APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained compensable injuries to both shoulders. His employer conceded the compensability of the right shoulder injury, but denied the left shoulder claim. An examination was done by a physician through the Medical Impairment Registry(“MIR”) regarding the right shoulder claim. The trial court found that the presumption of correctness of the MIR impairment opinion had been overcome by clear and convincing evidence as to the right shoulder injury. The trial court also concluded that the left shoulder injury was compensable and awarded benefits accordingly. The trial court also denied employer’s claim that it was entitled to an offset pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-114(b) for benefits paid under its accident and sickness policy. We hold and find that the trial court erred by failing to apply the offset sought by the employer, and affirm the judgment in all other respects.
 

A townhome owner and her tenant challenge an amendment adopted by the owner’s townhome association prohibiting the owner from leasing her unit to a third party. The owner purchased her unit before there were any restrictions on leasing individual units. The amendment was adopted in accordance with the Horizontal Property Act and in accordance with the documents governing the units where she lives. The trial court granted the association’s motion for summary judgment enjoining the owner from renting her townhome to a third party and requiring the tenant to vacate the unit. On appeal we conclude the amendment is enforceable and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This is a case alleging negligence by defendant, Mountain States Health Alliance, which resulted in injury to a patient, Ruby Williams. Ms. Williams fell off a table while she was undergoing myocardial perfusion imaging, also known as a nuclear stress test. Mountain States Health Alliance asserted that Ms. Williams’s complaint sounded in medical malpractice instead of ordinary negligence, and asked for summary judgment because Ms. Williams had not complied with the filing requirements of the medical malpractice statute. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the case involved a medical malpractice claim rather than an ordinary negligence claim. Ms. Williams’s Estate appeals. We affirm the trial court’s ruling.

Juan A. Hill (“the Petitioner”) filed for habeas corpus relief, claiming that his judgment of conviction is void because it (1) is based on a defective indictment and (2) fails to reflect pretrial jail credits. The habeas corpus court denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Petitioner, Fredrick Milan, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. More specifically he contends that (1) trial counsel failed to convey a twenty-five year offer by the State; and (2) trial counsel failed to call certain witnesses to testify at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and we accordingly affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Nicole D. (“Mother”) and Terry D. (“Father”) to their minor children, Austin D. and Trinity D. (collectively “the Children”). Mother and Father separated after an incident of domestic violence; the Children remained with Mother. A drug raid at Mother’s house led the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) to remove the Children and take them into temporary protective custody. DCS filed a petition seeking temporary legal custody. Later, the Children’s maternal grandmother, Lisa D. V. (“Grandmother”), filed an intervening petition and was granted temporary custody. A year later, Grandmother filed a petition seeking to terminate both parents’ parental rights; she seeks to adopt the Children. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition based upon its findings, said to be made by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Mother and Father appeal. We vacate in part and affirm in part. As to the trial court’s decision that termination is appropriate, we affirm that ultimate conclusion.

Brandon Neal (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleas to attempted carjacking and aggravated assault, alleging that the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) violated his due process rights by miscalculating his sentences and that TDOC’s actions have rendered his pleas constitutionally infirm. The post-conviction court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Antonio Starks, of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse, and the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of life and fifteen years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to testify about his previous abuse of the victim; (3) the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question the victim’s mother about a prior conviction; (4) the trial court should have granted a mistrial when a police officer testified that the victim had been sexually abused; (5) the trial court should have given a curative instruction when the State made an improper comment during closing arguments; and (6) the trial court should have granted a new trial because the State failed to disclose that the victim’s mother received favorable treatment in return for her testimony. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Bruce D. Mendenhall, was convicted of three counts and acquitted of two counts of solicitation to commit first degree murder, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-102, -12-107, -13-202. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to ten years for each conviction and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends the following: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever two of the counts; (2) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police; (3) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements made to a fellow inmate turned police informant; (4) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress numerous letters the Defendant had sent from jail; (5) that the trial court erred by admitting redacted portions from numerous letters the Defendant had sent from jail and from several telephone conversations the Defendant had while in jail; (6) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of another crime as "contextual background evidence;" (7) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s convictions; and (8) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences.Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this worker’s compensation action, the widow of the decedent sought workers’ compensation benefits for her husband’s death. She filed suit twice but voluntarily non-suited each of those actions. She filed suit a third time, and her husband’s employer moved to dismiss, contending that the third action was barred by the statute of limitations and by Tenn. R. Civ. Pro. 41.01(2). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and the widow has appealed, contending that her third action was timely filed. We reverse the decision of the trial court.
 

