APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

The issues in the former underlying action and the present controversy pertain to an easement dispute that arose from a joint driveway agreement. A final judgment in the underlying action, titled “Consent Agreement and Order” (hereinafter “the Consent Order”), was entered in July 2013, from which there was no appeal. The final judgment was also duly recorded in the office of the Washington County Register of Deeds on August 5, 2013. The only parties to the former action were the plaintiff, Bobby MacBryan Green (“Mr. Green”), and the defendant, Michael John May (“Mr. May”). In 2021, Daniel Anthony (“Mr. Anthony”) purchased the property previously owned by Mr. May. In December 2023, Mr. Green obtained and filed an order of extension with the Washington County Circuit Court to extend the judgment entered in 2013. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Green filed a motion to show cause alleging that Mr. Anthony had violated the Consent Order and personally handed the motion to Mr. Anthony. One week later, Mr. Green filed a motion for joinder of Mr. Anthony pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which was also hand delivered to Mr. Anthony. Mr. Anthony’s counsel made a limited appearance opposing the relief sought on multiple grounds. Following a hearing on Mr. Green’s motions, the trial court found that Mr. Anthony was not a proper or feasible party capable of being joined in the former 2013 action. Based on this finding, the court denied Mr. Green’s motion for joinder and dismissed the show cause motion as moot. Mr. Green appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. In his brief, Mr. Anthony asks this court to award him the attorney’s fees and expenses he incurred in defending this appeal, contending that the appeal is frivolous. Finding that the appeal is devoid of merit and, therefore, frivolous, we remand this matter to the trial court to award Mr. Anthony his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this frivolous appeal.

The plaintiff in this case sued the State of Tennessee, Tennessee Department of Correction, alleging that it refused to hire her for employment solely on the basis of her disability. The complaint asserted a single claim -- for violation of the Tennessee Disability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-50-103, et seq. During the three years of litigation that followed, the plaintiff’s TDA claim survived a motion for summary judgment and was eventually tried before a jury over the course of five days. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff but awarded her only $10,000 for lost wages and $5,000 for compensatory damages. The plaintiff’s counsel then sought an award of attorney fees of nearly $700,000. The Department challenged the reasonableness of the fees. After a hearing, the trial court found the requested amount was excessive and reduced it, but only by twenty-five percent, awarding counsel $511,620. Due to the lack of findings regarding the factors applicable to such decisions, we vacate the award and remand for entry of an order analyzing the relevant factors.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of alimony and attorney’s fees to wife following a long-term marriage. Upon our review of the record transmitted on appeal, and for the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s denial of alimony and attorney’s fees and remand those matters for reconsideration.

A Hancock County jury found Defendant, Michael J. Hite, guilty of driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court imposed
a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with Defendant to serve sixty days in confinement and the rest of his sentence on
probation. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

The Defendant, Keith Harding Miller, was convicted by a Rhea County Circuit Court jury
of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-
102(A)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced him to
three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the State
violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose material evidence, (2) a juror imparted
extraneous information which impacted the verdict, and (3) the trial court erred in denying
judicial diversion and in imposing incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident on a road encircling a Chattanooga mall. The case was heard before a jury, which concluded that the defendant was not at fault. The plaintiff appeals. Having determined that there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm.

The Defendant, Lawrence E. Hampton, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his third motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s entry of corrected judgment forms changing the order of consecutive service of sentences constituted an ex parte sentencing in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3). Following our review, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Darius Markee Alston, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his untimely petition for writ of error coram nobis. Upon review, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment wherein the trial court found that the plaintiff corporations were barred, based on a prior lawsuit between the same parties, from litigating their claim that a promissory note had been procured by fraudulent inducement. The defendants in the instant case, who were the plaintiffs in the prior action, had successfully moved for summary judgment in that prior action concerning the enforcement of a promissory note against the corporations, which were the defendants in the prior action. In that action, the trial court found that the corporations had waived their fraud defense b cause they had neither pled fraud as an affirmative defense in their answer nor requested permission to amend their answer. The trial court ultimately held that the promissory note was enforceable and entered judgment against the corporations. On appeal in the prior action, this Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, including its ruling that the defense of fraud had been waived. In the present action, the corporations—now plaintiffs—sought to repudiate the same promissory note, alleging that it was induced by fraud. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, as well as expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The plaintiff corporations have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal arises out of the partial denial of a Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”) petition filed by the Appellant/Defendant, Jane Roe (“Roe”). This case was previously before this Court after Roe appealed the trial court’s determination that the TPPA was not applicable to the claims of Appellee/Plaintiff, John Doe (“Doe”). In the first appeal, this Court found that Roe’s filing of a Title IX complaint fell within the scope of the TPPA and remanded the case back to the trial court. On remand, the trial court granted in part and denied in part Roe’s TPPA petition. Roe now appeals the trial court’s partial denial on remand. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Eric Lamar Caffey, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of second degree murder. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether his due process rights to a fair trial were violated by the State’s failure to correct false testimony given by a material witness; and (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves a post-divorce petition for criminal contempt filed by the husband against the wife for alleged violations of the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The trial court determined that the husband had not met his burden of proof to establish criminal contempt. The husband timely appealed to this Court. Because the husband’s appellate brief does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we hereby dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner sought recusal of the trial court judge. The trial court denied the motion. The Petitioner appeals to this court. Because the petition on appeal was not filed within twenty-one days of the entry of the order, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

