APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this workers’ compensation appeal the employer asserts that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury was permanent. The employee, a package car driver for United Parcel Service, experienced two episodes of heat exhaustion while at work. The trial court found the heat exhaustion to be permanent and awarded benefits for permanent partial disability and the employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Mashaal Arradi, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of three counts of tax evasion and one count of theft of property valued at over $1,000 but under $10,000. He received an effective sentence of three years, to be released after serving 10 days incarceration, and was ordered to pay restitution. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in (1) permitting admission of unreliable scientific evidence through a non-expert witness; (2) allowing multiple references to 404(b) evidence without a jury-out hearing; (3) permitting the felony theft charge to be based on an aggregation of evidence; (4) permitting multiple references to the Defendant’s Yemeni background and Arabic language; and (5) allowing instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a question of law concerning the interpretation and application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 (2009) certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. Based on the undisputed facts, the District Court has asked this Court to determine whether, after a defendant asserts a comparative fault claim against a non-party tortfeasor who was known to the plaintiff when the original suit was filed, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 permits the plaintiff to amend its complaint to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor named by the defendant, even though the statute of limitations on that claim has expired. We hold that the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 is not restricted to tortfeasors who were unknown to the plaintiff when its original complaint was filed. Therefore, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the tortfeasor named by the defendant within ninety days after the filing of the answer or amended answer in which the defendant first asserts a comparative fault claim against the tortfeasor.

The petitioner, Franklin Fitch, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Clinton Travis Simpson, appeals the revocation of the three-year probationary sentence imposed for his Hamilton County Criminal Court conviction of aggravated burglary. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellant, Joey Godwin, was convicted of two counts of the sale of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, for which he received consecutive sentences of thirty years each. He appeals his convictions and sentences on the following grounds: (1) the evidence underlying the convictions was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that the State did not improperly exercise some of its peremptory challenges during jury selection. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffrey D. Miree, appeals the summary dismissal of his 2012 petition for post-conviction relief from his 1990 conviction of first degree murder as time barred. Because the petition was filed decades beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff filed an action against Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, in addition to its Tennessee affiliate and others, seeking damages arising from alleged sexual and emotional abuse of a minor child by a Big Brothers Big Sisters of Middle Tennessee volunteer. The trial court determined that the national organization did not owe a duty to the minor child and entered summary judgment in favor of the organization. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the Johnson County Criminal Court’s grant of habeas corpus relief to the petitioner, Michael W. Belcher, in the form of pretrial jail credits. Because the habeas corpus court’s order awarding jail credits is somewhat vague, we vacate that order and remand the case to the habeas corpus court for the entry of an order directing the trial court to amend the petitioner’s judgment in count two to reflect the grant of appropriate pretrial jail credits.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the trial court did not err by ordering consecutive sentences in this case. I agree with the majority that the trial judge in this case recited his reasons for imposing consecutive sentences and that the ruling is therefore entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. See State v. James Allen Pollard, -- S.W.3d --, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 WL 6732667, at *7-9 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013). “So long as a trial court properly articulates reasons for ordering consecutive sentences, thereby providing a basis for meaningful appellate review, the sentences will be presumed reasonable and, absent an abuse of discretion, upheld on appeal.” Id. at *9 (citing Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(1) (“The order [for consecutive sentences] shall specify the reasons for this decision and is reviewable on appeal.”)); see also State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 705 (Tenn. 2012). I agree as well that the record supports the trial judge’s determination that appellant’s record of criminal activity is extensive pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b)(2). That, however, in my opinion does not end our inquiry.

This appeal involves questions regarding when the police may legally arrest a suspect based on information provided by an accomplice and the amount of corroboration required to convict a person who has confessed to a crime. A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant of attempted aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed both convictions after deciding (1) that the defendant’s confession should have been suppressed because it was the result of an illegal arrest and detention and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support either conviction because the State did not introduce sufficient evidence, independent of the defendant’s confession, to corroborate the commission of the attempted robbery. State v. Bishop, No. W2010-01207-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 938969 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 14, 2012). We have determined that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant. We have also determined that the defendant’s in court confession did not require corroboration but that, had his extrajudicial confession required corroboration, the State presented ample evidence that this confession was trustworthy. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the defendant’s convictions and sentences.

