APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

More than sixty days before filing suit, the plaintiff gave written notice to the potential defendants of her healthcare liability claim against them. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) (2012) requires that a plaintiff’s pre-suit notice include a HIPAA compliant medical authorization that permits the healthcare provider receiving the notice to obtain complete medical records from every other provider that is being sent a notice. Contrary to the statute, the plaintiff provided a non-HIPAA compliant medical authorization that only permitted the release of medical records to plaintiff’s counsel. After the plaintiff filed suit, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The trial court denied the motion, ruling that plaintiff’s noncompliance was excused by extraordinary cause. We hold that the plaintiff was required to substantially comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) and failed to do so, and that her failure to comply is not excused by extraordinary cause. We dismiss the plaintiff’s case without prejudice.

Scott J. Wexler sued James Reed, Jr., and Robert Rankin in the General Sessions Court for Knox County to recover damages based on an alleged fraudulent sale of goods. The general sessions court awarded a judgment in Wexler’s favor in the amount of $2,000, the purchase price of the goods, plus costs. Defendants appealed to the trial court. After a bench trial, the court awarded a judgment in favor of Wexler, but reduced the amount to $1,025 including interest. Wexler appeals. We modify the judgment to reinstate the award of $2,000 plus costs.

The defendant, Demetrius Hollins, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the exclusion of certain evidence, as well as the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Travis Lee Dobson, pled guilty to one count of vehicular homicide as a Range I, standard offender, and the trial court imposed twelve years’ incarceration.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence and by denying any form of alternative sentencing.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

After receiving a stop-work order, a property owner petitioned the City of Belle Meade Board of Zoning Appeals for a declaration that a nearly completed structure on his property constituted an accessory use as a children’s playhouse under the city’s zoning code. After a hearing, the Board denied the request and the property owner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking court review; the trial court affirmed the Board’s denial. We concur with the trial court and affirm the Board’s action.

On April 11, 2011, Christine Stevens (the “Plaintiff”) provided written notice to Hickman Community Health Care Services, Inc., Elite Emergency Services, LLC, and Halford Whitaker, M.D. (collectively, the “Defendants”), advising each of them of her potential health care liability claim based upon their negligent treatment of her late husband, Mark Stevens. As required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(A)–(D) (Supp. 2011), the Plaintiff’s notice included the full name and date of birth of the Plaintiff’s late husband; the contact information for the Plaintiff; the name and address of the Plaintiff’s counsel; and a list of the names and addresses of all providers being sent a notice. The notice also included a medical authorization form intended to allow each of the Defendants to access the medical records in the possession of the other Defendants, as is required under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E). The medical authorization form, however, was not fully compliant with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).

This is a motor vehicle accident case wherein the jury’s verdict resulted in an award of compensatory damages to the plaintiff of $317,000.00. The defendants filed a motion seeking a new trial or, in the alternative, a remittitur of the amount of damages awarded. The trial court granted the remittitur, finding that the damages awarded by the jury were excessive and unsupported by the evidence. The trial court also ruled that if the plaintiff rejected the remittitur, a new trial would be awarded. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur under protest, subsequently filing the instant appeal. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for a new trial solely on the issue of damages.

The Defendant, Keenan Scott McNeal, was convicted by a Blount County jury of possession of 0.5 grams or more of a substance ontaining cocaine with intent to sell or distribute within 1,000 feet of a child care facility, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Upon our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Petitioner, Gary Wayne Garrett, has appealed the Wayne County Circuit Court order dismissing his second petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that the trial court failed to order mandatory pre-trial jail credits.  Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Clay Stuart Gregory, was convicted by a Humphreys County jury of aggravated robbery, first degree felony murder, and premeditated first degree murder.  The first degree murder convictions merged into a single conviction for which the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in prison.  The trial court then sentenced the Defendant to eight years for aggravated robbery to be served concurrently to his life sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it refused to grant the Defendant’s recusal motion; and (3) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress.  Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Johnny Pyle sued Betty Mullins for personal injuries sustained in a three-vehicle accident. Mullins admitted liability. The issue of damages was tried to a jury. At the close of the proof, the jury returned a verdict awarding Pyle $15,000 in compensatory damages. The trial court, in its role as the thirteenth juror, affirmed the verdict. Pyle appeals. He claims the verdict should be set aside because of a lack of material evidence to support the verdict, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and the failure of the court to instruct the jury regarding a pre-existing condition. On our review, we conclude that there is no reversible error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Defendant-Appellant, Morris Wayne Adcock, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and domestic assault.  A jury convicted him of the lesser included offense of simple assault and the charged offense of domestic assault, Class A misdemeanors.  The trial court merged the simple assault conviction with the domestic assault conviction and sentenced Adcock to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the county jail.  On appeal, Adcock argues:  (1) the trial court erred in failing to rule on the defense’s objection to one of the prosecutor’s questions to Joshua Jernigan; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (3) the cumulative effect of the errors entitles him to relief; and (4) his sentence is excessive.  Upon review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is the second appeal in this boundary line dispute between neighbors. Following (1) the original trial, (2) the release of our opinion in the first appeal, and (3) the subsequent issuance of the mandate, the defendants, husband and wife, filed a motion “to void or set aside the judgment” pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant Callie A. West appeals, raising issues regarding the propriety of the court’s earlier trial rulings. We hold that defendant Mrs. West waived these issues, either by failing to raise them at the first trial, or by failing to raise them in the first appeal. We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Mrs. West has not established a Rule 60.02 ground for relief from the final judgment.

