APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In 2011, the Tennessee General Assembly amended Tennessee’s voting procedures to provide for the use of photographic identification in elections. The General Assembly amended these procedures in 20122 and again in 2013.3 I concur with the Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of these procedures as they stood in 2012. I write separately, however, to address the threshold matter of the standard of review that should be used to address the constitutionality of these amendments.

Defendant, Dustin Marshall Goforth, was serving a suspended eight-year sentence on supervised probation. Violation of probation warrants were filed, and his suspended sentence was revoked after an evidentiary hearing. The trial court ordered the sentence to be served by incarceration in the Department of Correction. In his sole issue on appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for the judge to recuse himself in this case prior to the evidentiary hearing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

St. Thomas Hospital suspended a surgeon’s hospital privileges and restored them less than three months later, as part of a settlement in which the doctor also waived a “fair hearing,” which was the next step in the hospital’s procedures. The surgeon subsequently sued the hospital, contending that it had not properly followed its own bylaws in regard to the suspension of his privileges and that he was therefore entitled to damages for breach of contract, defamation of character, and tortious interference with business relations. The hospital denied that it had violated any of its bylaws and asserted that it was entitled to immunity for its actions under the Tennessee Peer Review Law of 1967 and the Federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986.  The trial court granted summary judgment to the hospital. Because the surgeon failed to show that the hospital did not follow its bylaws, because of his settlement and waiver of a fair hearing, the hospital was entitled to the immunity granted to the peer review process. We affirm.

Defendant, Lavario Devon Kibble, entered guilty pleas to reckless endangerment and aggravated assault pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. Under the agreement he received consecutive sentences of one year for reckless endangerment and four years for aggravated assault. The manner of service of the effective sentence of five years was left to determination by the trial court after a sentencing hearing. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served totally by incarceration. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court should have ordered an alternative sentence of either split confinement or periodic confinement. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Darrell Carpenter, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for second degree murder in November of 2007. At the conclusion of a jury trial, he was convicted of the offense as charged in the indictment and sentenced to twenty years in incarceration as a violent offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant did not seek an appeal. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he sought a delayed appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-113. The trial court granted the motion for delayed appeal. In this Court, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence resulting in his second degree murder conviction. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Pursuant to this court’s opinion in Stephen Anthony Scott v. State, No. M2010-00448-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 632, at *5 (Nashville, Aug. 16, 2011), the Montgomery County Circuit Court resentenced the appellant, Stephen Anthony Scott, to the presumptive minimum sentence in the range for his convictions of aggravated robbery, attempted aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, and attempted robbery. Six months later, the trial court found the appellant to be an especially mitigated offender and further reduced his sentences for count 3, especially aggravated kidnapping, and count 4, kidnapping, by ten percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by not allowing him to be sentenced pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the Tennessee Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, that the trial court erred by failing to sentence him as an especially mitigated offender for all of the offenses, and that his sentences violate Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court was without jurisdiction to classify the appellant as an especially mitigated offender and could not reduce his sentences by ten percent. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for reinstatement of his previous sentences for counts 3 and 4. Regarding the issues raised on appeal, we conclude that the appellant is not entitled to relief and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, a state prison inmate, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for declaratory order, in which he alleged that the respondents, Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) and Morgan County Correctional Complex (“MCCX”), denied his due process rights and violated TDOC policies when he was placed on administrative segregation following a disciplinary hearing. The trial court found that the petitioner had failed to pay court costs from a previously filed action and dismissed his petition pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-812 (2010). Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Dameon Williams, was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in the county workhouse. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting an autopsy photograph of the victim’s skull and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Based upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Kevin Bell, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probationary sentence and challenges the imposition of the original sentence to be served in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Felton Neville Jackson, was indicted by a Wilson County grand jury for especially aggravated robbery and aggravated assault. He was convicted of both charges, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty-five years and six years, respectively. He now appeals his convictions and sentences on the following grounds: (1) the trial court erred by allowing a police officer to offer an allegedly testimonial statement attributed to the victim; (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) his sentences are excessive. Following our review, we discern no error and affirm appellant’s convictions. However, we vacate the judgments in this case and remand this cause for entry of a single judgment of conviction noting merger of the aggravated assault conviction into the especially aggravated robbery conviction.

