APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Billy Tankersley (“Employee”) worked for Batesville Casket Company (“Employer”) for thirty-seven years. He injured his right shoulder and arm on December 12, 2012. He ultimately was unable to return to work. He filed this action in the Chancery Court for Coffee County seeking permanent total disability benefits. The trial court found him to be permanently and totally disabled. The award was apportioned 90% to Employer and 10% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Linda Wimmer (“Plaintiff”) sued Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System (“Erlanger”) with regard to an incident in which Plaintiff was hit with an interior door and seriously injured. After a trial without a jury, the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) entered its Memorandum and Judgment finding and holding, inter alia, there was no evidence that the location of the door constituted a defective design and no evidence that the door itself was defective, and that even if Erlanger had a duty to post a sign or put a glass window in the door, there was no evidence of causation. The Trial Court entered judgment in favor of Erlanger. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that Erlanger was immune from suit pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-101, et seq., that Plaintiff failed to prove that said immunity was removed, and, in the alternative, that Plaintiff failed to prove causation. We, therefore, affirm the Trial Court’s judgment in favor of Erlanger.

This appeal arises from an alleged breach of contract. Lew Winters (“Winters”) sued Southern Heritage Bank (“the Bank”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) for, among other things, breach of contract. Specifically, Winters asserted that the Bank wrongly backed out of a tripartite agreement involving the Internal Revenue Service (“the IRS”) which would have allowed Winters to obtain financing for new tractors and therefore be able to continue operating his trucking company. The Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that no such agreement was reached. Instead, according to the Bank, the parties only engaged in discussions about a possible resolution. The Trial Court granted the Bank’s motion for summary judgment. Winters appealed to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the purported oral agreement violates the Statute of Frauds. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal arises from a judgment of divorce and an award of damages in tort.  The trial court awarded the wife an absolute divorce and full custody of their minor child.  After determining that the husband was willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the court set child support based on his earning capacity rather than his actual gross income.  Then, the court classified, valued, and divided the marital property and awarded the wife both alimony in futuro and alimony in solido.  The court also granted the wife a judgment for compensatory damages on her tort claim.  On appeal, the husband challenges the court’s determination that he is willfully and voluntarily underemployed, the valuation of the marital residence, the alimony awards, and the award of damages in tort.  After careful review, we vacate the court’s award of damages to the wife for her child’s pain and suffering.  In all other respects, we affirm.

A father filed a petition to modify his child support obligation based on a reduction in income. Following a trial, the court determined that there was a significant variance between the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines and the amount of support ordered, and the court reduced the father’s child support obligation. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support or visit; (2) abandonment by an incarcerated parent by wanton disregard; and (3) on grounds codified at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) et seq. Because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Father willfully failed to support or visit the child, and because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Father had the financial means to pay for his reasonable share of prenatal and postnatal support, we reverse the trial court’s findings as to these grounds. We affirm as to the other grounds found by the trial court. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the best interest of the minor child.

The petitioner, Randy Poole, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and in filing his motion for new trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Aaron Westbrook, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel relating to the entry of his guilty plea. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Thomas J. Privett, entered a guilty plea to vehicular homicide by intoxication, with an agreed sentence length of ten years and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and determined that the Defendant would serve his sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing and in fully revoking his probation on a prior conviction. After a review of the record, we determine that there was no abuse of discretion, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In May 2015, the Montgomery County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Christopher D. Linsey, for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted as charged, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range III persistent offender, to a total effective sentence of twenty-three years. On appeal, he contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver, and he challenges his sentence as excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Gregory Griggs, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On June 18, 2015, Petitioner pleaded guilty to multiple offenses: attempted first degree murder; employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; attempted aggravated robbery; possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and evading arrest. Petitioner received an effective sentence of 24 years’ incarceration. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief, finding that Petitioner failed to establish that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficiency. After a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an action against an attorney who previously served as a Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 40A court appointed guardian ad litem for the benefit of the plaintiff and his two younger siblings in their parents’ divorce. Plaintiff alleges that he had an attorney-client relationship with the guardian ad litem, and the guardian ad litem violated the attorney-client relationship by disclosing confidential information to the divorce court after he was 18 years old. The guardian ad litem denies any liability or actionable conduct, insisting that all of her actions were pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 40A and the Order Appointing Guardian Ad Litem in the divorce action. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) upon a finding that the complaint failed to state a claim because the guardian ad litem’s duties in the divorce action did not terminate when the oldest child turned 18 due to the fact that the custody proceeding concerning his two younger siblings was still ongoing, and the order of appointment authorized the guardian ad litem to disclose to the court confidential information that may affect the best interests of the children. Finding no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Jeffrey Henry, was indicted in case number 13-06323 by a Shelby County Grand Jury for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner was also indicted in case number 13-06324 for two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. Petitioner entered best interest guilty pleas in both cases to each count of aggravated sexual battery in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges. Petitioner agreed to serve an out-of-range sentence of 20 years at 100%. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; and (2) failure to substantially comply with the reasonable requirements of the permanency plan. Because Appellees did not meet their burden to show that Mother willfully failed to provide support for the children, we reverse the trial court’s order as to the ground of abandonment by willful failure to support. The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.

