APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Houston Thomas Wilkes, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that trial counsel coerced him into entering the guilty plea and that the State withheld potentially exculpatory evidence, such that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. He further argues that these circumstances led to manifest injustice, and the trial court therefore abused its discretion in refusing to allow the withdrawal of his guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

This is a divorce action in which the wife appeals the trial court’s classification of property and the type and amount of alimony awarded. We affirm.  

The Petitioner, Bruce Marvin Vann, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call “alibi” witnesses during trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This action involves a termination petition filed by the mother and stepfather against the father of a minor child. Following a bench trial, the court found that the statutory grounds alleged, abandonment for failure to visit and to support, were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. The petitioners appeal the denial of the petition and the assessment of costs accrued below. We affirm.

The Defendant, Darrin Keith Ward, Jr., appeals the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on stale information and insufficient evidence in deciding to revoke his sentence. After review, we affirm the revocation of the alternative sentence.

In this divorce case, the trial court designated father, Frederick Jerome Brown, Jr., as the primary residential parent of the parties’ only child. Mother, Roxana Isabel Brown, appeals. She argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it (1) designated father as the primary residential parent and (2) when it established a parenting plan that was not in the best interest of the child. We reverse the trial court’s designation of father as the primary residential parent and remand the case for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Jereco Tynes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2010 jury convictions of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and attempted aggravated robbery, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Shawn Bough filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari seeking review of his prison disciplinary conviction. The petition named as respondents the Tennessee Department of Correction and various individuals involved in petitioner’s conviction. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to timely comply with the court’s order to submit a partial payment of the filing fee as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-807 (2014). Petitioner subsequently filed a “motion to reconsider,” which the trial court denied. This appeal follows. We affirm.

The petitioner, Devin Rogers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2013 conviction of aggravated robbery, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son, who tested positive for illegal drugs at birth. In due course, the child was placed in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services and adjudicated dependent and neglected; Mother was later sentenced to a ten-year prison term. The Department thereafter filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights and, following a trial, Mother’s rights were terminated on the grounds that Mother had been found guilty of severe child abuse of the child’s half-sister in another proceeding and abandonment by incarcerated parent and upon the finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Mother appeals; upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment.

Father appeals from an order of the juvenile court awarding permanent guardianship following an adjudication of dependency and neglect. Father filed his notice of appeal to this Court twenty-eight days following the trial court’s order. Because Father’s appeal was to circuit court and his notice of appeal was not filed within ten days of the trial court’s order, we dismiss this appeal.

In this divorce case, the trial court denied wife’s request for a continuance of the trial and then, during the trial, excluded an exhibit proffered by wife. Wife contends that the trial court erred in both respects. Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either decision, we affirm.    

In this probate action, the intestate decedent owned real property at the time of his death that was titled solely in his name. The decedent’s spouse subsequently died within 120 hours of the decedent’s death. The trial court ruled that, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 31-3-120 (2015), the spouse’s heirs possessed no claim to or interest in the real property at issue. The spouse’s heirs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. We decline to award attorney’s fees to the decedent’s estate as damages, determining that this appeal is not frivolous.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict. The case arises from a motor vehicle accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee, and the trial court entered a final judgment for $68,995.02. Because the trial court erred in excluding relevant medical records, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new jury trial.  

In this interlocutory appeal, the issue is whether a statutory amendment barring class action lawsuits against the defendant, Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-221-608(e)(4) (Supp. 2017), applies retroactively thereby requiring the denial of the plaintiff’s previously-filed request for class certification under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 23. We hold that the statutory language at issue, providing that, “[t]his part shall not authorize or permit any class action lawsuits against any authority,” is unambiguous, and therefore reference to its legislative history is unnecessary and improper. Because this provision is procedural and remedial in nature, not affecting substantive rights of the plaintiff, we affirm the trial court’s judgment that it applies retroactively to bar plaintiff’s class certification request.

