APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellants filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of
Appellee Fayette County Board of Zoning Appeals’ grant of a special exception to other
Appellees for the construction of a solar farm. The trial court denied the writ of certiorari.
Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an administrative property tax appeal concerning the classification of real property
for ad valorem tax purposes. This action originated with a taxpayer appeal of the property
valuation by the Sevier County property assessor. On appeal, the administrative law judge
re-classified the property as commercial, resulting in a tax assessment of 40% of the fair
market property value. The Assessment Appeals Commission reversed the classification.
The trial court affirmed the reversal. We now reinstate the commercial classification.

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce involving the trial court’s award of parenting time and requiring parental restrictions. The trial court entered a permanent parenting plan in which Mother and Father were awarded equal parenting time, with Father being named the primary residential parent. The trial court also ordered that neither Father nor Mother were to consume alcohol in the presence of Child. Father appeals. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s order. We further award Mother her attorney’s fees on appeal and remand to the trial court for a determination of the amount awarded.

The Petitioner, Christopher Bostick, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of
his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child and
aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court
erred by denying his claims that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We
affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children. The trial court concluded that the petitioners proved four statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. The court also concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest. After a thorough review, we agree and affirm.

The Defendant, Joshua X. Beasley, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of
various drug offenses committed within a drug-free zone and received an effective fifteenyear
sentence to be served at one hundred percent in confinement. Subsequently, the trial
court granted his motion to resentence him pursuant to the amended version of the Drug-
Free Zone Act and imposed an effective twelve-year sentence to be served at thirty percent
release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions and that the trial court erred by initially sentencing him under the
previous version of the Act. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’
briefs, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand for resentencing as to his
conviction in count four, delivering fentanyl, and correction of the judgment.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Kenneth J. Mynatt (“Plaintiff”) served as the vice president of the local chapter of his union. He filed an action for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy against the union, the local chapter, and several individuals associated with the union. He alleged that after he publicly criticized the union’s financial waste, its leadership accused him of misusing union funds. Those accusations led to his indictment on two felony charges. In the resulting criminal case, the State filed a motion to retire the charges for one year, and those charges were ultimately dismissed after the year passed. In Plaintiff’s complaint for malicious prosecution, he stated that he continued to maintain his innocence, that he refused any plea deals, and that the criminal case terminated in his favor because it was ultimately dismissed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the retirement and dismissal of the criminal charges was not a favorable termination on the merits. Thus, they argued his complaint was missing an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. The defendants sought review from this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard for determining what constitutes a favorable termination for the purpose of a malicious prosecution claim. We conclude that the prohibition in Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012), precluding a factintensive and subjective inquiry into the reasons and circumstances leading to dispositions in civil cases also applies to dispositions in criminal cases. We hold that plaintiffs can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused. Under this standard, Mr. Mynatt did not allege sufficient facts for a court to conclude that the dismissal of his criminal case was a favorable termination. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss.

This appeal concerns a Memphis police officer’s application for a line-of-duty disability
pension. Torrance Taylor (“Taylor”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Shelby
County (“the Trial Court”) seeking judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Law
Judge (“the ALJ”) for the Board of Administration of the City of Memphis Retirement
System denying his application for a line-of-duty disability pension. In 2016, Taylor
injured his left knee in the course of his duty while detaining a suspect. Afterwards, Taylor
retired from the police force and was recommended for ordinary disability benefits. The
ALJ ruled that, based on the opinions of physicians, Taylor’s disability stemmed from a
chronic condition in his left knee and not from his employment. Thus, the ALJ denied
Taylor’s application for a line-of-duty disability pension. The Trial Court upheld the ALJ’s
decision. Taylor appeals to this Court. He argues among other things that, but for his 2016
injury in the line of duty, he would not be disabled. The evidence reflects that Taylor
worked without restriction before the injury in 2016, which ended his police career. We
find that the ALJ’s decision was unsupported by substantial and material evidence. We
further find that the ALJ’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. Taylor is entitled to a
line-of-duty disability pension. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court.

The majority thoughtfully examines the evidence in the present case and may even
have reached a better understanding of the actual cause of Officer Torrance Taylor’s injury
than was arrived at by the City of Memphis Pension Board and the hearing officer.
However, in its analysis, the majority has engaged, at least in my view, in a reweighing of
the evidence that exceeds the scope of this court’s authority when reviewing such decisions
under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

This appeal stems from the trial court’s dismissal of two creditors’ claims against the
personal representatives of the decedent debtor’s estate. The creditors claimed that the
personal representatives breached their fiduciary duties to the estate by failing to exercise
the decedent’s statutory right, as a surviving spouse, to take an elective share of his
deceased wife’s estate when the time limit for doing so had not yet expired at the time of
the decedent’s death. The creditors also asserted claims against other parties associated
with the personal representatives for conspiracy and inducement. In dismissing the
creditors’ complaint, the trial court determined that (1) Tennessee statutory law provides
that a personal representative of the surviving spouse’s estate “may” take an elective
share on behalf of the surviving spouse who has died, (2) “may” indicates that the
decision is discretionary, (3) the personal representative maintains the same discretion to
elect that the surviving spouse held, (4) the personal representative owes no duty to
creditors of the estate to make the election, and (5) the right to elect is not an asset of the
estate that can be deemed “wasted” if unexercised. The creditors have appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The defendant, Shelby Brooks, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order revoking
her probation and requiring her to serve the balance of her five-year sentence for the sale
of a Schedule II controlled substance and the sale of a Schedule III controlled substance in
confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is a dispute involving the usage and subdivision of real property in McMinn County.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that a restrictive covenant contained in the
deed to their property applied to other parcels originating from the same parent tract.
Upon competing motions for summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court
entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing
the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The trial court determined that the language in the
plaintiffs’ deed was not sufficient to create an express restrictive covenant upon the
property subsequently conveyed to the defendants and that the plaintiffs did not produce
sufficient evidence of a “common plan” for the original tract such as would warrant
imposition of an implied negative reciprocal easement. The plaintiffs have appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm

