APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Many years prior to the decedent’s death, he was ordered to pay child support. Upon his death, the decedent’s ex-wife filed a claim against his estate seeking recovery of child support arrearages. The personal representative filed an exception, and the trial court denied the claim. The ex-wife appeals. We reverse.

The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed.

This case involves the status of the parties with respect to a baby conceived pursuant to a surrogacy agreement. The juvenile court determined that there was a valid surrogacy agreement and denied the surrogate’s requests for relief from a final order ratifying the surrogacy agreement. We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

The Petitioner, Ricky Ronell Jones, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury convictions. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately investigate and prepare for trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this workers’ compensation case, a Hawkins County employee sustained a compensable injury in September 2000. His claim was settled in July 2003. The settlement, which was approved by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, provided that the employer would continue to provide medical care for the injury in accordance with the workers’ compensation law. In 2009, the employee and his employer’s insurer entered into an agreement closing future medical benefits in exchange for a lump sum payment, subject to approval by Medicare. This settlement closing future medical benefits was approved by the Circuit Court for Knox County by agreement of the parties. Medicare declined to approve the proposed agreement and suggested an alternate, much larger, lump sum payment. The employee filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County to enforce the settlement agreement as amended by Medicare. The employer and insurer moved to dismiss, based on improper venue. That motion was denied. After a series of non-evidentiary hearings, the trial court ordered the employer’s insurer to make a lump sum payment in excess of $500,000. The employer and insurer have appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss, and by ordering the $500,000 payment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We conclude that the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss, and therefore reverse.

The Metropolitan Government issued a parking citation to the driver of a vehicle parked at an expired meter; upon his failure to pay the $11.00 fine within the requisite 45-day period, the fine was increased to $50.00 and costs were assessed. Driver challenged the fine as a violation of the Fifty-Dollar Fines Clause of Article VI, Section 14 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Metropolitan Government’s authority to increase the fine, and asserted that the parking citation was unconstitutional for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-3-501. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Williams, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of attempted second degree murder and possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Desi Kris Moore, was convicted of rape of a child, a class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant claims his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee mental health facility, effectively dismissing the case. Having determined that the trial court failed to state the legal grounds upon which it was granting summary judgment, we vacate the orders at issue and remand for entry of orders that comply with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

This interlocutory appeal involves comparative fault and amending to add a defendant. The plaintiff suffered slip-and-fall injuries at the defendant airport. The day before the statute of limitations ran, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the airport, alleging negligence. The airport’s answer asserted comparative fault but did not identify an additional tortfeasor. In later discovery, the airport identified its janitorial service. The plaintiff amended her complaint to add the janitorial service as a defendant, citing T.C.A. 20-1-119. The defendant janitorial service filed a motion to dismiss, citing the statute of limitations. The trial court declined to dismiss the claims against the janitorial service, holding that the disclosure of the identity of the janitorial service in discovery triggered the 90-day statutory period under Section 20-1-119 in which the plaintiff is permitted to amend the complaint to add a defendant. We reverse, holding that, by the express terms of Section 20-1-119, the statutory 90-day period is not triggered by a defendant’s response to a discovery request.

An employee was pinned between a large crane and a pickup truck. He suffered injuries to his ribs, shoulder, and back. He also suffered a collapsed lung and contusions on his lungs. He recovered from those injuries and was able to return to work for his employer. The trial court found the correct impairment to be 19% to the body as a whole and awarded 28.5% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding benefits for pulmonary dysfunction. The employee contends that the award was based on an incorrect impairment rating. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pro se petitioner, Tony Hoover, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of rape and two counts of incest, and he received an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the judgments were illegal because they did not impose mandatory lifetime community supervision or a sex offender surcharge. Because the Petitioner’s judgments do not reflect the statutory requirement of mandatory lifetime community supervision, we conclude that the judgments for rape are illegal and void. We vacate the Petitioner’s sentences for rape only and remand to the habeas court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the illegal sentence was a bargained for element of the Petitioner’s plea agreement. In all other respects, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Cauley McCilton Cross, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction following his convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of exhibition of obscene materials to a minor. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erroneously denied his petition because the proof established that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he specifically contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the charges against the petitioner based upon a constitutional challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-504. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.