The Appellant, Marc K. Eliazar, pled guilty in the Rutherford County Circuit Court to possession of one-half ounce or more of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver, a Class E felony, and reserved certified questions of law concerning whether the police officer’s dog sniff of his vehicle prolonged the traffic stop and, if so, whether the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the dog sniff. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

The defendant, Amail John Land, appeals his Dekalb County Criminal Court jury convictions of burglary, theft of property valued at less than $500, and vandalism of property valued at less than $500. He challenges the admission of his pretrial statement to the police, the admission of testimony concerning the contents of a video recording that had been destroyed prior to trial, and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Defendant, Gregory Lynn Kelley, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury for one count of sale of more than 0.5 grams of methamphetamine, a Class B felony. Defendant pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of facilitation of the sale of methamphetamine over 0.5 grams, a Class C felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II offender to serve eight years and six months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Defendant’s request to serve his sentence on probation. Having reviewed the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves two consolidated actions brought by opposing boards of directors of a residential development community club, with each board claiming legitimacy. The plaintiffs to the original action were owners of real property in the development who held a special meeting in September 2011 in order to elect a new board of directors for the community club. The previous board of directors and defendants to the original action contested the validity of the election, claiming that none of the counted votes were cast by members in good standing. The defendants subsequently met in November 2011 and again in March 2012 to ratify their positions on the community club board of directors. In December 2011, the “new” board of directors, purportedly elected in September 2011, filed a declaratory judgment action against the original board of directors in the Cumberland County Chancery Court, requesting that the court declare which board of directors was legally in control. The complaint also requested that the court declare whether the purported developer properly possessed developer’s rights and that the court award damages to the new board for breach of fiduciary duties by the original board. In April 2012, the original board filed a separate declaratory judgment action against the new board in the Cumberland County Chancery Court, making similar allegations and requesting a declaratory judgment, an injunction preventing the new board from acting on behalf of the community club, and damages for conversion. The trial court consolidated the two actions in July 2012 and conducted a bench trial on the matter over the course of seven non-consecutive days in 2015 and 2016. At the conclusion of trial, the court determined that the new board was prevented from challenging the developer’s status due to a statute of limitations. The trial court further determined that neither board was legitimately in control and appointed a special master to conduct an accounting of dues and a supervised election. The trial court also directed each side to pay its own attorney’s fees, ordering the boards to repay to the community club any funds used to pay attorney’s fees. The original board was re-elected during the supervised election, and the special master determined that both sides had paid attorney’s fees from their respective annual assessments collected. The trial court conducted a hearing on the parties’ objections to 08/29/2018 2 the special master’s report before adopting the master’s findings in total. The trial court thereby affirmed the original directors as current directors; ordered those directors to repay $54,157.41 to the community club funds; and ordered the plaintiffs to repay $143,513.55 to the community club funds. The plaintiffs have appealed. Determining that the trial court improperly relied upon a statute of limitations that is inapplicable to the plaintiffs’ action, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We further reverse the trial court’s alternative rulings for lack of evidentiary basis.

In this appeal, the marital dissolution agreement at issue stated the parties’ intent to enter into a separate farm lease agreement for up to 7 years, upon completion of which the exwife could sell the property subject to the ex-husband’s right of first refusal. However, the parties never entered into the contemplated farm lease. The ex-wife, desiring to sell the property prior to the passing of 7 years, brought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of the rights of the parties under the marital dissolution agreement. The trial court held that the ex-wife would be in breach of the agreement if she sold the property prior to 7 years and awarded attorney’s fees to the ex-husband. The ex-wife appeals. We reverse.

The Defendant-Appellant, John Paul Little, was convicted by a Roane County jury of four counts of rape of a child, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-522, for which he received a sentence of 120 years in confinement. The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court determined that the defendant, Janet Kimberly Hughes, breached her fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, Johnny Stephen Francis, by utilizing a power of attorney to withdraw funds from Mr. Francis’s bank account for Ms. Hughes’s sole benefit. The trial court ordered Ms. Hughes to repay those funds. Ms. Hughes timely appealed. Because Ms. Hughes has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6, we dismiss this appeal.

This is an appeal from a final judgment entered on April 24, 2018. Because the appellant did not file either her motion to alter or amend or her notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the judgment as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

This appeal arises from the juvenile court’s ruling terminating the father’s parental rights to his son on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit, failure to support, and wanton disregard; substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume responsibility. The court further determined that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm as modified.   

This is a termination of parental rights case involving the parental rights of the mother, Bethany C. (“Mother”), to her minor child, Alexis C. (“the Child”), who was two years of age at the time of trial. The Child was born in 2014 to Mother and Jeremy C. (“Father”). In August 2015, the Maury County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) entered an order removing the Child from Mother’s custody and placing the Child into the temporary legal custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where she remained at the time of trial. The trial court subsequently entered an order on October 12, 2015, wherein the trial court found that the Child was dependent and neglected due to Mother’s and Father’s incarceration. On August 23, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights to the Child upon determining by clear and convincing evidence that (1) Mother had abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, (3) the conditions leading to removal still persisted and other conditions persisted that would in all probability cause the Child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, and (4) Mother had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of and financial responsibility for the Child. The court further found clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. Mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.