APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Stephanie D. Cooley, pled guilty to two counts of obtaining controlled substances by fraud in Sumner County in 2007. As a result, she was sentenced to two, concurrent, two-year sentences. The sentences were suspended, and Petitioner was ordered to probation. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the Sumner County convictions in Davidson County in October of 2012. The petition was dismissed because there was nothing on the face of the judgments to indicate that the convictions were void. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the habeas corpus court improperly denied habeas corpus relief. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the habeas corpus court properly denied habeas corpus relief where Petitioner failed to show that her judgments were void.

The petitioner, Samuel Winkfield, was indicted for first degree (premeditated) murder, first degree (felony) murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, tampering with evidence, and conspiracy to tamper with evidence. During his July 2007 trial, the petitioner was acquitted of the felony murder and conspiracy to tamper with evidence charges. Because the jury was unable to reach a decision regarding the remaining charges, he was retried in January 2008 and convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. The jury was again unable to reach a decision on the kidnapping charge, and this charge was eventually dismissed. On the direct appeal of his convictions, the petitioner challenged the admission into evidence of his testimony from the first trial, the exclusion from evidence of the MySpace page of the State’s chief witness, the sufficiency of the evidence, and his sentence. His convictions and sentences were affirmed. The petitioner then filed a timely post-conviction petition, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner asserted his trial counsel’s performance was deficient in failing to investigate and produce witnesses; in failing to obtain expert testimony; in failing to adequately cross-examine witnesses; and in failing to explore alternative defense strategies. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Having reviewed the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Roy L. McAlister (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated statutory rape and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant was given an effective sentence of three years, suspended to supervised probation after service of 219 days in confinement. Upon the filing of a probation violation warrant, the Defendant was taken into custody, and a probation violation hearing was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In his original appeal of the trial court’s ruling, we vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for the trial court to clarify its findings. Subsequently, the trial court issued an order clarifying its findings and affirming its previous order revoking the Defendant’s probation. The Defendant again appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Mother and Father were divorced in 2006, and their parenting plan did not include an award of child support because residential parenting time was equally shared and they were earning roughly the same amount. Mother filed a petition in 2010 seeking an award of child support based on Father’s increased income. The trial court deviated downward from the presumptive amount of child support established by the child support guidelines to take into account each party’s expenses incurred in driving back and forth to work, and then awarded Mother child support payable on a monthly basis. Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court exceeded its authority by deviating downward for a reason not explicitly set forth in the guidelines. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because tribunals have discretion to deviate from the guidelines for reasons other than those explicitly set forth in the guidelines.

The petitioner, Donald Keith Solomon, pled guilty in 2009 to numerous charges and, subsequently, sent a letter to the trial court, which apparently was treated as a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appointed counsel then filed an amended petition, setting out as claims for relief that trial counsel had failed to advise the petitioner of his “legal innocence” of three of the charges for passing worthless checks and that, contrary to his understanding at the plea submission, he was required to pay court costs.  Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the petitioner’s trial counsel had “thoroughly investigated and reviewed the evidence” with him and “any decisions made about the timing of filing of motions were a strategic decision.” We conclude that the record supports the opinion and order of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

Attorney filed petition pursuant to the Public Records Act for disclosure of documents held by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, the Board’s Chair, and Disciplinary Counsel to the Board relating to eight disciplinary proceedings. Access to the documents had been withheld based on a claim that the documents were exempt from disclosure in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 25.3. Responding officials appeal the trial court’s order that the documents be produced. Finding that the documents sought were confidential and privileged from disclosure, we reverse the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition.

Shelenda Nicole Windmon (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of attempt to commit aggravated child abuse. Pursuant to her plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to six years with manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a hearing, the trial court granted probation but denied the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion. The Defendant now appeals the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Edwina Johnson, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued over $1,000 and one count of identity theft. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of three years, to be served on probation, consecutive to an effective three year sentence of incarceration imposed in a separate case. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that she had violated the terms of her probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it found she had violated the rules and conditions of her probation and when it denied her request for an alternative sentence. She further contends that the trial court erred because it found she had committed the probation violation on a date not within the term of her supervised probation period. After reviewing the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

After a jury trial, the defendant was found guilty of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, four counts of attempted aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of evading arrest. He received an effective sentence of three hundred years. The defendant was convicted on the theory of criminal responsibility for the conduct of another as he was not physically present in the home during the violent home invasion. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that his convictions should be reversed because the State failed to establish the chain of custody of a ski mask containing the defendant’s DNA that was recovered from the getaway vehicle after the crimes, and that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after a witness made a general remark to the effect that the defendant had engaged wrongful behavior in the past. After review, we find that the defendant’s claims lack merit. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

A Knox County jury convicted the Petitioner, Robin Lynn Cooper, of one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of rape, one count of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, and three counts of aggravated kidnapping. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. State v. Cooper, No. E2009-00291-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2490768, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, June 21, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 20, 2010). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Frederick Moore, was convicted by a jury of first degree (premeditated) murder; first degree (felony) murder, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; and two counts of tampering with evidence, Class C felonies. The petitioner was sentenced to life plus twenty years. The petitioner now appeals the post conviction court’s denial of his petition for post conviction relief in which he alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm the post conviction court’s denial of relief.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey A. Simmons, was convicted of four counts of aggravated sexual battery and received an effective sentence of thirty-two years. At the hearing on his motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court, the Petitioner claimed the ineffective assistance of Initial and Trial Counsel. The Petitioner later filed a petition for post conviction relief, in which he alleged the ineffective assistance of Initial, Trial, and Successor Counsel. The post-conviction court granted partial relief in the form of a delayed appeal after it determined, contrary to this court’s conclusion in State v. Jeffrey Simmons, No. M2007-01383-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 27881 (Tenn. Crim. App. January 6, 2010), that the Petitioner had, in fact, filed a timely motion for new trial. The post-conviction court limited the delayed appeal to review of issues that were deemed waived by this court in the direct appeal. It dismissed the post-conviction relief petition reasoning that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims had been previously determined. In this consolidated appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Following our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly granted the Petitioner a delayed appeal for review of issues raised but not addressed in his direct appeal. Upon consideration of whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury after it appeared to be deadlocked, the only issue not reviewed by this court in the Petitioner’s direct appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We additionally conclude that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the post-conviction petition with respect to the Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of Successor Counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the portion of the petition that alleged ineffective assistance of Success or Counsel and remand for an evidentiary hearing. In all other respects, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of Initial Counsel and Trial Counsel.

