APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the tolling of the statute of limitations for a breach of contract. The plaintiff architect rendered services to the defendant real estate developer, and the developer failed to pay for the architect’s services. Approximately four years later, the architect recorded a lien against the real property to secure the indebtedness. The developer then promised the architect he would pay the indebtedness if the architect released the lien. The architect released the lien but still was not paid. Approximately four years after that, the architect filed this lawsuit against the developer to collect the debt. The developer asserted that the architect’s claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. After a trial, the trial court held that the statute of limitations was tolled under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, so the architect’s lawsuit was timely filed. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the architect. The developer appeals only on the issue of whether the claim was time-barred. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Knox County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jasmine W. (“Mother”) to the minor child Sahara W. (“the Child”). A new permanency plan was approved following the filing of the petition. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence had been proven that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(2) and (g)(3), and that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights, arguing that she was not properly notified of being at risk of losing her parental rights because the new permanency plan was approved after the filing of the petition. We hold that Mother sufficiently was put on notice that her parental rights were subject to being terminated at trial. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joshua D. Jones, appeals from the Dickson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation.  The Appellant previously entered a guilty plea to initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-435 and was sentenced to six years in the Department of Correction. The sentence was suspended, and the Appellant was placed on Community Corrections and then transferred to the drug court program.  The Appellant was terminated from the drug court program, and the trial court subsequently revoked the Appellant’s probation and ordered that he serve his original six-year sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Christy D. Naillon (“the Petitioner”) pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated child abuse. As part of her plea agreement with the State, the trial court sentenced her to fifteen years’ incarceration. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that her indictment was deficient, that she received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that her guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Jeffrey King (“Defendant J. King”) entered conditional guilty pleas in Rutherford County to one count of conspiracy to sell over seventy pounds of marijuana and one count of possessing over seventy pounds of marijuana; to several counts of felony marijuana offenses and several counts of money-laundering offenses in Davidson County; and to several counts of felony marijuana offenses, several counts of money-laundering offenses, and one count of a felony firearm offense in Sumner County.  Kasey King (“Defendant K. King”) (collectively “the Defendants”) entered conditional guilty pleas in Davidson County to two counts of felony marijuana offenses and two counts of money-laundering offenses; and to one count of a felony firearm offense and two counts of felony marijuana offenses in Sumner County.  These conditional guilty pleas were entered after the trial courts denied the Defendants’ motions to suppress evidence gleaned from wiretaps on several telephones.  Each of the Defendants reserved certified questions of law regarding the legality of the wiretaps and timely appealed.  This Court ordered that the appeals be consolidated.  We now consider the Defendants’ certified questions of law and hold that the trial courts did not err in denying the Defendants’ motions to suppress.  Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to no relief from their pleas of guilt.  Therefore, we affirm the trial courts’ judgments and the Defendants’ convictions.

Wife signed a marital dissolution agreement that was incorporated into a final divorce decree. After the final decree was entered, wife sought relief from the decree based on assertions that she was entitled to a greater portion of a settlement received by her husband prior to the divorce and that, contrary to the parties’ agreement, there was equity in the marital home. The trial court denied wife’s motion to alter or amend, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.

A Knox County jury found appellants Robert Hurst and Destiny Hurst guilty of four counts of felony murder; one count of second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of felony murder; one count of first degree premeditated murder; and two counts of especially aggravated robbery. They were found not guilty of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and not guilty of all counts of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed life sentences upon both appellants for the murder conviction, a concurrent eighteen-year sentence for appellant Robert Hurst’s especially aggravated robbery conviction, and a consecutive thirty-five-year sentence for appellant Destiny Hurst’s especially aggravated robbery conviction. In this appeal, appellants jointly challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence underlying the felony murder convictions and the trial court’s failure to poll the jury as to a witness’s status as an accomplice. Appellant Robert Hurst argues that there was a conflict surrounding the manner in which authorities matched his fingerprint to the bloody fingerprint found at the scene. Appellant Destiny Hurst claims that the State committed a Brady violation; that the trial court erred in permitting the State to present evidence of her other crimes, wrongs, or acts pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); and that the trial court erred in characterizing her as a professional criminal, sentencing her at the top of her range, and imposing consecutive sentences. Based on our review of the record as a whole, we affirm both appellants’ convictions and sentences. However, for each appellant, we remand this cause for entry of a single judgment form reflecting merger of all counts of murder and a single judgment form reflecting merger of both counts of especially aggravated robbery. Appellant Destiny Hurst’s judgment for especially aggravated robbery should note consecutive sentence alignment of her thirty-five-year sentence with her life sentence for murder. We also note, with respect to appellant Destiny Hurst, that the record does not contain a judgment form for Count 12, knowingly employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after having been previously convicted of the same. Thus, we order the criminal court to supplement the record with a judgment form reflecting the jury’s verdict of not guilty on this count of the indictment.

