APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is an appeal from an Order of Protection entered on July 2, 2013. The Notice of Appeal was not filed until August 19, 2013, more than (30) days from the date of entry of the order to which it is directed. Because the Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Conservator for injured bus passenger challenges the trial court’s dismissal of her action after the defendant’s filing of a confession of judgment for the full amount of damages requested in the general sessions warrant. In light of the plaintiff’s failure to amend the complaint after transferring the case to circuit court to increase the amount of damages sought, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Heather Widner, Administratrix of the Estate of Glenn Edward Smith (“Plaintiff”) sued Chattanooga Entertainment, Inc. d/b/a Electric Cowboy (“Electric Cowboy”) and Ashley Langworthy with regard to the tragic death of Glenn Edward Smith (“Deceased”). Electric Cowboy filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Electric Cowboy summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that on the relevant night there had been no sale of alcoholic beverages pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 57-10-102 by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting Electric Cowboy summary judgment and whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to allow Plaintiff additional time for discovery. We find and hold, as did the Trial Court, that no sale of alcoholic beverages by Electric Cowboy to Ashley Langworthy occurred on the relevant night, and that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow further discovery. We, therefore, affirm.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s denial of a motion to recuse. The motion was based upon allegations of bias against the party, who is also a licensed attorney representing herself in this matter. Because we can find no evidence in the record of any bias that would require recusal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion.

The Petitioner, Timothy Christopher Pillow, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. In this appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In September of 2006 in exchange for an eight-year sentence, Appellant, Jeremy Bo Eaker, pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. Appellant was released to probation with credit for time served. Subsequently, Appellant was arrested for possession of cocaine and hallucinogenic mushrooms. A violation of probation warrant was filed. Appellant pled guilty to possession of over .5 grams of cocaine and received a sentence of nine years, to be served concurrently to the eight-year sentence for which he was already on probation. Appellant’s probation was revoked, and Appellant was ordered to serve twelve months in incarceration with the trial court reserving the right to suspend the balance of the sentence upon Appellant’s entry into a drug treatment program. Following Appellant’s release from incarceration and reinstatement to probation, numerous probation violation warrants were filed against Appellant on the basis of among other things new criminal charges and positive drug screens. As a result of these various probation violations, Appellant’s probation was partially revoked, he was ordered to enter into and complete a drug treatment program, and he was ordered to community corrections. This appeal arises following a violation of probation warrant filed in response to Appellant’s January 17, 2013 arrest for possession of methamphetamine and failure to report the arrest to his probation officer. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his effective nine-year sentence in incarceration. Appellant appeals, challenging the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. After a review of the record, we determine the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The sole issue in this putative class action is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees under the common law substantial benefit doctrine. Plaintiffs, shareholders of O’Charley’s Inc., filed this action against several parties to enjoin the imminent merger with and acquisition by Fidelity National Financial, Inc.; no monetary relief was sought. The gravamen of the complaint was breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs requested additional disclosures but did not seek to enjoin the merger. After the merger was completed, Defendants filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; Plaintiffs contemporaneously filed a motion to recover attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs did not oppose the motions to dismiss and an agreed order was entered by which the complaint was dismissed but, by agreement, the issue of attorneys’ fees was reserved for hearing. Plaintiffs acknowledged this was not a shareholder derivative action and that they were not entitled to recover attorneys’ fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-17-401; however, Plaintiffs claimed they were entitled to attorneys’ fees under the common law substantial benefit doctrine. The chancellor disagreed and denied Plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees. We affirm.

The petitioner, George Anthony Braddock, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was in error because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to investigate the petitioner’s psychological, mental, and physical health history and to present proof of such at trial in an attempt to negate the petitioner’s culpable mental state; (2) failing to file a motion to suppress the petitioner’s statement to law enforcement; and (3) failing to fulfill his duty of loyalty and to zealously advocate on behalf of the petitioner because of a familial relationship with the district attorney general. Following review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly denied and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves the termination of a biological father’s parental rights with regard to his son. The child at issue was removed from the custody of the mother as a result of the mother’s drug use and neglect. The child, now five years of age, did not have a significant relationship with the father, if any. Following a hearing, the juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights for failure to substantially comply with the responsibilities of the permanency plan. The father appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff Husband appeals the trial court’s division of marital property and awards of transitional alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido in this divorce action. Finding no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm. Husband also appeals the trial court’s judgment holding him in contempt for failing to comply with the trial court’s order to pay to Wife one-half of a health savings account. We affirm on this issue. Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is granted.

