reckless endangerment (count four), aggravated child neglect (count six), and two counts of child abuse (counts seven and eight). Defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of life imprisonment plus forty-eight years. On appeal, Defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to require the State to make an election of offenses at the close of the proof, and that the trial court improperly imposed consecutive sentences. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant filed this accelerated interlocutory appeal under Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee. Because the trial court has not entered an order on Appellant’s motion for recusal, there is no order for this Court to review. Appeal dismissed.

Michael Robert Quinn (“Defendant”) appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court
convictions for possession with intent to sell or deliver more than .5 grams of
methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a public elementary school, possession of drug
paraphernalia, driving on a suspended license, and violation of the financial responsibility
law, for which he received a total effective sentence of twenty-five years’ incarceration.
Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court should have dismissed the presentment based
upon the denial of his right to a preliminary hearing; (2) the trial court erred by denying
Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle; (3) the
trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from two
searches of his cell phone; (4) the failure to make a return on the arrest warrant invalidated
the warrant, resulting in a warrantless search and seizure of Defendant in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s
pro se request for a continuance of his trial; (6) the trial court erroneously admitted text
messages found on the cell phone in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (7)
the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (8) the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing a sentence of twenty-five years with a one hundred percent release
eligibility. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father based on the finding of multiple grounds and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The trial court’s finding of a failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the children is vacated for lack of sufficient findings of fact. We affirm the remainder of the trial court’s order, including both the finding of four grounds of termination against each parent and the finding that termination is in the children’s best interests.

James Kevin Pardue, Defendant, was charged via presentment with one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and one count of home improvement fraud. After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor theft in count 1 and home improvement fraud in count 2. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of six years on probation and ordered to pay $50,000 in restitution at the rate of $600 per month as a condition of his probation. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for home improvement fraud. Defendant does not challenge his conviction for misdemeanor theft. After a review of the record and the parties’ arguments, we agree with Defendant that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for home improvement fraud. As a result, Defendant’s conviction for home improvement fraud is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for any further proceedings which may be necessary.

This case involves a petition for judicial review filed pursuant to the Tennessee Public
Records Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-503, et seq., after the Shelby County Sheriff and the
District Attorney General denied a journalist’s request to inspect surveillance video from
inside a jail facility. The chancery court denied the petition. The journalist appeals. We
affirm.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one of her children. The trial court found seven grounds for termination: abandonment by failure to support; persistent conditions; severe child abuse; imprisonment for more than two years; failure to visit; failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody; and a risk of substantial harm. The trial court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest and terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother raises procedural and substantive challenges to the trial court’s best interest determination but does not challenge the grounds for termination. Conducting a Carrington review, we conclude the trial court erred in finding some of the aforementioned grounds for termination. Nevertheless, because clear and convincing evidence supports at least one of termination grounds and the conclusion that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights.

The Defendant, Joshua Moore, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. On
appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction,
specifically regarding whether he acted with premeditation. Additionally, he argues that
the trial court erred by admitting a responding police officer’s body camera (“bodycam”)
footage, contending that the recording was overly prejudicial in violation of Tennessee
Rule of Evidence 403. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Katelyn Taylor, pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree murder in exchange for concurrent sentences of life imprisonment. Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, and that her guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily. After appointing counsel and holding an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, which Petitioner appealed. After review, we conclude that Petitioner failed to prepare a sufficient brief in compliance with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7) and Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 10(b), therefore, her issues are waived. Additionally, after our review of the record, we conclude Petitioner’s claims are without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After seven years of marriage, a wife filed a complaint for divorce against her husband. The primary issues before the trial court pertained to the classification of the marital residence and custody of the parties’ child. After a hearing on those issues, the trial court determined that the marital residence had once been the husband’s separate property but had transmuted into marital property. The court then ordered the property sold and the proceeds distributed equally between the parties. Regarding custody, the court designated the wife as primary residential parent and severely restricted the husband’s parenting time. Discerning that the trial court erred in its valuation of the marital residence, we modify the court’s order to reflect the amount submitted by the husband. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule
10B from a circuit court judge’s denial of a motion to recuse. The plaintiffs moved for
recusal based primarily on an alleged attorney-client relationship between the judge and
counsel for the defendants. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to recuse.

