APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Appellant, Jerome Edwin Lockridge, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, and misdemeanor vandalism and received an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted aggravated burglary conviction because the State failed to prove that he entered the habitation with the intent to commit theft. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this action, the trial court terminated the appellant mother’s parental rights to her three children upon the court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the statutory grounds of (1) abandonment by willful failure to visit, (2) abandonment by willful failure to financially support, and (3) severe child abuse. The court also determined by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother has timely appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm

The Appellant, Ramey Michelle Long, was convicted by a jury of the Class A misdemeanors driving under the influence (DUI); DUI, second offense; possession of marijuana; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Appellant was also convicted of the Class C misdemeanors speeding and violating the open container law. The trial court merged the DUI convictions and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each Class A misdemeanor and thirty days for each Class C misdemeanor. The court ordered the sentence for the DUI conviction to be served consecutively to the remaining sentences, which were to be served concurrently. The trial court further approved of the fines imposed by the jury, which were the maximum allowable for each offense, for a total of $8,600. On appeal, the Appellant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction of DUI, second offense; (2) the trial court erred by denying her motions to suppress; (3) the trial court erred by preventing her from introducing her pharmaceutical records, medical records, hardware taken from her back during surgery, and a hand-drawn chart concerning the therapeutic levels of her medication; (4) the trial court erred by admitting still photographs taken from a video; (5) the trial court failed to dismiss the speeding charge because it was not included in the indictment; (6) the trial court erred in sentencing; and (7) the trial court erred in revoking her bond pending appeal. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by imposing a thirty-day sentence for violating the open container law; accordingly, the case must be remanded for correction of the judgment of conviction to reflect that the punishment is a $50 fine. Further, on remand the judgment of conviction for speeding must be vacated and dismissed. We affirm the trial court’s judgments in all other respects.

The Defendant, Katherine Taylor, was convicted of attempted first-degree murder and sentenced to 18 years as a Range I offender. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s history of drug use and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment.

This appeal arises from the termination of a father’s parental rights. John C. and Kellee C. (“Petitioners”), uncle and aunt respectively of Apex R. (“the Child”), filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) seeking to terminate Dustin R. (“Father”)’s parental rights to the Child. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order terminating Father’s parental rights on the grounds of willful failure to visit and support. The Trial Court found also that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest, all by clear and convincing evidence. Father appeals, arguing among other things that the Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“the UCCJEA”) because the Juvenile Court for Jefferson County, Alabama (“the Alabama Court”) made the initial custody determination, the Child’s mother remained in Alabama, and the Alabama Court never relinquished its exclusive and continuing jurisdiction. We hold that the Trial Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the termination petition. We hold further that grounds for termination were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Homeowners in housing development brought suit against their homeowners association, its directors and the bank that assumed management of the development after the developers defaulted on their loans used to finance the development; the homeowners sought damages and other relief arising from the defendants’ alleged failure to fulfill their obligations to properly maintain the subdivision. Plaintiffs asserted claims for tortious interference with their contract rights, breach of fiduciary duties, invalid liens, and slander of title. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the various claims, and plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the grant of summary judgment to the bank on plaintiffs’ claim of tortious interference, and to the homeowners association on its counterclaim for recovery of delinquent assessments; we vacate the award of counsel fees to the association and the order quashing the notice of deposition of a director of the association and the association’s counsel; in all other respects we affirm the judgment.

The pro se Petitioner, E. Louis Thomas, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This suit was brought by the children of a woman who died while incarcerated at Hickman County Jail. Defendant is a contractor of the jail that provides medical services at the jail; a nurse in Defendant’s employment treated the decedent for symptoms of drug and alcohol withdrawal. She passed away shortly after. The children brought this suit under the Health Care Liability Act claiming negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. In due course, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that element of Plaintiffs’ claim; the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and subsequently denied a motion to revise, filed by the Plaintiffs. This appeal followed.