The defendant, William Roger Campbell, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder, and the trial court imposed consecutive life sentences. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting one of the victim’s cellphone records into evidence; the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and the trial court erred in ordering his life sentences be served consecutively. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the defendant’s convictions. However, we reverse the imposition of consecutive sentences and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for consideration of the consecutive sentencing factors outlined in State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995).

The Petitioner sought recusal of the trial court judge. The trial court denied the motion. The Petitioner appeals to this court. Because the petition on appeal was not filed within twenty-one days of the entry of the order, we dismiss the appeal as untimely.

A divorced father retired from the military.  Afterward, he received only disability pay due to service-related injuries.  The mother sought to hA divorced father retired from the military.  Afterward, he received only disability pay due to service-related injuries.  The mother sought to hold him in contempt, claiming she was denied a percentage of his military retirement benefits.  The father denied her allegations and petitioned to modify child support.  He argued that his disability pay could not be counted as income for child support purposes because federal law preempted the provision of the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines governing military disability benefits.  The trial court concluded that the father’s disability pay counted as income for child support.  On appeal, the father reiterates his preemption argument.  Because he failed to provide timely notice of his constitutional challenge to the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter, we consider the preemption issue waived.   old him in contempt, claiming she was denied a percentage of his military retirement benefits.  The father denied her allegations and petitioned to modify child support.  He argued that his disability pay could not be counted as income for child support purposes because federal law preempted the provision of the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines governing military disability benefits.  The trial court concluded that the father’s disability pay counted as income for child support.  On appeal, the father reiterates his preemption argument.  Because he failed to provide timely notice of his constitutional challenge to the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter, we consider the preemption issue waived.   

A Greene County jury found the Defendant, Mr. Vikash Patel, guilty of one count of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a term of eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was suspended after service of ten days in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his conviction. He also asserts that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for his blood sample and that, as such, the analysis of this sample should not have been admitted. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This second recusal appeal in the underlying conservatorship case is currently before this Court on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. This Court had issued an opinion vacating, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, three orders entered by the trial court, including the trial court’s order denying the second motion to recuse that is the subject of this appeal. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that (1) the stay imposed by this Court during pendency of the first recusal appeal did not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case and (2) the proponents of the stay had waived any argument that orders entered by the trial court should be vacated because they were entered prior to issuance of the mandate. Accordingly, the second recusal motion is again before this Court. Upon thorough review, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the second motion to recuse.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion finding that recusal is not justified in this case. Like Judge Armstrong, I believe that the majority “fails to consider the cumulative effects of the trial court’s actions, and wholly fails to consider the fact that the ultimate result of these actions is usurpation of the autonomous decisions Ms. Malone made for her own care when she was competent to do so.” Malone v. Malone, No. W2023- 00843-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 8457951, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023) (Armstrong, J., dissenting).

This appeal arises from a decision by the Tennessee Department of Human Services denying a recertification application for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits to a one-person household based upon the determination that the household’s income exceeded the eligibility requirements. After the petitioner questioned the finding, the trial court affirmed the decision of the agency and dismissed the petition for judicial review. Upon our review of the record, we affirm.

This appeal arises from an order establishing the amount of retroactive child support owed by the father for the care of two of his children. The father challenges the trial court’s decision to impute income to him for the purposes of instituting that order. Finding no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Cedric Taylor, was indicted for possession with intent to deliver 26 grams or more of cocaine (count one), possession with intent to deliver between one half ounce and ten pounds of marijuana (count two), and resisting arrest (count three). He entered an open guilty plea as charged in counts one and three, and the State agreed to nolle prosequi count two. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of fourteen years for count one and six months for count two to be served in confinement as a Range II multiple offender. 1 On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion denying his request for community corrections. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a dispute over homeowner’s insurance coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insuror, finding that the insureds made a misrepresentation on their application for insurance which voided the policy pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-103. Because whether the insureds made a misrepresentation is a question of fact for the jury in this case, we reverse.

This appeal arises out of a contract for the sale of a hotel property near the Nashville airport.
After numerous amendments to the purchase and sale agreement, the seller declared the
prospective buyer to be in default, sold the property to a different buyer, and retained over
18 million dollars in earnest money. The prospective buyer filed suit against the seller for
a declaratory judgment that the liquidated damages provision in the contract was
unenforceable and for conversion. The trial court dismissed the conversion claim and ruled
in favor of the seller on summary judgment. We have concluded that the trial court erred
in its disposition of both causes of action.