This is an appeal from an Order Granting Respondents’ Motions to Dismiss and Denying Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari and Mandamus. Because the appellant did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the final judgment as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s division of the marital estate,
its determination that he was underemployed, and the wife’s awards of alimony. For the
reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a landlord/tenant dispute. Tricap Cross Creek Associates, LLC (“Plaintiff”), the landlord, filed a detainer action against Gabriel Corzo (“Defendant”), the tenant, in the General Sessions Court for Hamilton County. Judgment was entered for Plaintiff. Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. Defendant appeals, arguing that genuine issues of material fact exist. Plaintiff asks, pursuant to the lease, for an award of attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal. As Defendant never responded to Plaintiff’s statement of undisputed material facts, he failed to show a genuine issue of material fact existed. We affirm. On remand, the Trial Court is to determine and award to Plaintiff its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal.

In this post-divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals the trial court’s order holding him in
criminal contempt. Due to the deficiencies in Husband’s brief, we do not reach the
substantive issues. Appeal dismissed.

I join in full the majority opinion’s analysis of the Brady issue and its judgment
affirming Tony Thomas’s conviction. I also agree with much of the majority’s analysis
regarding the accomplice-corroboration rule, including its decision to abrogate that rule. I
respectfully disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that our holding abrogating
the accomplice-corroboration rule should apply only in future cases and pending cases that
have not yet gone to trial. I would instead apply that holding here—and to other cases
pending in trial courts or in appellate courts on direct review—and affirm Laronda Turner’s
conviction on that basis. I write separately to offer an additional reason why the
accomplice-corroboration rule should be abrogated and to explain why our decision should
apply retroactively.1

This is a divorce proceeding in which the wife filed a divorce complaint against the husband on the grounds of adultery and inappropriate marital conduct. While the action was pending, Husband drafted a handwritten reconciliation document in which he promised that the marital residence would become the wife’s separate property if he ever “cheated” on her again, “in consideration of her reconciling with [him] (also dropping the
divorce lawsuit currently filed).” Although the wife took no action to “drop” or dismiss the divorce complaint, the trial court, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. Upon learning that the husband’s infidelity had resumed, the wife successfully motioned to set aside the order of dismissal, and the case went to trial. In its final order, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on grounds of inappropriate marital conduct due to the husband’s infidelity. Because the wife took no action to enforce the purported reconciliation agreement, the court classified the marital residence as marital property, not the wife’s separate property. The court awarded the wife approximately $3.9 million in marital assets, of which $1.3 million was liquid assets, representing 60% of the marital estate. The court further awarded the wife $13,000 per month in transitional alimony for eight years and $229,000 in alimony in solido, but declined to award her alimony in futuro. The court also denied the wife’s request to recover her attorney’s fees and expenses. The wife appeals, contending that the trial court erred in failing to classify the marital residence as her separate property and in failing to award her alimony in futuro as well as her attorney’s fees. We affirm.

After a Dickson County jury trial, Defendant, Kirk D. Farmer, was convicted of vandalism of $2,500 or more but less than $10,000 and disorderly conduct. The trial court sentenced him to an effective term of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain his vandalism conviction. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted two defendants, Tony Thomas and Laronda Turner, of three counts of
first-degree premeditated murder. Those convictions stem from a triple homicide that
occurred in Memphis, Tennessee, in 2015. Another co-defendant, Demarco Hawkins, was
also implicated in the killings. However, his trial was severed from the other defendants,
and he testified against Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner. After Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner
were convicted, they appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, raising five issues for
review. The intermediate appellate court ruled unanimously on three of the issues, but one
judge dissented on the other two. Mr. Thomas and Ms. Turner sought permission to appeal,
and we accepted the appeal only as to the two issues on which the intermediate appellate
court was divided. First, we agreed to consider whether the prosecution breached the
requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to produce statements
made by Mr. Hawkins at proffer conferences, which were allegedly inconsistent with Mr.
Hawkins’ formal statement to law enforcement, before trial. Second, we agreed to address
whether the evidence was sufficient to support Ms. Turner’s murder convictions. Based
on our review, we conclude that the State did not breach its obligations under Brady with
regard to Mr. Thomas. Additionally, we determine that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain Ms. Turner’s convictions because Mr. Hawkins’ testimony was not adequately
corroborated.1 As a result, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals in part
and reverse in part. Additionally, in this opinion, we abrogate Tennessee’s common law
accomplice-corroboration rule. However, we apply that change on a prospective basis
only, and, thus, it has no bearing on the outcome of this case.

