APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises from a family dispute over a life estate. Charles Eason, Thomas Eason, Marsha Grayer, and Walter Stokely (“Petitioners”) filed suit against their siblings Anna Eason, James Stokely, and Mark Stokely (“Respondents”) in the Chancery Court for Greene County (“the Trial Court”) seeking partition of their late mother’s home and property which they all had inherited but to which they had executed a quitclaim deed to sister Anna Eason to hold as life tenant. Respondents filed an answer asserting that Anna Eason was the life tenant and the land was not subject to partition. Respondents asserted the statute of limitations as a defense, as well. After a trial, the Trial Court dismissed Petitioners’ lawsuit. Petitioners’ appeal, arguing that Respondents waived the statute of limitations as a defense through abandonment and also that the Trial Court erred in not reforming the deed when the parties did not understand it would create a life estate for Anna Eason. We hold, inter alia, that Respondents properly pled the statute of limitations and could rely upon it. We hold further that Petitioners’ lack of knowledge regarding all the implications of a life estate is not, in itself, a basis for reforming the deed. We affirm the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Zackary James Childress, entered an open guilty plea to two counts of simple possession of a Schedule II controlled substance, one count of simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent release eligibility on each count. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Andre Benson, was convicted of aggravated robbery after a jury trial and was sentenced to serve fifteen years in prison. The Petitioner filed a timely postconviction petition, and the post-conviction court denied the petition without a hearing for failure to state a colorable claim. The Petitioner then filed a second petition, raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing on the second petition, which it proceeded to deny. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of his counsel at trial and that, as a result, he is entitled to post-conviction relief. The State counters that the post-conviction court lacked jurisdiction to hear a second post-conviction petition when a prior petition was decided on the merits. Alternatively, the State argues that the petition was without merit and that the denial should be affirmed. We conclude that the post-conviction court was required by statute to dismiss the second or subsequent petition, and we affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

Defendant, Christopher Jones, appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to serve in confinement his effective two-year sentence resulting from his guilty pleas to reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), simple possession of buprenophine (a Schedule III drug), and simple possession of marijuana (a Schedule VI drug). Upon reviewing the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Wayne Phillips, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine and was sentenced by the trial court to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements made to an officer after the Defendant consented to a search of his bedroom. The Defendant also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendants, Jaquan Gathing and Prince Parker, were convicted of various offenses in connection with the robbery and assault of three victims committed with firearms and a hatchet. Mr. Gathing was convicted of attempted especially aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, facilitation of aggravated assault, facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated robbery, and he received an effective sentence of forty-seven years. Mr. Parker was convicted of facilitation of attempted especially aggravated robbery, facilitation of aggravated assault, facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery, and facilitation of especially aggravated robbery, and he received an effective sentence of twenty-six years. On appeal, Mr. Gathing relies on his brief and oral argument and challenges: (1) the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress; (2) improper comments made by the State during voir dire; (3) the insufficient chain of custody for DNA evidence; (4) improper comments made to the jury regarding the merger of offenses; and (5) the State’s failure to preserve the record for appeal. On appeal, Mr. Parker relies on his brief and challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions; (2) the admission of a photograph of an alleged victim’s injuries; (3) the trial court’s application of enhancement factors to his sentences; and (4) the trial court’s decision to run his sentences consecutively. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of corrected judgments of Prince Parker to reflect facilitation of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, rather than with serious bodily injury, and to reflect the proper classification of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery as a Class B felony, rather than a Class C felony.

The Appellant, William Lamont Green, is appealing the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State has filed a motion asking this Court to affirm pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.  Said motion is hereby granted.          

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (2) abandonment by demonstrating a wanton disregard for the children’s welfare; (3) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans; and (4) persistent conditions. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.

Deborah Goodman (“Employee”) sustained a back injury in the course of her work for Schwarz Paper Company (“Employer”). It is undisputed that the injury was compensable. All medical expenses were paid by Employer. Employee continued to work after her injury. The sole issue presented to the trial court was whether Employee successfully rebutted the presumption of correctness attached to the authorized treating physician’s impairment rating. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(k)(7) (2014 & Supp. 2017). After a compensation hearing, the trial court ruled that Employee had not overcome the presumption. Benefits were awarded based on the treating physician’s impairment rating. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

Christopher Alan Walls, the Petitioner, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, stating as his ground for relief that he was “presently restrained of his liberty by virtue of an illegal, void, and/or expired criminal conviction/sentence[.]” The Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to receive the pretrial jail credit for the time he was incarcerated in Loudon County after a hold was placed on him by the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department on October 25, 2010. Therefore his sentence, after applying sentence reduction credits, expired on or about December 29, 2016. The habeas corpus court found that “the petition demonstrates no right to relief” and summarily dismissed the petition. We affirm the dismissal of the petition but remand the cause to the habeas corpus court for transfer to the Circuit Court for Jefferson County for correction of the judgments to provide the pretrial jail credit to which the Petitioner is entitled.

