APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants in this action for defamation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff appeals the award of summary judgment on its claims for defamation and civil conspiracy. We affirm.
 

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. The majority affirms summary judgment on the basis that Aegis is unable to show that a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence could find that the advertisement was capable of a defamatory meaning. Instead, I would hold that summary judgment is inappropriate in this case, reverse the trial court, and remand for further proceedings.
 

The defendant pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence (first offense), a Class A misdemeanor, while reserving a certified question of law concerning the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. The defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, and permitted to serve all but two days of this sentence on probation. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress, claiming that the State failed to prove that the police officer initiating the traffic stop had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed or was about to commit an offense. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the certified question reserved by the defendant did not clearly outline the scope and limits of the question presented as required by existing precedent. We dismiss the appeal accordingly.

Husband appeals the order granting Wife a legal separation and alimony in futuro. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

A jury convicted the defendant, Jurico Readus, of one count of first degree (felony) murder of Luis Reyes Hernandez, and two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery,class B felonies. The trial court merged the count of attempted especially aggravated robbery of Luis Reyes Hernandez with the first degree (felony) murder conviction, for which the defendant received a life sentence. The defendant was sentenced to serve ten years, concurrently with his life sentence, for the attempted especially aggravated robbery of Jary Reyes. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions and the voluntariness of his confession which was obtained while he was a juvenile. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there was no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee was injured at work as a result of the actions of a third-party tortfeasor. The employee suffered permanent injuries that required future medical care. The injured employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits and filed a lawsuit against the third-party tortfeasor. The employer intervened in the lawsuit pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 (2008) to protect its subrogation lien against any recovery from the third-partytortfeasor. The employee settled the lawsuit with the third-partytortfeasor and voluntarily dismissed the case. The employer requested that the case be set for trial, claiming that it was entitled to a lien against the settlement proceeds for the cost of future medical benefits that may be paid on behalf of the injured employee. We hold that the employer’s subrogation lien provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 does not include the cost of future medical benefits that may be provided to an injured employee.

I dissent from the majority because I believe that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the husband did not prove a ground for divorce. My review of the record leads me to conclude that the husband did, in fact, produce unrebutted evidence that established the ground of inappropriate marital conduct.
 

Employees’work-related injuries are, on occasion, caused by the fault of third parties. Approximately fifty years ago, the Tennessee General Assembly addressed how recoveries from these third parties should be apportioned between the employee and the employer. This appeal requires us to interpret and apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112(c) (2008), one of these fifty-year-old statutes. Rather than applying the plain statutory language, the Court has undertaken to harmonize Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112 with other changes in the Workers’ Compensation Law that were made after Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-112 was enacted. There is no doubt that the Tennessee General Assembly should revisit Tenn.Code Ann.§ 50-6-112. However, until the General Assembly does, I would interpret and apply the statute according to its plain meaning. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

I fully concur with the decision to affirm the trial court in all respects; I write separately to address the emphasis on reconciliation as a predicate to granting Wife a legal separation for two years even though Husband failed to prove any ground upon which he would be entitled to a divorce. I fully recognize that the trial court had the discretion to grant or deny Wife’s request for a legal separation; however, based upon the facts of this case, I submit the only party who would have a basis to appeal the grant or denial of a legal separation would be Wife, not Husband. This is because Husband failed to prove any ground upon which he would be entitled to a divorce at the time of the hearing.
 

This appeal involves a GTLA claim for personal injuries arising out of alleged negligence. The plaintiff suffered personal injuries after falling in a hole in a school football field. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant board of education alleging negligence by failure to maintain the school premises and failure to warn. As defenses, the defendant board of education asserted governmental immunity and comparative fault. After a bench trial, the trial court held that the board of education had constructive notice of the hole in the football field and so did not have governmental immunity, and awarded the plaintiff monetary damages. The board of education now appeals, challenging the trial court’s holding on governmental immunity and arguing the plaintiff’s comparative fault. We affirm the trial court’s holding as to governmental immunity, but remand on the issue of comparative fault for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey Martin, entered a best-interest guilty plea in two cases. In one case, he pled guilty to statutory rape in exchange for a suspended two-year sentence. In the second case, the Petitioner pled guilty to the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, and he received a sentence of twenty years in prison as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial judge ordered that the sentences run concurrently, and it ordered that the sentences run concurrently with all other Maury County convictions. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, causing his guilty pleas to be entered unknowingly and involuntarily. The Petitioner also argues that the post-conviction court erred when it required him to testify at the post-conviction hearing about the underlying facts of his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the Petitioner did not establish that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, that his guilty pleas were knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that the post-conviction court did not err in requiring the Petitioner’s testimony. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Petitioner, Monroe Mangium, pled guilty to attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. He received agreed sentences of twenty years at one-hundred percent for attempted first degree murder, twenty years at one-hundred percent for especially aggravated kidnapping, and ten years at thirty percent for aggravated robbery to be served concurrently for an effective twenty-year sentence. In this appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner asserts that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. More specifically, he argues that counsel failed to investigate his case by not interviewing Randy Tyus, Tony Hammond, or other potential witnesses listed by the State. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Williamson county jury convicted the Petitioner, Joe M. Gilbert, of aggravated child abuse in 2006, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to fifteen years in prison. In 2012, the Petitioner filed a writ of error coram nobis, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing after finding that coram nobis relief was not applicable to the Petitioner’s claim. The Petitioner appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing. After a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