A husband challenges the issuance of an order of protection prohibiting him from contacting his wife. Finding that the evidence supports the issuance of an order of protection and that the husband has waived any objection to improper venue, we affirm.

I agree that Tony Thomas’s murder convictions should be affirmed. The Brady v.
Maryland issue raised by Mr. Thomas is a close question. Before trial, Mr. Thomas
requested the prosecution to provide witnesses’ prior inconsistent statements. The trial
court ordered disclosure, the prosecution failed to disclose the statements in its possession,
and the statements were favorable to Mr. Thomas. In my view, the State’s failure to disclose
the witness’s statements until he testified at trial was nondisclosure, not delayed disclosure.
However, the nondisclosed statements had to be material to Mr. Thomas’s defense for his
Brady claim to prevail. Because the statements were not sufficiently material, his Brady
claim fails.

This appeal arises from a Tennessee Public Records Act (“TPRA”) petition to access a Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) case file regarding its investigation into the fatality of a fourteen-year-old boy. The petition also sought disclosure of the investigation into the child’s death, as well as four prior investigations related to the same child, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-5-107. Prior to the filing of the petition, the petitioner, Stacy Jacobson (“Ms. Jacobson”), submitted a written request to obtain the unredacted version of the deceased child’s case file, along with the records from four prior DCS investigations related to the child. DCS denied the requests, citing several legal bases, including Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-5-124, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 37-1-409 and 612, Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-5-107, Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (“Rule 16”), and the 2013 Davidson County Chancery Court order requiring that DCS redact all such records to eliminate information made confidential under state law. Thereafter, Ms. Jacobson filed a petition in the Chancery Court of Davidson County to obtain access to the unredacted public records, the four related investigative files, and for her attorney’s fees and costs. The trial court denied the petition, finding that, under “the state law exception” to the TPRA, which encompasses Rule 16, the redacted portions of the case file and the four related investigative files are exempt from disclosure because they are relevant to an ongoing criminal prosecution of the deceased child’s family members who are alleged to be responsible for his abuse and death. Ms. Jacobson subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend judgment, arguing that the trial court had failed to consider whether the DCS records from the prior investigations involving the deceased child were part of the child’s “full case file.” The trial court denied the motion, finding that a ruling on this issue would constitute an advisory opinion. Ms. Jacobson appeals the trial court’s denial of her requests. For the reasons explained below, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

This is the second interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court
Rule 10B, filed by the appellants seeking to recuse the trial judge in the underlying
conservatorship action. After this Court entered its opinion and judgment in the first
interlocutory appeal, the trial judge entered several orders before the mandate was entered
with the trial court. In this second interlocutory appeal, appellants request, inter alia, that
we declare those orders void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. After careful review,
we determine that the stay of trial court proceedings imposed by this Court in the first
interlocutory appeal remained in place until the mandate was entered. Taking into
consideration the limits of our review in a Rule 10B appeal, we vacate the trial court’s
orders entered between the time the appellants filed their second motion to recuse and the
trial court’s ruling on the recusal motion. We also vacate the trial court’s order denying
the second motion to recuse. Because the trial court’s order denying the second motion to
recuse is vacated, all remaining matters in this second interlocutory appeal are pretermitted
as moot.

Appellant filed a premises liability claim against the defendant store after she fell at its entrance. The trial court granted the defendant summary judgment. We affirm.