APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Years after the parties divorced, they agreed to entry of a consent order requiring the mother to cooperate with the father in obtaining passports for the parties’ two minor children. Months later, the father filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the mother had refused to cooperate in executing the necessary documents. The trial court found the mother in contempt for willfully refusing to execute the documents. The mother appeals, arguing that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order finding her in contempt, citing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”), because the parties no longer live in Tennessee. She also argues that the trial court erred in holding her in contempt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A.F.C. (“Father”) appeals the order terminating his rights to his minor children, T.F.H. and P.F.H. (“the Children”). After a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds exist to terminate Father’s parental rights. The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the Children. Father appeals. He challenges the finding of grounds for termination, but not the best-interest determination. We affirm the judgment in all respects.

This appeal involves post-divorce parental relocation. The mother notified the father that she intended to relocate outside Tennessee with the parties’ minor daughter. The mother asserted that the relocation was for purposes related to her career as a surgeon. The father filed a petition opposing the relocation on the grounds that the mother’s motive for the relocation was vindictive and that the relocation did not have a reasonable purpose under Tennessee’s parental relocation statute. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the father had not carried his burden of proving the mother’s motive was vindictive or that the relocation was not for a reasonable purpose, and so permitted the mother to relocate with the parties’ child. The father now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Victor Gonzalez, Jr., appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court should have found that due process considerations tolled the statute of limitations for filing his petition. Following our review, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition on the basis that it was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations and the petitioner failed to show any reason for the statute of limitations to be tolled. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition.

I concur in most of the majority opinion, with the exception of its decision to deem waived Mother’s stated issue of whether the trial court erred in holding her in contempt when the order she was accused of violating had no deadline.

Plaintiff filed an action alleging retaliation and interference in violation of the Tennessee Disabilities Act. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant Employer on the basis that the Act does not require employers to make “reasonable accommodations,” as were required by Plaintiff at the time she was discharged. We affirm.

The Defendant, Troy Lynn Fox, was convicted of the first degree premeditated murder of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting certain photographs into evidence—one, a photograph of the murder victim that was taken while she was alive and, two, multiple photographs of the crime scene and of the victim’s injuries, taken both at the scene and during the autopsy; (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to conduct a jury-out hearing prior to the admission of several photographs of the victim taken at the crime scene and by describing those photographs as “gross” in front of the jury; (4) whether the trial court erred by requiring the Defendant to cross-examine the victim’s mother during the State’s case-in-chief rather than allowing the Defendant to recall her as a defense witness; (5) whether the trial court erred by prohibiting the Defendant from further development of the couple’s social, family, and marital history; (6) whether the trial court committed reversible error in its instruction to the jury on the impeachment of a witness; and (7) whether the trial court demonstrated judicial bias against the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court found that Petitioners had failed to demonstrate willful abandonment in this action to terminate the parental rights of Mother. We affirm.

The Defendant, Shawn Christopher Sales, pled guilty to robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to 163 days in confinement followed by fifteen years to be served in Community Corrections. In March 2013, the Defendant’s Community Corrections officer filed a second affidavit alleging the Defendant had violated his Community Corrections sentence, and, after a hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it revoked his Community Corrections sentence because the State presented insufficient evidence to support the revocation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s Community Corrections sentence, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns post-divorce alimony issues. Dwight O. Satterfield (“Mr. Satterfield”) and Margaret H. Satterfield (“Ms. Satterfield”) divorced after 31 years of marriage. Mr. Satterfield some years later filed a motion to terminate alimony in the General Sessions Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) alleging that Ms. Satterfield had been cohabiting with a man. The Trial Court ruled orally that under the Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”), Ms. Satterfield’s cohabitation did not precipitate termination of alimony. Before an order was entered on his first motion, Mr. Satterfield filed another motion, this time based on the statutory rebuttable presumption that arises if there is cohabitation. The Trial Court held that res judicata resolved the issue and that alimony would not be modified. Mr. Satterfield appeals. We affirm the Trial Court as to its interpretation of the MDA. However, as Mr. Satterfield’s second motion was pending when the first order was entered, the first order was not final and the Trial Court erred in holding in its second order that res judicata resolved the alimony issue. We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Jonathan Downey (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, and aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the felony murder and then merged the latter two convictions with the felony murder conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction of first degree felony murder. The State asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s merger of the aggravated burglary conviction. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction of first degree felony murder. We order the trial court to reinstate the Defendant’s conviction of aggravated burglary and remand this matter for sentencing on that conviction.

I concur completely in Judge Swiney’s well-reasoned majority opinion. I write separately to stress the linchpin of the majority’s rationale in rejecting Mr. Satterfield’s first issue.

The Defendant, Jackie Wayne Miller, pled guilty to initiation of the process of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of the sentences. The trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years and three months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a slip and fall case under the GTLA. The plaintiff high school student slipped on a patch of ice on the sidewalk at his public high school and sustained injuries. The student filed this action against the county board of education alleging negligence. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the defendant school board had constructive notice of the ice on the sidewalk and thus was liable under the GTLA. The school board now appeals. After carefully reviewing the record, we find insufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of constructive notice and so reverse the trial court’s decision.

