APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, William Albert Kelly, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for perjury and attempted failure to report as a sex offender and ordering his effective two-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine-day sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by revoking his probation and (2) illegally recommended that he not be eligible for release after serving thirty percent of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dante Devon Omar Truitt, pled guilty to explosive weapon possession with an agreed eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve the eight-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find no error in the trial court’s judgment.

This case concerns whether the widow of a deceased man may share in the wrongful death settlement obtained by his personal representative. We conclude that the postnuptial agreement entered into by the widow prevents her from benefitting from the wrongful death settlement. Affirmed and remanded.

Plaintiff defaulted on her mortgage and Defendants advised Plaintiff of their plan to foreclose. Plaintiff then sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order preventing foreclosure, which it dissolved after granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Timothy R. Chatmon, filed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his two convictions for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Stephan L. Beasley, Sr., filed for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for first degree murder. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Kevin D. McMillan, pled guilty to the sale of a controlled substance, less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to three years of incarceration, to be served consecutively to two other convictions, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas court erred when it summarily dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

Appellant, Joseph W. Jones, pleaded guilty to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance and received a three-year sentence, suspended to probation. A violation of probation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that he had violated a condition of his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine on a drug screen. The trial court revoked his probation, and this appeal follows. Appellant now alleges that the trial court erred in admitting the laboratory report of his drug test without the proper chain of custody and that the trial court should have extended his probation rather than ordering execution of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jason Clark, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition without providing a reason for the dismissal in its order, depriving the Petitioner of an opportunity to respond. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Ako Hassan Nejad, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder and attempt to commit second degree murder and his effective Range I, thirty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to call a material witness and failed to present a defense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the issue of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state attorney. Defendant is an attorney who resides in Washington D.C. and practiced with a law firm in Virginia. He sought the assistance of Plaintiff, a Memphis law firm, in connection with a lawsuit that Defendant had filed in Maryland. After several discussions, Defendant, Plaintiff, and the client eventually entered into a contract whereby Plaintiff associated with Defendant as co-counsel in the Maryland case. After trial, Defendant allegedly refused to pay his onehalf share of the expenses, as provided by the parties’ contract. Plaintiff then filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant in Tennessee. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Mother sued Father for one-half of child’s college expenses based on the language of their Marital Dissolution Agreement’s parenting plan. Father defended based on the same language. The trial court found the language ambiguous and, based on all the circumstances, found that Father was required to pay one-half of the child’s college expenses at the University of Alabama. Father appealed. We do not find the language ambiguous, but agree with the trial court that the language requires Father to pay one-half of the expenses. We reverse the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest and remand for a calculation of that interest.  We also award Mother attorney’s fees for this appeal and remand to the trial court for a calculation of those fees.

This appeal arises from a dispute over the zoning of a certain tract of land in Clinton, Tennessee. Clinton annexed property (“the Property”) belonging to Rogers Group, Inc., and assigned zoning classifications to the newly annexed tract. The group Citizens for Safety and Clean Air, and individual local residents Walt Warren, Patricia Warren, Charles Goins, and Judy Goins (“the Plaintiffs,”collectively) sued the City of Clinton, Tennessee, Clinton Municipal Planning Commission, and Rogers Group (“the Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“the Trial Court”) seeking declaratory judgment. The Plaintiffs, opposed to the prospective development of a quarry and asphalt plant on the Property, challenged the heavy industrial zoning classification of a portion of the Property on the basis that it was arbitrary and capricious; constituted illegal contract zoning; and, constituted illegal spot zoning. Alternatively, the Plaintiffs sought to enforce the Master Settlement Agreement (“the MSA”), an agreement settling an annexation dispute entered into by Anderson County, Clinton, and Rogers Group. The Plaintiffs alleged they were third-party beneficiaries to the MSA. The Trial Court found in favor of the Defendants on all issues. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Jarrell Antonio Campbell, has appealed the habeas corpus court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that his conviction for possession of less than .5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver was void because it was not ordered to be served consecutively to a previous conviction for which he was on parole at the time he committed the offense. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal arises from a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff in an action filed pursuant to the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”). Defendant appeals denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the trial court’s determination that post-judgment interest is properly awarded in the amount provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-14-121 and not federal law. On cross-appeal, Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude certain evidence and its determination that post-judgment interest is properly calculated from the date the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict rather than the date the jury rendered its verdict as provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-14-122. We affirm denial of Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and the trial court’s evidentiary decisions. We also affirm the trial court’s determination that post-judgment interest is properly awarded at the rate provided by Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-14-121. We reverse the trial court’s determination that post-judgment interest accrues from the date provided by federal law. We hold that state law controls the calculation of post-judgment interest to be awarded in FELA actions adjudicated in state court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Mother and Father were divorced in 2001 and the Final Decree required Father to pay a fixed amount to Mother each month as child support in addition to a percentage of his fluctuating income. Father was also ordered to provide Mother with proof of his income on a quarterly basis. In response to Mother’s motion to modify in 2003, the trial court averaged three years of Father’s gross income and increased Father’s monthly child support payments. Mother moved in 2011 to hold Father in contempt of court for failing to continue providing her with proof of his income and sought a child support arrearage based on Father’s failure to pay a percentage of his fluctuating income for the years 2003 through 2010. The trial court awarded Mother the arrearage she sought and found Father was in civil contempt for failing to continue providing Mother with proof of his income. The court awarded Mother her attorney’s fees based on Father’s civil contempt. Father appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. The governing statute requires child support payments to be for a definite amount, not an amount that fluctuates. The existing order did not include the requirement that Father provide proof of income. Therefore, we also reverse the trial court’s award to Mother of attorney’s fees incurred in the civil contempt proceedings.
 

