APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Patrick L. Maliani, for the sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever offenses; (3) the evidence presented is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him to the maximum sentence within his range because it failed to apply one applicable mitigating factor. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the judgment of the trial court. As such, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict, dismissing Appellant’s claims of: (1) slander/defamation; (2) false light invasion of privacy; (3) false imprisonment; (4) malicious harassment; (5) negligent supervision, hiring, and retention; (6) negligent failure to affirm identification; (7) negligence; (8) assault and battery; and (9) civil conspiracy. Appellant also raises issues concerning the scope of cross-examination and the admission of certain evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion concerning either the scope of the cross-examination, or by excluding certain evidence. We further conclude that Appellant failed to put forth sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case for any of the foregoing claims. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict. Affirmed and remanded.

The defendant, Luis Guillen, was found guilty after a trial by jury of one count of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for the aggravated rape and to a consecutive ten years for the aggravated kidnapping, for a total effective sentence of thirtyfive years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Danny Pendergrass, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he claimed that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case. Petitioner was charged in a 22-count presentment with multiple counts of rape of a child, incest, and aggravated statutory rape against the same victim. Petitioner entered best interests pleas to all counts and received an effective sentence of 25 years in confinement to be served at 100 percent. Following a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Larry Hunt, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape and resulting effective sentence of thirty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, because the post-conviction court failed to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law in its denial of the petition, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant, Andre Benson, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury in July of 2009 with aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the offenses as charged in the indictment. He was sentenced as a Range II, Multiple Offender to fifteen years in incarceration for the aggravated robbery conviction and thirty-five years as a Violent Offender for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years at 100 percent. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated this appeal. The following issues are presented for our review: (1) whether Appellant is entitled to relief from his kidnapping conviction as a result of the holding in State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012); (2) whether the trial court violated Appellant’s right to confront witnesses by admitting preliminary hearing testimony of the victim at trial after it was determined the victim was incompetent to testify at trial; (3) whether the trial court improperly admitted excited utterances of the victim; (4) whether the trial court erred in admitting expert witness testimony about the victim’s mental state; (5) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (6) whether the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant; and (7) whether cumulative error affected Appellant’s constitutional due process rights. After a review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we determine: (1) the trial court properly determined that the victim was unavailable at trial such that the State could utilize her preliminary hearing testimony; (2) the trial court properly admitted excited utterances of the victim; (3) Appellant waived any issue with regard to hearsay admitted during the testimony of Jarian Henry based on the failure to object to the evidence; (5) Appellant is entitled to relief from his aggravated kidnapping conviction based on White because the issue has been fairly raised and we conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; (6) the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for aggravated robbery; and (7) the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. Accordingly, Appellant’s aggravated robbery conviction is affirmed, but a new trial is required on the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. Therefore, this case is remanded for further proceedings as set out in this opinion.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a complaint alleging fraudulent paternity testing.  Discerning no error, we affirm and award attorney fees for a frivolous appeal.

