APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant’s probation was revoked after a full evidentiary hearing, and he was ordered to serve his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment accordingly.

Petitioner, Michael Small, was convicted of aggravated robbery and received a sentence of 20 years, to be served consecutively to his sentences for three prior aggravated robbery convictions. Petitioner appealed his sentence, and this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Michael Small, No. W2010-00470-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Mar. 28, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn., July 15, 2011). A summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions in this case can be found in that opinion. Petitioner now appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

A jury convicted Ricco R. Williams (“the Defendant”) of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Defendant appealed and contended, among other issues, that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. Upon our review, this Court reversed the Defendant’s two convictions of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and remanded those counts for a new trial; modified one of the Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions to a conviction of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault; reversed and dismissed the Defendant’s conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and affirmed the Defendant’s convictions of and sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and the remaining aggravated robbery. See State v. Ricco R. Williams, No. W2011-02365-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 167285, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2013) (“Williams I”). Upon the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court for consideration in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), and State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013). See State v. Ricco R. Williams, No. W2011-02365-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2013). Upon our consideration of the Defendant’s especially aggravated kidnapping convictions in light of White and Cecil, we affirm the Defendant’s three convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping as to the victims A.R., K.R., and M.R. We reverse the Defendant’s two convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping as to the victims Timothy Currie and Sherita Currie and remand those charges for a new trial. Our previous holdings regarding the Defendant’s remaining convictions are unaffected by the remand and, thus, remain valid.

I respectfully write separately to express departure from the majority with respect to the absence of the White instruction in the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions wherein M.R., K.R., and A.R. were respectively named victims. I emphasize that I do not disagree with the logic underlying the majority’s conclusion that due process principles do not impact these three convictions, the victims of which were not also named victims in accompanying felonies. Rather, I disagree with the implication emanating from Anthony that due process principles constrict the use of kidnapping convictions against victims even though those victims were not victims in any accompanying felony. This vestige of the Anthony regime should be specifically overruled, but I view that as a responsibility of our supreme court.

The defendant, Brian Alan Lambright, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of four counts of aggravated child abuse, Class A felonies, which the trial court merged into two convictions and sentenced the defendant to twenty-two years on each conviction, to be served consecutively, for an effective term of forty-four years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentences imposed by the trial court.  After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mario A. Reed, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Montgomery County.  He was convicted of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated rape, and theft under $500, and received an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  In this appeal, he claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

E. Ron Pickard and Linda Pickard have filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition requesting this Court to revisit its opinion filed in this case on December 17, 2013. This petition is premised on the Pickards’ erroneous conclusion that the focal point of the Court’s analysis was their April 6, 2009 petition for a declaratory order, to the exclusion of their January 16, 2009 petition for a declaratory order.

The defendant, Cortino A. Harris, stands convicted for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the registration law. He was sentenced to a term of six months in the county jail for the convictions, and the sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a term imposed in a separate case. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the convicting evidence with regard to the conviction for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license. Following review of the record and arguments, we affirm the convictions as imposed.

The defendant, Samuel Blake Maness, was convicted of robbery, aggravated burglary, and assault and is currently serving an effective twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) consecutive sentences were improperly imposed. Following review of the argument and record, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

Defendant, Dwayne B. Harris, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking Defendant’s sentences of probation following a hearing in which violation of conditions of probation were admitted to by Defendant through his attorney. While acknowledging on appeal that violations of probation conditions had been admitted, Defendant asserts the trial court still erred by revoking probation and ordering him to serve his sentences in incarceration. The State argues the appeal should be dismissed because the notice of appeal was filed seven days late. Defendant admits the notice of appeal was late but requests this court to waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Under the circumstances, we decline to do so. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The defendant, Timothy Aaron Baxter, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of Class E felony failure to appear, see T.C.A. § 39-16-609, the result of which was a six-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of hearsay evidence, the use of prior convictions to impeach the defendant as a witness, and the failure to suppress his pretrial statements recorded in a transcript of an earlier court appearance. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the purchase of property at a tax sale. MERS filed suit against Purchaser to invalidate his purchase of property because it had not received notice of the sale even though it was listed as a beneficiary or nominee on the deed of trust. Purchaser claimed that MERS was not entitled to notice because MERS did not have an interest in the property. Purchaser also alleged that MERS failed to properly commence its lawsuit because it did not remit the proper funds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2504(c). The trial court refused to set aside the tax sale, holding that the applicable notice requirements were met and that Purchaser was the holder of legal title to the property. MERS appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

This is a property boundary dispute. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and found that Defendant did not acquire disputed property bordering the western edge of Plaintiff’s property and the eastern edge of Defendant’s property by adverse possession. The trial court also found that Defendant did not demonstrate laches. We affirm.

