APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Jerry W. Phillips, Petitioner, appeals from the summary dismissal of his habeas corpus petition in which he claimed his convictions were void because there was a fatal variance between the proof at trial and the indictment and that the proof at trial, which differed from the proof at the preliminary hearing, constructively amended the indictment. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

This appeal involves the termination of a tenured teacher for the cause of inefficiency.
After receiving a written charge recommending his dismissal, the teacher requested a
tenure hearing before a hearing officer, who found that there was substantial evidence to
support the charge of inefficiency and that there was just cause for termination. The teacher
appealed, the board of education voted to sustain the decision of the hearing officer, and
the teacher was terminated. The teacher petitioned for judicial review of the decision in
the chancery court. The chancery court reversed and reinstated the teacher with back pay.
The school system appeals. We reverse.

The pro se Petitioner, Charles Anderson Clark, Jr., appeals the denial of his motion to
correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Based
on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Kyanedre Oshea-Malik Benson, was convicted in the Haywood County Circuit Court of one count of employing a firearm during the attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony; one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a Class C felony; one count of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; ten counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony.  After a sentencing hearing, he received an effective sentence of sixty-two years in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter and that the trial court erred by refusing to merge one of his convictions of reckless aggravated assault into his conviction of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this case involving a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her child and to allow the petitioners to adopt the child, the trial court determined that three statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that the petitioners had provided clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed the best interest determination. Upon our review, we affirm the trial court’s finding as to the statutory grounds of abandonment through failure to support, abandonment through failure to visit, and severe abuse of the child’s sibling. However, having determined that under the facts of this case, the trial court erred in applying the statutory best interest factors applicable to the initial termination petition rather than those applicable to the amended petition, we reverse the trial court’s best interest finding and remand for reconsideration applying the amended best interest factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2022).

Appellant, a tenured teacher employed by Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools, was involved in an altercation with students at an alternative high school. Subsequently, Appellee Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education (the “Board”) terminated Appellant’s employment. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Appellant filed an action with the trial court arguing that the Board exceeded its authority under the Teachers’ Tenure Act. The trial court vacated the Board’s decision on the ground that the Board violated the Open Meetings Act. We affirm the trial court’s decision on different grounds, i.e., that the Board committed a clear error of law when it conducted a third hearing concerning the termination of Appellant’s employment. We also conclude that Appellant is entitled to reinstatement and back pay. There is nothing further for the Board to do; accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order of remand.

Petitioner, Martiness Henderson, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.  Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

A father appeals an order transferring jurisdiction over his minor children to West Virginia. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate court within thirty days after entry of the final order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

In litigation commenced by landlord to recover unpaid rent, the tenant asserted a
counterclaim alleging violations of the parties’ lease agreement and seeking a declaration
of the parties’ rights and obligations. Featuring prominently in the parties’ dispute is a
lease provision providing for, among other things, rent abatement if a non-party to this
litigation, the designated “Major Anchor Tenant,” ceases operations in the shopping center
where the tenant’s store is located. Under another lease provision, which is also at issue,
the right to rent abatement is triggered, subject to certain exceptions, if landlord enters into
another lease agreement “with or by any national or regional tenant having . . . more than
one store for whom the majority of its revenue is from the sale of apparel and/or clothing
accessories.” In this case, the tenant has asserted rights to relief with respect to both of
these provisions. Following a bench trial, the trial court rejected various defenses raised
by landlord in the litigation and determined that the tenant was entitled to relief under the
parties’ lease. As part of its order, the trial court awarded the tenant a monetary judgment
against landlord related to rent overpayments the tenant had made during a period when
rent abatement was in effect. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in awarding
a monetary judgment related to the rent overpayments given that the remedy provided
under the relevant lease provision specifically provides only for an offset against current
or future rent, we otherwise affirm the trial court’s order in this case.

In this appeal from a resentencing hearing, the Defendant, Darius Henderson, challenges
his total effective sentence of twelve years following his convictions for theft of property
and evading arrest. The Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not applying two
mitigating circumstances and by aligning the sentences to run consecutively. We
respectfully disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Petitioner, Michael Bailey, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary
dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the
judgment of the habeas corpus court.

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her two children, the Lawrence County Chancery Court (“trial court”) determined that seven statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further determined that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The trial court held that an insurance company properly denied an insured’s claim for property loss arising out of a fire. The trial court found that the denial was supported by two grounds: (1) that the property was not “occupied” as defined by the policy at the time of the fire and, therefore, the policy did not cover the loss, and (2) that the policy was voided by the insured’s misrepresentations relating to the loss. We affirm the trial court’s decision.

