APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The pro se plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her legal malpractice action against her former attorney. The trial court found that the plaintiff failed to offer any proof in support of her claim of negligence against the defendant attorney. We affirm.

The Defendant, Marcus Terrell Bradford, was convicted by a Bradley County Criminal Court Jury of assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of 11 months, 29 days for the assault conviction and 30 days for the disorderly conduct conviction, to be served at 75% in the county jail. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentences for the offenses, by ordering that the sentences run consecutively, and by not allowing any alternative sentencing options. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Antonio Benson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claim alleging that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to meaningfully present the Petitioner’s self-defense claim. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Anthony Lynn Taylor, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement. On appeal the Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that he absconded from probation and that the trial court failed to place sufficient findings on the record to justify placing his sentence into effect. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Davidson County Jury convicted DaShawn Patrick Slone¹ and Demetrius Trevon Higgins, Defendants, of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse. The trial court imposed effective sentences of life plus six years for Defendant Slone and life plus four years for Defendant Higgins. On appeal, Defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case involves a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process and for
expiration of the statute of limitations. The plaintiff filed this health care liability suit
against a defendant physician. A process server went to the defendant’s office to serve
him, and after the process server was unable to locate the defendant, he served the summons
and complaint on an employee of the hospital where the defendant’s office was located.
The defendant answered the complaint and raised the defense that there was insufficient
service of process. More than a year after the complaint was filed, the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, finding that the plaintiff
failed to properly serve the defendant and that the statute of limitations had run on the
health care liability action. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The defendant appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion for access to the sealed Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) juvenile records relating to the victim’s mother’s records which were sealed to public inspection but provided to the parties prior to the defendant’s trial. Upon our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we conclude the defendant does not have an appeal as of right from the denial of his motion. Additionally, the defendant has failed to establish review as a petition for writ of certiorari is appropriate. Therefore, the instant appeal is dismissed.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant, Phennix Givens, of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of aggravated cruelty to animals. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective forty-six-year sentence. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This interlocutory appeal involves an alleged slip and fall incident that occurred at the defendant’s grocery store. The plaintiff’s amended complaint included allegations of vicarious liability, premises liability, negligent training, and negligent supervision against the defendant. In an attempt to dismiss the plaintiff’s negligent training and supervision claims, the defendant filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and asserted two alternative arguments, both of which the trial court rejected. First, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that courts must dismiss “negligent activity” claims, such as claims for negligent training and supervision, when asserted concurrently with a premises liability theory of recovery. Second, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s direct negligence claims were no longer legally viable due to the defendant admitting it was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employee, commonly referred to as the “preemption rule.” After denying the defendant’s motion, the trial court granted permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the defendant’s application. The defendant then appealed to this Court, and we granted review. We hold that the preemption rule is incompatible with Tennessee’s system of comparative fault and decline to adopt it. In addition, we decline to adopt the rule proposed by the defendant pertaining to “negligent activity” claims asserted alongside premises liability claims. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

Following a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, Timothy Whitby, guilty of:
vandalism under $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor; disorderly conduct, a Class C
misdemeanor; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the
Defendant to concurrent sentences of eleven months and twenty-nine days on each count,
suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence supporting his assault conviction, and the trial court’s sentence of eleven
months and twenty-nine days for his disorderly conduct conviction. After review, we
conclude that the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and
twenty-nine days for his Class C misdemeanor disorderly conduct conviction. Thus, we
remand for entry of a sentence within the appropriate sentencing range. We affirm the
judgments in all other respects.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to one of her children. On the day of trial, her appointed counsel orally moved for leave to withdraw. The court granted the motion, and the trial proceeded with the mother representing herself. Ultimately, the court found clear and convincing evidence of six grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in permitting her appointed counsel to withdraw. Because we agree, we vacate the judgment terminating her parental rights and remand for further proceedings.

