APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a breach of contract case in which Company sought to hold Defendant personally liable for the amount remaining on a contract. During Company’s proof-in-chief, Defendant used parol evidence attempting to show that while he signed the contract, the parties understood that he was signing as a representative of his business. Following Company’s presentation of its proof, Defendant moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion, finding that Company failed to establish that Defendant was personally liable. Company appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Charles Edward Graham aka Charles Edward Stevenson, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence concerning the judicial misconduct of a trial judge affected the outcome of his 2005 jury trial and 2010 post-conviction evidentiary hearing. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s motion is well-taken and affirm the order of the trial court.

Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted the Defendant, Joshua Lynn Pitts, of driving under the influence (“DUI”).  The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation after serving forty-eight hours in jail.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal stop of his vehicle.  After thoroughly reviewing the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant’s vehicle.  As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Pro se petitioner, Johnny L. McGowan, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the statute of limitations should be tolled because his claim is based on a constitutional right that did not exist at the time of his plea, and further contends that the post-conviction court erred in failing to appoint counsel prior to dismissal.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Bradley County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Bruce Anton Parks, Jr., of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years and six years, respectively, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to declare a mistrial when the State questioned a police officer about whether anyone had provided an alibi for the appellant, and that his effective thirty-one-year sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Lee Shaw, of  possession of more than twenty-six grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a child care agency, a Class B felony; evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, a Class E felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor.  Shaw received an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence supporting Shaw’s drug-related convictions was sufficient to establish constructive possession.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Charles Nash (“the Petitioner”) filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appealed, claiming that he is entitled to relief because his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to a motion to suppress, in failing to object to the State’s closing arguments, and in failing to present a defense of duress. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a proceeding to recover fees under an attorney’s lien. The wife in the underlying Tennessee divorce action retained the appellant Washington, D.C. attorney to advise her on business issues related to the parties’ largest marital asset, an international business. The attorney’s engagement agreement gave the attorney a lien against any proceeds collected by the wife in the divorce and also provided for a monthly service charge on fee bills that were not paid when due. After considerable litigation, the divorce settled. After the settlement, the wife refused to pay the appellant attorney’s outstanding fees. The attorney filed a motion in the divorce action to recover those fees under his attorney’s lien. The wife objected to the attorney fees as excessive, unnecessary, and unreasonable. The trial judge in the divorce proceeding conducted an eight-day trial and ultimately held that the fees were reasonable and necessary to the attorney’s representation of the wife. The trial court awarded the attorney damages, a service charge per the engagement agreement, and prejudgment interest, but it denied the attorney’s request for the costs of collection. Both the wife and the attorney now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision in all respects.

The petitioner, Junior Aldridge, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, he raises three allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The majority opinion in this case is detailed and thorough. However, because I disagree with the basic premise upon which the majority opinion rests, I must dissent. The majority opinion concludes that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to consider and award Shawn Coulson its requested fee on the basis of the contractual attorney lien included in Ms. Coleman’s contract with Shawn Coulson. I respectfully disagree, and instead, conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award Shawn Coulson its requested fee in this matter.

Appellant’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the matter and this appeal must be dismissed.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Mother appeals from the trial court’s post-divorce modification decreasing Father’s child support obligation. Finding no error, we affirm. We have also determined that Father is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees he incurred in this appeal  pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).

Petitioner, Taft Arkey Murphy, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing.  Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to sell three hundred or more grams of cocaine in a school zone,  possession with intent to sell twenty-six or more grams of cocaine in a school zone, the sale of twenty-six or more grams of cocaine in a school zone, two counts of the sale of twenty-six or more grams of cocaine, and possession of a handgun by a felon.  He received an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.  Specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective (1) by failing to adequately communicate and meet with him to prepare for the case and failing to properly investigate the facts of the case; (2) by failing to discuss with Petitioner whether he should testify on his own behalf at trial; and (3) by failing to object to testimony regarding Petitioner’s prior voluntary manslaughter conviction. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