I concur with the majority opinion in all respects save one. I believe the Defendant should have been granted judicial diversion, given the circumstances of this case, the Defendant’s excellent background, and the circumstances existing in Knox County relative to official misconduct and the granting of diversion.

In this divorce case, Wife appeals the trial court’s determination that she was not entitled to an award of alimony. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award alimony and affirm the trial court.

Petitioner, Quamine Jones, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder by a Shelby County jury. See State v. Quamine Jones, No. W2007-01111-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 4963516, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Jackson, Nov. 21, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Apr. 27, 2009). Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. Id. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, challenging the denial of post-conviction  relief. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court because Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the record preponderates against the post-conviction court’s findings. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Stanley Rooks, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-four years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the identification by the victim was not reliable. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cynthia J. Finch, was indicted for one count of fabricating evidence, a Class C felony; one count of forgery of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and one count of forgery of less than $1,000, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105, -14-114, -16-503. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was acquitted of the fabricating evidence count and convicted of the two forgery counts. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years to be served on unsupervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the statute allowing a district attorney general to specially appoint the attorney general and reporter to conduct specific criminal proceedings violates the Tennessee Constitution; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; (3) that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of a settlement in a civil lawsuit between the Defendant and Knox County; (4) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with respect to its definition of “value” and in denying the Defendant’s request for an instruction on the rule of cancellation; (5) that the State abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s request for pretrial diversion; (6) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion; and (7) that the trial court erred in its determination that the Defendant was not an especially mitigated offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the finality of a judgment and notice in a child support matter. Tamara J. Harness (“Plaintiff”) and Gerald Scott Harness (“Defendant”) have a history of litigation related to their divorce. On November 18, 2009, Defendant simultaneously filed separate petitions to modify his spousal support and child support obligations. The Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”) confirmed the findings and recommendations of the magistrate with respect to child support on April 29, 2011 . After a hearing, the Trial Court set aside its April 29, 2011 modification of Defendant’s child support. Defendant appeals, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court erred in addressing for a second time his petition to modify child support when that issue allegedly had been resolved by the magistrate’s findings and recommendations as confirmed by the Trial Court. We hold, inter alia, that the Trial Court’s order of confirmation was interlocutory rather than final, and that the Trial Court did not err in revisiting the child support issue. We affirm the Trial Court.

This appeal involves a dispute between an insurer and its insured following a fire loss at a commercial building. The case was resolved by a series of motions for partial summary judgment. The issues on appeal involve the amount of damages owed by the insurer for the insured’s lost business income during the period of restoration of the building following the fire. The insurer relies upon two separate provisions of the insurance policy to argue that its obligation to pay for lost business income was limited to either six or, at most, twelve months. The trial court denied the insurer’s motions for partial summary judgment and granted the motions for partial summary judgment filed by the insured, holding that the insurer’s obligation to pay was not limited to either a six-month or a twelve-month period. The insurer appeals. We affirm and remand for further proceedings as may be necessary.

Over nine years of litigation in both state and federal courts has stemmed from a 2004 incident (“the Incident”) wherein Alexander A. Stratienko, M.D. (“Plaintiff”) pushed Van Stephen Monroe, Jr., M.D. while in a staff break room at Erlanger Hospital (“the Hospital”) in Hamilton County, Tennessee. In this appeal, Plaintiff raises issues regarding whether the Trial Court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, in not allowing another amendment to the complaint and additional discovery, in excluding claims at trial relative to an administrative hearing, and in holding that Plaintiff failed to prove at trial intentional interference with business relations. We find no error in the Trial Court’s judgments and, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Willie Gatewood, of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to fifty-five years for the attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder conviction and to thirteen years for the aggravated burglary conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we discern no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to decide whether, for the purpose of determining proximate cause, an assault on an inmate by another inmate is always reasonably foreseeable because penal institutions house dangerous individuals. The plaintiff sued for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of negligence on the part of the staff of the Anderson County Detention Facility in classifying and housing the plaintiff and in failing to release him in a timely manner. The County denied any negligence on its part. The trial court found that while the County was not negligent in its classification or housing of the plaintiff, it had a duty and breached that duty in failing to timely release him. The trial court awarded the plaintiff $170,000 in damages, excluding medical bills, and assessed 55% of the fault to the County and 45% to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s actions, making an additional finding that proximate cause existed sufficient to link the plaintiff’s injuries to the County’s breach of its duty to timely release him. We reverse the Court of Appeals and trial court in part and hold that Anderson County is not liable for failing to release the plaintiff in a timely manner because the injuries Mr. King suffered as a result of the delay were not reasonably foreseeable. The award of damages is vacated, with the exception of the statutorily mandated payment of the plaintiff’s medical bills, and the case is reversed and remanded to the trial court for dismissal.

Appellant, Cleo Henderson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, violent offender to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant has presented several issues that we have deemed waived; however, we have reviewed his sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing issues. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent.