APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this action for breach of an employment contract filed by a plaintiff/employee against
the defendant company/employer and two individual defendants, the trial court entered an
order granting a motion to dismiss filed by the individual defendants. Upon a subsequent
motion filed by the defendant company, the trial court entered an order granting summary
judgment in favor of the company and dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with
prejudice. The plaintiff has appealed, raising an issue regarding the dismissal of the
individual defendants from the case. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This is a breach of contract action brought by a nontenured teacher against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) for nonrenewal of her teaching contract for the 2018–2019 school year. The teacher alleges that the nonrenewal of her yearly teaching contract was ineffective because the decision to nonrenew was improperly delegated by the Director of Schools to the principal. The school district contends that the decision to nonrenew is delegable and that the teacher lacks a private cause of action because the school district provided her with timely notice of her nonrenewal. The trial court summarily ruled in favor of the teacher, awarding her damages for breach of contract. The school district appeals, reiterating its same arguments. For the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher to be effective, the proper authority must make the decision to nonrenew, and the school district must provide timely notice to the teacher. Because the decision to nonrenew requires the Director of Schools to exercise his or her independent judgment and discretion, the Director of Schools may not delegate this authority. In this case, the Director of Schools did not exercise his independent judgment and discretion in the decision to not renew the teacher’s contract; thus, the purported nonrenewal was ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm.

This is a breach of contract case. It is undisputed that Appellee performed under the
parties’ contract, and Appellant did not. Appellant raised affirmative defenses, including
waiver, anticipatory breach, and laches. The trial court denied the defenses of waiver and
anticipatory breach, enforced the contract, and entered judgment against Appellant for the
amount due thereunder. The trial court denied Appellee attorney’s fees and costs under the
contract based on the application of laches. We reverse the trial court’s finding of laches.
However, because Appellee did not raise an issue concerning the denial of his attorney’s
fees and costs, we leave undisturbed that portion of the trial court’s order. The trial court’s
order is otherwise affirmed.

A pro se petitioner seeks accelerated interlocutory review of the denial of her motion to
disqualify the trial judge. After a de novo review, we affirm the denial of the motion for
disqualification.

Jay Dee Garrity, Defendant, was convicted of three counts of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to consecutive sentences of 17 years for each conviction. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that: 1) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of Defendant’s prior bad acts; 2) it was plain error for the trial court to admit portions of the victim’s recorded interview; 3) the trial court abused its discretion in running Defendant’s sentences consecutively and his sentence is presumptively vindictive; 4) the trial court improperly restricted Defendant’s cross-examination of the victim; 5) the trial court erred in allowing the State to call a witness at trial without giving sufficient notice to Defendant; 6) the trial court erred by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction; and 7) the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s order finding that Husband’s alimony to Wife
constituted alimony in solido and that Husband was in breach of the parties’ marital
dissolution agreement for failure to pay alimony to Wife in accordance with their
agreement. Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm.

In this defamation lawsuit, the defendants filed a petition to dismiss pursuant to the
Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). Following the filing of various documents
and declarations by the parties, the trial court denied the petition based upon its analysis
of the burden-shifting framework outlined in the TPPA’s dismissal procedure. The
defendants have appealed. Determining that the trial court’s analysis concerning the
TPPA’s dismissal procedure was incomplete, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and
remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the
defendants’ petition to dismiss was not frivolous, and we accordingly decline to award
attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiffs on appeal.

Appellant/employee brought this retaliatory discharge case against Appellee, his former
employer. Appellant alleged that he was fired in retaliation for claiming workers’
compensation benefits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
employer, finding that Appellant failed to meet his burden to show a causal connection
between the filing of his workers’ compensation claim and the termination of his
employment. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

Petitioner, Tevin Dominique Lumpkin, appeals as of right from the Henry County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his
conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to file a motion to
dismiss related to the State’s failure to collect, test, or maintain blood droplets from the
crime scene. He also argues that his due process rights were violated by the lost evidence
and because the post-conviction court did not force a witness to testify or, alternatively,
speak to post-conviction counsel. Lastly, he argues that the cumulative effect of these
errors requires relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The petitioner, Kevin McDougle, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s
summary denial of his sixth pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to
Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Based on our review of the record, the parties’
briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The defendant, Jermaine Campbell, pleaded guilty to aggravated statutory rape, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years’ incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for alternative sentencing. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we conclude that a new sentencing hearing is necessary because the trial court failed to place the appropriate findings on the record. Additionally, corrected judgment forms are needed in counts one and two. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Stephen M. Mobley, of two counts of
first-degree premeditated murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, one count
of aggravated assault, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a
dangerous felony. The trial court merged the attempted first degree murder and aggravated
assault convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twentysix
years. In his first appeal, the Defendant contended that the trial court erred when it
failed to make requisite findings based on Batson v. Kentucky regarding the State’s use of
a peremptory challenge to strike an African-American potential juror during voir dire.
State v. Stephen Maurice Mobley, No. E2020-00234-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 3610905, at
*1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 31, 2021). This court remanded the case for the
trial court to make appropriate findings pursuant to Batson. On remand, the trial court
concluded that the State’s exercise of the peremptory challenge did not violate Batson. The
Defendant again appeals, contending that the trial court erred. After our review, we affirm
the trial court’s judgments.

