APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case.

The Defendant, Andre Anthony, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct a clerical mistake pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. The Defendant contends that his two consecutive sentences at issue were originally ordered to run in a specific order but that the challenged corrected judgment forms indicate that each sentence runs consecutively to the other, in no particular order, and should once again be corrected. The State responds that the trial court correctly denied the Rule 36 motion because the order of the consecutive sentences is immaterial and because the corrected judgments accurately reflect the Defendant’s sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Cheryl Hanzlik, in the form of attorney’s fees.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection shouldtherefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Alethea Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of a petition for an order of protection based upon allegations of stalking. This is one of four cases in which the petitioner sought an order of protection against four women. We affirm the trial court’s denial of the petition in this case

The defendant, Anthony Eugene Barnett, appeals his Lawrence County Circuit Court conviction of theft of services, arguing that his judgment of conviction contains a clerical error by listing the incorrect statute for his conviction and that the trial court erred in denying his oral motion to continue his case, made the day of his trial.  Upon review of the record, we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the defendant’s conviction for theft of services.  Because the record includes neither a transcript of the defendant’s oral motion to continue his case, the trial court’s ruling thereupon, nor a transcript of the trial, we conclude that the issue is waived and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that this action has been “rendered moot” by the closure of the Bristol Regional Women’s Center in Bristol, Tennessee (“the Clinic”). Regarding the remaining issues on appeal, I concur with the majority’s holding that Petitioner Schanzenbach did not present sufficient evidence of stalking and that the trial court’s denial of her petition for order of protection should therefore be affirmed. I also agree with the majority’s decision not to award damages to the respondent, Rowan Skeen, in the form of attorney’s fees.

The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) removed two children from their parents’
custody in May of 2020. After a long period in which DCS did not hear from the children’s
father, and the father made no progress on his permanency plan, DCS filed a petition to
terminate the father’s parental rights. Following a bench trial, the Juvenile Court for
Overton County (the “juvenile court”) found that DCS proved five statutory grounds for
termination of the father’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile
court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of the father’s parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. The father appeals and, discerning no error, we
affirm.

In this post-divorce case, the husband filed a petition for declaratory judgment on the issue of whether a provision of the parties’ marital dissolution agreement concerning military retirement was modifiable.  The trial court dismissed the husband’s petition on the ground of failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and ruled that the provision at issue was not modifiable.  While we find that the trial court erred in granting the wife’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we affirm the result reached by the trial court on the merits of the dispute.  Further, we have determined that the wife was not entitled to an additional award of attorney fees at trial and is not entitled to her attorney fees on appeal.

A taxpayer failed to pay property taxes for a number of years. The county began enforcement proceedings and, following the entry of a default judgment against the taxpayer, the taxpayer’s property was ultimately sold at a delinquent tax sale. The purchaser filed a writ of possession to obtain possession of the property from the taxpayer, at which time the taxpayer filed a motion to set aside the default judgment and resulting tax sale. The taxpayer alleged lack of notice concerning the underlying delinquent tax proceedings and violation of her due
process and equal protection rights. The trial court denied the taxpayer’s motion to set aside, concluding the taxpayer was properly served with notice of the underlying delinquent tax proceedings. We affirm.

Caprice McLemore, Gary McLemore, Misty Tanner, Barrett Tanner, and McKinley Tanner (together, “Plaintiffs” or “Appellants”) appeal from the judgment of the trial court dismissing their case against the defendant, Knox County (“Appellee” or “the County”). Appellants were injured in a car accident on Clinton Highway after being struck by a vehicle driven by Roy Michael Simmons (“Mr. Simmons”), who was evading a Knox County sheriff’s deputy. Plaintiffs filed suit against the County, alleging that it was liable for their injuries arising from the accident. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the deputy pursuing Mr. Simmons did not act unreasonably under the circumstances and that the County was thus not liable for Plaintiffs’ injuries. Plaintiffs timely appealed to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Gary Porter (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the Davidson County Chancery Court (the
“chancery court”), wherein he requested that the chancery court award him certain pre-trial
jail credits which he was already awarded toward a separate sentence that Petitioner
previously served. The chancery court granted summary judgment in favor of Amber
Phillips (“Phillips”), Director of Sentence Management Services for Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Petitioner appeals the judgment of the chancery
court. Having determined that Petitioner’s brief is not compliant with the relevant rules of
briefing in this Court, we conclude that his issue purportedly raised on appeal is waived.
The appeal is dismissed.

A renal care company retained a broker to locate sites for new dialysis clinics.  The company agreed to pay the broker a commission when leases were signed and “at the renewal or extension of said leases.”  The company later negotiated amendments to the leases without the broker’s participation.  The broker sued the company for breach of contract, alleging that he was due a commission on the lease amendments.  The trial court determined that eight lease amendments were renewals or extensions of the original leases.  And it entered a judgment against the company for the amount of the unpaid commissions.  We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the court’s finding that two of the lease amendments were renewals or extensions.  So we affirm the judgment as modified.