Tellico Village Property Owners Association, Inc. (“TVPOA”) sued Health Solutions, LLC; Tellico Senior Living, LLC; Citizens National Bancorp, Inc. d/b/a Citizens National Bank of Tennessee; Home Federal Bank Corporation d/b/a Home Federal Bank; and NBN Corporation d/b/a National Bank of Tennessee (“National Bank”) with regard to a failed development project. TVPOA asked the Trial Court to declare that TVPOA’s option agreement concerning real estate in the development project had priority over certain recorded deeds of trust. National Bank appeals the Trial Court’s grant of partial summary judgment to TVPOA raising issues about whether the Memorandum of Agreement and Development Agreement between TVPOA and the Developer and the Developer Company violated the statute of frauds, and the Trial Court’s grant of TVPOA’s motion in limine to exclude evidence on National Bank’s claim of unjust enrichment. We find and hold that National Bank was not a party to the Memorandum of Agreement or the Development Agreement and, therefore, may not raise a statute of frauds defense. We further find and hold that the Trial Court did not err in excluding evidence on National Bank’s claim of unjust enrichment.

This case involves the issue of retroactive child support and whether the trial court appropriately denied Wife’s request. Husband’s divorce petition was pending for more than three years before Wife answered. During that time the parties were separated, and Husband made monthly car payments on Wife’s vehicle in an amount that exceeded what would have been his child support obligation. We conclude that Husband satisfied his child support obligations based on the unique facts of this case and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Plaintiff motorist was seriously injured when a padlock was hurled from beneath a lawn mower operated by a City of Memphis Parks Services employee and through the window of her vehicle, striking her in the head and resulting in the loss of her left eye. The motorist and her husband filed an action for damages against the City, which was adjudicated pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs, and the City appeals. We affirm.

Fred V. Wilson and his wife, Anna R. Wilson, were the initial plaintiffs. They filed suit against Monroe County and the City of Sweetwater alleging that the amputation of Mrs. Wilson’s left leg was proximately caused by the negligence of those responding to an emergency call to her home. Mrs. Wilson died before trial and the case proceeded with her husband as the sole plaintiff, individually and in a representative capacity. At a bench trial, the court found that the injury to Mrs. Wilson’s left foot occurred during the ambulance ride from the Wilsons’ home to the hospital emergency room. It further found that the injury, which did not heal, necessitated the amputation of her leg. The court entered judgment against Monroe County. The claims against Sweetwater were dismissed. Monroe County appeals. The plaintiff, by way of a separate issue, challenges the sufficiency of the court’s award of damages. We affirm.

A bank filed a complaint against husband and wife to recoup money owed on a credit agreement after a foreclosure sale failed to produce sufficient funds to repay the loan in full. The trial court entered a judgment against the couple, and the couple appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment because the bank relied on two different versions of a credit agreement, thereby failing to prove the existence of an enforceable contract with definite terms.

Plaintiff filed this action against the instructor of a motorcycle safety course and his employer for injuries she sustained when she drove off of the designated course site and collided with a parked pickup truck.The trial court found that the plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred because she signed a valid written waiver/release from liability document prior to starting the course. The trial court also dismissed the plaintiff’s gross negligence claims, finding there was nothing in the record which would allow a reasonable juror to conclude the defendant exercised a conscious neglect of duty or a callous indifference to consequences. We affirm.