The Appellant, Christopher Ray Smith, entered a guilty plea to three counts of misdemeanor failure to appear, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-609, with the length and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment for each count, with counts two and three to be served concurrently to a consecutive term in count one. The trial court suspended the sentence to supervised probation following service of six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we modify the sentence in count one and remand for entry of corrected judgment form as to that count. In all other respects, we affirm.

We granted this extraordinary appeal to determine whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-307 and 29-20-313(b), requires severance in cases involving both non-governmental and governmental entities.  Following the legislature’s amendment of these statutes in 1994, we conclude that, when a jury is demanded, the entire case against both non-governmental and governmental entities shall be tried to a jury without severance. 

A Montgomery County jury convicted Petitioner, Curtis O’Neal Shelton, Jr., of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated burglary, four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and seven counts of attempted aggravated robbery. After merging the two felony murder convictions, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an effective term of life in prison plus twenty years. Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions and sentence. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) communicate with Petitioner effectively; (2) raise sufficient, proper objections to the State’s evidence; (3) introduce evidence on Petitioner’s behalf; and (4) file a timely motion for new trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The petitioner, Harry Clint Weaver, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief, which petition challenged his 2019 Sullivan County Criminal Court
guilty-pleaded convictions of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, three
counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and aggravated domestic assault, for
which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the petitioner
argues that the post-conviction court erred in allowing trial counsel to remain in the
courtroom while the petitioner testified during the evidentiary hearing and that he was
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Petitioner, Ronnell Barclay, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for
rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic
means. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel
because counsel (1) did not communicate to Petitioner that the victim made a new
disclosure on the first day of trial; (2) failed to request a continuance after the State
informed the trial court and Petitioner of the new disclosure; and (3) incorrectly informed
Petitioner of his potential exposure at trial as a result of the new disclosure. Following our
review, we affirm in part; however, we remand the case to the post-conviction court for
further findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to the exposure issue.

Defendant, Emanuel Kidega Samson, was convicted of three counts of civil rights intimidation, one count of first-degree premeditated murder, seven counts of attempted first-degree murder, seven counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, twenty-four counts of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment. He received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for his firstdegree murder conviction. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 281 years for the remaining convictions to be served consecutively to the life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excluded expert testimony as to his mental health; that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for civil rights intimidation, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree premeditated murder; that his conviction for civil rights intimidation in Count 3 of the indictment and his convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violated double jeopardy; that the State failed to make an election of offenses as to his convictions for civil rights intimidation; that the trial court erred by admitting a note he wrote; that the trial court erred by admitting a portion of the recordings of his jail phone calls; that the trial court incorrectly charged the jury that his failure to remember the facts of the offenses was not a defense; and that his sentence was improper. Following our review of the entire record, oral argument, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a dependency and neglect case concerning two minor children. Appellee Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services received a referral of potential child abuse. Following
a brief investigation, the oldest child was taken into DCS custody after he admitted to
sexually assaulting Appellant, his mother. Three days later the juvenile court sua sponte
ordered the younger child into DCS custody due to allegations of domestic violence and
sexual abuse in the home. Later, the juvenile court adjudicated both children dependent
and neglected. On de novo review, the circuit court found the older child dependent and
neglected under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(13)(A) and found both
children dependent and neglected under section 37-1-102(b)(13)(F) and (G). Mother
appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The trial court granted Defendants/Appellees’ motion for a directed verdict at the close of Plaintiff/Appellant’s proof. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jasmine Lashay Bland, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court
jury of leaving the scene of an accident, assault, and burglary of a vehicle. She was
sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of two years
for the felony burglary of a vehicle conviction, six months for the assault conviction, and
thirty days for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction, with the sentences suspended
after thirty days of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court
committed reversible error by not allowing her to cross-examine the victim about a
potential source of bias related to the victim’s alleged insurance claim for personal injuries.
Based on our review, we conclude that this issue is waived because it was not raised in the
trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

At issue is whether Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(2) extends the statute of
limitations for a personal injury action to two years when a traffic citation for the violation
of Memphis City Code Ordinance § 11-16-3 for Failure to Maintain Safe Lookout is issued
to the driver alleged to be at fault. Stated another way, is an exception created to the oneyear
statute of limitations for personal injuries if a person involved in an automobile
accident receives a ticket for the violation of a municipal ordinance from that accident?
The trial court ruled in the negative. We affirm.

This is a divorce action filed by Meredith Lee Taylor (“Mother”) against Christopher Bryan Taylor (“Father”). The trial court divided the marital estate nearly equally and granted Mother primary residential custody of the parties’ child. Father was granted 130 days per year of parenting time. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its valuation of several marital assets. He also asserts that the trial court should have awarded him more parenting time. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.