APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Douglas Killins, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2003 conviction for second degree murder and Range II thirty-eight-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by denying him relief because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mario Green (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of second degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Petitioner to twenty years’ incarceration. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Jessie Dotson, of six counts of premeditated first degree murder and three counts of attempted first degree murder. The jury sentenced the defendant to death for each conviction of first degree murder. Following a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to forty years for each conviction for attempted first degree murder, to be served consecutively to each other and to the first degree murder sentences. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) testimony regarding one of the victims’ statement to police was hearsay and its admission violated the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; (3) the admission of the defendant’s custodial statements violated his rights under the United States and Tennessee Constitutions; (4) the admission of testimony that the defendant invoked his right to counsel violated his due process rights; (5) the admission of testimony regarding the defendant’s history of imprisonment violated his right to a fair trial; (6) the trial court’s treatment of defense counsel in the jury’s presence violated his right to a fair trial; (7) the admission of the pathologist’s testimony regarding autopsies that she did not perform violated the defendant’s confrontation rights; (8) the trial court erred in admitting photographs of the victims; (9) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to provide DNA analysis of all those who came in contact with the crime scene; (10) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for production of the statements of those not to be called as witnesses for the State; (11) the trial court improperly defined “reasonable doubt” in instructing the jury; (12) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on facilitation of first degree murder as a lesser included offense; (13) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to strike aggravating circumstances; (14) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a probable cause finding regarding the aggravating circumstances; (15) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for disclosure of information regarding the proportionality review; (16) the admission of victim impact evidence was improper; (17) the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to argue last during the penalty phase; (18) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its argument to the jury; (19) the trial court erred in allowing the death verdicts to stand; (20) the defendant’s sentences for his three convictions for attempted first degree murder were excessive; and (21) cumulative error requires reversal. Based upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Vershawn McCoy, was convicted by a Shelby County jury for second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to a twenty-year sentence to be served at 100%. He unsuccessfully appealed to this Court. State v. Vershawn McCoy, No. W2009-01222-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4540076 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 9, 2010). Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has been unable to prove either deficient performance on the part of trial counsel, or prejudice even if deficient performance had been found. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Colton D. Whitelow, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide and acquitted of the aggravated assault charge. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-211, -215. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective ten-year sentence. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the length of his sentences were excessive; and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother’s parental rights to her child were terminated due to her diminished mental capacity, which caused her to be incompetent to care for her child. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The trial court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

The Petitioner, Auqeith Lashawn Byner, pled guilty to driving on a suspended license, and a Davidson County jury convicted him of possession with the intent to sell or deliver over twenty-six grams of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve an effective sentence of seventeen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed his convictions but withdrew his appeal on February 11, 2010. On February 14, 2011, the Petitioner, pro se, timely filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and was thereafter appointed an attorney. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court issued an order denying the Petitioner relief. The Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial of his claim. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

In this medical malpractice action, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the defendant doctor. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in allowing a medical expert witness to testify. We find no error in the trial court’s decision.

The Petitioner, Kenneth Coleman Benefiel, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-529(a), (e)(1). On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal, the mother of the child at issue appeals the trial court’s order establishing paternity. The appellant mother filed this parentage petition against the father. At the outset of the hearing on the petition, the mother’s attorney announced that he had developed a conflict of interest regarding his representation of the mother, because he had previously consulted with both the mother and the father when the parties agreed on the issues. By the time of the hearing, the parties no longer agreed and the father had hired his own attorney. Despite the attorney’s disclosure that he had developed a conflict of interest in continuing to represent the mother, the trial court proceeded with the paternity hearing. What ensued was a procedural train wreck; it ultimately resulted in orders that resolved all issues on their merits. The mother appeals. We conclude that this particular train never should have left the station. In light of the disclosure by the mother’s prior attorney that he had developed a conflict of interest, we vacate everything that followed the attorney’s disclosure, except the order allowing the mother’s attorney to withdraw.

