APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Juan De Paz Mondragon, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court
jury of two counts of second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, and
employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and the trial court
imposed an effective sentence of thirty-eight years’ incarceration. On appeal, the
defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for seconddegree
murder and attempted second-degree murder, and the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences. After review, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court. Furthermore, we remand to the trial court entry of corrected judgment forms
in counts one and two reflecting the merger of the defendant’s convictions for seconddegree
murder into a single conviction.

The defendant, Eric Dewayne Milton, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his
community corrections sentence and order directing the defendant to serve the remainder
of his eight-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to treat the defendant’s violation as a violation of probation
and impose a thirty-day sentence of confinement. After a thorough review of the record,
the applicable law, and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Chauncy Black, was found guilty by a Shelby County jury of reckless
endangerment of Kaleb Wakefield and reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon of
Isabella Edwards for discharging a firearm into an occupied habitation. The trial court
imposed a six-and-a-half-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction of reckless endangerment with
a deadly weapon of Isabella Edwards. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in
failing to instruct the jury as to a presumption of reasonableness in the use of deadly force
within his residence. Following our review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions.

Defendant, Taylor Brent Farley, pleaded guilty to one count of attempted delivery of fentanyl, a Class C felony. Defendant sought judicial diversion, but the trial court denied diversion and imposed a six-year sentence on Community Corrections. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Edward Dean, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing
the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel.
After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the
petition.

This is a State appeal, filed by the State Attorney General and Reporter, from the entry of
an order granting the petitioner’s, Courtney Anderson’s, motion to reopen his postconviction
and amending/reducing his original sentence of 162 years, 11 months, and 29
days to a time served sentence of 25 years. The State appealed, arguing the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s motion as it was barred by the one-year statute
of limitations and the petitioner failed to prove the statute should be tolled. Additionally,
the State submits that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to amend the petitioner’s sentence
under the post-conviction statute and that the trial court’s actions amount to an improper
commutation of the petitioner’s sentence. The petitioner contends that the State waived
any challenge to the statute of limitations by failing to raise the issue below and that his
claim meets the requirements of the statute and allows for the tolling of the statute, and
therefore, the trial court properly granted the relief requested. Upon our thorough review
of the applicable law and the briefs and arguments of both parties, we conclude that the
instant petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations and that the petitioner failed
to establish and the trial court failed to find a proper basis for tolling the statute.
Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s motion and amend
the petitioner’s sentence. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court, reinstate the
petitioner’s original sentence, and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Frederick Peat, of aggravated rape, for
which he received a sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the
defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his
conviction. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in preventing him from
impeaching the victim with evidence of the victim’s prior convictions and in imposing an
excessive sentence. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this accelerated interlocutory appeal, Appellant seeks to appeal from the denial of three separate motions to recuse the trial judge. As to the first motion, we affirm the trial court’s denial of that motion on the basis of Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. As the second and third recusal motion, we dismiss this appeal, as no effective order denying those motions has yet been entered by the trial court.

Michael Notaro, Defendant, pled guilty to three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor
with an agreed-upon sentence of 10 years for each conviction, to be served consecutively
for a total effective sentence of 30 years at 100% in exchange for the State agreeing not to
seek further prosecution for any other offenses under investigation. Defendant did not seek
a direct appeal of his sentence. Instead, Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 36.1 of
the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure in which he argued that his sentence was
illegal. The trial court dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim.
Defendant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a long-term marriage, the parties divorced. The trial court, which found the husband’s testimony not to be credible, set the value of the marital property, divided the marital property, and awarded alimony in futuro to the wife.  The husband appeals, challenging the credibility finding, the trial court’s valuation of the marital property, the division of property, and the alimony award.  We affirm the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the marital property, but we vacate the trial court’s alimony award, remanding for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal arises from a forfeiture action regarding funds seized during a traffic stop. In
a prior appeal, this Court vacated and remanded for entry of an order that complied with
Rule 58 and Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court entered
an additional order on remand, and the appellant has again appealed. Due to deficiencies
in the appellant’s brief on appeal, we conclude that he waived consideration of his issue on
appeal and hereby dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Christopher Kirk Stack, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s
probation revocation of the six-year sentence he received for his guilty-pleaded conviction
for attempted aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial
court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the
remainder of his sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Will Vaughn, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of
first-degree murder, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no
error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Bradley Dwight Bowen, appeals from his jury convictions for possession of one-half gram or more of methamphetamine with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver; simple possession of cocaine; possession of drug paraphernalia; and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; for which he received an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of (1) his motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his detention and (2) his motion to continue requesting additional time to prepare his pro se defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, Mark L. Ward, was convicted by a Knox County jury of aggravated
kidnapping, attempted aggravated burglary, and two counts of aggravated rape, for which
he received an effective sentence of sixty-eight years in confinement. The sole issue
presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Appellant’s
convictions. Upon our review, we affirm.

