APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Antonio Marques Peebles, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers and the evidence obtained following his arrest, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Pursuant to his guilty-pleaded convictions, appellant, Alex Wayne Gibson, was sentenced to four years, suspended to probation, for aggravated burglary and several misdemeanor charges. A probation violation warrant was issued that alleged several technical violations as well as a failed drug screen. Following a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered execution of the four-year sentence. It is from this order that he now appeals. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted Christopher Vance Smalling’s (“Husband”) application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to consider issues related to his suit for divorce from his wife Sarah Rebecca Smalling (“Wife”). This divorce case reached an unexpected impasse when the Chancery Court for Sullivan County (“the Trial Court”) refused to set a hearing in the matter until a Temporary Parenting Plan concerning the parties’ minor child was entered. Husband appeals, arguing both that he had complied with local rules by submitting a suitable Temporary Parenting Plan and that state law does not require the filing of a Temporary Parenting Plan in circumstances like those of this case. We hold that the local rules are in conflict with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-403 because they require the filing of a written Temporary Parenting Plan even though the statute specifically states this is not required if the parties agree, as in this case, to a Temporary Parenting Plan. We also hold that even if we err in our judgment that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-403 conflicts with and overrides the local rules, Husband complied with the local rules by submitting a Temporary Parenting Plan. We reverse the Trial Court.

In August of 2012, Chloe S.K. (“Mother”) and Timothy A.K. (“Step-father”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Joshua A.P. (“Father”) to the minor child Jocilyn M.P. (“the Child”) and to allow Step-father to adopt the Child. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Order Terminating Parental Rights on August 19, 2013 terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child after finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed of grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (1)(A)(iv) for both willful failure to support and for wanton disregard, and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Child.

A Madison County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Marty Clark, charging him with possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and attempted possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of cocaine and six months for attempted possession of drug paraphernalia to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to an unrelated case. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to give the absent material witness instruction to the jury. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, James D. Beaird, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon allegations that Counsel failed to exclude or introduce certain evidence at trial and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to trial.  Additionally, he asserts that the cumulative errors made by Counsel entitle him to relief.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Otis Melvin, Jr., was convicted by a Perry County jury of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2010).  The trial court denied Melvin’s request for judicial diversion and sentenced him as Range I, standard offender to one year in the Department of Correction.  The sentence was suspended to two years on supervised probation.  Melvin was also ordered to pay $7,022.11 in restitution to the Social Security Administration.  On appeal, Melvin argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him judicial diversion.  Upon review, we affirm the theft  conviction and the two-year probationary sentence imposed by the trial court.  However, we remand the matter for entry of an amended judgment consistent with this opinion.

The appellant, Chad Walter Cook, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to two counts of selling one-half gram or more of methamphetamine and received an effective eight year sentence to be served on supervised probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered that he serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original sentences. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellants, Daryl and Shannon Maness, were each indicted by the Chester County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated statutory rape. After a jury trial, Appellants were found guilty as charged. They were each sentenced to an effective sentence of three years. The trial court denied Appellants’ request for alternative sentencing. On appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions in limine requesting the exclusion of certain sexually explicit photographs, that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, and that the trial court erred in denying their request for alternative sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion in limine and that the evidence was sufficient. However, we conclude that the trial court based the denial of alternative sentencing on deterrence grounds without sufficient evidence as required under State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000). Therefore, we affirm Appellants’ convictions, but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

The Defendant-Appellant, Roy Pierson, Jr., was convicted by a Shelby County jury for possession of one hundred or more recordings that did not clearly and conspicuously disclose the name and address of the manufacturer in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-139 (Supp. 2009). He received a sentence of twenty-five months in the workhouse to be served at thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his business. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning an employment contract between United States Metal Powders, Inc. and Plaintiffs, who claimed that they were owed vacation and severance pay when the company ceased production and sold its assets. United States Metal Powders, Inc. denied that Plaintiffs were owed vacation and severance pay. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded severance pay but denied the claim for vacation pay. United States Metal Powders, Inc. appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, Corey Tarvin, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for first degree murder and resulting life sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel (1) denied him the right to subpoena witnesses, (2) failed to investigate adequately and hire an investigator, (3) advised him not to testify, (4) failed to impeach a key witness and request a related jury instruction, and (5) failed to present evidence that he suffered from macular degeneration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this governmental tort liability action involving two metropolitan government employees, Employee 1 drove a school bus into Employee 2, resulting in serious injuries. Employee 2 and his wife filed suit under the Governmental Tort Liability Act against metropolitan government alleging that Employee 1 was negligent while acting in the course and scope of her employment and that, therefore, metropolitan government was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Metropolitan government filed a third-party complaint against Employee 1 seeking to recover lost wages and medical expenses paid to Employee 2. The trial court determined that statutory removal of metropolitan government’s immunity for injuries caused by Employee 1’s negligence resulted in Employee 1’s immunity from liability. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment for Employee 2 and his wife against metropolitan government. We affirm.
 

The petitioner, Qawi Nur, also known as Darrius James, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Maurice Shaw, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Petitioner, Keith Williams, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, one count of assault, and one count of domestic assault in case numbers 5338, 5767, 6756, and 6757 in Haywood County over a period of several years. For each of the convictions, Petitioner was sentenced and ordered to serve the sentence on probation. Several probation violation reports were filed against Petitioner. Eventually, probation was revoked. Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in Hardeman County on the basis that his sentences had expired. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition for relief without a hearing, finding that Petitioner failed to show that his judgments were void or that his sentence had expired. Petitioner appealed. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court because Petitioner has failed to show that his sentences have expired or that the judgments are void.

The defendant, Steven Matthew Messer, appeals the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion for his convictions of statutory rape. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a parental termination appeal brought by the incarcerated biological father. The child at issue was placed with the petitioners shortly after her birth five years ago. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence to support the ground for termination and clear and convincing evidence that such termination was in the child’s best interest. The father appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Frederick Herron, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of rape of a child. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to serve 25 years at 100%. Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that: 1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit into evidence a video recording of the victim’s forensic interview; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that the State could ask Defendant about prior arrests and an unnamed prior felony conviction if Defendant chose to testify; 3) the State failed to ensure a unanimous verdict by electing an offense that occurred on an unspecified date, and the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the offense; 4) the trial court should have granted a mistrial after a State’s witness testified about Defendant’s alleged prior DUI conviction; 5) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding a letter written by the victim to her sister; and 6) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, David Easton Jones, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition.  After review of the entire record we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

As the majority says, this appeal presents a close case. After much consideration, I respectfully conclude that one error requires a reversal and a new trial.

This is a termination of parental rights action focusing on the two minor children (“the Children”) of mother, Sandra W. (“Mother”). A termination petition was filed by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) after the third custody proceeding involving the Children. The petition alleges the statutory grounds of abandonment, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and persistent conditions. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) Mother had abandoned the Children, (2) Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plans, and (3) the conditions leading to removal still persisted. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Jason McCallum, appeals the Dyer County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for sale of one-half gram or more of methamphetamine in a drug-free school zone and his eighteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Ken Parker, charging him with first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of facilitation of first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years for facilitation of first degree murder and ten years for attempted second degree murder with the sentences to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to a life sentence that Defendant had received in a separate case. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of certain writings and drawings found on Defendant’s person and in his backpack at the time of his arrest; and (3) that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to elect which facts it relied upon to establish the offense of attempted second degree murder. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Courtney Wesley, was convicted of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of ten years and four years, respectively. Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.