The Defendant, Ronnie Peter Wilson, III, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-103, -12-107, -13-402. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twenty-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A bail bondsman filed suit against an attorney over title to several pieces of land.  The suit went to trial before a jury, but the parties settled before a verdict was announced.  The attorney subsequently sued the bail bondsman’s attorneys for malicious prosecution and other torts.  The defendant attorneys filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that the parties’ agreement to settle the underlying case negated one of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim, “a final and favorable termination” of the underlying suit in favor of the defendant.  The motion also argued that the complaint did not sufficiently allege the elements of the other causes of action.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff attorney had failed to state a claim for relief under any of the causes of action.  We affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Tamika Michelle Claybourne, challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.  After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we discern no error in the trial court’s determinations and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A woman driving a passenger vehicle was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a tractor trailer. The woman and her husband filed a complaint alleging negligence and loss of consortium against the other driver and against the owner of the tractor trailer. The Plaintiffs did not comply with the deadlines set out in the Scheduling Order and, as a result, they were precluded from introducing medical testimony or records in support of their claims. On the day set for trial, the Plaintiffs told the court they were not prepared to try their case and wanted to go home. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice, with the option of filing a new complaint within a year, and the Plaintiffs appealed. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and, accordingly, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant was found by the trial court to be in violation of the terms of his community corrections sentence and ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to incarceration rather than to rehabilitation. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we discern no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a neurosurgeon, negligently penetrated her spinal cord with a surgical instrument while performing a cervical fusion at two levels of her neck leading to partial paralysis and other neurological problems. She was ultimately diagnosed with a condition called Brown Sequard Syndrome. The issues were tried before a jury; however, several of the claims were dismissed on directed verdict. The remaining claims went to the jury which rendered a verdict on behalf of the defendant-neurosurgeon. The plaintiff raises numerous issues on appeal, the substance of which may be divided into three categories. First, she contends error associated with the directed verdict, the verdict form, and the jury instructions. In this regard she contends, inter alia, that the trial court erred in directing a verdict as to res ipsa loquitur because she presented the testimony of three expert witnesses of the defendant’s specific acts of negligence. The plaintiff also contends the court erred by dismissing all but three of her claims upon a directed verdict. Second, the plaintiff argues she was denied a fair trial due to inappropriate argument and misconduct. Third, she argues a host of errors secondary to evidentiary rulings. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

This action involves the proper adjudication of the parties’ interests in certain marital retirement assets post divorce. The sole issue raised is whether the trial court properly retained jurisdiction over the retirement assets pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”). Based on prior precedent, we find that the trial court did properly retain jurisdiction, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s decision in this case.

The defendant, convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, and sentenced to concurrent terms of ten and six years respectively, appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the evidence of identification was sufficient as to both convictions and, as to the aggravated burglary, holding that the victim had not given his “effective consent” to the entry of the residence. We granted the application for permission to appeal to determine whether the evidence, circumstantial or direct, was sufficient to establish both convictions. Because the jury had the prerogative to reject the alibi testimony offered by the defendant, the identification evidence was sufficient as to both offenses. The aggravated robbery conviction is, therefore, affirmed. As to the aggravated burglary, however, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction because there was no evidence that the Defendant engaged in an act of “deception,” as defined by statute, in the context of “effective consent.” The aggravated burglary conviction is, therefore, reversed and the charge dismissed. We remand for a new trial on the lesser included offenses of aggravated criminal trespass and criminal trespass.

The Petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his guilty-pleaded conviction for burglary and resulting eight-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing principally by failing to discover or challenge several errors in the presentence investigation report regarding his criminal history. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post-divorce case. Jimmy Glenn Fields (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s order (1) denying his motion for a reduction in alimony and (2) granting the counter-motion of Rene Annette Fields (“Wife”) for an increase in alimony. Following a bench trial, the court held that Husband had failed to demonstrate his inability to return to work as a material change in circumstances justifying a decrease in his court-ordered alimony obligation of $1,100 a month. Rather, the court found that the proof demonstrated that Husband had the ability to pay, and that Wife had a need for, increased support. The court increased Husband’s obligation to $2,000 per month. We affirm.

I do not take issue with any of the law as set forth in the majority’s opinion. I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the Appellant’s request to reduce the amount of the alimony. I do, however, respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the Trial Court’s decision to increase the amount of the alimony.

Appellant, Cassie Chapman, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for two counts of theft over $1,000 and one count of aggravated burglary. She pled guilty to the charges and agreed to a three-year sentence for one count of theft, a two-year sentence for the second count of theft, and a three-year sentence for aggravated burglary. The plea agreement specified that one two-year sentence for theft and the sentence for aggravated burglary would run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the three-year sentence for aggravated burglary would run consecutively to the theft sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing on the theft sentences. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to incarceration. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.