Alberto DeLeon (“the Claimant”) filed a claim pursuant to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act for permanent impairment benefits and moving expense benefits allegedly arising out of an incident that occurred on April 5, 2011, in which the Claimant apparently was shot by his landlord. The claim was assigned to the small claims docket of the Claims Commission. Because we have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order denying a claim appearing on the small claims docket of the Claims Commission, this appeal is dismissed.

After primary residential parent Mother notified Father of her intent to relocate, Father opposed relocation and he petitioned to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The trial court determined the Father had demonstrated a material change in circumstances, but it found the child’s best interests would be promoted by Mother remaining the primary residential parent, and it allowed Mother’s relocation with the child. We affirm in part and we reverse in part.

The legal issues in this appeal revolve around the assignment of three agreements. The first is a Right-of-First-Refusal Agreement that allowed for an assignment with the consent of the non-assigning party. The agreement was silent as to the anticipated standard of conduct of the non-assigning party in withholding consent. The other two agreements—a Time Brokerage Agreement and a Consulting Agreement—were assignable without consent. The primary issue we address is whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to the non-assigning party’s conduct in refusing to consent to an assignment when the agreement does not specify a standard of conduct. Oak Ridge FM, Inc. (“Oak Ridge FM”) contractually agreed for Dick Broadcasting Company (“DBC”) to have a right of first refusal to purchase Oak Ridge FM’s WOKI-FM radio station assets. The agreement was assignable by DBC only with the written consent of Oak Ridge FM. When DBC requested Oak Ridge FM to consent to the assignment of the Right-of-First-Refusal agreement to a prospective buyer, Oak Ridge FM refused to consent. Oak Ridge FM also refused to consent to the assignment of the Consulting Agreement and Time Brokerage Agreement, neither of which contained a consent provision. DBC sued Oak Ridge FM and the other defendants, alleging breach of contract and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted the defendants a summary judgment. DBC appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment. We hold that where the parties have contracted to allow assignment of an agreement with the consent of the non-assigning party, and the agreement is silent regarding the anticipated standard of conduct in withholding consent, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies and requires the non-assigning party to act with good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner in deciding whether to consent to the assignment. Because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ appeal. We affirm.
 

I concur with the Court’s decision to apply the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to the three contracts involved in this case. I also concur with the Court’s decision that neither party is entitled to a summary judgment because the current record reflects genuine disputes regarding the facts material to their claims and defenses. However, because there is no consensus regarding the scope of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the context of arm’s length commercial transactions, I write separately to address this important point.

Respondent Convention Center Authority appeals the trial court’s determination that the residential addresses of employees of third-party contractors contained in payroll records submitted by the contractors to the Convention Center Authority aren ot exempt from disclosure under the Tennessee Public Records Act. Petitioners cross-appeal the trial court’s denial of their request for attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal is from an order of the trial court entered on August 14, 2012, which order terminated the parental rights of Jeremy A. to his son, Jeremiah P.A., based upon Jeremy A.’s joining in the petition for adoption filed by Donna J. P., the child’s biological maternal grandmother, on September 20, 2011. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-117(f). The order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the petition for adoption, or the petition to intervene and adopt filed by Charles R., the child’s biological maternal grandfather. As such, the order is not a final order and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The majority affirms summary judgment on the basis that Aegis is unable to show that a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence could find that the advertisement was capable of a defamatory meaning. Instead, I would hold that summary judgment is inappropriate in this case, reverse the trial court, and remand for further proceedings.
 

The defendant pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence (first offense), a Class A misdemeanor, while reserving a certified question of law concerning the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. The defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, and permitted to serve all but two days of this sentence on probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, claiming that the State failed to prove that the police officer initiating the traffic stop had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about to commit an offense. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the certified question reserved by the defendant did not clearly outline the scope and limits of the question presented as required by existing precedent. We dismiss the appeal accordingly.

Husband appeals the order granting Wife a legal separation and alimony in futuro. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

A jury convicted the defendant, Jurico Readus, of one count of first degree (felony) murder of Luis Reyes Hernandez, and two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery,class B felonies. The trial court merged the count of attempted especially aggravated robbery of Luis Reyes Hernandez with the first degree (felony) murder conviction, for which the defendant received a life sentence. The defendant was sentenced to serve ten years, concurrently with his life sentence, for the attempted especially aggravated robbery of Jary Reyes. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions and the voluntariness of his confession which was obtained while he was a juvenile. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.