Defendant, Daryl Deangelo Rollins, pled guilty to one count of reckless vehicular homicide
and two counts of reckless endangerment, as a Range I offender, in exchange for dismissal
of the remaining counts of the indictment with no agreement as to the sentences. After a
sentencing hearing, the trial court denied judicial diversion and alternative sentencing.
Defendant was sentenced to six years for reckless vehicular homicide, two years on one
count of reckless endangerment, and one year on the remaining count of reckless
endangerment, to be served concurrently. Defendant appeals, arguing that his sentence for
vehicular homicide is excessive, that the trial court improperly applied enhancement
factors, and that the trial court erred by denying an alternative sentence. We affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

Eric Todd Sparks (“Husband”) and Rachel Collins Sparks (“Wife”) were divorced by order of the Chancery Court for Bradley County (the “trial court”) on December 2, 2021. In addition to $693 in monthly child support, the trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $750 per month in alimony in futuro. The trial court also ordered that once the parties’ minor child, who was nine years old at the time of trial, reached the age of majority, Husband’s alimony in futuro obligation would automatically increase to $1,250 per month. Husband timely appealed to this Court. We affirm the trial court’s decision to award Wife alimony in futuro, but, considering Husband’s ability to pay and Wife’s need, we vacate the trial court’s ruling as to the monthly amount and remand for further proceedings. We also conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the automatic increase in Husband’s alimony obligation upon the Child reaching the age of majority and vacate that portion of the trial court’s order. Consequently, the trial court’s ruling is vacated in part and affirmed in part. We decline to award Wife her attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.

The Petitioner, Courtney R. Logan, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s
summary dismissal of his fifth petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. Following our
review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules
of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

The petitioner, Jessica R. Adkins, appeals the denial of her post-conviction petition,
arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding she received the effective assistance of
counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of
the petition.

The petitioner, Roger Reed, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of postconviction
relief from his 2016 convictions of premeditated first degree murder, felony
murder, and aggravated robbery, arguing that he was deprived of the effective assistance
of counsel at trial. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Knox County jury convicted the defendant, Erik Courtney Lehto, of two counts of rape
of a child, one count of solicitation of rape of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual
battery for which he received an effective sentence of eighty-six years in prison. On appeal,
the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
convictions. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the
judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns a circuit court's disrnissal of an appeal by a Defendant from
judgments entered by a general sessions court. The circuit court dismissed the Defendant's
appeal as untimely. The Defendant appealed that dismissal to this Court. In addition to
asserting that the circuit court erred in concluding her appeal was untimely, the Defendant
also raises issues related to recusal and notice. We affirm the circuit court's dismissal of
the Defendant's appeal.

This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 9, 2023. The Notice of Appeal was
not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until April 12, 2023, more than thirty days from
the date of entry of the order from which she is seeking to appeal. Because the Notice of
Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

A qui tam relator brought a Tennessee False Claims Act suit on behalf of himself and the State of Tennessee against a manufacturer of guardrail end terminals. The manufacturer moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion on a wide variety of bases. The qui tam relator appeals. We conclude that a number of the rationales relied upon by the trial court were in error; nevertheless, the trial court properly dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Tennessee False Claims Act.

After flooding washed away a bridge and part of a driveway which a homeowner used to
access his house, he made repairs. The repaired route was also used on rare occasions by
an easement holder who had a right to access a family cemetery. The homeowner brought
suit against the easement holder, seeking equitable reimbursement for the costs of repairs.
The trial court ruled against the homeowner, concluding the equities of this case did not
warrant requiring the easement holder to contribute to the costs of repair. The homeowner
appealed. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion; accordingly, we
affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Appellant and Appellee were involved in a romantic relationship during which time
Appellee adopted her biological grandson. After Appellee ended the relationship with
Appellant, Appellant filed a petition to adopt Appellee’s grandson. The trial court
dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice on its conclusion that Appellant did not have
standing to file an adoption petition. Discerning no error, we affirm. We grant Appellee’s
motion to declare Appellant’s appeal frivolous and award her damages.

The defendant appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion seeking resentencing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432(h). Upon our review of the applicable law and the briefs of the parties, we conclude the defendant does not have an appeal as of right and the instant appeal should be dismissed.