This is a termination of parental rights case in which Mother and Stepfather filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father to the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Father’s parental rights on the statutory ground of abandonment and that termination of his rights was in the Child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this malicious prosecution action, the jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages and punitive damages. The trial court affirmed the punitive damages award; the court suggested a remittitur of the compensatory damages award, which the plaintiff accepted under protest. The defendant appeals the finding of liability, the award of damages, the admission of evidence, and the procedure followed by the court in affirming the punitive damages award; the plaintiff appeals the remittitur of the compensatory damages award. Finding that the court erred when it failed to follow the appropriate procedures in affirming the punitive damages award, we vacate the award and remand the case for further proceedings; in all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is the second appeal in this post-divorce matter. Wife, Maryam Ghorashi-Bajestani (“Wife”), was granted a divorce from husband, Masoud Bajestani (“Husband”), on April 16, 2009. Following the first appeal to this Court, the case was remanded to the trial court. Various petitions and motions were filed by the parties, seeking modification of the trial court’s valuation of marital property, modification of child support, a lien on husband’s assets to secure his child support and alimony obligations, a finding of contempt, and an award of attorney’s fees. The trial court, inter alia, modified Husband’s child support obligation due to his reduced income, found Husband in contempt for his late payments of child support and alimony, and awarded Wife attorney’s fees. Both parties appeal the trial court’s order. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Commissioner of Revenue assessed Company a sales and use tax for its sale of a wide area network (“WAN”) service during the period 1998 through 2003 on the basis that the service was a “telecommunication service” as that term is defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6102(a)(32) (2003). Company denied its WAN constituted a taxable telecommunication service because users were limited to accessing information on geographically remote computers; the WAN did not allow its users to communicate with one another. Following motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded the WAN service was a taxable telecommunication service. Company appealed, and we reverse the trial court’s judgment. The primary purpose of the WAN was to enable a company’s authorized users to access information related to the company’s business,not to provide communication between users. The fact that Company itself did not provide information does not alter the result.

Kay F. Fritz (“Plaintiff”) sued CVS Corporation d/b/a CVS Pharmacy, Inc. (“Defendant”) alleging that Defendant had improperly filled a prescription for Plaintiff causing Plaintiff damages. Defendant filed a motion for involuntary dismissal or in the alternative for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendant summary judgment after finding that Plaintiff was unable to prove an essential element of her claim, i.e., causation. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We affirm.

Aubrey Tremaine Eisom (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of first degree felony murder and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to life imprisonment for each felony murder conviction and to forty years’ incarceration for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, all to run consecutively. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s decision denying relief.

Appellant, Chris Nachampasak, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for one count of first degree murder, one count of felony murder, four counts of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment after a drive-by shooting at a graduation party that resulted in the death of a fourteen-year-old child.  Appellant subsequently pled guilty to a single count of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault in return for the dismissal of the remaining counts of the indictment.  In exchange for the guilty pleas, Appellant received an effective sentence of thirty-five years in incarceration.  Subsequently, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.  After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.  Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.  After a review, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas where Appellant failed to show a manifest injustice.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

After fifteen years of marriage, Charlotte Ann Goad Human (“Wife”) sued Jeffrey Allen Human (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree of Divorce which, inter alia, declared the parties divorced, divided the marital assets and debts, and entered a Permanent Parenting Plan designating Husband as the primary residential parent for the parties’ two minor children. Wife appeals to this Court alleging that the Trial Court erred in entering a Parenting Plan designating Husband as the primary residential parent when Husband did not request this designation. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings relative to the Permanent Parenting Plan, and we affirm.

This appeal concerns a dispute over the modification of a permanent parenting plan. Leslie Kay Johnson (“Mother”) and Darren Tracy Johnson (“Father”) were divorced in the Chancery Court for Monroe County (“the Trial Court”). A permanent parenting plan was entered regarding the parties’ minor child (“the Child”). Mother was designated as the primary residential parent with the parties to have equal parenting time with the Child. Mother later filed an emergency petition for custody and contempt, alleging that the Child had severe anxiety about going to see Father. Father filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that because Mother failed to file a proposed parenting plan contemporaneously with her petition as required by statute, Mother’s petition should be dismissed. Both Mother and Father ultimately filed proposed parenting plans with Father’s being submitted with his own Petition for Change in Co-Parenting Time. The Trial Court denied Father’s motion to dismiss. After a hearing on the competing petitions, the Trial Court modified the parenting plan to grant Mother more time with the Child. Father appeals. We hold that the Trial Court had jurisdiction to decide Mother’s petition and that the Trial Court did not err in modifying the existing parenting plan. We affirm the Trial Court.