Defendant in wrongful death action appeals the judgment entered against him in favor of the mother and personal representative of the decedent’s estate. Over the course of the litigation, the defendant failed to comply with multiple orders to compel discovery, and as a result, the court entered a judgment by default in accordance with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 37.02. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

The Defendant, Nicholas J. Alberts, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The pro se Petitioner, Kenneth O. Williams, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

This suit was brought by the children of a woman who died while incarcerated at Hickman County Jail. Defendant is a contractor of the jail that provides medical services at the jail; a nurse in Defendant’s employment treated the decedent for symptoms of drug and alcohol withdrawal. She passed away shortly after. The children brought this suit under the Health Care Liability Act claiming negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. In due course, Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that element of Plaintiffs’ claim; the trial court granted Defendant’s motion and subsequently denied a motion to revise, filed by the Plaintiffs. This appeal followed.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case.

The evidence presented at trial indicates that the school system’s “mopping policy” was actually part of a larger “Departmental Safety Program” directed toward all Clarksville-Montgomery County School System employees. For the “Custodial Department,” the program provided, “[w]hen mopping floors, cleaning up spills, or anytime the floor becomes wet for whatever reason, always put the wet floor signs out until the area is completely dry.” For “Professional Staff,” the program provided, “[a]lways pay close attention to wet floor signs or wet floor conditions to avoid slips and falls.”

In this case, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for constructing a gate that interfered with their use of an existing gravel road located on the defendants’ farm. According to the plaintiffs, access to their property required use of the gravel road. The gravel road in question crosses two separate tracts owned by the defendants and runs southwest to northeast from a state highway through the defendants’ farm and then east to west through another tract. Although the plaintiffs claimed that the easement was fifty-feet in width along its entire length, the court found that the section of the road running through the defendants’ farm was a public road with a width of only twelve feet. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for discretionary costs. The plaintiffs appeal the court’s finding concerning the width of the public road and the denial of discretionary costs. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case involves a contract dispute concerning four simultaneously executed agreements that, if completed, would have essentially constituted a trade of two parcels of improved real property. The plaintiff buyers entered into the four agreements with the defendant sellers on October 1, 2013, giving the buyers a lease on the sellers’ property, located on Walnut Breeze Lane in Knoxville, Tennessee (the “Walnut Breeze Property”), with an option to purchase that property in the unspecified future. The buyers agreed to trade equity in their own property, located on First Street in Corryton, Tennessee (“First Street Property”), as partial payment for the Walnut Breeze Property if they chose to exercise the option. On January 6, 2014, the parties met for a “closing,” and the buyers conveyed title to the First Street Property to the sellers. However, the “REAL ESTATE SALES CONTRACT” related to the Walnut Breeze Property stipulated that the transfer of title to the Walnut Breeze Property was subject to the existing mortgagee’s approval, which neither party had obtained. The buyers continued to reside at the Walnut Breeze Property, making monthly payments to the sellers until a year later when the buyers vacated the Walnut Breeze Property and stopped making payments. The sellers sent the buyers a notice to vacate three months later. In November 2016, the buyers filed a complaint in the Union County Chancery Court (“trial court”), claiming breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud. The buyers requested $75,000 in compensatory damages, $150,000 in punitive damages, return of the First Street Property, and reasonable attorney’s fees. The sellers filed an answer and subsequent amended answer, denying all substantive allegations and raising affirmative defenses. The sellers concomitantly filed a counterclaim, asserting, inter alia, that the buyers had breached the lease agreement and requesting an award of unpaid rent and reasonable attorney’s fees. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the buyers breached the terms of the lease agreement by withholding payments on the Walnut Breeze Property for three months. The trial court also found that the buyers had exercised their option to purchase the Walnut Breeze Property by signing over title to the First Street Property but that the sellers knew at that time that the buyers could not satisfy the financing condition of the sale. The trial court awarded to the buyers the equity value of the First Street Property as stipulated in the sales agreement concerning that property, minus the value of three months’ unpaid rent, which the trial court awarded to the sellers. The trial court denied the parties’ respective requests for attorney’s fees. The sellers have appealed. Having determined that each party is entitled to some award of attorney’s fees under the overarching contract, we reverse the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees and remand for a determination of the respective attorney’s fee awards. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to two children. The juvenile court found six statutory grounds for termination and that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We conclude that the evidence was less than clear and convincing as to one of the statutory grounds and that two other statutory grounds did not apply in this instance. But the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support three grounds for termination and that termination is in the children’s best interest. So we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