In this child support case, Father appeals the trial court’s determination that he was voluntarily underemployed. We have reviewed the record and the relevant authorityand find that the trial court did not err in concluding that Father was underemployed for the purpose of calculating his child support obligation. We affirm.

Ronald Eugene Brewer, Jr., (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and attempted first degree murder. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for each first degree murder conviction and a concurrent twenty-five-year sentence for the attempted first degree murder conviction. The trial court then merged the felony murder conviction with the premeditated murder conviction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. See State v. Ronald Eugene Brewer, Jr., No. E2010-01147-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 2732566, at *22 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 14, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011). The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he was denied due process and the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

In this appeal, the defendant, Lane Lee Coggins, challenges his Cocke County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of driving under the influence, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401(a), and violating the financial responsibility law, see id. § 55-12-139(c), via a certified question of law, see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b). Because the defendant failed to properly reserve the certified question, the appeal is dismissed.

A Monroe County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jonathan Michael Brown, of facilitation of second degree murder and being an accessory after the fact to second degree murder, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years to be served in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss based upon the loss or destruction of evidence, the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, and the denial of alternative sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph Egan Underwood, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This action involves a dispute regarding the validity of an $80,000 check written against the revocable living trust account of the decedent by the defendant, who is the decedent’s nephew. Two days before the decedent’s death, the defendant deposited the check into a personal savings account he held jointly with the decedent. The plaintiff, serving as trustee and as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a complaint seeking recovery of the $80,000. The trial court issued an ex parte restraining order, directing, inter alia, the bank where the joint account was held to transfer $80,000 to the clerk and master for safekeeping in the registry of the court. Following a bench trial, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the $80,000 check at issue was a forgery and that the defendant did not have permission from the decedent to sign the check. The court directed the $80,000 to be transferred from the clerk and master to the decedent’s estate account and dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim for damages. The defendant appeals. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Christopher Lee Pirtle, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Benjamin Keith Fowler, of six counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of criminally negligent homicide, two counts of especially aggravated burglary, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court merged the homicide verdicts and imposed two convictions of first degree murder. The court also merged the especially aggravated burglary verdicts and imposed a single conviction of that offense. In this appeal, the defendant contends that prosecutorial misconduct and the behavior of a State witness deprived him of the right to a fair trial, that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony, and that the trial court erred by prohibiting the admission of certain evidence. Although we discern no error with regard to the issues presented by the defendant, we observe plain error with regard to the defendant’s conviction of especially aggravated burglary  Because dual convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary in this case are prohibited by statute, the defendant’s conviction of especially aggravated burglary is modified to a conviction of aggravated burglary and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

Kenneth R. Griffin (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Scott Knerr, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in counts 1 and 2 for attempted aggravated rape, in counts 3 and 4 for aggravated sexual battery, in count 5 for attempted especially aggravated kidnapping, and in count 6 for attempted aggravated kidnapping. A jury convicted Knerr of the lesser included offenses of attempted sexual battery in count 3, attempted aggravated sexual battery in count 4, and attempted false imprisonment in count 6 and acquitted him of the remaining counts. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged count 3 with count 4 and sentenced Knerr to four years with all but sixty days suspended. In addition, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of six months with all but sixty days suspended for Knerr’s conviction for attempted false imprisonment. On appeal, Knerr argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for attempted aggravated sexual battery and attempted sexual battery. Upon review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment.

In this case, we are asked to determine whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss. The Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-5-319, grants Tennessee appellate courts subject matter jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals only in specifically enumerated circumstances involving arbitration agreements. The statutory exceptions include appeals from orders denying an application to compel arbitration, and appeals from orders granting an application to stay arbitration. Because the order appealed in this case is simply a denial of a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 motion to dismiss, it does not fall within the statutory exceptions. Accordingly, this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Dismissed and remanded.

After foreclosure proceedings were instituted against Plaintiff, Plaintiff asserted numerous claims against Defendants. All claims were dismissed in the trial court. We affirm.

Petitioner, Willie Lewis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. See State v. Willie Lewis, No. W2008-02636-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL1267070 (Tenn. Crim. App., March 31, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn., Sept. 3, 2010). Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post conviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of the applicable sentencing range and failing to investigate his criminal record. Petitioner contends that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have proceeded to trial but would have accepted the State’s plea offer. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.