APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Anita Kay Broughton, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole. On appeal, she contends that she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, she contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to pursue a defense of diminished capacity despite ample proof that the petitioner suffered from a mental condition. She also challenges the accuracy of the post-conviction court’s order denying relief. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

A Putnam County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Lewis, of second degree murder, and the trial court imposed a fifteen-year prison sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s motion to sequester the jury; (3) the trial court erred by admitting photographs of the body of the deceased; and (4) the trial court erred by allowing certain witness testimony.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father appeals the trial court’s holding that termination of his parental rights to two children was in the best interest of the children. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After his previous guilty-pleaded convictions were vacated, petitioner, Bruce Reliford, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery charges and was found guilty by a jury of felony murder. Following an unsuccessful direct appeal and denial of discretionary review by our supreme court, he filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal follows, in which petitioner alleges the following: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to properly communicate with him; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel by advising him to plead guilty to the aggravated robbery charges; and (3) the post-conviction court’s error in denying his motion to recuse. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s holdings that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder.
 

This appeal involves removal from general sessions court to circuit court. The defendant tenants rented residential property from the plaintiff property owner. The owner filed a civil warrant in general sessions court against the tenants for unpaid rent. The tenants filed an application in the general sessions court to remove the case to circuit court; they asserted that the counterclaim they anticipated filing would exceed the jurisdictional limits of the general sessions court. The general sessions court granted the application for removal, the tenants filed their counterclaim in the circuit court, and the case proceeded in the circuit court for over two years. The circuit court then issued a sua sponte order directing the parties to show cause why the case should not be remanded to the general sessions court, because the removal statute does not apply in that county and because the tenants did not file a cost bond when the case was removed. The tenants objected to the remand on several grounds and alternatively asked the circuit court to retain jurisdiction over the counterclaim even if it remanded the original claim to general sessions court. The circuit court remanded the original claim to general sessions court holding, inter alia, that the tenants failed to file a proper cost bond in connection with the removal. It then held that the counterclaim and all other pleadings filed in the case were “null and void” and dismissed the counterclaim on that basis. The tenants now appeal. We reverse the circuit court’s decision that the tenants failed to file a proper bond, vacate that portion of the circuit court’s order declaring that all proceedings other than the original claim were a nullity, and remand for reconsideration in light of Rules 13.09 and Rule 42.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Petitioner, Bruce Elliot, challenges the post-conviction court’s finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial and its denial of post-conviction relief from his jury convictions for conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, conspiracy to possess 300 grams or more of cocaine, possession of 300 grams or more of cocaine, all Class A felonies; money laundering, a Class B felony; possession of over one-half ounce of marijuana and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, both Class E felonies.  The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress the wiretaps on his telephone, which provided the basis for all evidence subsequently obtained against him, was deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficiency.  Upon consideration of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a boundary line dispute involving the placement of a new fence and the location of a corner. The suit involves a small triangular piece of property approximately two-tenths of an acre out of two adjoining 40-acre tracts owned by the parties. The value of the land in dispute is approximately $200. The trial court found the boundary line runs along a tree line essentially synonymous with the agreed upon old fence line as indicated on the Lawson survey. The court then located the corner as a car axle in the southwest corner of the plaintiff and the southeast corner of the defendant. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm the findings of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Cory Lee Jackson, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000.  At trial, the jury convicted Jackson of the lesser included offense of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-14-103(a), -105(a)(3).  The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to six years in confinement.  On appeal, Jackson argues:  (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of his missed court dates on unrelated charges; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony regarding Budget’s loss regarding the rental vehicle; and (4) his sentence was excessive.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Aldrick Lillard, appeals the Rutherford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.  On appeal, the Petitioner argues that both his trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance of counsel in their failure to raise in the motion for new trial or on direct appeal the trial court’s denial of the Petitioner’s motion for mistrial.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff/Appellant appeals the trial court’s division of property and award of alimony in this divorce action. We affirm.

Following a traffic stop premised on a possible violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107 (the window tint statute), appellees were charged with several drug offenses.  Appellee Shaun Anthony Davidson was indicted for possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone.  Appellee Deedra Lynette Kizer was indicted for possession or casual exchange of hydrocodone.  Both appellees were indicted for possession or casual exchange of marijuana.  The trial court granted the appellees’ motion to suppress evidence, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107(c) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  As a result, the case was dismissed.  The State now appeals, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107(c) is constitutional.  We reverse the ruling of the trial court, reinstate the indictment, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