Following a motor vehicle accident, Appellant/the insured brought a breach of contract
claim against Appellee/the automobile insurer. In a motion for summary judgment,
Appellee argued that Appellant materially breached the duty to cooperate clause of the
insurance policy, which barred his recovery. The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Appellee, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that Appellant
materially breached the insurance policy by failing to submit to an examination under oath.
The trial court concluded that the material breach barred Appellant from recovery under
the policy. Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

This protracted and contentious child support action began on April 15, 2005, with the
filing of a petition for child support filed by the State of Tennessee (“the State”) on behalf
of the mother, Nedra R. Hastings (“Mother”) in the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby
County, Tennessee seeking support from the father, Larry M. Hastings (“Father”), for
Mother and Father’s only child, born in 2004. The petition sought child support
enforcement assistance pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 651, et seq. (“Title IV-D”). In July 2005, the trial court entered an order
establishing child support, which ordered that Father pay support, that Father provide
medical insurance for the child, and that each parent pay half of any medical expenses not
covered by insurance. Over the years that followed, the State, acting on behalf of Mother,
or Mother acting pro se and independent of the State, filed numerous motions and/or
petitions, including petitions to modify the child support amount, petitions for contempt
for Father’s failure to pay medical and other expenses, objections to the appointment of
special judges and magistrates by the juvenile court judge, objections to the court hearing
motions virtually via Zoom, and requests for the court to rehear motions and petitions. On
September 24, 2020, an appointed special judge, who heard only Title IV-D matters,
disposed of all matters remaining in the Title IV-D case and continued the pending
contempt and child-support modification matters to be heard by a judge who handled non-
Title IV-D matters. This appeal, which is the second of Mother’s four appeals that arise
from this case, followed. The numerous issues Mother raises in this appeal principally
relate to the appointment of a special judge, recusal issues, and issues that led up to the
final order entered on September 24, 2020. Following a thorough review of the record and
the issues raised in this appeal for which Mother presents arguments as required by
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(7), we affirm the decisions of the trial court.

The dispositive issue on appeal concerns a forum selection clause in the LLC Agreement of Catch22Nashville, LLC (“the LLC Agreement”). Catch22Nashville, LLC initially had four members who owned equal membership interests. The principal business of the LLC was a restaurant operating under the name Catch22 Gastropub. A dispute arose when one of the four members, Christopher Holloway (“Mr. Holloway”), purchased the membership interests of two other members, Richard Miley (“Mr. Miley”) and Justin Kamishlian (“Mr. Kamishlian”), resulting in Mr. Holloway owning three-fourths of the membership interests in the LLC. The fourth member, Victor Daniel Medina-Tratel (“Mr. Medina”), claims that Mr. Holloway promised to transfer the interest portion belonging to Mr. Kamishlian to Mr. Medina upon his payment of $40,000, so that Mr. Holloway and Mr. Medina would own Catch22Nashville, LLC in equal interests. Instead, Mr. Holloway transferred a one-fourth membership interest in the LLC to his wife Melanie Holloway (“Ms. Holloway”). Two years later, the landlord of Catch22 Gastropub terminated its lease and evicted the restaurant from the premises, forcing it to cease business. On the day of the eviction, Mr. Medina obtained a cashier’s check in the amount of $100,000 from the LLC’s bank account that was made payable to the Clerk and Master of Wilson County. Mr. Medina then filed a complaint in the Chancery Court of Wilson County against Mr. Holloway and Ms. Holloway (hereinafter “the Holloways”) for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and conversion related to the transfer of Mr. Kamishlian’s membership interest in the LLC. Mr. Medina also filed a motion to interplead into court the $100,000 that he withdrew from the LLC’s corporate account. The LLC then motioned to intervene as a party with a vested interest in the interpleaded funds. The trial court granted both Mr. Medina’s motion for interpleader and the LLC’s motion to intervene. The LLC and the Holloways (hereinafter “Defendants”) then filed motions to dismiss based on the forum selection clause in the LLC Agreement. Section 1.09 of the LLC Agreement states “[v]enue for any dispute arising under this LLC Agreement or any disputes among any Members or the Company will be in the county of the Company’s Registered Office.” The trial court ruled that, under the forum selection clause in the LLC Agreement, exclusive venue for Mr. Medina’s claims was in Oconee County, Georgia, the county of the company’s registered office, and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of proper venue. Mr. Medina filed a timely appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Appellant, Terry L. Gragg, appeals his conviction of aggravated assault for which he received a sentence of four years’ probation.  On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act in self-defense.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a divorce case where the wife has raised several discrete issues on appeal. Although certain of her assertions are without merit, we agree with the wife that the trial court erred in failing to account for certain real property located in Nigeria. Thus, the marital estate division is vacated, and the matter is remanded so that the trial court can account for the Nigerian real property highlighted herein. As a result of our disposition on that issue, as well as other concerns, we also vacate the trial court’s award of alimony to the husband.

