APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found the employee suffered compensable injuries to his neck and back stemming from a motor vehicle accident and awarded him 54% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, asserting the trial court’s award is excessive. Having carefully reviewed the record, we reverse the trial court’s judgment with respect to the impairment to the cervical spine and affirm in all other respects.

The petitioner, Derrick Rice, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely filed. Upon our review, we reverse the decision of the post-conviction court and remand for proceedings consistent with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

The Defendant, Seymore S. Staten, was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-102 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years’ confinement to be served consecutively to a previously imposed eighty-seven-month federal sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) his right to a speedy trial was violated. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Cory Austin Edison, challenges his jury conviction for aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and his effective twenty-year sentence alleging prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments; the admission of hearsay evidence without proper authentication at trial; and the improper imposition of consecutive sentencing. After reviewing the record and the relevant authorities, we conclude that the imposition of consecutive sentencing was not supported by the evidence and remand for a new sentencing hearing on that issue. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The Petitioner, Herschel V. Lillard, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 conviction for first degree felony murder and resulting life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the weight that should be given to a motorist’s performance on field sobrietytests in determining whether probable cause existed to arrest the motorist for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”). A law enforcement officer stopped a motorist who was driving in the wrong direction on a divided highway in Sevier County. Another officer administered several field sobriety tests, and arrested the motorist for DUI because the motorist had been driving in the wrong direction on a divided highway, smelled of alcohol, and admitted that he had been drinking. When the grand juryreturned a presentment charging the motorist with DUI and DUI per se, he filed a motion in the Circuit Court for Sevier County to suppress the evidence and to dismiss the charges. The trial court dismissed the charges on the ground that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the motorist in light of his performance on the field sobriety tests. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. State v. Bell, No. E2011-01241-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 3776695 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2012). We granted the State’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal and now hold that the officer had probable cause to arrest the motorist for DUI without a warrant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the trial court, reinstate the charges, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings

The petitioner, Derrick Hodge, filed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition because it was untimely. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the holdings in Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), establish a new rule of law that is entitled to retroactive application to cases on collateral review. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Astin D. Hill, contends that the trial court improperly (1) denied all forms of alternative sentencing in direct contravention of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122, which prohibits continuous confinement for non-violent property offenses, and (2) imposed consecutive sentencing based on its erroneous finding that the Defendant had an extensive criminal history. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court’s failure to follow the dictates of section 40-35-122 was in error and affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the case for resentencing.

The Defendant, Ronald Lynn Cook, pled guilty to six counts of forgery valued at less than $1,000, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-105, -114. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, George Jones, contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, effectively depriving him of his constitutional right to counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to do the following: investigate the facts of and adequately prepare for his case; prepare him for his trial testimony; and advise him of the potential consequences of his decision to testify. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Demetrius Wynn, filed in the Knox County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell. He alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted James Prindle (“the Defendant”) of aggravated sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and filing a false offense report. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective term of twenty-two years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence; (2) the trial court’s jury charge was erroneous; (3) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (4) the trial court should have remanded the case to juvenile court; and (5) his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction of aggravated child neglect for lack of sufficient evidence. We affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Joey Walton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor; aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; and especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. The trial court merged the false imprisonment count into the aggravated rape count and sentenced the defendant as a violent offender to twenty-two years for the aggravated rape conviction, fifteen years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and twelve years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction. The court ordered that the aggravated rape and aggravated sexual battery sentences be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the especially aggravated kidnapping sentence, for an effective sentence of thirty-seven years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) whether the trial court properly admitted a police officer’s testimony about his conversation with the defendant; and (3) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce. Maryam Mubashir (“Wife”) sued Mubashir Mahmood (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Hamblen County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted the divorce. Husband appeals, raising numerous issues concerning parenting time, arrearages, and alimony. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court as it pertains to certain arrearages and Husband’s parenting time with the parties’ children. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Petitioner, Felix Tamayo, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated robbery and agreed to allow the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of his sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive twelve-year sentences for a total effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s sentence. State v. Felix Tamayo, No. M2010-00800-CCA-R3-CD, 2011 WL 1876315, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, May. 16, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 21, 2011). The Petitioner timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s denial, maintaining that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he was not advised that he could receive consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves Wife’s attempt to set aside a judgment entered against her relating to her failure to fulfill seven promissory notes. The trial court granted Wife’s motion to set aside, in part, affirming her liability for three of the seven notes but holding that Wife was not liable for the remaining notes. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Lawrence Fred Slagle (“Husband”) appeals the Trial Court’s finding that he has the ability to pay to purge his civil contempt. We find no error in the Trial Court’s determination that Husband failed to make a prima facie showing that he had an inability to pay the purge amount, and we affirm.