This is a medical malpractice action arising from the death of Decedent.  Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to comply with the notice requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(1).  The trial court agreed and dismissed the action without prejudice.  Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to this court, and we vacated the dismissal order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that section 29-26-121 did not mandate dismissal for noncompliance with its terms.  Givens v. Vanderbilt Univ., No. M2013-00266-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5773431, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2013).  Defendants filed an application for permission to appeal our decision.  The Tennessee Supreme Court granted the application for purposes of remanding the case for reconsideration in light of its decision in Stevens v. Hickman Community Health Care, Inc., – S.W.3d –, 2013 WL 6158000 (Tenn. Nov. 25, 2013).  Upon our reconsideration, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Madison County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Joseph Shane Powell, charging him with promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged in the indictment. The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years as a Range II multiple offender. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Auqeith Lashawn Byner, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver and one count of reckless driving. After a jury trial, he was convicted as charged. As a result, he was sentenced to a sixteen-year sentence for the possession of cocaine with intent to sell conviction and six months for reckless driving, to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentence in another case 2007-D-3157. Petitioner initiated a direct appeal of his convictions but dismissed the appeal voluntarily. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. After a review, we determine Petitioner has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Plaintiffs appeal a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to the Tennessee Right to Farm Act, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 43-26-101 et seq. (“the TRFA”). Plaintiffs own an express ingress/egress easement, a gravel road, that passes through Defendants’ farm. In what Plaintiffs titled a “COMPLAINT FOR ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE AND DAMAGES”, they alleged, inter alia, that Defendants substantially destroyed the utility of their ingress/egress easement by driving heavy farming equipment across and allowing cattle to walk upon the easement. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and monetary damages. Defendants filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss contending that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief may be granted because the nuisance claim was barred by the TRFA. More specifically, Defendants contended that Plaintiffs failed to allege that Defendants violated any “generally accepted agricultural practices” or a “statute or regulation” in the use or operation of the farm upon which the easement lies. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs appeal. We have determined that the TRFA pertains to nuisances alleged to arise from a farm or farm operations but not to claims of unreasonable interference with the use of an ingress and egress easement. We, therefore, affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim, for the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted for a nuisance arising from a farm or farm operation. However, we have determined the complaint states a separate claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress and egress easement, a claim that is not subject to the TRFA. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the complaint for it states a separate and viable claim for impairment of and damage to Plaintiffs’ ingress/egress easement. Further, this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellee, Donald Lee Reburn, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. At his guilty plea submission hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a persistent offender to ten years, suspended to probation. The State has appealed and argues that the trial court erred by sentencing appellee without a sentencing hearing and without a presentence report. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a sentencing hearing.

J.B. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her rights to her minor children, J.B. Jr. and J.B. (“the Children”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) was involved with the family going back to 2006. In 2009, the Children were taken into emergency, protective custody predicated on allegations of illegal drug use, failure to protect from sexual abuse, and domestic violence. The Children were adjudicated dependent and neglected and placed in foster care. A year later, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. It alleged that Mother abandoned the Children and that she failed to resolve the issues that led to their removal. Following a bench trial, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the best interest of the Children. On this appeal, Mother challenges only the best interest determination. We affirm.

This appeal stems from a case of alleged nursing home abuse and neglect and involves a dispute as to whether a health care power of attorney executed by decedent was effective to authorize the agent to execute an optional arbitration agreement on the decedent’s behalf. The trial court denied the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the attorney-in-fact did not have authority to sign the optional arbitration agreement on the principal’s behalf. The nursing home appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

The petitioner, Joseph Lamont Johnson, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of felony evading arrest. The trial court then reduced one of the aggravated robbery convictions to aggravated assault pursuant to State v. Franklin, 130 S.W.3d 789, 798 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) and sentenced the petitioner to an aggregate sentence of fifty-four years. The petitioner’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal. State v. Johnson, No. M2007-01644-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2567729, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2009). The petitioner brings this post-conviction action alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in that: (1) trial counsel failed to convey a plea offer or inform the petitioner regarding his potential exposure; (2) trial counsel did not adequately investigate the case; (3) trial counsel performed deficiently by not moving to dismiss one of the aggravated robbery counts; (4) trial counsel performed deficiently by not moving to suppress a witness’s identification of the petitioner; (5) appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to challenge the petitioner’s sentencing range; and (6) that the cumulative errors above resulted in the deprivation of the right to counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petitioner has failed to prove one or both prongs of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to each claim, and we accordingly affirm the denial of the petition.

This is a divorce appeal. Husband appeals the classification, valuation, and division of certain items in the marital estate, the award of alimony in futuro, and the requirement that he pay a portion an expert witness fee. We vacate the classification and valuation of the furniture which is at issue, vacate the valuation of the stock and the 401(k), and remand those matters for further consideration. We affirm the court’s decision to award alimony, but vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand for further consideration of the type, amount and duration of the award. We affirm the court’s ruling in all other respects.

This appeal involves review of an administrative decision. Chattanooga‟s local utility company hired the Appellant construction company to perform preliminary work on the  utility company‟s fiber-optic internet infrastructure.  One of the Appellant‟s employees  was  injured  while  performing  this  work.  The  Tennessee  Department  of Labor  and  Workforce  Development‟s Division  of Occupational  Safety and Health  (“TOSHA”) conducted  an investigation  of the  incident. Thereafter,  on  recommendation  of the inspector, TOSHA cited the Appellant for violations of the telecommunications safety regulations.  Appellant contested the citations before the Division of Occupational Safety and  Health Review  Commission (“the  Commission”),  which  upheld the  citations. Appellant then appealed the Commission‟s decision to the Davidson County Chancery Court, which also affirmed the citations.  Appellant now appeals the Chancery Court‟s  decision  to this  Court.  We conclude that  TOSHA  erred  in  applying  the telecommunications regulation instead of the construction regulations.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial court and vacate the citations issued to Appellant construction company.

Defendant, Derrick Braxton, was convicted as charged for one count of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years’ confinement to be served at 100 percent release eligibility. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts the following: 1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; 2) his sentence is excessive; 3) the trial court failed to act as thirteenth juror; and 4) the prosecutor’s comments about Defendant’s credibility during closing argument were improper. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.