APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

From 2011–2014, a municipality charged alcoholic beverage retailers higher inspection fees than was authorized by the municipality’s ordinance. A group of alcoholic beverage retailers paid the excess fees, but not under protest. After the municipality denied the retailers’ requests for refunds, they sued the municipality for recovery of the excess collections and other damages. The municipality moved to dismiss, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-1-901, et seq., required the retailers to have paid under protest any disputed taxes before filing suit to recover the overpayments. The trial court disagreed and awarded the retailers a judgment for the overpayments, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-1-1801, et seq., applied and payment under protest was not required. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that Tennessee Code Annotated sections 67-1-901, et seq., rather than sections 67 1-1801, et seq., apply to a suit to recover municipal taxes. Under section 67-1-901(a), the retailers were required to have paid under protest the disputed taxes before filing suit. Because the retailers did not pay the taxes under protest, they are not entitled to refunds.

This is a health care liability case. Appellant/Plaintiff first filed suit against Appellees/Defendants for medical malpractice in April 2014. Defendants filed motions to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirements for health care liability claims. Before the trial court could hear Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit, and an order was entered thereon. Plaintiff subsequently re-filed her case against Defendants in September 2016 in reliance on the one year savings statute. Defendants moved the court to dismiss Plaintiff’s suit based on the statute of limitations. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice, holding that, because Plaintiff’s original presuit notice was defective, her first complaint was untimely and she could not rely on the savings statute to revive a time-barred cause of action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Marvin Devon Summers, guilty of theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve a ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient, his sentence is excessive, and he requests plain error review of "all objections" and "all issues regarding venue and jurisidiction." After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Defendant, Travis Eugene Taylor, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. In exchange for his guilty pleas, he received consecutive sentences of fifteen years for voluntary manslaughter and six years for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Many years later, Defendant sought to set aside the trial court’s judgment, arguing that his convictions violated the principles of double jeopardy. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion. Because Defendant’s motion fails regardless of how it is construed, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Asata Dia Lowe, appeals the Blount County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2000 convictions for two counts of first degree murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery and his effective sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus twenty-five years. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Dorothy Denise Cross, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from her assault conviction, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a continuance due to the Petitioner’s mental health issues. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Latisha Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus, wherein she sought relief from her convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner alleges that her convictions are void because she was illegally extradited from Mississippi to Tennessee, depriving the trial court of lawful jurisdiction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Charvasea Lancaster, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his trial counsel was ineffective in explaining the possible sentencing outcomes to him. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of the mother’s parental rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plan, and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination of the mother’s rights was in the best interest of the child. The mother appeals. We affirm.

A bank filed an action against a debtor to collect the outstanding balance on an installment loan approximately five and one-half years after the cause of action accrued. After finding that Florida’s five-year statute of limitations for actions on contracts applied, the trial court denied the bank’s motion for summary judgment and granted the debtor’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The bank appeals, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Edward Jerome Harbison, was convicted of first-degree murder, second degree burglary, and grand larceny for the 1983 death of Edith Russell and sentenced to death. State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314 (Tenn. 1986). The defendant’s death sentence was eventually commuted, and he is currently serving a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. After numerous appeals, the defendant filed the present motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The defendant argues his sentence under the prior Tennessee statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-2-202(a) (1982), is unconstitutional in addition to a plethora of other claims. Having reviewed the record and the procedural history of the defendant’s convictions, we conclude that the defendant’s claims are either not cognizable under Rule 36.1 and/or have been previously reviewed and resolved by our courts. As a result, the defendant is not entitled to relief.

Putative father appeals the juvenile court’s adjudication of parentage, arguing that the court erred in considering a paternity test report previously entered as an exhibit in proceedings before a magistrate. Although the court erred in taking judicial notice of the report, we conclude the error was harmless. We also conclude that the preponderance of the evidence supports the court’s paternity determination. Thus, we affirm.

This is the second appeal in a dispute over enforcement of a mechanic’s lien. An architect entered into an architect agreement with the developer to build a condominium project in Ashland City, Tennessee. The architect later entered into a purchase agreement with the successor developer to receive a penthouse as “consideration of design fees owed” on the first contract. The architect never received payment for its work and filed suit against the successor developer and its surety to enforce its mechanic’s lien for the amount owed under the architect agreement. The trial court held that the purchase agreement was a novation, extinguishing the rights and obligations of the parties under the architect agreement. In the first appeal, this Court found a lack of intent for a novation and, therefore, reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, after additional discovery, the architect moved for summary judgment on its claim. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the architect. In this appeal, the developer argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on its defense of novation and multiple other defenses. We affirm the decision of the trial court.  