A Stewart County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeffrey M. Forguson, of sale of a schedule IV drug (Alprazolam) and sale of a Schedule III drug (Dihydrocodeinone). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve consecutive six-year sentences for an effective sentence of twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) consecutive sentencing was improper in his case; and (3) the trial court could not properly fulfill its role as thirteenth juror. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Mother and Stepfather filed petition seeking to terminate biological Father’s parental rights and to permit Stepfather to adopt Child. Trial court found Father had abandoned Child by failing to visit or support Child in the four months preceding the petition’s filing and that it was in Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s rights. Father appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment terminating Father’s rights because the evidence was not clear and convincing that it is in Child’s best interest that Father’s rights be terminated.

I concur in the majority opinion in this case and only write separately to respectfully comment about the issue of the trial judge’s Facebook “friendship” with the confidential informant in this case.
 

This appeal stems from the denial of a Rule 60.02 motion, filed by an attorney on his own behalf, to set aside an order. The attorney tried unsuccessfully to derail a sheriff’s sale of his client’s property through the use of an elaborate contrivance. In the aftermath, contempt charges were filed against the attorney. In the ensuing civil contempt proceedings, the trial court entered an order that concluded that the trial court was unable to hold the errant attorney in civil contempt of court. The order included obiter dictum in which the trial court questioned the attorney’s veracity as an officer of the court, stated that he could have been held in criminal contempt had he been charged with such, and referred the matter to the Board of Professional Responsibility. Over five years later, the attorney and his client filed the Rule 60.02 motion that is the subject of this appeal, asking the trial court to set aside the order with the offending dicta. The trial court dismissed the Rule 60.02 motion, finding that it either did not have subject matter jurisdiction to set aside the order or, in the alternative, that the motion to set aside was untimely and without merit. The attorney and his client appeal. We reverse the trial court’s holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the Rule 60.02 motion, but affirm the trial court’s alternative holding that the motion to set aside is untimely and wholly without merit. In light of improper statements made in the attorney’s appellate brief about the trial judge, we also find it necessary to refer the appellant attorney to the Board of Professional Responsibility.

Petitioner, Jeremiah R. Key, sought post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for aggravated robbery, second degree murder, and coercion of a witness. The post-conviction court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, petitioner raises the following issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to adequately communicate with petitioner; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to ensure that his guilty pleas were voluntarily entered; and (3) involuntariness of his guilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. Father’s parental rights were terminated on the ground of abandonment for willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. Because the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights fails to set forth sufficient findings, we are unable to adequately address the issue of abandonment in this case. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the chancery court and we remand for entry of an order that sets forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the termination of Father’s parental rights.

This appeal questions the propriety of the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 10-7-505(g) (Supp. 2013). The statute provides that an award of fees and costs can be made when a municipality wrongfully fails to disclose public documents requested pursuant to the Public Records Act. In the prior appeal of this action, this Court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award the plaintiff fees and costs she incurred in seeking the disclosure of public documents from the City of Chattanooga pursuant to the referenced statute. Upon remand, the plaintiff filed a petition seeking attorney’s fees and costs exceeding $70,000.00. The trial court found that the total fees and costs sought by the plaintiff were unreasonable and excessive, and the court reduced the amount of fees awarded to $50,284.50. The court also reduced the costs awarded for mileage and court reporter charges. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of an award of the full amount of fees and costs sought.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the Trial Court’s denial of a Motion to Recuse in a post-divorce proceeding. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by the Petitioner/Former Husband, Joel David Constance (“Petitioner”), pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court, we affirm the Trial Court.