The defendant, Martin Dean "Cub" Meeks, was convicted by a Grundy County jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court failed to properly exercise its duty as thirteenth juror; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to establish premeditation; and (3) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on voluntary intoxication. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1996, Petitioner, Tony Von Carruthers, was convicted of three counts of first degree murder and sentenced to death on each count by a Shelby County Jury. See State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 523 (Tenn. 2000). Petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief for, inter alia, ineffective assistance of pretrial counsel for failing to retain an expert in the field of deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) analysis. See Tony Carruthers v. State, No. W2006-00376-CCA-R3-PD, 2007 WL 4355481, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Dec. 12, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 27, 2008). After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and this Court affirmed the post-conviction court’s judgment. Id. In December of 2011, Petitioner sought to have DNA analysis performed on a vaginal swab and a blanket pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001. The Shelby County Criminal Court denied relief. Petitioner appeals, arguing that the post-conviction court improperly denied relief. Because Petitioner did not establish the criteria for ordering DNA analysis under the Act, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Appellant, Carletha Jefferson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of six years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for aggravated assault and that the trial court erred in denying her requests for judicial diversion and probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jimmy Ray Massey, Jr., pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to felony failure to appear, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to six years at 60% in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, James Ray Walker, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury in January of 2011 for one count of official misconduct and one count of theft of property valued at less than $500. The events that gave rise to the indictments occurred in May of 2010 while Appellant was employed by the United States Postal Service in Jackson, Tennessee. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of both offenses. As a result, the trial court sentenced Appellant to two years for the conviction for official misconduct. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve 90 days of the sentence in incarceration and the balance of the sentence on probation. Appellant was sentenced to thirty days for the theft of property conviction, to be served concurrently with the sentence for official misconduct. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant presents various allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. In addition, he asks this Court to determine if the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and whether his sentence was “unfair.” After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant has waived any issues with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to support the issues with argument, citations to the record, or citations to authority. Moreover, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant, Kelly Ruth Osteen, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, theft of property valued under $500.00, fraudulent use of a credit card or debit card, and illegal possession of a credit card or debit card. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of three years, to be served on supervised probation. This sentence was to run concurrently with another sentence, number II-CR084354. After each of two subsequent arrests for additional criminal offenses in case number II-CR065737 and case number II-CR085803, a probation violation warrant was issued. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation , ordering her to serve seventy days and then return to supervised probation with an additional condition that she successfully complete the 21^st Judicial District Drug Court program. Thereafter, another probation violation warrant was issued for the Defendant’s failure to complete the drug court program, and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered that she serve her sentence in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke her sentence and seeks jail credit for time she spent participating in the drug court program. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Mother and Father were divorced in 2007 and granted joint custody of their then-six year old child. Mother filed a petition for modification in which she asked to be named the primary residential parent because the joint arrangement was not working for the parties and was not in Child’s best interest. Trial court granted Mother’s petition to be named primary residential parent, but directed that major decisions for Child should be made jointly. Father appealed, arguing that trial court erred in finding material change of circumstances had occurred since the initial parenting plan was entered and that the comparative fitness analysis favored Mother as the primary residential parent. Mother appealed trial court’s judgment regarding major decision making. We affirm trial court’s judgment modifying the parenting plan to name Mother the primary residential parent and amend the plan to have Mother make major decisions for Child rather than both Mother and Father jointly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Mother’s attorney fees but award her reasonable fees incurred on appeal.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Joseph G., Trinity G., and Stephen G. (“the Children”), the minor children of a married couple, J.G. (“Father”) and E.G. (“Mother”). The Children, then ages four, two and one respectively, were placed in the protective custody of the Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) following the incarceration of both parents. The Children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected by stipulation of the parents. A year after the Children entered foster care, DCS filed suit to terminate the parents’ rights. Following a bench trial, the court granted DCS’s petition. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds for termination exist as to both parents and that termination is in the Children’s best interest. Father and Mother separately appeal. As to both parents, we reverse the trial court’s finding of willful failure to support. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Here we have yet another case from Shelby County involving the bond requirements for an appeal from general sessions court to circuit court. This Court squarely addressed this issue in University Partners Development v. Bliss, No. M2008-00020-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 112571 (Tenn. Ct. App. W.S. Jan. 14, 2009), a memorandum opinion, and we addressed it again in Jacob v. Partee, 389 S.W.3d 339 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012). Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103 provides that “the person appealing shall give bond with good security, as hereinafter provided, for the costs of the appeal, or take the oath for poor persons.” In both Jacob and University Partners, we held that the statute is unambiguous, and that an appellant who seeks to appeal from general sessions court to circuit court cannot satisfy the bond requirements of the statute by merely remitting payment of an initial filing fee. Payment of the initial filing fee, we explained, simply does not constitute giving “bond with good security” for “the cost of the cause on appeal.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-103. The Supreme Court denied permission to appeal in both Jacob and University Partners. An opinion from the Office of the Attorney General reached the same result. See Tenn. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 12-23 (Feb. 23, 2012).

