APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The City of Newport sought to annex certain properties in Cocke County, Tennessee. A number of affected parties objected to the annexation and filed a complaint against the City. The trial court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to allege that the City was barred from annexing their properties because it had defaulted on a prior plan of services from an earlier annexation. The City filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the City’s motion on the ground that the statutory amendments on which the plaintiffs relied to support their claim could not be retroactively applied. The plaintiffs appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Tony Arness Degraffreed, appeals from the denial of his petition for post conviction relief, wherein he challenged his Tipton County Circuit Court jury conviction of rape of a child. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Brandon L. Kirk, contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his jury conviction for attempted second degree murder and (2) that the effective twenty-two year sentence imposed by the trial court is inconsistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing because the trial court failed to state the facts it considered in mitigation and to make the requisite findings to impose consecutive sentencing. After our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court properly denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. The defendants assert that Ms. Webb signed an agreement to arbitrate “all controversies” when she opened the brokerage account with them. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable under state law, that Ms. Webb did not agree to arbitration, and that the account representative fraudulently induced Ms. Webb to enter into the agreement. We affirm the decision of the trial court only as to arbitration; we vacate any findings that go to the merits of the underlying case and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Lesergio D. Wilson, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress both the statement he made to police and the evidence seized in his traffic stop, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive service of his sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm.

James Gibbs (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court erred in not giving him his proper community corrections credit. The habeas corpus court dismissed his petition without a hearing, stating that the Petitioner failed to allege a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief and that he failed to establish that his sentence had expired. The Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we hold that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his sentence has expired. Accordingly, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment denying relief.

Petitioner, Chauncey Moore, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of attempting to commit premeditated murder and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He entered a guilty plea to the lesser included offense of attempt to commit manslaughter and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to two years at thirty percent for the attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter conviction and six years at 100 percent for the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that he entered his guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prove any of his allegations that counsel’s representation was ineffective and that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

Appellant, Paul Robert Carrier, Jr., who was a police officer, was indicted by the Gibson County Grand Jury for one count of reckless homicide for a shooting death that occurred while he was on duty. Following a change of venue, he was tried by a jury in Montgomery County. The jury convicted him as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to two years incarceration and denied his request for judicial diversion. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing certain testimony at trial and in denying his request for judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Alyssa Y. and Brian Y. (“the Children”), the minor twin children of Juanita Y. (“Mother”). When the Children were three months old, their maternal grandmother filed a petition with the Knox County Juvenile Court, asserting that the Children were dependent and neglected due to Mother’s drug use. The Children were placed in the custody of the maternal grandmother by order of the court entered January 23, 2009. When the maternal grandmother became unable to care for the Children in November 2010, they were taken into custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and placed in foster care. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother on April 26, 2012. The petition alleged several grounds for termination, including abandonment based on Mother’s willful failure to visit and support the Children, persistent conditions, and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition after finding by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Children due to her failure to pay child support. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that Mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan and that termination of parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Mother has appealed. We affirm.

The Defendant, Quincy D. Moutry, alias, was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses arising from a carjacking in March of 2008. He received an effective twenty-seven-year sentence for those convictions. In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing the State to amend the date of the offenses alleged in the presentment after the jury had been sworn. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, the judgments are affirmed.

The Petitioner, Patrick Devin Camp, appeals as of right from the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Pursuant to the terms of a negotiated plea agreement, the Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping and received an effective sentence of forty years. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the performance of trial counsel. Specifically, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, leading to an involuntary plea, because trial counsel (1) failed to adequately communicate with him; (2) failed to inform him of State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997), due process issues; (3) failed to inform him of the factors involved in a consecutive sentencing determination; (4) failed to properly investigate the case; (5) failed to assess his mental status; (6) “abandoned” the Petitioner’s request to withdraw the plea; and (7) “never intended to fully represent [the Petitioner].” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Mitchell Darnell Eads, filed in the Claiborne County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the admission of certain evidence at trial and by erroneously stipulating at the sentencing hearing that the petitioner was a career offender. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner currently appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Thomas W. Farr, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his effective thirtyeight-year sentence is void. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Appellant, Joseph L. Lands, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication in McNairy County. Lands, 377 S.W.3d 678, 679 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2012). Because of a procedural error, Appellant’s appeal to this Court was dismissed and his appeal bond was revoked. Id. at 684. The trial court subsequently granted Appellant’s request for bond while appealing to the Tennessee Supreme Court. The State filed an application pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for an extraordinary appeal arguing that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to grant the request. We granted the Rule 10 application. On appeal, we conclude that Rule 8(c) specifically states that this Court has jurisdiction to determine questions regarding appeal bonds when an appellant appeals this Court’s determination to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Therefore, we remand this case for proceedings to revoke his appeal bond in the trial court.