The defendant, Denton Jones, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, arguing that the State should not have been permitted to aggregate into a single count of theft the value of property taken on five separate occasions from two different locations; that the trial court erred by permitting testimony concerning evidence that suggested the defendant had committed other offenses; that the trial court erred by denying his motions for mistrial, including one based upon an alleged violation of Brady v. Maryland; that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial entitle him to a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

I concur fully in the majority’s opinion in this case. I write separately solely to express my opinion that inasmuch as the majority opinion relies on this Court’s decision in In re Ayden S., No. M2017-01185-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2447044, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 31, 2018), for the standard of proof concerning Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(14) (2017), I believe that this statutory ground allows termination of parental rights if the petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent “has failed to meet the requirement of manifesting both a willingness and an ability to assume legal and physical custody of the child or has failed to meet the requirement of manifesting both a willingness and an ability to assume financial responsibility of the child.” See In re Amynn K., No. E2017-01866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280, at *12-15 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018); see also In re Neamiah R., No. E2017-02000-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 2331868, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 23, 2018).

The Defendant, Franklin James Howe, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

This is a slip-and-fall case. A middle school teacher injured herself when she fell in the hallway outside her classroom on a wet floor. A custodian had been mopping the hallway prior to her fall, and the teacher alleged that the custodians had negligently and misleadingly placed wet-floor signs on the opposite side of the hallway, which did not warn her of the wet floor on her side of the hallway. Thereafter, the teacher brought suit against the school district pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the custodians guilty of negligence and assigned seventy-five percent of the fault to the school district and twenty-five percent of the fault to the teacher. A judgment was entered against the school district in the amount of $180,000.00, after reduction for the teacher’s comparative fault. The school district appeals, contending (1) that it is immune from suit; (2) that it was not negligent; and (3) that any negligence it may have committed is outweighed by that of the teacher’s comparative fault. The teacher argues that the trial court erred in assigning any of the fault to her. We affirm in part and reverse in part

A medical product sales representative brought suit against her former employer, a hospital, claiming retaliation in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. After a bench trial, the trial court judge entered a verdict in favor of the hospital, having concluded that the employee failed to carry her burden of proof. In spite of dismissing the employee’s case, the trial court awarded the employee a portion of her attorney’s fees as “sanctions” against the hospital for making an allegedly late-filed motion to strike the employee’s demand for a jury trial, which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the employee’s retaliation claim, and we reverse the trial court’s order granting the employee attorney’s fees.

Defendant, Quincy D. Scott, appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery for which he was sentenced to seventeen years as a Range II, multiple offender at 85%. On appeal, Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of various errors at trial entitled him to a new trial. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Chris Jones, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief upon the post-conviction court’s determination that it was filed outside the statute of limitations and that the Petitioner failed to prove that his mental incompetence required its tolling. After review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

In this post-divorce matter, the trial court ordered the father, Harold W. Duke, III (“Father”), to deposit $5,729.17 and $5,312.50 per month, respectively, into the educational accounts of the parties’ two daughters. The court determined that the children’s separate trust accounts were not required to be utilized to fund their college expenses. The court also awarded the mother, Kathryn A. Duke (“Mother”), $4,006.00 for attorney’s fees incurred in pursuing a civil contempt petition against Father, as well as $25,000.00 for attorney’s fees and $1,237.50 in discretionary costs related to establishment of the proper amounts to be contributed by Father to the educational accounts. Father has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We decline, however, to award Mother attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal.

The Petitioner, Richard Earl Madkins, Jr., filed a petition in the Trousdale County Circuit Court seeking habeas corpus relief from his conviction of especially aggravated robbery and resulting twenty-five-year sentence, alleging that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict or sentence him because he was arrested for the offense without a warrant. The habeas corpus court denied relief without a hearing, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.