The Petitioner, Torrey L. Frazier, appeals the Roane County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of second degree murder and resulting twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant was found guilty after a trial by jury of one count of robbery, a Class C felony, and one count of assault, which, depending on the circumstances, can be either a Class A misdemeanor or a Class B misdemeanor, but which the trial court treated as a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant was sentenced to four years for the robbery and eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the robbery charge due to a defect in the indictment. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred in an evidentiary ruling and by failing to grant him a new trial on the grounds that the prosecutor made improper comments during voir dire. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we find that the defendant’s arguments lack merit, but we conclude that the trial court erroneously classified the defendant’s assault conviction as a Class A misdemeanor when it was properly classified as a Class B misdemeanor. We modify the judgment of the trial court accordingly and impose a modified sentence of six months on this count. The judgments of the trial court are otherwise affirmed.

The Disciplinary Board of the Turney Center Industrial Complex convicted Petitioner of assault based upon his involvement in a gang stabbing of another inmate, the conviction was affirmed by the Commissioner of the Department of Correction. Petitioner then filed this common law writ of certiorari with the Chancery Court of Hickman County to challenge his conviction. The trial court granted the writ and the administrative record was filed with the trial court. Thereafter, on motion of the respondents, the trial court denied relief to Petitioner on the grounds the record demonstrated that the disciplinary board had not acted illegally, arbitrarily or exceeded its jurisdiction, and that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated. Finding no error, we affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Mickey Lee Williams, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that his Grainger County Circuit Court judgment of conviction for second degree murder is void due to the denial of pretrial jail credits. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the Bledsoe County Circuit Court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Sylvester Smith, of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-304, -14-403 (2010). The trial court merged the two counts of aggravated burglary and sentenced Smith as a Range III, persistent offender to fifteen-years imprisonment with a forty-five percent release eligibility for the aggravated burglary conviction. For the aggravated kidnapping conviction, Smith was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty-years at one hundred percent release eligibility. The sentences were to be served consecutively for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to properly instruct the jury on aggravated kidnapping pursuant to State v. White; (2) sentencing him based on insufficient evidence; (3) excluding Smith’s written statement to the police as inadmissible hearsay; (4) admitting into evidence hearsay statements in violation of Smith’s right to confrontation; (5) permitting improper impeachment of Smith based on prior convictions; (6) imposing excessive sentences; and (7) depriving Smith of his due process rights based on cumulative error. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s medical malpractice and wrongful death case for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice requirement found in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-26-121(a). Appellant’s pre-suit notice contained a misnomer, naming the Appellee’s fundraising entity, rather than Appellee, as the proper defendant. The trial court determined that under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 307 (Tenn. 2012), substantial compliance was not effective to satisfy the statutory requirement for pre-suit notice. Furthermore, because the type of notice required under Section 29-26-121 precedes the filing of the lawsuit, it is not the same type of notice as required for correction of misnomers in pleadings under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03; thus, this rule will not operate to cure the misnomer in the pre-suit notice. Because the Appellant failed to show extraordinary cause for failure to comply with the pre-suit notice, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing this matter. Affirmed and remanded.
 

In a post-divorce action, Mother filed a motion to set aside the permanent parenting plan that had been incorporated into the parties’ final decree of divorce. The trial court granted Mother’s motion for relief based on a mutual mistake of the parties. Additionally, the trial court amended the parenting plan to reflect parties’ original agreement and ordered Father to pay child support. Father appealed. After reviewing the record, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Father appeals the parenting plan naming Mother primary residential parent entered by the trial court in this divorce action. We remand for further proceedings, if necessary, and findings regarding the comparative fitness of the parties.
 

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the classification and division of the marital estate, the alimony and attorney fee awards, and the parenting plan decision of the trial court. The decision of the trial court is affirmed in part and modified in part.

This case concerns custody and alimony decisions relative to a divorce. Discerning no error, we affirm

Appellant, Charles Matthew Garrett, entered a guilty plea without a recommended sentence to robbery, for which the trial court imposed a four-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He appeals the manner of service of this sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Denver Joe McMath, Jr., was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for six counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child. On motion of the State, the indictment was amended to include four counts each of aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child, and the remaining two counts of aggravated sexual battery were dismissed. Defendant was convicted as charged on all counts of the amended indictment and sentenced to an effective sentence of 140 years. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts 1) the State’s bill of particulars was insufficient to state the offenses with specificity; 2) the trial court erred by allowing into evidence the testimony of three State’s witnesses, as the testimony constituted inadmissible character evidence and inadmissible hearsay; 3) the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence a drawing enclosed with a letter from Defendant to the son of Defendant and the victim’s mother; and 4) the trial court erred in its sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Daniel Mungia, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare a defense; and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.