The defendant, Jamaal L. Byrd, appeals from his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury conviction of voluntary manslaughter, claiming error in the jury instructions provided by the trial court and in the trial court’s failure to admit certain evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The appellant, Johnny L. McGowen, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to aggravated assault and received an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion to reduce his sentence to probation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Perley Winkler, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 Monroe County Criminal Court convictions of two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of attempted aggravated arson, claiming that the State withheld material evidence at trial, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and that the post-conviction court erred by refusing to allow the petitioner to treat his trial counsel as an adverse party. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Appellant, Teddy Russell Robbins, Jr., was indicted by the Scott County Grand Jury for domestic assault, aggravated assault, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape based on acts committed against his wife. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of all the offenses as charged in the indictment. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifty years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and rape; and (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial. After our review, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial where the juror in question was dismissed from the jury pool and the trial court issued a curative instruction. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Charged by the Hamilton County Criminal Court grand jury with aggravated robbery, the defendant, Tavaruus Montrel Moss, pleaded guilty to facilitation of aggravated robbery and agreed to a three-year sentence of split confinement consisting of 11 months and 29 days in jail with credit for time served and the balance of the sentence to be served on supervised probation. The trial court entered the judgment on August 9, 2012, but on January 17, 2013, the State obtained a probation revocation warrant that alleged that the defendant had incurred new criminal charges, that he had failed to report his arrest to his probation officer, that he had failed to provide proof of lawful employment, that he had failed to report for probation, that his whereabouts were unknown, and that he had failed to pay his probation fees. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. In his timely appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him into confinement. Because the record supports the trial court’s order, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Robert Edward Fritts, appeals his conviction for first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a sentence of life without parole. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce expert testimony regarding Fritts’s gang affiliation, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this retaliatory discharge action brought by a former city administrator of the City of LaFollette, Tennessee (“LaFollette”), the trial court, following a bench hearing, denied LaFollette’s motion to strike the city administrator’s demand for a jury trial. The trial court, however, granted LaFollette permission for interlocutory appeal on the question of whether the city administrator’s request for a jury trial properly may be granted pursuant to the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Supp. 2013), despite the non-jury provision of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-307 (Supp. 2013). We conclude that the non-jury requirement of the GTLA applies to this TPPA claim. We therefore reverse the trial court’s denial of LaFollette’s motion to strike the city administrator’s jury demand, and we remand to the trial court for further proceedings without a jury.

Following a retrial, the defendant, Elgie Sykes, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order, affirming the decision of the Designee of the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development that Appellant/Employee was not qualified for unemployment benefits. Because there is substantial and material evidence in the record, and a reasonable basis in law, to support the Commissioner’s Designee’s decision, we affirm the order of the trial court. Affirmed and remanded.

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff Lessee in this action for breach of contract and promissory fraud.  It also awarded Plaintiff punitive damages and prejudgment interest at the rate of eight percent per annum.  We affirm.

Appellants, Grico Clark, Jordan Curry, and Deangelo White, were each indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of evading arrest. Deangelo White was also indicted for one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with the intent to sell and one count of possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. After a jury trial, Clark, Curry, and White were found guilty of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. Clark and Curry were found guilty of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. White was found not guilty of the firearm charge and convicted of the lesser included offenses of simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced Clark and Curry each to effective sentences of forty-four years and White to an effective sentence of forty years. The trial court denied motions for new trial. In this consolidated appeal, we are asked to determine whether under the holding of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), the evidence supported convictions for both especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Additionally, we must determine whether the State was required to make an election of offenses and whether the trial court properly imposed consecutive sentencing. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the trial court properly instructed the jury as mandated in White and that the evidence supported convictions for both especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Further, we determine that the State was not required to elect offenses. In addition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing White to an effective sentence of forty years and Clark and Curry each to an effective sentence of forty-four years. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Petitioner, Jeremie Alan Thomas, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner sought relief from his convictions for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated robbery.  Petitioner pled guilty to these charges as a result of a negotiated plea agreement, and he received all concurrent sentencing with an effective sentence of 20 years of incarceration.  On appeal Petitioner asserts that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to ineffective assistance of trial counsel.  After a thorough review of the briefs and the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner’s third habeas corpus petition attacking his conviction for first degree murder, with a sentence of life without parole, was dismissed by the trial court without an evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner argues on appeal that he is entitled to relief because (1) the trial court failed to require the State to make an appropriate election of offenses; (2) the indictment was erroneously amended; (3) Petitioner was never given notice of the offense he was charged with; and (4) a final ground that can only be accurately described by a direct quote from Petitioner’s brief: “whether the unanimity of the verdict was decided upon imparcially [sic] due to multiple offenses that have never been recognized by the Grand Jury that has always been a Constitutional right of any citizen born in the United States that have alleged to have committed an offense.”  We affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeal 20.

Petitioner, Mathis L. Vaughn, was convicted in 1993 of first degree murder during the perpetration of a robbery.  His conviction was affirmed on appeal.  See State v. Mathis T. Vaughn, No. 01C01-0312-CR-00425, 1994 WL 256993, at *1 (Tenn., June 9, 1994).  Subsequently, Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Mathis T. Vaughn v. State, No. M2007-00755-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 WL 303034, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 29, 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2001).  Petitioner first sought habeas corpus relief in 2006; it was denied.  See Mathis T. Vaughn v. James Worthington, Warden, No. E2007-00808-CCA-R3-HC, 2008 WL 58956, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jan. 4, 2008).  Petitioner again seeks habeas relief, arguing that his judgment is void because it lists his conviction offense as first degree murder when the jury actually convicted him of first degree felony murder.  The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition.  Petitioner appeals.  After a review, we determine that the habeas corpur court properly dismissed the petition where Petitioner failed to establish that the judgment was void or that his sentence had expired.  Consequently, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Appellant, John Nolan Sunde, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and domestic assault.  After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of both charges.  The trial court merged the convictions into a single conviction for aggravated assault and sentenced Appellant to three years in incarceration.  The trial court suspended the sentence “on time served” and ordered Appellant to attend an anger management class and ordered him to have no contact with the victim.  Appellant’s motion for new trial was denied, and he initiated this appeal.  On appeal, he argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to prove serious bodily injury; (2) the trial court erred in admitting multiple photographs of the victim; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing Appellant to anger management class.  After a review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the victim suffered serious bodily injury to sustain the conviction for aggravated assault; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim’s injuries at trial; and the trial court properly ordered anger management classes as a condition of probation.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.