A Tipton County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for especially aggravated kidnapping,
especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault by strangulation. Prior to trial,
counts one and two of the indictment were amended to aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated burglary. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated assault by strangulation, and aggravated criminal trespass. The
trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective eight-year sentence. Defendant appeals,
arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated
kidnapping and aggravated assault by strangulation. Following our review of the entire
record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

This matter concerns prior restraint on speech. Patrick M. Malone (“Father”) is a party to
an action in the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Trial Court”) against
maternal grandparents James William Rose and Jennie Adams Rose (“Respondents”)
concerning Father’s minor child, Rosie (“the Child”). Father’s father, Michael P. Malone
(“Petitioner”), testified voluntarily at a hearing on Father’s motion to set bail pending
appeal of Father’s convictions for criminal contempt. In two written orders, the Trial Court
ordered Petitioner not to discuss the legal proceedings of Father’s case with the Child.
Petitioner, a non-party, filed a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court seeking reversal
of the Trial Court’s orders against him as he contends they were improper. We granted the
petition. The Trial Court’s restrictions lack an adequate evidentiary basis. In addition, the
Trial Court erred in abridging Petitioner’s constitutional right to free speech when
Petitioner is a non-party who lacked the benefit of notice or a hearing. We reverse the
provisions of the Trial Court’s orders dated August 15, 2023 and August 17, 2023
restraining Petitioner from discussing the legal proceedings of Father’s case with the Child.

This appeal arises from a breach of contract action wherein the appellee was directed to deposit funds owed to the appellant with the Clerk and Master. The appellee claimed an interest in some of the deposited funds pursuant to a separate contract. The trial court granted a default judgment in favor of the appellee for the requested amount. Because the appellant failed to comply with the briefing requirements set out in Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss the appeal.

Cecil Cemontaie Burnice, Defendant, claims the trial court erred by revoking his probation based on new criminal charges of aggravated robbery and criminal trespass because Defendant was subsequently found not guilty by a jury of aggravated robbery and the State dismissed the criminal trespass count  We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Defendant’s probation based on the evidence presented at the revocation hearing.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Antonio D. Gause, was convicted by a Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury of two counts of first degree felony murder under alternate theories; especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony; and accessory after the fact, a Class E felony. After merging the felony murder convictions, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the first degree felony murder conviction, twenty-five years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and two years for the accessory after the fact conviction, for an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A mother and a father appeal the termination of their parental rights. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of four statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s parental rights and five statutory grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights. The court also determined termination was in the child’s best interest. After a thorough review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 3, 2023. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until December 8, 2023, more than thirty days after the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a divorce after a short marriage. The husband appeals from the ruling of
the trial court as it relates to the division of marital assets, the number of days he was awarded in
the parenting plan, and the alimony award to the wife. Upon our review, we find the order appealed
from is nonfinal and must be dismissed.

Defendant, Jamieum Alvin Reid, was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for
possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of 0.5 grams or
more of cocaine with intent to deliver, and possession of methamphetamine. Defendant
pled guilty as charged and agreed to an effective eight-year sentence, with the manner of
service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve
his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying alternative sentencing because he was already approved by a
community based program, and the State failed to present evidence that an alternative
sentence was inappropriate. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce action following a short-term marriage. There were no children born of the marriage, and the only issue on appeal pertains to the classification of real property. At issue is the Wade Springs property, which the husband purchased using his separate property. He closed on the purchase of the Wade Springs property the day after the parties married, and the property was deeded in the husband’s name only. Because the property was used as the marital residence during the two-year marriage and marital assets were used to maintain the property, the wife contended that the property became marital property by transmutation, commingling, or Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121. The trial court found that the Wade Springs property was the husband’s separate property at the time of purchase and it remained his separate property. The court further found that the wife’s contributions to the property could easily be extracted and awarded her, inter alia, a cash judgment in the amount of her contributions to the home. Determining that the evidence does not preponderate against these findings, we affirm.

In this easement dispute involving a shared driveway between adjoining real property
owners, the petitioners filed an action for declaratory judgment, alleging that the
respondents had interfered with their use of the driveway and requesting that the court
declare the “rights and obligations of the parties.” Acting without benefit of counsel, one
of the two respondents filed a response opposing the petition and subsequently filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting multiple counterclaims. The trial court
dismissed the respondent’s counterclaims in an order not included in the appellate record.
The trial court conducted a bench trial, during which all parties were represented by
counsel. At trial, the petitioners sought an implied easement and an easement by
necessity. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the parties had shared driveway
easements and that the petitioners had carried their burden to prove an implied easement
and an easement by necessity. The court included in its judgment parking limitations on
the parties’ use of the shared driveway. The respondent who initially filed pleadings pro
se has appealed, again acting without benefit of counsel. Discerning no reversible error,
we affirm