Plaintiffs/appellants, who are owners of real property in a residential community that was developed for horse riding enthusiasts, filed this action to enforce restrictive covenants that prohibit the use of motorized vehicles on trails in the residential community. At the hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss, all of the parties agreed to the entry of an order prohibiting the use of any motorized vehicles on horse trails within four specified sections that contained the restrictive covenants; at the same hearing, the parties also agreed with the trial court’s statement that all other claims would be dismissed. A Final Order was entered that was consistent with the parties’ agreement. Although the plaintiffs consented in open court to the order that was entered and they did not file a motion to alter or amend that order, plaintiffs now appeal from that order. On appeal, they contend they were deprived of the opportunity to put on evidence at the hearing on the motions to dismiss; they also contend the court erred in dismissing all other claims. Finding the plaintiffs expressly consented in open court to the entry of the order appealed from, that the plaintiffs made no request to introduce evidence, and that they agreed to the dismissal of all other claims, we have determined that the plaintiffs waived all issues raised in this appeal. Therefore, we affirm the trial court. Defendants contend this was a frivolous appeal and have requested damages. Exercising our discretion, we respectfully deny the defendants request for damages.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is the second appeal of this case. We previously affirmed the trial court’s award of temporary total disability benefits and past medical expenses, but reversed its decision not to award permanent disability benefits and future medical expenses. Wilson v. Jennings, No. E2010-02028-WC-R3-WC, 2012 WL 727853 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Mar. 6, 2012). On remand, the trial court heard additional medical, vocational and other proof as to the employee’s anatomical impairment and vocational disability. Based on that evidence, it awarded 200 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits and future medical expenses. The employer has again appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying its motion for sanctions, by denying its motion in limine to exclude certain medical testimony, by relying on the proof of the employee’s vocational expert and by awarding discretionary costs. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Alex Porter, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying the petition because both trial counsel and appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective at trial by (1) failing to adequately investigate, develop, or present a theory of self-defense; (2) allowing a witness to improperly assert Fifth Amendment protection after a prior admonition from the trial court; (3) failing to properly advise the petitioner of his right to testify on his own behalf and failing to preserve Petitioner’s right to appeal Momon defects in the trial court proceedings; (4) announcing to the jury that Petitioner was incarcerated at the time of trial; and (5) failing to challenge the expert witness testimony of the State’s firearms examiner or presenting rebuttal evidence to her testimony. Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective on appeal by failing to adequately communicate with him during the appellate process. Petitioner further contends that he was denied due process during the post-conviction proceedings. Following our review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

Donald West Allen, Jr. (“the Defendant”) was charged with three counts of rape of a child, and a jury convicted the Defendant of three counts of aggravated sexual battery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years on each count, with the sentences for counts one and two to run consecutively and the sentence for count three to run concurrently, for an effective term of eighteen years’ incarceration, to be served at 100%. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises four issues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to reference uncharged conduct during its opening statement and then to adduce testimony about the uncharged conduct during trial; (2) the evidence is not sufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in singling out a juror for questioning after the close of proof; and (4) his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we discern no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The pro se petitioner, David Lawrence Holt, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal on the grounds that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Curtis Lee Majors, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of tampering with evidence and simple possession and resulting effective fifteen-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Brian Patrick Pierce, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery.  The trial court sentenced the appellant to concurrent sentences of ten years for each offense.  On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court.  Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves inquiry notice of the claimed injury for purposes of triggering the medical malpractice one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs, a married couple with four children, wanted to prevent the conception of another child. To that end, the plaintiff wife underwent a procedure to prevent pregnancy at the defendant medical clinic. About a year later, she became pregnant. The wife later gave birth to a healthy baby boy. The plaintiffs filed this medical malpractice lawsuit against the clinic and the treating physician, claiming the wife’s pregnancy as the injury. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claim was barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations. The trial court held that the wife was put on notice of her pregnancy by, at the very latest, the day that she obtained a positive result on a home pregnancy test; it held that the claim was time-barred on that basis and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs’ subsequent motion to alter or amend was denied. The plaintiffs now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights to Son on the grounds of abandonment and persistence of conditions, and upon its finding that termination is in Son’s best interest. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to Son.

The Defendant, Dawn Alish Black, entered a nolo contendere plea to driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2012). She was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all suspended but 48 hours. On appeal, she presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to her arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Johnny Lynn, appeals the Perry County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery and resulting effective sentence of fifty-four years to be served at 100%.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to advise him of his right to waive ex post facto protections and be sentenced pursuant to the 2005 amendments to the Tennessee Sentencing Reform Act of 1989.  Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.