The father in this termination of parental rights case, who was incarcerated at all times material to this case at Riverbend Maximum Security Prison and is indigent, appeals the termination of his rights contending he was denied due process because he was not informed of his rights as required under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f), he did not sign a waiver of his rights, and he was not provided a court-appointed attorney. The father, who did not file a responsive pleading to the petition, contends, inter alia, that the trial court failed to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f), which mandates that he be informed that he has the right to participate and contest the allegations and, if he wished to contest the petition, that a court-appointed attorney would be provided to assist in contesting the petition. The record does not contain a signed waiver by the father nor does it reflect that the juvenile court made the requisite determination that he was informed of his rights and, after being informed, voluntarily waived his right to a court-appointed attorney to assist in contesting the petition, or that, if he did not participate after being informed of his rights, the court may proceed with such action without the parent’s participation as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f)(5). We, therefore, vacate the judgment of the juvenile court as it pertains to the father’s parental rights and remand with instructions for the juvenile court to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(f) and, if the father wishes to contest the petition, that a court-appointed attorney be provided and the case set for a new trial once his attorney has had a reasonable opportunity to prepare.
 

This appeal involves a post-divorce dispute over whether the parties’ MDA required the payment of alimony in futuro or alimony in solido. The Wife remarried shortly after the parties’ divorce, and the Husband filed a motion to terminate his alimony obligation, claiming that the obligation was for alimony in futuro, which automatically terminates upon remarriage. The trial court concluded that the obligation was for alimony in futuro, and therefore, the court granted the Husband’s motion to terminate his alimony obligation. Wife appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Sterling Lamar Cooper, appeals the Anderson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions for possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance less than 0.5 grams, a Class C felony, and possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance more than 0.5 grams, a Class B felony, and his concurrent sentences of ten years and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the convictions should be vacated and the charges dismissed because (1) his sentences were illegal, (2) the trial court committed judicial misconduct, (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgement of the trial court.

Appellant, Elder Mark Anthony Thornton,was convicted in Davidson County General Sessions Court of eighty counts of criminal contempt after violating an order of protection. He appealed those convictions to the Davidson County Criminal Court and, following a bench trial, was found guilty of criminal contempt for 180 separate violations of the order of protection. Appellant was pro se at trial. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten calendar days per incident consecutively, for a total of 1800 days of incarceration. Appellant, still proceeding pro se, filed a timely notice of appeal. After a review of the original and the supplemented record, we determine that ten of the convictions and sentences are proper and, thus, are affirmed. However, the balance of the convictions, 170 in total, which were not listed in the charging notice can not stand, as proper notice was not given to Appellant. As such, those convictions are reversed, and the resulting sentences are vacated.

Former administrator of decedent’s estate appeals order denying his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion, which sought relief from an order requiring him to reimburse the estate for fees incurred by the successor administrator. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

Dwight Miller (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life in prison. The Defendant sought post-conviction relief and, after a hearing, the post-conviction court granted relief in the form of a delayed appeal. We now address two issues in the delayed appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after a bomb threat; and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the prior testimony of an unavailable witness to be read into the record. After a thorough review of the record, we have determined that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on either of these issues. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s judgment of conviction.

I respectfully dissent. Specifically, I disagree with the majority’s conclusions that in Miller I this court reversed the conviction solely “because of the manner in which the trial court admonished Blackwell [the unavailable witness] in front of the jury, [Blackwell’s] explanation that her improved memory resulted from the threat of jail, and her testimony that she had been assaulted after she spoke with the TBI together with her attribution of the assault to her involvement in the case.”

Upon the parties’ divorce, Mother was named the children’s primary residential parent. Years later, Mother petitioned to increase Father’s child support, and Father filed a countercomplaint seeking to be named the primary residential parent. The trial court found that a material change in circumstances had occurred since the entryof the parties’ parenting plan. The trial court further found that certain best interest factors weighed in favor of,and against, both parties; however, it determined that the children’s best interests would be served by Mother remaining the primary residential parent. Father appeals and, discerning no error, we affirm.
 

The defendant, Jeffrey Leo Rochelle, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder and was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. On appeal, the defendant alleges the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court should have granted a mistrial when a witness testified regarding the defendant’s anger management issues. After a careful review of the record, we conclude there was no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.