This is a personal injury case involving a motor vehicle accident. The alleged tortfeasor died subsequent to the injury-causing accident. The plaintiffs were unaware of the decedent’s death and commenced this suit naming him as a defendant. Some months later, after learning of the decedent’s death, the plaintiffs sought the appointment of an administrator ad litem in the Probate Court and amended their complaint naming the administrator ad litem as a party as required by the survival statute. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the plaintiffs’ complaint was not properly filed until after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs timely appealed. Having concluded that the plaintiffs did not properly commence their lawsuit within the time afforded by the applicable statute of limitations, we affirm.

This case involves various issues related to an ordinance the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County enacted to address short-term rental properties. Among other things, the enacted ordinance provided that no more than 3% of
non-owner-occupied single-family or two-family residential units would be granted short-term rental permits in each census tract. The plaintiffs, who previously listed their home on Airbnb.com, filed suit against the Metropolitan Government challenging the enforceability of the ordinance on several fronts. In addition to asserting that the enacted ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, the plaintiffs contended that the 3% cap on certain short-term rentals was an unlawful monopoly. After competing motions for summary judgment were filed, the trial court held that the definition of a “short-term rental property” was unconstitutionally vague as-applied to the plaintiffs, but it also held that the 3% cap did not constitute a monopoly. Given the plaintiffs’ success on their constitutional “vagueness” claim, the trial court found them to be prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and awarded them certain attorney’s fees. On appeal, both sides raise issues asserting error. Because several definitions contained within the governmental ordinance have been amended since the filing of this appeal, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ constitutional “vagueness” claim is now moot. Concerning the propriety of the 3% cap on non-owner-occupied short-term rentals, we have determined that the cap is constitutionally permissible even assuming that it constitutes a monopoly. For reasons discussed herein, we vacate the award of attorney’s fees and remand the issue for reconsideration.   

Plaintiffs, an elderly man and his wife, sued their bank and affiliated entities and others, alleging various theories of liability. The elderly man, upon making two separate withdrawals of a large amount of cash from the bank, was robbed on two separate occasions following the withdrawals. Plaintiffs alleged that the robberies occurred because a bank employee informed her husband of the elderly couple’s address and of the large cash withdrawals. The bank filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the trial court granted the motion. We affirm the dismissal of several claims because the Appellants’ brief does not comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We affirm the dismissal of the remaining claims because Appellants have not stated a claim for which relief may be granted.

Two individuals purchased commercial property for the purpose of housing a business offering “flex loans” to consumers; the property owners were denied a building permit because the Zoning Administrator concluded that “flex loans” constituted cash advances, and consequently, the property owners’ intended use violated the requirement in the Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County Code of Ordinances that cash advance, check cashing, or title loan businesses be at least 1,320 feet apart. The property owners appealed to the Board of Zoning Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the administrator. The property owners then petitioned for certiorari review in Davidson County Chancery Court; the court granted the writ and, after a hearing, affirmed the Board’s decision. Finding that the decision of the Board is supported by substantial and material evidence and is not arbitrary or capricious, we concur with the decision of the trial court and affirm the Board’s decision.      