 Petitioner, Tommy Lee Page, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for one count of sale of a controlled substance in a Drug Free School Zone.  He entered a guilty plea to the reduced charge of the sale of a controlled substance weighing less than .5 grams.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years as a Range II, multiple offender.  Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel and that he entered his guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily.  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to prove any of his allegations that counsel’s representation was ineffective and we conclude that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.  Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Roy Len Rogers, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of first degree premeditated murder, second degree murder, and reckless endangerment. Subsequently, the trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction and imposed a mandatory life sentence for that conviction and a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the reckless endangerment conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his home; (2) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the verdicts were inconsistent; (3) that the trial court erred by refusing to allow the Defendant to play a 911 tape; (4) that the trial court improperly admitted irrelevant photographs of tires of the Defendant’s vehicle; (5) that the State withheld Brady material, specifically the statement of a potential suspect; and (6) that a juror evidenced bias by her actions and body language prior to deliberations. Following our review of the record and the applicable authorities, we determine that there is no reversible error in the judgments of the trial court and affirm.

The defendant pled guilty to one count of the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, one count of delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, one count of maintaining a dwelling for purposes of selling controlled substances, a Class D felony, and one count of casual exchange of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. After accepting the defendant’s plea, the trial court merged the defendant’s convictions concerning the sale and the delivery of cocaine. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to five years for the sale of cocaine, three years for maintaining a dwelling for purposes of selling a controlled substance, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for his casual exchange. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve these sentences concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of five years. The defendant moved the court for alternative sentencing, but the trial court denied this motion following a hearing and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion for alternative sentencing. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. The judgments denying alternative sentencing are affirmed.

This appeal arises from an action filed by Plaintiff to set aside a quitclaim deed executed by Decedent conveying Decedent’s home to her grandsons. Following a bench trial, the Chancery Court of Fayette County concluded that Decedent was incompetent to execute the deed and that the grandsons exercised undue influence over Decedent to obtain the deed. In a subsequent order, the trial court concluded that the grandsons intentionally defrauded Decedent to obtain Decedent’s signature on the deed and ordered them to pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. On appeal, the grandsons argue that the trial court erred in concluding that Decedent was incompetent to execute the deed and in concluding that the grandsons exercised undue influence over her to obtain the deed. Additionally, the grandsons contend that the trial court erred in concluding that they intentionally defrauded Decedent in order to obtain Decedent’s signature on the deed and in ordering them to pay Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the grandson’s appeal constitutes a frivolous appeal under Tenn. Code Ann. section 27-1-122. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Ginger Ilene Hudson Stump, was indicted by a Bedford County Grand Jury for twenty-six counts of forgery.  See T.C.A. § 39-14-114 (Supp. 2011).  Pursuant to her plea agreement, Stump entered guilty pleas to six Class E felonies (counts 3, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19) involving more than $500 but less than $1,000 and one Class D felony (count 25) involving $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences.  As a part of this agreement, the State dismissed the remaining nineteen forgery counts.  Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Stump as a career offender to twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  On appeal, Stump argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her an alternative sentence and in denying her a community corrections sentence.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Michael Alan Burleson, pled guilty to three counts of aggravated burglary of a vehicle and was sentenced to a total of five years to be served on community corrections. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the sentences and ordered the appellant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a breach of contract case in which Company sought to hold Defendant personally liable for the amount remaining on a contract. During Company’s proof-in-chief, Defendant used parol evidence attempting to show that while he signed the contract, the parties understood that he was signing as a representative of his business. Following Company’s presentation of its proof, Defendant moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion, finding that Company failed to establish that Defendant was personally liable. Company appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Charles Edward Graham aka Charles Edward Stevenson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence concerning the judicial misconduct of a trial judge affected the outcome of his 2005 jury trial and 2010 post-conviction evidentiary hearing. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Joshua Lynn Pitts, of driving under the influence (“DUI”).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation after serving forty-eight hours in jail.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal stop of his vehicle.  After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle.  As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.