The Appellant, Michael Dominic Sales, appeals the post-conviction court’s order dismissing his post-conviction petition as untimely. Appointed counsel has moved to withdraw pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 22. That motion is denied. Upon review of the appellate record on file, this Court hereby affirms the judgment of the post-conviction court pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

A Monroe County jury convicted the Defendant, Steven Shawn Bowen, of driving under
the influence, third offense, driving on a revoked license, second offense, and violation of
the financial responsibility for a motor vehicle statute. On appeal, the Defendant asserts
that the trial court erred when it: (1) “refused to allow [the Defendant] a court reporter;”
(2) denied his motion to dismiss based on the State’s failure to preserve video footage of
the stop and arrest; (3) denied his motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations; and
(4) admitted the official toxicology report in the absence of witnesses to establish chain of
custody for the blood sample. Finally, the Defendant claims that there is insufficient
evidence to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Defendant, Darries Leon Jackson, was convicted by a Hawkins County Criminal Court
jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The
Defendant raises five issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his
conviction; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the
Defendant’s shooting of the victim’s daughter in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence
404(b); (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the Defendant’s wife to testify about
conversations with the Defendant in violation of the Defendant’s marital privilege; (4)
whether the jury’s overhearing of jury-out proceedings deprived the Defendant of his right
to a fair trial; and (5) whether the Defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. Based
on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Buyer of property at delinquent tax sale filed suit against the property’s former owner to quiet title. The former owner filed an answer and counterclaim, alleging, lack of notice concerning the underlying delinquent tax lawsuit and violation of her due process rights. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice, concluding the counterclaim was time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations for invalidating tax sales, and ruled for the buyer in the quiet title action. We hold that the former owner failed to institute a legal challenge to the tax sale within the limitations period despite having adequate notice of the sale. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

Petitioner, Ricky Durham, appeals the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. On appeal,
he asserts that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition as untimely without
a hearing on the merits of his claims. Following our review of the entire record and the
briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Kevin Allen Fleming, appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of three counts of
aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of driving under the influence, fourth
offense. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying
relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We
affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Travis Smith, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for rape of a child. On appeal, the
Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims
alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Petitioner argues
that trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to meet with and keep the Petitioner
informed, (2) failing to object on Confrontation Clause grounds to exclusion of the victim’s
testimony about an indecent exposure incident that occurred at the courthouse during the
Petitioner’s trial and failing to preserve the issue for appeal, (3) failing to find and prepare
witnesses, and (4) failing to properly cross-examine witnesses. The Petitioner additionally
argues that he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After review, we
affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Nicklaus Edward Brush, alias, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court
jury convictions of aggravated kidnapping and domestic assault, arguing that the first count
of the indictment failed to charge an offense, that the evidence was insufficient to support
his aggravated kidnapping conviction, that the State failed to establish venue, and that the
trial court improperly questioned a witness at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Gavin Tyler Sheets, pled guilty to the offenses of vehicular homicide by recklessness and reckless endangerment. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of six years to serve in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request for judicial diversion. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order an alternative sentence to incarceration. We respectfully disagree and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Alvin Stewart, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated assault, and domestic assault and his effective twenty-year sentence.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Antonio J. Hurt, Defendant, was indicted by a Rutherford County Grand Jury for attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment after a shooting at a barber shop. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter and employing a firearm during a dangerous felony. The trial court entered a nolle prosequi on the aggravated assault charge, and the State withdrew the reckless endangerment charge. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of 8 years. Defendant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal. Defendant filed a pro se premature notice of appeal in the trial court. The trial court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal. Defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal in this Court. This Court waived the timely filing of the notice of appeal. On appeal, Defendant complains about the sufficiency of the evidence, the admissibility of certain testimony of two witnesses, and statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument. After a review, we determine the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that Defendant is not entitled to plain error review of the remaining issues. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. However, the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment form dismissing the count of the indictment for reckless endangerment.

This is a contract dispute between a doctor and healthcare entities. The trial court awarded
summary judgment to the healthcare defendants, and the doctor appeals. We find no basis
to overturn the ruling of the trial court.

The Defendant, Charles Larry Nichols, III, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence or clerical error, arguing that he was entitled to “street time” credit for the time he served on community corrections but was being supervised by state probation. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the Defendant was not entitled to the street time credit because he was on supervised probation, not community corrections. However, we remand the case to the trial court for correction of a separate clerical error in the amended judgment of conviction.