This is a controversy between the City of Tullahoma and Coffee County about the proper distribution of a portion of liquor by the drink revenues collected in Tullahoma. The trial court ruled that the distribution provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(2)(A) were not effective in Coffee County and that the statute was ambiguous. The trial court resorted to the legislative history to determine that Tullahoma should keep the funds addressed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-4-306(2)(A). We do not find the statutory language ambiguous and reverse the decision of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of C.K.H. (mother) with respect to her child, K.Y.H. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of mother’s rights based upon the persistence of conditions that led to the removal of the child. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence that terminating mother’s rights was in the best interest of the child. Mother appeals. We affirm.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion to recuse the Trial Court Judge filed by Stephanie Diane Metzger (“Mother”) during the final hearing in the parties’ divorce proceedings below. Having reviewed the Petition for Recusal Appeal filed by Mother, and discerning no reversible error in Trial Court’s denial of the motion, we affirm

Mueller Company (“Employer”) manufactures cast iron valves and related objects. Tommy Wyatt (“Employee”) worked for Employer for nineteen years, primarily in the cleaning room where flawed cast iron parts are chipped and ground. The job required moving and manipulating heavy objects. After suffering from low back pain for approximately three years, Employee underwent surgery in 2006. He returned to his regular job without restrictions. However, his symptoms persisted, and he underwent spinal fusion surgery in July 2013. In March 2014, he notified Employer he was seeking benefits for an alleged gradual injury. After investigation, Employer denied the claim contending Employee’s condition was caused by preexisting degenerative disease in his spine and further asserting Employee had failed to give timely notice. The trial court ruled in favor of Employee and awarded permanent total disability benefits. Employer appeals. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The plaintiff, C.D., a minor, was a resident of Mountain Youth Academy, a traumafocused residential treatment facility, when he got into a physical altercation with an employee of the defendant Keystone Continuum, LLC doing business as Mountain Youth Academy. The employee, Jacob Spencer, is described by the defendant as a “mental health associate.” The plaintiffs describe him as a “third shift night guard.” The minor’s mother filed this action, proceeding both individually and on behalf of her son. The complaint alleges, among other things, that Spencer pulled the minor plaintiff to the ground and stomped on his foot, causing him injury. Defendant moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, arguing that the complaint in this case alleges health care liability claims. Defendant argued that because of plaintiffs’ (1) failure to provide pre-suit notice under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act (the THCLA), Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26- 121 (Supp. 2017), and (2) their failure to file a certificate of good faith with the complaint, id. § 29-26-122, the lawsuit should be dismissed with prejudice. The trial court held that plaintiffs’ claims sounded in health care liability. It dismissed the mother’s action with prejudice. The court also dismissed the minor’s action, but did so without prejudice. Defendant appeals, arguing that the minor’s action should have been dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiffs also present issues. They argue that the trial court erred in ruling that their claims are based upon health care liability. Additionally and alternatively, plaintiffs argue that their claims fall within the “common knowledge” exception to the general requirement of expert testimony in a health care liability action. We hold that plaintiffs’ claims for assault and battery are unrelated to the provision of, or failure to provide, health care services. As a consequence of this, we hold that the plaintiffs’ assault and battery claims do not fall within the ambit of a “health care liability action” as defined by the statute. We further hold that plaintiffs’ direct claims against the defendant, for negligent supervision and/or training of its employees, are health care liability claims but ones involving matters that ordinary laypersons will be able to assess by their common knowledge. Hence, expert medical testimony is not required. The trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims for assault and battery is vacated. We further hold that mother’s failure to provide the defendant with pre-suit notice mandates a dismissal of her claim for negligent supervision and/or training, but that dismissal should have been without prejudice rather than with prejudice. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment on this part of mother’s claim is modified to reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice. We affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the minor’s claim of negligent supervision and/or training and further affirm the trial court’s judgment that this dismissal is without prejudice.

The petitioner, Earl D. Crawford, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2016 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1986 convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, and armed robbery. Because the petition was filed nearly three decades beyond the applicable statute of limitations, because this is the petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction relief, because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief, and because there is no merit to the petitioner’s claim of sentence illegality, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

John B. Evans (“Plaintiff”) appeals the December 13, 2016 order of the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Piedmont Natural Gas Co., Inc. (“Piedmont”) after finding and holding that there was no evidence that Piedmont or its agent had committed any intentional, reckless, or malicious act which caused the damages claimed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff additionally raises an issue regarding the Trial Court’s grant of discretionary costs to Piedmont, which included costs taxed to Piedmont by this Court in a previous appeal. We find and hold that Piedmont made a properly supported motion for summary judgment and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate specific facts in the record showing that Piedmont or its agent had committed any intentional, reckless, or malicious act. We, therefore, affirm the grant of summary judgment. We further find and hold that costs taxed to Piedmont by this Court in the previous appeal are not properly included in an award of discretionary costs pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.04. We, therefore, modify the award of discretionary costs by reducing the discretionary costs from $1,133.00 to $643.00.