This case arises from a dispute between a property owner and his homeowners’ association. The property owner, Pratik Pandharipande, purchased a home in a vacation community on a Tennessee lake, intending to use it as a short-term rental. At the time of the purchase, the property was subject to covenants requiring that the home be used for “residential and no other purposes.” The covenants were amended several years later to allow leases with minimum lease terms of thirty days. Pandharipande contends that neither the original covenants nor the amendments prohibit him from leasing his property for short terms of two to twenty-eight days. His homeowners’ association disagrees on both scores. We agree with Pandharipande that the original covenants requiring residential use of the property do not bar his short-term rentals, but we agree with the homeowners’ association that the amendments do. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the homeowners’ association based on both the original covenants and the amendments. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We affirm the Court of Appeals in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Petitioner, Micah Joshua Ford, alias Joseph Tolbert, III, appeals the denial of his postconviction
petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received
the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal. He also argues that he is
entitled to a new trial under the doctrine of cumulative error. Following our review of the
entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction
court.

The defendant, Cedric D. Marshall, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence and resentencing him to an effective sentence of seven years’ incarceration for his guilty-pleaded convictions of evading arrest, burglary, and theft of property. Because the defendant’s notice of appeal is untimely, we dismiss the appeal.

The plaintiffs filed this breach of contract action against their homeowners association for failure to rectify alleged violations of the neighborhood restrictions. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment establishing that the issues complained of were actual violations of the restrictions. The trial court dismissed the action in favor of the homeowners association and the plaintiffs’ neighbors who joined as interested parties. We affirm.

The Defendant, Lorie Ann Gerbis, was convicted following a bench trial of two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Specifically, she contends that the State’s evidence was inadequate to establish her identity as the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gregory L. Nelson, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his eight-year sentence for unlawful possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by fully revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Pettioner, Victercika Gilchrease, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of
her petition for post-conviction relief from her guilty plea convictions for second degree
murder and two counts of aggravated assault, for which she is serving an agreed, effective
twenty-one-year sentence. On appeal, she contends that the post-conviction court erred in
denying relief on her ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

In this breach of implied warranty of good workmanship and materials case, the trial court awarded Appellee $77,494.36 in damages. Although the parties agree that the proper measure of damages is the cost to repair the defects, the parties dispute the method of repair and its cost. In determining Appellee’s damages, the trial court relied on testimony from Appellee’s expert contractor. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s order. The parties’ respective requests for appellate attorney’s fees are denied.

This appeal arises from a petition filed by a beneficiary of a trust seeking an accounting and removal of the trustee. The trustee asserted the affirmative defense that the beneficiary violated the no-contest clause in the settlor’s trust. The trustee served the beneficiary with requests for admissions, to which the beneficiary responded with objections to the majority of the requests. After the trial court granted his motion for the requests for admissions to be admitted, the trustee filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the no-contest clauses in the trust and will of the settlor. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the beneficiary’s petition with prejudice. The beneficiary appealed. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Alain Benitez, appeals the Smith County Criminal Court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing for his two convictions of first degree felony murder. Upon review, we conclude that we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.