Petitioner, George Campbell, Jr., was convicted by a jury in Memphis of felony murder and aggravated assault and sentenced to life in prison in 1994. See State v. George Campbell, Jr., No. 02-C-01-9408-CR00165, 1996 WL 368224, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 28, 1996), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jan. 6, 1997). His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Id. Petitioner later sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief and this Court affirmed the decision of the post-conviction court. See George Campbell, Jr. v. State, No. W2002-00703-CCA-R3-PC, 2001 WL 1042112, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Sept. 10, 2001), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 27, 2001). Then Petitioner sought relief via the writ of habeas corpus on the basis that his convictions were void for various reasons. The trial court denied relief and this Court affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief on appeal. See George Campbell, Jr. v. Bruce Westbrooks, No. W2002-02086-CCA-R3-CO, 2003 WL 22309471, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 6, 2003). Petitioner also sought redress in the form of a motion of writ of error coram nobis in which he claimed that newly discovered evidence may have resulted in a different judgment at trial had the evidence been admitted at the trial. See George Campbell, Jr. v. State, No. W2007-00820-CCA-R3-CO, 2008 WL 2219305, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 28, 2008). This Court affirmed the dismissal of the petition for writ of error coram nobis on the basis that it was untimely and “nothing in the record implicate[d] any due process concerns that would require that the statute of limitations be tolled.” Id. at *2. Petitioner filed a second petition for writ of error coram nobis that is the subject of the appeal herein. After a hearing concerning the timeliness of the petition, the trial court entered an order finding that Petitioner’s claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations pertaining to coram nobis petitions and that due process did not require the rolling of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the determination made by the trial court. The petition was filed more than one year after the judgment became final. Further, Petitioner has shown no reason that due process would require the tolling of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Petitioner asserts that disciplinary board acted arbitrarily and illegally in the conduct of the hearing and imposition of penalties. The trial court dismissed the petition; finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Lamour Ashleigh Sligh, was charged by information in the Blount County Circuit Court with possession with intent to deliver not less than one-half ounce of marijuana, a charge to which he pleaded guilty in 2007, agreeing to a suspended, two-year, Range I sentence. Following a series of probation revocations, the trial court revoked the probation in 2012 and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of his original sentence. We affirm the trial court’s order.

This appeal concerns alleged defamation and the applicability of both the legislative privilege and the litigation privilege. Bassam Issa (“Issa”), a developer seeking rezoning of certain real property, sued Chattanooga City Councilman Jack Benson, Sr. (“Benson”) in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Issa alleged that, in two separate incidents, Benson had defamed him by accusing him of offering a bribe to influence Benson’s vote on the rezoning matter. Benson filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that his statements were protected by the legislative privilege and the litigation privilege. The Trial Court granted Benson’s motion. Issa appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

In this appeal, we review the denial of an attorney’s petition for reinstatement of his law license. The attorney was suspended from the practice of law for five years after he pleaded guilty to attempted extortion in federal court. The extortion arose out of the attorney’s attempt to broker the testimony of a witness in a civil trial for a substantial fee. After serving a nineteen-month prison sentence and a five-year suspension from the practice of law, the attorney petitioned for reinstatement. A hearing panel of the Board of Professional Responsibility denied the attorney’s request, finding that the attorney failed to carry his burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that he had the moral qualifications, competency and learning in law, and that reinstatement would not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of justice and subversive to the public interest. The panel considered, among other things, the nature of the crime, that the extortion involved several million dollars, the attorney’s unwillingness to take responsibility for his actions, and his lack of credibility. The attorney appealed to the Chancery Court for Williamson County. The trial court affirmed the hearing panel’s decision. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this appeal, we interpret the meaning of the phrase “term of imprisonment” in Articles III and IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-31-101 to -108 (2006), and determine whether the defendant is entitled to relief under the IAD. The IAD, a compact between state and federal jurisdictions, provides cooperative procedures for the exchange of prisoners between state and federal jurisdictions so that prisoners can be brought to trial on untried indictments or complaints. Under Article III of the IAD, a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment may request a trial within 180 days after being delivered to another state. Under Article IV of the IAD, an official of one jurisdiction may seek custody of a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment in another jurisdiction, but the prisoner must be tried within 120 days of arrival in that jurisdiction and cannot be “shuttled” back to the original place of imprisonment before the trial. The IAD mandates a dismissal of the indictment for a violation of either Article III or IV. The defendant in this case was arrested on related federal and state charges and taken into federal custody. After the defendant was tried and convicted in federal court, he was indicted by the grand jury in Gibson County on the related state charges. Before being sentenced in federal court, the defendant filed a demand for speedy disposition of the state charges under Article III of the IAD. While the defendant was confined at a federal temporary detention facility after his sentencing in federal court, the Gibson County Sheriff filed a detainer and transported the defendant to Gibson County for an arraignment. After counsel was appointed and the defendant was arraigned, he was transferred back into federal custody. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the state indictment for violations of Articles III and IV of the IAD. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11 and reserved a certified question of law seeking appellate review of the denial of the motion to dismiss because of the alleged violation of the IAD. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. See State v. Springer, No. W2010-02153-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 603820, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2012). We hold that for purposes of the IAD, a prisoner who is incarcerated after sentencing is serving a “term of imprisonment.” We further hold that the defendant properly reserved his issues for appeal in the certified question; that the defendant was a federal pretrial detainee at the time he filed a procedurally deficient demand for speedy disposition and is not entitled to relief under Article III; and that the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment when he was transferred, pursuant to a detainer, from the federal temporary detention facility to Gibson County for his arraignment and back to federal custody on the same day. Article IV of the IAD was violated when the defendant was transferred back to the federal detention center before being tried for the state charges. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, the conviction is vacated, and the indictment against the defendant is dismissed with prejudice.