The Criminal Court for Carter County sentenced the Defendant, Steven Todd Andes, to community corrections sentences after his convictions in 2002, 2007, and 2010. In January 2012, the Defendant’s probation officer filed an affidavit alleging the Defendant had violated his probation. The trial court issued a warrant, and, after a hearing, at which the Defendant’s probation officer did not testify, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentences in all of his cases. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it revoked his probation because the trial court: (1) denied his due process rights by failing to allow him to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; and (2) failed to provide a written statement regarding the evidence and reasons upon which it relied when revoking his probation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s probation. The trial court’s judgment is, therefore, affirmed.

Appellant, Aaricka Biley, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for aggravated child abuse in Count One and aggravated child neglect or endangerment in Count Two. At trial, after the State’s proof, the trial court granted a motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to Count Two. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced Appellant to thirteen years and six months in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal. On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) the trial court erroneously failed to compel the State to elect a particular act or injury; (2) the trial court erroneously failed to charge the jury with an enhanced unanimity instruction; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude: (1) after the trial court dismissed one count of the indictment, the State was not required to make an election; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated child abuse. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal concerns a landowner’s potential liability to a person injured while riding a motorcycle on the landowner’s property. Jordan K. Wilson (“Wilson”) suffered severe injuries in a motorcycle accident on property owned by David W. Dossett (“Dossett”). Wilson sued Dossett in the Circuit Court for Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). Dossett filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting the affirmative defense for landowners under Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102. The Trial Court held that Dossett was afforded protection under the statute as Wilson had been engaged in recreational activities on Dossett’s land. At a subsequent hearing, the Trial Court found that no exception to the statutory defense was applicable. Wilson appeals. We hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 applies to shield Dossett from liability as Wilson was engaged in recreational activities on Dossett’s property, and that no exception to the defense is applicable. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The Defendant, Joseph Floyd, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of driving under the influence (DUI), Class A misdemeanors, and reckless driving, a Class B misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401, 55-10-205 (2012). The trial court merged the DUI convictions. The Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the DUI conviction and seven days for the reckless driving conviction, all suspended but seven days. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner pled guilty in Smith County to one count of aggravated statutory rape and one count of criminal exposure to HIV and received an effective sentence of twenty years. The petitioner’s guilty pleas were entered with the condition that he reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding the search and seizure of certain evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal based on a lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner brought this post-conviction petition asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective in reserving the certified question and bringing the appeal. The post-conviction court dismissed the claim without a hearing or the appointment of counsel, finding that the issues had been previously determined on direct appeal. See T.C.A. § 40-30-106(h) (2010). The petitioner appeals, asserting that this Court on direct appeal concluded it was without jurisdiction and did not rule on the merits of his claims. After a thorough examination of the facts and law, we conclude that the petitioner has stated a colorable claim; and we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for further proceedings.

Appellant, James A. Lambert, was indicted by the McNairy County Grand Jury for rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, attempted aggravated sexual battery, and incest. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery. One count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery were later dismissed. As a result of the convictions, Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years at 100 percent. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Don Mask Brown, Jr., (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of second degree murder and aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of fifty-five years’ incarceration. The Petitioner, pro se, subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief. The post-conviction court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Jeremy J. Edick (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, one count of solicitation of rape of a child, and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifty years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his conviction for rape of a child. He also argues that the trial court erred in ordering partial consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I write separately to address the current split of authority on the standard to be applied to appellate review of consecutive sentencing.

The defendant, Mikel C. Hamrick, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for reinstatement of his probationary sentence. Because the trial court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the defendant’s probation, we affirm.

The petitioner, Leon Morris, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.