Petitioner, Venus L. Viera, plead guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of aggravated robbery. Pursuant to her plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to a sentence of eight years to be served at eighty-five percent incarceration. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which she argued that she was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that she entered her guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing and subsequently entered a written order denying the petition. Petitioner appeals to this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the denial of the petition should be affirmed. However, in our review of the record, we have discovered that the judgment form provides that the sentence is eight years to be served at 100 percent. Therefore, in addition to affirming the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief, we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment.

The Petitioner, Antoinette Hill, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis. She asserts that newly discovered evidence, namely an addiction to alcohol and pills by the trial court judge who presided over her trial for first degree premeditated murder, warrants a new trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

The Defendant, William Albert Kelly, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for perjury and attempted failure to report as a sex offender and ordering his effective two-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine-day sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by revoking his probation and (2) illegally recommended that he not be eligible for release after serving thirty percent of his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Dante Devon Omar Truitt, pled guilty to explosive weapon possession with an agreed eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. At a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve the eight-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it denied alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we find no error in the trial court’s judgment.

Appellee, Jay Hart Frier, was indicted by the Williamson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”), DUI per se, DUI with a blood alcohol concentration of .20% or more, and DUI second offense. Prior to trial, Appellee filed a motion in limine to dismiss the last count of the indictment based on the fact that his prior DUI was facially invalid. The trial court held a hearing and denied the motion. Appellee filed a motion to reconsider. The trial court ultimately granted the motion in limine and dismissed the last count of the indictment. The State sought reconsideration of the ruling. The trial court declined to reconsider. The State sought an interlocutory appeal. The trial court denied the application. The State then sought an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court granted the application. On appeal, after a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the trial court improperly dismissed the indictment where Appellant sought to collaterally attack his previous conviction rather than seeking review of the underlying conviction via a writ of habeas corpus. As a result, thedecision of the trial court is reversed. On remand, the indictment should be reinstated and the matter set for further proceedings.

This case concerns whether the widow of a deceased man may share in the wrongful death settlement obtained by his personal representative. We conclude that the postnuptial agreement entered into by the widow prevents her from benefitting from the wrongful death settlement. Affirmed and remanded.

Plaintiff defaulted on her mortgage and Defendants advised Plaintiff of their plan to foreclose. Plaintiff then sought an injunction and a declaratory judgment. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order preventing foreclosure, which it dissolved after granting Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and we remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Timothy R. Chatmon, filed in the Hamilton County Criminal Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from his two convictions for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, Stephan L. Beasley, Sr., filed for habeas corpus relief from his conviction for first degree murder. The habeas corpus court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Kevin D. McMillan, pled guilty to the sale of a controlled substance, less than 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to three years of incarceration, to be served consecutively to two other convictions, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas court summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the habeas court erred when it summarily dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment.

Appellant, Joseph W. Jones, pleaded guilty to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance and received a three-year sentence, suspended to probation. A violation of probation warrant was subsequently filed, alleging that he had violated a condition of his probation by testing positive for methamphetamine on a drug screen. The trial court revoked his probation, and this appeal follows. Appellant now alleges that the trial court erred in admitting the laboratory report of his drug test without the proper chain of custody and that the trial court should have extended his probation rather than ordering execution of his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jason Clark, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it dismissed his petition without providing a reason for the dismissal in its order, depriving the Petitioner of an opportunity to respond. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Ako Hassan Nejad, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 convictions for conspiracy to commit first degree murder and attempt to commit second degree murder and his effective Range I, thirty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to call a material witness and failed to present a defense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the issue of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state attorney. Defendant is an attorney who resides in Washington D.C. and practiced with a law firm in Virginia. He sought the assistance of Plaintiff, a Memphis law firm, in connection with a lawsuit that Defendant had filed in Maryland. After several discussions, Defendant, Plaintiff, and the client eventually entered into a contract whereby Plaintiff associated with Defendant as co-counsel in the Maryland case. After trial, Defendant allegedly refused to pay his onehalf share of the expenses, as provided by the parties’ contract. Plaintiff then filed the instant lawsuit against Defendant in Tennessee. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Mother sued Father for one-half of child’s college expenses based on the language of their Marital Dissolution Agreement’s parenting plan. Father defended based on the same language. The trial court found the language ambiguous and, based on all the circumstances, found that Father was required to pay one-half of the child’s college expenses at the University of Alabama. Father appealed. We do not find the language ambiguous, but agree with the trial court that the language requires Father to pay one-half of the expenses. We reverse the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest and remand for a calculation of that interest.  We also award Mother attorney’s fees for this appeal and remand to the trial court for a calculation of those fees.