James John Lewis ("the Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court erred in not investigating the medications the Petitioner was taking when he entered his guilty plea and accordingly erred in accepting the Petitioner’s guilty plea. The habeas corpus court summarily denied relief, and this appeal followed. Upon review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

On December 19, 2012, Appellant, Antonio Freeman, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, section 2.01, filed a petition for an interlocutory appeal as of right. The petition sought an appeal of the trial court’s order denying his motion to have the trial judge recused. The Appellant asks this Court to review the trial judge’s order denying his motion to recuse. See　Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, Sec. 1. Appellant presents the following issues for our review on appeal: (1) whether a person of ordinary prudence in the trial court’s position, knowing all the facts known to the trial court, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the trial court’s impartiality in the present case; and (2) whether Rule 10B requires specific language as to why the motion for recusal is not presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. After a thorough de novo review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion for recusal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Michael Terrell, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On May 28, 2009, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated robbery, and he received an agreed sentence of seventeen years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the performance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Sumner County jury convicted the Defendant, Gene Earl Stanley, of one count of burglary, two counts of theft of property, felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, driving under the influence of an intoxicant, and driving on a canceled, revoked, or suspended license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Career Offender to an effective sentence of forty-eight years. Three months after the jury’s verdict and one month after sentencing, the Defendant filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court ultimately denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that he was denied due process when the State failed to provide him "potentially exculpatory evidence" that was in the State’s possession. The State counters that the Defendant’s motion for new trial was untimely filed. After a thorough review of the record and relevant law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Lauderdale County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Ricco R. Williams, of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been previously convicted of a felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 72 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and also contends that the jury was exposed to prejudicial information during voir dire and that the imposition of partially consecutive sentences violated his Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. Because the trial court committed plain error by failing to require the State to elect a predicate felony for the defendant’s conviction under Code section 39-17-1324 and because 39-17-1324(c) precludes the defendant’s conviction when the underlying dangerous felony is aggravated kidnapping or especially aggravated kidnapping as charged in this case, the defendant’s convictions in counts seven and ten are reversed, and those charges are remanded for a new trial on the offense of employing a firearm during the commission of an aggravated burglary. Because principles of double jeopardy preclude dual convictions for the aggravated robberies of Mr. and Ms. Currie, the defendant’s conviction of the aggravated robbery of Ms. Currie is reversed and modified to a conviction of the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, that conviction is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. The defendant’s convictions of and sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and the aggravated robbery of Mr. Currie are affirmed.

The defendant, James D. Morgan, appeals the revocation of the probationary sentence imposed for his Hamilton County Criminal Court conviction of vandalism. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This case was filed pursuant to the Electronic Funds Transfer Act. Customer sought reimbursement from Bank for unauthorized transactions made using a debit card linked to his account. Bank limited reimbursement to the transactions that occurred prior to and within 60 days of the transmittal of the bank statement that revealed the first unauthorized transaction. Customer filed suit. The trial court upheld Bank’s denial of recovery, finding that Customer’s failure to review his bank statements resulted in losses beyond the 60-day time period. Customer appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Barry C. Melton, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in which he challenged the legality of the sentences imposed for his Sevier County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated sexual battery. We reverse the habeas corpus court’s rejection of all forms of habeas corpus relief and hold that the petitioner is entitled to have his illegal sentences corrected. The habeas corpus court, however, correctly ruled that the petitioner failed to establish a basis for withdrawing his guilty pleas. We do not reach the issue whether the 2009 amendments to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101 violate Article I, section 15, and/or Article II, section 2, of the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is reversed in part and affirmed in part.

The State of Tennessee Department of Revenue rendered an assessment against James T. Higdon (“Higdon”) for certain business taxes owed. Higdon, challenging the actions taken by the department, sued the State of Tennessee; Commissioner Richard Roberts of the Department of Revenue; and, M. Bernadette Welch of the Department of Revenue (“the Defendants,” collectively), in the Chancery Court for Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the Trial Court granted. The Trial Court held, among other things, that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case as Higdon had not satisfied the statutory requirements for seeking relief regarding state tax claims. Higdon appeals to this Court. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

The Petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the reversal of the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental rights. However, it is my opinion that the Guardians failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father willfully failed to support the child in the four months prior to the filing of the petition. The evidence set out in the majority opinion does not, in my opinion, meet the Constitutionally required standard

The Defendant, Ryan James Howard, was convicted by a Washington County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-210, -211 (2010). He was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty years for second degree murder and five years for voluntary manslaughter. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in (2) allowing hearsay testimony into evidence; (3) allowing unauthenticated recordings of telephone calls into evidence; and (4) sentencing him to an effective twenty-five years’ confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.