The defendant, angry about the quality of the cocaine that he had purchased, procured weapons and ammunition and enlisted the assistance of two other men to help him confront the drug dealers and obtain a refund. After forcing his way into a cabin where the drug dealers were located, one of his compatriots—-whom the defendant had armed with a .45 pistol—shot and seriously wounded two unarmed victims. Following a bench trial, the trial judge ruled that the defendant was criminally responsible for the actions of the shooter and found the defendant guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder, and one count each of especially aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. The trial judge sentenced the defendant on these convictions, including consecutive twenty-five year sentences for each attempted first degree murder conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals reduced one count of attempted first degree murder to attempted second degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of premeditation with respect to the shooting of one of the unarmed victims, and modified the conviction of especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary. The court affirmed the other convictions and remanded the case to the trial court for re-sentencing on attempted second degree murder and aggravated burglary. We accepted this case to review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the convictions of attempted first degree murder and the propriety of the consecutive sentences for the attempted first degree murder convictions. We affirm both convictions for attempted first degree murder and the consecutive sentences.
 

Operations agent employed by Southwest Airlines brought an action against a passenger for posting allegedly false and defamatory statements on Twitter and Facebook regarding actions taken by agent when passenger attempted to board a flight. The trial court granted the passenger’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the statements did not rise to the level of defamation, that the language could not be construed to hold the agent up to public ridicule, and that the language was not highly offensive to a reasonable person. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the defamation claim and reverse the grant of summary judgment on the claim for invasion of privacy; we remand the case for further proceedings.

A jury convicted the defendant of first degree felony murder. The jury imposed a sentence of death based on three aggravating circumstances: (1) the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more felonies involving the use of violence; (2) the murder was knowingly committed while the defendant had a substantial role in committing a robbery; and (3) the victim was seventy years of age or older. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (7), (14) (2010). The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1) (2010), we designated the following issues for oral argument: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt of first degree felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) whether the trial court erred in determining that the defendant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was intellectually disabled and thereby ineligible for the death penalty; and (3) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid pursuant to the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). On December 6, 2012, we ordered re-argument on the following issues: (1) whether the proportionality analysis adopted by the majority of the Court in State v. Bland, should be modified; (2) whether the absence of an intent to kill should render the death penalty disproportionate; and (3) whether the pool of cases considered in proportionality analysis should be broadened. Having carefully considered these issues and the other issues raised by the defendant, we find no merit to the defendant’s arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

I concur in the majority’s holding affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Ms. Patterson’s claim for defamation. However, I dissent from the holding reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the claim based upon false light invasion of privacy.

We concur fully with the Court’s decision to affirm Corinio Pruitt’s conviction for first-degree felony murder. However, we respectfully disagree with the manner in which the Court has carried out the proportionality analysis required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (2010) because we believe that it is inconsistent with the plain requirements of the statute. After considering “both the nature of the crime and the defendant” in this case and in “similar cases” as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206(c)(1)(D), we conclude that Mr. Pruitt should be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.

The trial court in this case entered two identical final judgments fifteen days apart. The appellant filed her notice of appeal within thirty days of the second judgment, but not the first. Because the thirty day time limit for filing a notice of appeal runs from the entry of the first judgment, the notice of appeal was not timely filed. Although the appellant may seek relief from the trial court pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P.60, the failure to file a timely notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.
 

A University of Memphis student fell down an elevator shaft while removing artwork following a required University function at property owned by Donald Estes. The student sued Donald Estes and Estes, LLC, the University, and The University of Memphis Foundation. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the Foundation. The jury returned a verdict of $4,103,720.00, and the fault was ultimately allocated as follows: the State 40%; the student 15%; Estes 45%. Based upon an indemnification agreement, the trial court found the State liable for Mr. Estes’ share of the jury verdict, or $1,436,215.20. We find that the trial court erred in concluding that the indemnification agreement indemnified Mr. Estes for his own negligence and in granting summary judgment in favor of the Foundation. However, we affirm the trial court’s admission of testimony regarding $410,000 in medical bills, its exclusion of evidence regarding the student’s alleged drug use, and its capping of the State’s liability at $300,000. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff filed suit against a medical legal examiner alleging the medical legal examiner was negligent in failing to inform her of certain preventative medications. The medical legal examiner contended she was a government employee protected from liability by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion because the medical legal examiner could not prove she was paid by the payroll department of the governmental entity at issue, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20107(a)(2). The medical legal examiner appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.