The Petitioner, Thomas Ernest Young, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claims entitlement to habeas corpus relief, alleging that his guilty-pleaded conviction for Class C felony possession of cocaine is void because the cocaine was obtained following his unlawful arrest, because he was the victim of vindictive prosecution, because he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and because his plea resulted from coercion. Alternatively, he submits that we should treat his petition as one seeking post-conviction relief and that the one-year statute of limitations should be tolled due to his mental incompetence. Following our review, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief and, furthermore, that tolling of the one-year limitations period for filing a post-conviction petition is not required. Therefore, we affirm summary dismissal of his petition.

The Appellant, James Mario Starnes, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred because his motion stated a colorable claim for relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon Christopher Scott, was sentenced to an effective twenty-five-year sentence for his guilty-pleaded convictions to attempted first degree murder and reckless endangerment. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court failed to provide adequate analysis in support of its decision to enhance his sentence to the maximum within the range for a Class A felony, failed to assign enough weight to the one mitigating factor it found applicable, and failed to apply two additional mitigating factors. Additionally, the Defendant submits that his enhanced sentence does not comport with the purposes and principles of our Sentencing Act. Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s sentencing decision.

This is a termination of parental rights action involving two minor children. In June 2015, temporary custody of the children was granted to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the children were placed in foster care. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the father on May 12, 2016, following the mother’s surrender of her parental rights. The trial court conducted a bench trial on January 18, 2017. On February 1, 2017, the court entered an order granting the petition upon finding that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the ground of abandonment by the father’s engagement in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children prior to his incarceration. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Christopher Jerald Crowley, was convicted by a jury of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of expert witnesses about the Defendant’s mental health that the Defendant sought to present to establish that the killing was a voluntary manslaughter; (2) that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter; (3) that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from a witness about a statement the Defendant made several months before the killing; and (4) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wife challenges the trial court’s correction of the final divorce decree pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 by correcting the type of alimony awarded and adding an end date for the payment of alimony. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Hardin County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Joseph Howard Hinson, III, of selling .5 grams or more of methamphetamine within a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, James Earnest Smith, was indicted for one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a sentence of twelve years’ confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Quantez Person, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of criminal exposure to human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), see T.C.A. § 39-13-109(a), arguing that the trial court erred by consolidating the charge of criminal exposure to HIV with a charge of aggravated rape of which the defendant was later acquitted, that the trial court erred by admitting health department records, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Under the circumstances presented in this case, Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) barred the State from bringing the charge of criminal exposure to HIV to trial. In consequence, the defendant’s conviction is vacated, and the charge is dismissed.

The Plaintiff, Gregory E. Pope, filed this action for workers’ compensation benefits in the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (“trial court”) against his former employer, Nebco of Cleveland, Inc., d/b/a Toyota of Cleveland (“Toyota” or “the dealership”). In 2014, Mr. Pope suffered a severe knee injury while competing in a “mud run” charity event sponsored by his employer and other local businesses. During trial, Toyota argued that Mr. Pope’s injury was not compensable because it arose from his voluntary participation in a non-work-related activity. The trial court determined that Mr. Pope’s injury was compensable and awarded him medical benefits. On post-trial motion, the trial court also increased the amount of Mr. Pope’s awarded attorney’s fees. Toyota appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (“Appeals Board”), which reversed on the issue of compensability as well as the accompanying award of attorney’s fees. Mr. Pope subsequently appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which referred this case to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. In this appeal, Mr. Pope challenges the Appeals Board’s determination on the issue of compensability and raises two constitutional challenges to the statutes establishing the Appeals Board. We determine that Mr. Pope’s constitutional challenges to the statutes establishing the Appeals Board are without merit. Following our thorough review of the record, we also affirm the Appeals Board’s reversal and dismissal of the case on the grounds that Mr. Pope’s injury is not compensable.

The defendant, Douglas Beauregard, appeals his Madison County Criminal Court jury conviction of vandalism of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, alleging an insufficiency of evidence and error in the sentencing and restitution decisions of the trial court. Because the record does not support either the denial of all forms of alternative sentencing or the amount of restitution ordered in this case, we reverse the imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence, vacate the restitution order, and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

Petitioner, Dwayne Wright, was convicted of one count of aggravated rape and sentenced to twenty-four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Dwayne Wright, No. W2013-00433-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 1168579 (Tenn. Crim. App. March 21, 2014). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to call Eric Hulbert as a witness at trial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Joseph Cordell Brewer, III, appeals from the denial of relief following a hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief. Only Petitioner and his trial counsel testified at the post-conviction hearing. Since Petitioner failed to present evidence of any prejudice to him as a result of trial counsel’s alleged deficient representation, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Greene County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Mario Donte Keene, on four counts of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, all in connection with the death of the victim, Donald Gunter. A jury convicted the Defendant as charged, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a rational juror to have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The Defendant also asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing arguments, warranting a new trial. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand the case for entry of amended judgments merging counts two, three, and four into count one.

This case involves the dismissal of a Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA) action filed by Jamal Watson against the Tennessee Board of Regents (TBR) and Pellissippi State Community College (PSCC) (collectively the defendants). PSCC offered Watson a fulltime, tenure-track position, but subsequently rescinded the offer. Watson filed a THRA case in the Circuit Court for Knox County (the trial court) against the defendants alleging race discrimination. He later filed a notice of claim for breach of contract in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the same entities. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants asserted that Watson waived his cause of action against “any state officer or employee,” pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(b), by filing a claim against the state in the Tennessee Claims Commission. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Watson appeals. We reverse.