APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant-Appellant, Jawaras Beauregard, was indicted by the Davidson County grand jury for attempted especially aggravated robbery and attempted first degree premeditated murder.  He was convicted by a jury of the charged offense of attempted especially aggravated robbery and the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter.  He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction and as a Range II, multiple offender to a concurrent sentence of five years for the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction.  On appeal, he argues:  (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him in a photographic lineup; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The defendant, Michael Alvin Harding, appeals his Maury County Circuit Court jury convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, and that the 15-year sentence was excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.
 

An employee died from “traumatic asphyxiation” after a front-end loader accidentally pushed him into a trailer loaded with garbage. The employee’s widow sought workers’ compensation death benefits. The employer denied that the employee was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits and raised the affirmative defenses of willful misconduct and willful failure to use a safety device. Following a trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the employer, and the employee’s widow appealed.  We affirm.

The appellant, Gary D. Jones, pled guilty in the Henderson County Circuit Court to theft of property valued more than $500 but less than $1,000; felony evading arrest; driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license; and leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage greater than $400. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to an effective four-year sentence to be served in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that his effective sentence is excessive. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jason Martindill, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the habeas corpus court erred in dismissing his petition without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of summary dismissal.

Proceeding pro se, the Petitioner, Michael L. McKillip, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the Petitioner did not comply with the requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-117(c) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 10(B), this court is without jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Joseph Nelson, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that due process concerns should toll the one-year statute of limitations to allow review of his underlying claims. Because the Petitioner has failed to prove any grounds upon which to toll the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted the Petitioner, Brandon Compton, of two counts of first degree murder. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the judgments of conviction and entered convictions for second degree murder, remanding to the trial court for resentencing. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2005-01419-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 2924992, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Oct. 13, 2006) perm. to app. denied (Feb. 26, 2007). After the trial court resentenced the Petitioner to twenty-five years for each of his second degree murder convictions to be served consecutively, this Court affirmed the twenty-five year consecutive sentences. State v. Brandon Compton, No. E2007-01790-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4071825 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 2, 2008) perm. app. denied (Feb. 17, 2009). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, claiming that his attorney failed to: (1) adequately investigate witnesses, (2) present the theory of self-defense, (3) refute the State’s characterization of the Petitioner as a drug dealer, and (4) present expert testimony on gunshot residue. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.
 

Plaintiff purchased landlocked property and filed suit against adjoining landowners to establish an easement for a private road and for utilities pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 54-14-101, et seq. After the jury of view returned its verdict form selecting a certain route for the easement, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, which the trial court granted. Defendants filed a motion to set aside the order of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, which the trial court denied. Defendants appeal. We affirm.

Defendant, Michael Vance, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for first degree premeditated murder, making a false report to a law enforcement officer, evading arrest, aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, simple possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  The trial court severed counts 1, 2, 3, and 5 from counts 4, 6, 7, and 8, and upon the State’s motion, the trial court subsequently dismissed with prejudice counts 6, 7, and 8 of the indictment.  Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder, making a false statement to a law enforcement officer, evading arrest, and unlawful possession of a deadly weapon.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for felony murder, three years for making a false report, three years for evading arrest, and one year for unlawful possession of a weapon.  Defendant’s sentences in counts 2, 3, and 5 were ordered to run concurrently with each other and consecutively to his life sentence.  In this direct appeal, Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the testimony of the victim’s divorce attorney; 3) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of prior bad acts under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 404(b); 4) the trial court erred by limiting the testimony of the defense mental health expert, Dr. Lynn Zager; 5) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of the defense mental health expert, Dr. Murray Smith; 6) the trial court erred by allowing the testimony of the State’s mental health expert, Dr. Rokeya Farooque; 7) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a photo of the victim taken while the victim was living; 8) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence autopsy photographs of the victim; 9) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence a durable power of attorney executed by the victim; 10) the trial court erred by not severing count 1 from the remaining counts; 11) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing; and 12) the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s convictions.  After a careful review of the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Former unmarried partner of the child’s adoptive mother seeks visitation with the child. Because the former partner has no biological or legal relationship with the child, we affirm the trial court’s finding that she does not have standing to seek visitation.

I respectfully write separately to express somewhat different views from the majority on two issues.

First, relative to the 911 dispatcher’s testimony that the 911 system maintained a “flag” on the defendant’s address that indicated issues of officer safety, the majority relies upon the failure of the “flag” to identify the defendant as the source of the issue as a basis for denying the defendant relief.  I believe that, given other evidence in the case, the officer-safety flag substantially implicated the defendant.  Consequently, the trial court should have excluded the evidence. On the other hand, the totality of the evidence in the case renders the admission of this evidence harmless, and I would have affirmed the denial of relief on that basis.
 