Following a bench trial, the Defendant-Appellant, Charles Justin Woosley, was convicted of domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-101, -111 (2010).  He was sentenced to ninety days in the county jail, which the trial court suspended and ordered to be served on unsupervised probation.  The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Haywood County jury convicted appellant, Lymus Levar Brown, III, of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced him as a Range III offender to serve thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, with a release eligibility of eighty-five percent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(k)(1) (release eligibility for aggravated robbery conviction). On appeal, he argues that: (1) the evidence supporting his conviction was insufficient; (2) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify despite a violation of the rule of sequestration; (3) the trial court erred by not granting him a mistrial or some other remedy for the State’s failure to provide previously requested discovery; (4) his right to a speedy trial was violated; (5) the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear that appellant was a convicted criminal; (6) the State failed to provide a sufficient chain of custody for the cellular telephone found at the crime scene; and (7) the trial court erred by considering his prior convictions during the sentencing hearing despite not having certified copies of said convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree that Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-9-107(c) is not vague or overbroad, but such does not mean it is flawless.

The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendants in California state court, alleging a number of business-related torts. After one of the defendants moved to dismiss based on a forum selection clause contained in the parties’ contract, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his California complaint and refiled his action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.  In his federal court complaint, the plaintiff invoked federal-question jurisdiction by pleading a number of federal securities law violations. In its discretion, the federal district court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state-law claims. One of the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s federal securities law claims had expired. Before the federal court could dispose of the motion, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint without court approval pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).  The plaintiff later filed the present action in the Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee, pleading only three of the state-law claims that formed the basis for his two previously dismissed lawsuits. The defendants moved for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the plaintiff’s second voluntary dismissal in federal court. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted the plaintiff permission to appeal. We conclude that a plaintiff’s second voluntary dismissal of supplemental state-law claims filed in federal court does not, under Tennessee law,preclude the plaintiff from later refiling an action based on the same claims in Tennessee state court. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

This is a negligence case in which Plaintiff filed suit against the wrong party but sought to amend the complaint to add Defendant once the statute of limitations had passed. Defendant objected to the amendment and filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the applicable statute of limitations had passed because Rule 15.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure did not allow for the amendment of the complaint. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the judgment of the trial court. I write separately to express the reasons for my concurrence. Since the proposed amendment adding the Wilkinson defendants was filed well beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations, an allowance of the amendment would be futile unless it relates back, under the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.03 (1995), to the date of filing of the original complaint against the Glazer defendants. It is clear under Rule 15.03 that we are dealing in this case with an amendment “changing the party . . . against whom a claim is asserted.” Id. The new parties – the Wilkinson defendants – are totally different entities from the Glazer defendants. There can be no doubt that the plaintiff wants to change parties.

An apprentice lineman agreed to help a neighbor by climbing a utility pole on the neighbor’s land and disconnecting an electrical wire at the top. After he disconnected the wire, the pole fell over, causing the lineman himself to fall and to suffer severe injuries. He filed a negligence complaint, alleging that the neighbor had not set the pole deeply enough into the ground, thereby rendering it unreasonably dangerous. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that because of the plaintiff’s expertise in electrical matters, it was his duty alone to make sure the pole was safe before climbing it. We reverse.

The Petitioner, Samuel Ryan Hawkins, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his conviction for aggravated child abuse. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to obtain an expert witness to rebut the State’s theory of shaken baby syndrome.  Following our review, we affirm the denial of relief.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Renitra Harlen, of two counts of theft of property valued at more than $1,000.00.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent terms of two years, to be served on probation following the service of fourteen days in confinement.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it allowed the State to introduce a handwritten list of stolen items prepared by store employees immediately after the shoplifting incident occurred; (2) the State failed to disclose a victim questionnaire in violation of the rules of discovery; (3) the trial court erred by failing to merge the two theft convictions; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we remand to the trial court for the entry of modified judgments reflecting the merger of the Defendant’s two convictions and affirm the trial court in all other respects.

Michael T. Gibbs, Jr. (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Hamilton County Criminal Court, claiming that his sentences had expired. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal is untimely. Moreover, the Petitioner offers no reasons why the interests of justice would support a waiver of the filing deadline. Accordingly, we dismiss the Petitioner’s appeal.

The Defendant, Keenan Scott McNeal, was convicted by a Blount County jury of possession of 0.5 grams or more of a substance ontaining cocaine with intent to sell or distribute within 1,000 feet of a child care facility, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction. Upon our review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Petitioner, Gary Wayne Garrett, has appealed the Wayne County Circuit Court order dismissing his second petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that the trial court failed to order mandatory pre-trial jail credits.  Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.  Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Clay Stuart Gregory, was convicted by a Humphreys County jury of aggravated robbery, first degree felony murder, and premeditated first degree murder.  The first degree murder convictions merged into a single conviction for which the trial court sentenced the Defendant to life in prison.  The trial court then sentenced the Defendant to eight years for aggravated robbery to be served concurrently to his life sentence.  On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it refused to grant the Defendant’s recusal motion; and (3) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress.  Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.