The Petitioner, Albert Bohannon, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition seeking habeas corpus relief.  After review, we affirm the dismissal because the Petitioner is no longer imprisoned or restrained of his liberty and the petition fails to comply with the statutory requirements.

Petitioner, Larry J. Bradley, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief related to his convictions for evading arrest, attempted carjacking, aggravated burglary, and assault.  Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based upon his claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) trial counsel argued that Petitioner was guilty of attempted carjacking without consulting with Petitioner and (2) trial counsel failed to properly determine the felony classification for Petitioner’s Indiana convictions for purposes of sentencing.  He also argues the “Circuit Court erred in denying [Petitioner’s] petition to set aside the sentence on the attempted carjacking conviction due to the ineffective assistance of counsel.”  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Bruce Dorsett, II, Petitioner, filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief after the entry of a guilty plea to several offenses.  Petitioner requested equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.  The post-conviction court determined Petitioner was entitled to neither statutory nor equitable tolling of the statute of limitations and, consequently, denied relief and dismissed the petition.  Petitioner then filed an untimely notice of appeal.  On appeal, Petitioner claims the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without allowing Petitioner to amend it.  We waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal but affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner, Lavino Horne, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court correctly determined that the statute of limitations should be tolled for his untimely petition because he diligently pursued his petition after being abandoned by trial counsel. He further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The State responds that the post-conviction court erred by finding that extraordinary circumstances prevented Petitioner from timely filing his petition and denying the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. The State further argues that Petitioner failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we conclude that Petitioner failed to show that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds. Accordingly, Petitioner’s postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is barred by the statute of limitations and we reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely.

This appeal concerns a partial summary judgment order certified as final pursuant to Rule
54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon our review of the record, we
determine that the issue adjudicated in the partial summary judgment order did not dispose
of an entire claim or party, as is required to certify an order as final pursuant to Rule 54.02.
Because we conclude that the trial court improvidently certified the order as final, we
dismiss the appeal and remand for further proceedings.

An Obion County jury convicted the Appellant of second degree murder of Decora Alexander, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years’ confinement. At the time of the offense, the Appellant was serving a four-year probation sentence for an offense involving the same victim, which was subsequently violated and ordered to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-nine years’ confinement. The Appellant argues on appeal: (1) the trial court erred in denying the Appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in not charging the jury with self-defense; (4) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of the Appellant’s probation officer at trial; (5) the trial court erred in admitting photographs from the crime scene and a life-in-being photograph into evidence; (6) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence without consideration of the Appellant’s mitigation proof; and (7) the trial court’s cumulative errors necessitate a new trial.  Upon our review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua W. Gabehart, of the unlawful sale of fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve twelve years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove that he knew he was selling fentanyl instead of heroin. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At issue in this appeal is whether an individual, now deceased, lacked the requisite mental capacity when he signed a durable power of attorney for health care. The trial court answered this question in the affirmative, specifically concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence that the decedent was incompetent. As a result of this determination, the trial court further concluded that an arbitration agreement later signed by the decedent’s brother using the power of attorney was invalid, a conclusion which in turn prompted the trial court to deny the Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration on the basis of that agreement. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the trial court.