The petitioner, Michael Aaron Pounds, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 1988 conviction of felony murder.  In this appeal, the petitioner lists some 65 issues for appellate review.  His chief complaint, however, appears to be that an inconsistency between the wording of the indictment and the plea agreement documents renders his conviction void.  Discerning no error, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s denial of penalties and interest on ad valorum taxes owed by a funeral home business after the business was placed in receivership. The Appellant/Shelby County Trustee filed a claim with the Appellee/Receiver to recover delinquent taxes, penalties and interest. The trial court denied the penalties and interest, but allowed the Receiver to pay the base taxes. The Trustee appeals. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm and remand.

The pro se petitioner, Chivous S. Robinson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence concerning the judicial misconduct of a trial judge affected the outcome of his 2000 jury trial and 2005 post-conviction proceedings. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

Petitioner, Demarcus Sanders, appeals from the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner attacked his guilty plea to second degree murder and his resulting twenty-five-year sentence on the basis that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of which Petitioner entered a guilty plea that was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, E. Louis Thomas, was convicted by a Shelby County jury for the offense of first degree murder, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed on appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s timely filed pro se application for permission to appeal to that court. See State v. E. Louis Thomas, No. W2008-01360-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2977874 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 29, 2010) perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 18, 2011). Both of Petitioner’s counsel were allowed to withdraw as counsel of record on August 24, 2010, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 14. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The earliest it could be considered “filed,” under the “mailbox” rule, was March 22, 2012. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition because it was filed outside the one year statute of limitations. Petitioner appeals, and we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Johnny Tate, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that both trial counsel and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions on due process and double jeopardy grounds. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Stephen Wayne Davis, appeals from his 2012 Madison County Circuit Court jury convictions of guilty of one count each of aggravated kidnapping, robbery, and attempt to commit rape. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because the record supports the jury verdicts and because we conclude that principles of due process do not invalidate the aggravated kidnapping conviction, we affirm the convictions.

The Defendant, Kyto Sihapanya, pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident involving death, a Class E felony, and following too closely, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A.§§ 55-10-101, 55-8-124 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by denying judicial diversion, (2) by denying probation, and (3) by sentencing him to two years. We conclude that the trial court properly denied judicial diversion and sentenced the Petitioner to two years but that the court erred by denying probation. We reverse the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Stephanie D. Cooley, pled guilty to two counts of obtaining controlled substances by fraud in Sumner County in 2007. As a result, she was sentenced to two, concurrent, two-year sentences. The sentences were suspended, and Petitioner was ordered to probation. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the Sumner County convictions in Davidson County in October of 2012. The petition was dismissed because there was nothing on the face of the judgments to indicate that the convictions were void. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the habeas corpus court improperly denied habeas corpus relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the habeas corpus court properly denied habeas corpus relief where Petitioner failed to show that her judgments were void.

The petitioner, Samuel Winkfield, was indicted for first degree (premeditated) murder, first degree (felony) murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, tampering with evidence, and conspiracy to tamper with evidence. During his July 2007 trial, the petitioner was acquitted of the felony murder and conspiracy to tamper with evidence charges. Because the jury was unable to reach a decision regarding the remaining charges, he was retried in January 2008 and convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. The jury was again unable to reach a decision on the kidnapping charge, and this charge was eventually dismissed. On the direct appeal of his convictions, the petitioner challenged the admission into evidence of his testimony from the first trial, the exclusion from evidence of the MySpace page of the State’s chief witness, the sufficiency of the evidence, and his sentence. His convictions and sentences were affirmed. The petitioner then filed a timely post-conviction petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner asserted his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to investigate and produce witnesses; in failing to obtain expert testimony; in failing to adequately cross-examine witnesses; and in failing to explore alternative defense strategies. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Having reviewed the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This civil action is the progeny of a criminal proceeding in which Plaintiff was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for criminal trespass and stalking following an incident that occurred at the headquarters of Nissan North America. Plaintiff was convicted of criminal trespass; however, the stalking charge was dismissed because a corporation is not defined as a “person” under the stalking statute. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action against Nissan North America asserting claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process pertaining to the stalking charge. Nissan filed a motion for summary judgment and a statement of undisputed facts that was supported by the affidavit of the Williamson County Deputy District Attorney General who investigated and prosecuted the criminal proceedings. Plaintiff filed a response opposing Nissan’s motion for summary judgment; however, she failed to file a statement of disputed facts or any affidavit or deposition testimony to dispute the facts relied upon by Nissan as Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 requires. After setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 56.04, the trial court summarily dismissed the complaint upon the findings that Nissan presented competent evidence to negate essential elements of Plaintiff’s claims and that Plaintiff failed to create an issue of disputed material fact regarding any of the grounds relied upon by Nissan. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, we affirm the summary dismissal of the complaint.

John T. Vine, II (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery and one count of solicitation to commit aggravated sexual battery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of twenty-two years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. He also argues that the trial court committed plain error in admitting as evidence the videotaped recording of the Defendant’s interview with police. Finally, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentences and the trial court’s imposition of partially consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur with the majority opinion, except I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority that the trial court erred in denying appellant alternative sentencing. After considering the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing and the record as a whole, it is my view that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing appellant to a term of incarceration. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion reversing the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.