Donald Chill and his wife, Martha Chill, brought this action against their homeowner’s insurance carrier, Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (“Insurer”), alleging breach of contract by virtue of its refusal to pay for their loss caused by an earthquake. The insurance policy required suit to be brought within one year of the loss. The Chills filed their complaint almost seven years after the loss and over three and a half years after the Chills refused to accept Insurer’s offer to settle the claim for $88,086.49. The trial court granted Insurer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the lawsuit was not timely filed. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

Respondent utility district commissioners appeal the trial court’s determination that a ground for removal from office added to Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-82-307(b)(2), as amended effective June 2009, may be applied retrospectively to acts occurring prior to the effective date of the amendment to remove them from office. They also appeal the trial court’s determination that the additional ground for removal of commissioners, “failing to fulfill the commissioner’s or commissioners’ fiduciary responsibility in the operation or oversight of the district,” is not unconstitutionally vague. We reverse retrospective application of the additional ground for removal contained in the statute, as amended; hold that the statute is not void for vagueness; and remand.

In this appeal we must determine whether an injured worker was an “employee” or a
“temporary worker” within the meaning of a commercial general liability insurance policy.
The policy excludes coverage for injuries to the insureds’ employees, but it covers injuries
to “temporary workers” who are not employees, as that term is defined in the policy. The
trial court granted summary judgment to the worker upon concluding that he was a
“temporary worker,” and therefore covered under the policy, and it denied the insurer’s
motion for summary judgment. We find that the worker was not a “temporary worker” as
that term is defined by the insurance policy. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the
worker’s motion for summary judgment and denying the insurer’s motion. We reverse and
remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment to the insurer.

Eric Bledsoe (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of aggravated rape, aggravated burglary, and theft of property over $1000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of sixty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his conviction for aggravated rape. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Hawkins County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it denied him the opportunity to discover past allegations and cross-examine the victim about them; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his request to access the victim’s mother’s diary regarding the events; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this appeal we are asked to construe the scope of the Tennessee Lemon Law and to determine whether it applies to Plaintiff’s vehicle. For the following reasons,we find the law applicable to vehicles with a “gross vehicle weight” of 10,000 pounds or less, and we affirm the trial court’s conclusions that Plaintiff is entitled to protection and relief thereunder.

This dispute arises from a fire that destroyed six adjoining buildings in 1997. The buildings were located along a single city block, running north to south, in downtown Memphis, Tennessee. Defendant owned the second building, sandwiched between one building to the north, owned by one of the Plaintiffs, and the four remaining buildings to the south, owned by the other Plaintiff. Approximately one month before the fire, a substantial portion of the second and third buildings collapsed, damaging all six buildings, and compromising the structural integrity of each building. Due to safety concerns, the parties were ordered not to enter the buildings and were required to ensure that their buildings were inaccessible to the public. The parties complied with the orders. Shortly thereafter, a trespasser entered the Defendant’s building and started a fire which spread to each of the adjoining buildings resulting in substantial damage. Plaintiffs filed negligence actions against the Defendant and argued that she was liable to them for their property damage caused by the criminal acts of the trespasser. Following a trial, the trial court entered a directed verdict in favor of the Defendant based on its conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to establish any of the requisite elements of their negligence claims. After throughly reviewing the record, we affirm.

Mary Fern Smith (“Petitioner”) filed a petition in the trial court seeking the appointment of a conservator for her 90-year-old mother, Mary F. Stratton (“Mother”). Mother filed a motion to dismiss citing the provisions of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction of the petition because Mother was not a resident of Roane County. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3-101 (2007). It dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, James Perry Hyde, has appealed from the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his Petition for Forensic DNA Analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section Title 40, Chapter 30, Part 3. After review of the entire record, we conclude that the analysis sought by Petitioner is not included within the statutory definition of “DNA analysis.” We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.