A Shelby County grand jury indicted appellant, Darquan Swift, for one count of attempted first degree murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, one count of attempted especially aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324. Following a trial, a jury found him guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder and guilty as charged on all remaining counts. The trial court sentenced appellant to an effective sentence of ninety-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He now appeals his convictions on the following grounds: (1) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324 can be applied in a case involving robbery; (2) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1324 can be applied to lesser included offenses of the dangerous felony upon which the State relied; and (3) whether the trial court improperly limited the testimony of appellant’s expert witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case presents the issue of whether the trial court properly dismissed the Appellees, Donald and Barbara MacTavish, as parties from the lawsuit below because Plaintiff’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Phillip Burt, Plaintiff below, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of all claims against Donald and Barbara MacTavish. We vacate the trial court’s order granting dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

This is a case involving the Grandparent Visitation Statute in which the grandparents unquestionably played a significant role in the child’s life.

Dean Moore, Trustee for the Dean Henry Moore Living Trust (“Plaintiff”), Bobby Sullivan, and Willis Songer sued Paul Brock, Sanford Quay, and Russ Quay (“Defendants”) seeking, among other things, a declaration of a boundary line and a judgment for slander of title. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its order on June 19, 2012 finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiff has superior title over Defendants to the disputed real property, that the title Defendants claimed by quitclaim deed from Jerry Edmonds shall be held for naught, and that Plaintiff did not prove slander of title. Plaintiff appeals to this Court raising an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in dismissing his claim for slander of title. Defendants raise an issue regarding whether the Trial Court erred in finding for Plaintiff on the boundary line issue. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings with regard either to the boundary line dispute or to Plaintiff’s slander of title claim, and we affirm.

This is a divorce case in which the award of alimony in futuro is questioned. Appellant Husband and Appellee Wife were married for approximately thirty years. The trial court granted Husband a divorce, divided certain marital property and debt, and awarded Appellee Wife alimony in futuro in the amount of $850 per month until death or remarriage. Appellant Husband appeals only the award of alimony. From the totality of the circumstances, and specifically based upon Wife’s health issues, her level of education, her employment history, and past earnings, it does not appear that rehabilitation will be possible. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the type and amount of alimony awarded. Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied. Affirmed and remanded.

This appeal arises from a claim under the Governmental Tort Liability Act for injuries sustained by an employee of the Metropolitan Police Department that allegedly resulted from a fall in the break room at her workplace. The employee alleged that the chair she attempted to sit in, which had caster wheels, constituted a dangerous condition because it was on an uncarpeted, tile floor. She also alleged that the Metropolitan Government had notice of the dangerous condition and was negligent in failing to provide a safe work environment and in permitting the dangerous condition to remain. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the action finding that Plaintiff failed to prove her negligence claim by a preponderance of the evidence because the evidence did not establish that the Metro Police Department had actual or constructive notice of any dangerous condition with sufficient time to take corrective action. We affirm.

Antonio Grandberry (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of especially aggravated robbery. Pursuant to an agreement between the Defendant and the State, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eighteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Additionally, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the offense of facilitation of especially aggravated robbery. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction of especially aggravated robbery or any of the lesser-included offenses pertaining to robbery but is sufficient as to the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Accordingly, we modify the Defendant’s especially aggravated robbery conviction to aggravated assault and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing.

After review of the record in this case, I am unable to agree with majority’s conclusion that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for especially aggravated robbery. The majority bases is conclusion upon the fact that the evidence established only mere presence at the scene on the part of the Defendant rather than an intent to participate in the ongoing crime of robbery. The majority acknowledges that the Defendant is guilty of aggravated assault. I conclude that there is no logical reasoning behind the aggravated assault except in furtherance of the robbery. When “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution” as is the required standard, see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, I disagree that the evidence fails to establish that the Defendant “knowingly, voluntarily and with common intent joined with the principal offender in the commission of the robbery.” See Sherman, 266 S.W.3d at 408.

The State filed a motion to correct a clerical error pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, seeking to clarify sentence alignment for three sentences imposed upon appellant, Charlie Burks. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order clarifying that appellant’s sentences were to be served consecutively. It is from this order that he now appeals. Based on our review, we dismiss the appeal.