APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Edgar Ray Bettis, was convicted in the Dickson County Circuit Court of first degree premeditated murder; second degree murder; and unauthorized use of an automobile, also known as joyriding.  The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction and sentenced the appellant to life.  For the joyriding conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served concurrently with the murder conviction.  On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he murdered the victim, that the trial court erred by allowing the forensic pathologist to testify outside the contents of the autopsy report, and that the trial court’s error resulted in the jury’s improperly seeing a photograph of the victim’s larynx.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, William Lance Walker, was convicted by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of two counts of possession with the intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, two counts of possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417, 39-17-425 (2010).  The trial court merged each possession with the intent to deliver conviction with the corresponding possession with the intent to sell conviction.  The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of nineteen years for each possession with the intent to sell conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for the possession of drug paraphernalia conviction.  On appeal, he contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, and (3) the trial judge erred by failing to recuse himself.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

A Washington County jury convicted Russell Dean Long of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse and first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect. The jury convicted Jessica Renee Adkins of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect. The trial court merged Defendant Long’s convictions and sentenced both of the defendants to serve life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Long asserts that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions; (2) the trial court allowed the introduction of inadmissible hearsay evidence through the videotaped conversation between the defendants; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to exclude an autopsy photograph of the victim. Defendant Adkins asserts that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction; and (2) the trial court improperly overruled her objection to the State’s use of a visual aid during closing arguments. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Bradley Mitchell West, Jr., appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to locate and interview a potential witness.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Carroll County jury convicted appellant, Robert Joseph Harr, of attempted sexual battery. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail and ordered him to serve forty-five days in confinement with the balance of his sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, the trial court’s denial of full probation, the trial court’s discovery rulings under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, and the State’s denial of his application for pretrial diversion. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Clyde Turner, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering that he serve his original four-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent concealment, aiding and abetting breach of contract, common law tortious interference, statutory interference, and civil conspiracy. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Christopher S., Jr. (“C.J.”) and Lilly S., the minor children (“Children”) of Tawana S. (“Mother”) and Christopher S., Sr. (“Father”). The Children were taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on October 14, 2010. On September 22, 2011, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. Following a bench trial held on April 27, 2012, and July 11, 2012, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents had committed severe child abuse and were mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. Father and Mother have appealed. We reverse the finding that Father and Mother were mentally incompetent to provide for the further care and supervision of the Children. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights on the statutory ground of severe child abuse.

Matthew W. Wambles ("the Petitioner") pleaded nolo contendere to one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of sexual exploitation of a minor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to concurrent terms of eight years’ incarceration. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his pleas are constitutionally infirm. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal is from an order of the trial court denying the appellant’s motion to waive all fines and costs related to the nolle prosequi of all charges in Hamblen County Criminal Court case number 03CR212. Because it is clear from the record that no court costs or fines were assessed against the appellant as a result of the nolle prosequi entered in the proceedings below, there appears to be no judgment of the trial court adverse to the appellant’s interests and, therefore, we lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal.

Petitioner, Russell Lenox Hamblin, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief following on evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel and his appellate counsel (separate attorneys) rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  After a review of the record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a collateral attack on an order entered by a general sessions court. The plaintiff tenant leased residential property from the defendant landowner. The tenant fell behind in his rent, so the landowner filed a forcible entry and detainer action in general sessions court against the tenant and obtained a judgment for the past-due rent. The tenant did not appeal that judgment. Months later, the tenant filed the instant lawsuit in chancery court to set aside the general sessions court judgment. The tenant alleged in the chancery court complaint that the general sessions court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the FED action because the landowner did not give the tenant a statutorily-required notice of termination of the lease. The chancery court below agreed with the tenant and set aside the general sessions judgment as void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The landowner now appeals. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and remand with directions to dismiss the tenant’s lawsuit in its entirety.

Petitioner, Corey Finley, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder. State v. Corey Finley, No. W2005-02804-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1651879, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 7, 2007), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2007), aff’d after remand, No. W2007-2321-CCA-RM-CD, 2008 WL 726567 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Mar. 18, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2008). He was sentenced to twenty-three years. Id. at *8. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner has appealed to this Court. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, we conclude that Petitioner has not proven that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

In 2009, Petitioner, Sandra Hendricks Franklin, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of first degree murder. As a result, she received a sentence of life imprisonment. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on appeal. See State v. Cassandra Hendricks Franklin, No. W2009-01087-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2265439, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 3, 2010), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2010). In May of 2012, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which she claimed, among other things, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition for relief as untimely. Petitioner appeals. After a review of the record and authorities, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that her claims fall within the statutory exceptions to the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction claims as listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(b) or that due process requires the tolling of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition is affirmed

Jacqueline Crank (“the Defendant”) was convicted after a bench trial of one count of misdemeanor child abuse or neglect. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, suspended to probation. In this direct appeal, the defendant challenges the constitutionality of the “spiritual treatment exemption” provision set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-402(c). The Defendant also contends that, if this Court affirms her conviction, this matter must be remanded for a hearing under Tennessee’s ''Preservation of Religious Freedom” statute, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 4-1-07. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authority, for the reasons stated herein, we conclude that it is not necessary to address the constitutional issue or to remand this matter. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s upholding the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petitioner’s pro se post-conviction petition. I acknowledge that the petition was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations for filing a post-conviction petition. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(a). However, our supreme court has held that due process may require the statute of limitations to be tolled in cases where its strict application would deny the petitioner “‘a reasonable opportunity to assert a claim in a meaningful time and manner.’” Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 279 (Tenn. 2000)). Notably, “a post-conviction petitioner should not be denied a reasonable opportunity to raise a claim due to another’s misconduct.” Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d 267, 277 (Tenn. 2002); see also Williams, 44 S.W.3d at 468.

Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Rutherford County, Defendant, Bobby D. Parker, was convicted of three counts of attempted aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated burglary.  Defendant was sentenced as a career offender for each conviction, with sentences of 15 years imposed for each attempted aggravated robbery and 12 years for the attempted aggravated burglary.  The trial court ordered two of the 15-year sentences to be served concurrently with each other but ordered them to be served consecutively to the third attempted aggravated robbery sentence.  The attempted aggravated burglary sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to the other sentences, for an effective sentence of 42 years.  In this appeal, Defendant raises two issues: (1) the trial court committed reversible error by overruling his objection to a peremptory challenge exercised by the State, and (2) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by applying improper enhancement factors.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendants, Jack Price and Larry Thomas Cochran, were convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. Defendant Cochran was also convicted of resisting arrest and criminal impersonation, Class B misdemeanors. Both Defendants were sentenced to an effective twenty-five years’ incarceration for their respective convictions. In this appeal as of right, the Defendants raise the following issues: (1) both Defendants argue that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding by the jury of premeditation; (2) Defendant Cochran argues that issuance of a criminal responsibility instruction was in error; (3) Defendant Cochran contends that admission of his co-defendant’s statements against him violated Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); and (4) both Defendants contend that the trial court erred by submitting enhancement factors to the jury and by allowing the prosecutor to charge those factors, and that their sentences were excessive. Following our review, we affirm the Defendants’ convictions but, because the trial court utilized an unauthorized sentencing procedure, remand the case to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

A Putnam County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Jonathan Andrew Dietz, charging him with rape.  After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve ten years at one-hundred percent in the Department of Correction as a violent offender.  On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court improperly admitted a video of Defendant, according to the State, attempting to rub the victim’s DNA off his genitalia while he was in the police interrogation room and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his rape conviction.  After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The sister of the decedent signed several admissions documents on the decedent’s behalf for purposes of admitting her to the defendant health care facility. At that time, the sister also signed an optional arbitration agreement. Several days later, the decedent passed away, and subsequently, the decedent’s beneficiaries brought a wrongful death action against the healthcare facility on her behalf. The healthcare facility moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the sister had authority to bind the decedent to the terms of the arbitration agreement based on several agency theories, as no power of attorney existed. After reviewing the depositions submitted in lieu of live testimony, the trial court determined the arbitration agreement was not enforceable because the sister lacked the legal authority to bind the decedent. Based on a careful review of the evidence, we affirm.

During the pendency of this divorce action, the trial court found Husband in criminal contempt for failing to pay pendente lite support on five occasions and sentenced Husband to ten days per count for a total sentence of fifty days. Husband was not booked or jailed for contempt but he was detained for two hours during the court’s lunch recess. During the recess, Husband’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal. Husband was returned to the courtroom thereafter, and he and his counsel participated in the divorce hearing, which commenced after lunch. Following the conclusion of a short divorce hearing, the court took notice of the appeal from the contempt action and granted a stay of the sentence pending this appeal; Husband was then released. This appeal followed. We have concluded that the evidence upon which the five counts of criminal contempt were based was inadmissible and there is no other evidence to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Husband had the ability to pay the support when it was due. Therefore, we reverse the finding of five counts of criminal contempt.

The trial court terminated the parties’ parental rights based on a finding of severe child abuse and abandonment and determined that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the children. We find clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s determination that the parties engaged in severe child abuse and that termination of their parental rights is in the children’s best interest. We affirm the trial court.

This is a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff filed a claim with the Division of Claims Administration, as the resident physician alleged to have engaged in negligence was purportedly connected to a University of Tennessee training program at Erlanger Hospital in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The State moved the Commissioner to dismiss the plaintiff’s action for failure to comply with the requirements set out in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a). The Commissioner reluctantly agreed with the State’s position. We hold that the plaintiff complied with section 121(a)’s notice requirement by complying with the claim notice requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 9-8-402. We further hold that section 121 does not mandate dismissal with prejudice for noncompliance with its terms, and that the plaintiff’s failure to provide all the items denoted in section 121(a) does not warrant dismissal with prejudice under the facts of this case. We vacate the dismissal order and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Shanice L. Dycus, challenges the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion for her multiple convictions for various drug-related offenses, including possession of marijuana in excess of one half of a gram with intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school zone.  See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417, -432.  She contends that the trial court erred by failing to consider all of the required factors in deciding her suitability for judicial diversion and by failing to state on the record how it weighed the relevant factors.  The State counters that possession of marijuana in excess of one half of a gram with intent to sell or deliver in a school zone is a non-divertable offense and, regardless, that the trial court properly denied diversion under the standard announced in State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012).  Following our review, we conclude that the offense for which the Defendant stands convicted is eligible for diversion but that the trial court failed to consider and weigh all of the factors relevant in its decision denying diversion.  Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and remand this case for a resentencing hearing.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.