The Carroll County Grand Jury issued a five-count indictment in Case No. 2015-CR-8, charging Roy Lee Ellis (“the Defendant”) with especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, aggravated assault, possession of drug paraphernalia, and theft of services. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was found guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia but was acquitted of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and aggravated assault of A.H., an adult female. The theft of services count was not presented to the jury. Based on video images captured from one of the Defendant’s cellular phones during the police investigation into Case No. 2015-CR-8, the State also obtained an indictment of the Defendant for two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor in Case No. 2016-CR-87. The Defendant filed a “Motion to Quash Indictment Because [o]f Misjoinder and/or Double Jeopardy” (“the Motion”). Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court found that the State violated the mandatory joinder requirement of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) and dismissed the indictment, and the State appealed. Because the two counts of sexual exploittion of a minor were not “based on the same conduct” nor did they “arise from the same criminal episode” as the offenses for which the Defendant was tried, we reverse the trial court, reinstate the indictment in Case No. 2016-CR-87, and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Eddie Charles Warlick, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his 2015 guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Sandra Kay Stutts, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of one count of burglary of an automobile and one count of misdemeanor theft of property valued at $500 or less. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year in confinement for burglary of an automobile and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for misdemeanor theft and ordered the sentences to run concurrently. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve sixty days of her sentence in confinement and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict her of burglary and of theft and that the trial court erred in sentencing her to continuous confinement for the non-violent property offense of burglary of an automobile. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions but reverse the judgment for burglary of an automobile as to sentencing and remand for imposition of an appropriate sentence.

In this case, several entities were attempting to address the pollution issues of Sugar Creek and Arrow Lake. An Amended and Restated Consent Order was approved. StarLink Logistics, Inc., a property owner, appealed. Initially, this court reversed. After an appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee remanded for this court to review under the proper standard of review. We now affirm the trial court’s decision to approve the Consent Order.

A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her child. The chancery court found clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds for termination: abandonment by willful failure to support and persistence of conditions. The court also found that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Because we conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to each ground for termination, we reverse.    

The Bedford County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Ricardo Antonio Demling, for theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000. The jury found the Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to fifteen years as a Range III persistent offender and ordered this sentence to be served consecutively to any unexpired sentences. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft of property between the value of $10,000 and $60,000. He also argues that his sentence was excessive and asks this court to conduct a plain error review of “all objections” and “all issues regarding venue and jurisdiction[.]” After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

The Appellant, Devin Whiteside, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery, and he received concurrent sentences of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, alleging that after the plea hearing, he obtained information relating to the testimony of two of the State’s witnesses. He maintained that, if he had been provided the information prior to the plea, he would not have pled guilty. The trial court denied the motion, and the Appellant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Mardoche Olivier, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for the offense of driving a vehicle at a time when his license to drive had been canceled, suspended, or revoked. While this charge was pending in Montgomery County Circuit Court, the Defendant filed pro se a petition for habeas corpus relief as to the pending charge. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition and the Defendant has appealed. We conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Defendant’s habeas corpus petition, and accordingly the trial court properly summarily dismissed the petition. Because the instant appeal is frivolous and because the Defendant is abusing the appellate process, we order that the Clerk of this Court shall not file any further notices of appeal from the Defendant in habeas corpus matters unless the Defendant attaches to the notice of appeal a copy of the final judgment challenged. We tax the costs to the Defendant.

The Appellant, Timothy J. Hickman, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Said motion is hereby granted.

The Petitioner, David Ivy, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, seeking relief from his conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting sentence of death. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by dismissing his petition, by denying his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, and by denying his writ of error audita querela. In addition, he asks that this court advise him as to the correct pleading to file in order to challenge his death sentence. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the coram nobis court did not err by denying relief, and we decline to provide an advisory opinion regarding future requests for relief.

Jerome Lamont Wolley, the Petitioner, appeals from the post-conviction court’s order summarily dismissing his second
post-conviction petition. Discerning no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order.

This appeal arises out of a delinquency proceeding in Hamilton County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”). The juvenile was accused of violating his probation by failing to report to his probation officer as required by the rules of his probation. Following a hearing and ruling by the juvenile court, the matter was appealed to the Hamilton County Criminal Court (“trial court”). Upon a bench trial and de novo review, the trial court found that the juvenile had violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer. The trial court subsequently ordered that the juvenile be committed to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-131(a)(4). Discerning no error, we affirm.