APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

While I agree with the majority opinion in this case, I write separately to say that I view the question of whether to affirm the trial court’s decision to be a much closer question than is indicated by the majority opinion. I concur only because of the high standard of appellate review of the trial court’s decision.
 

The petitioner, Willie A. Cole, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this case, the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and tampering with evidence conviction. He was sentenced as a repeat violent offender to a term of life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction and to six years for the tampering with evidence. On appeal, he contends that the denial of his petition was error because the evidence established that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial and affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the trial court named Mother the primary residential parent and entered a permanent parenting plan limiting Father’s parenting time to one hundred and eight (108) days a year. Father appeals. We affirm.
 

The Defendant, Anthony S. Harding, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of six counts of aggravated statutory rape and one count of attempted aggravated statutory rape. The trial court later dismissed the attempt conviction. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve four years on each count of aggravated statutory rape, with all of these counts to run consecutively, resulting in an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the indictment was insufficient for failing to provide specific dates for the offenses; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (3) whether the trial court erred by excluding testimony from an alibi witness; and (4) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, the Defendant’s convictions and sentences for aggravated statutory rape are affirmed. We remand solely for the entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect dismissal of Count Seven, the attempt conviction.

The defendant, Christopher Lance Osteen, was convicted of burglary, reckless aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a weapon, evading arrest, and resisting arrest and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective term of sixteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s enhancement of his sentences by the use of prior convictions that were listed in his presentence report but not included in the State’s notice of enhanced punishment. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing determinations of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael A. Virga, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree felony murder and aggravated arson convictions. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was denied the right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. After review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Eric Shavonn Sayers, submitted a best interest guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to criminal conspiracy to commit theft of property valued over $1000, a Class E felony, eleven counts of criminal simulation, Class E felonies, two counts of theft of property valued over $1000, Class D felonies, and driving without a license in his possession, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-103, 39-14-115, 39-14-103, 55-50-351 (2010). The parties agreed to an effective six-year sentence as a Range III, persistent offender with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) the trial court failed to make the required factual findings to support the Defendant’s guilty pleas, (2) his convictions for criminal simulation and theft violate double jeopardy principles, and (3) the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised.
 

This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised.

The appellant, a juvenile, appealed the juvenile court’s revocation of his probation and commitment to the custody of the Department of Children’s Services. The trial court, upon the juvenile’s timely appeal, affirmed the ruling of the juvenile court. We affirm.

This appeal raises the question of whether a prisoner facing the death penalty has the mental capacity to abandon the pursuit of post-conviction relief in his three murder cases. After the prisoner decided not to seek a new trial in any of these cases, one of his sisters, in cooperation with the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, filed a “next friend” petition in each of the prisoner’s three murder cases, requesting the courts to declare the prisoner incompetent, thereby enabling her to pursue post-conviction relief on his behalf. The Criminal Court for Davidson County and the Circuit Court for Montgomery County conducted separate hearings in 2008. Each court denied the petitions after determining that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both of these judgments. Reid v. State, Nos. M2009-00128-CCA-R3-PD, M200900360-CCA-R3-PD, M2009-01557-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 3444171 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 8, 2011). We granted the prisoner’s Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application. We have determined that both trial courts employed the correct legal standard for determining whether the prisoner possessed the mental capacity to rationally forego seeking post-conviction relief and also that the prisoner’s sister and the Office of the Post-Conviction Defender failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner lacked the capacity to make rational decisions regarding the pursuit of post-conviction relief. For the sake of consistency, we further hold that, in all future cases, Tennessee’s courts should employ the mental competency standard of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 11(B) whenever the issue of a prisoner’s competency to pursue post-conviction relief is properly raised.
 

Petitioner, Anthony Bond, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. Following a second jury trial after his first conviction was reversed and he was granted a new trial, Petitioner was again convicted for first degree murder. This court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal. Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert witness to challenge the State’s medical expert’s testimony regarding the victim’s cause of death. After a careful review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Demetree Ptomey, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation for possession of oxycodone for sale or delivery, a Class C felony, and ordering his five-year sentence into execution. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael John Stitts, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, and sentenced to six years as a Range II offender in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gregory Scott Parton, alias, Gregory Scott Partin, alias, appeals from the trial court’s order declaring him to be an Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender (MVHO). On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the State’s petition to have him declared an habitual offender on the grounds that the State did not move “forthwith” in filing the petition as required by statute and that the court erred in using his most recent driving under the influence (DUI) conviction as a basis for its decision. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Cynthia Denise Marshall, pleaded guilty to introducing contraband into a penal institution, a Class C felony, possession with the intent to deliver morphine, a Class C felony, and possession with the intent to deliver more than one-half gram of marijuana, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-201 (2010) (amended 2012), 39-17-417 (2010) (amended 2012). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective six years on probation. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We reverse the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

The petitioner, Jesse L. Rogers, III, pro se, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 1994 convictions for first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. He claims the judgment is void due to an invalid waiver of his constitutional rights during the entry of his guilty plea. The trial court denied relief without appointing counsel, concluding that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Darren Price, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce a 911 call in support of his alibi defense. The petitioner also appeals the denial of his petition for DNA analysis of the knife, the victim’s vehicle, the crime scene, and the skin of the victim, arguing that “DNA testing of these items might yield DNA for analysis that could contain evidence that would assist [him] [to] establish his innocence.” Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petitions.

The Defendant, Tammy Marie Wilburn, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of attempt to commit aggravated arson, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-302 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s statements regarding his personal beliefs of witness credibility is reversible error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Stewart, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2008 conviction for destruction or interference with utility lines and his three-year, three-month sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that counsel provided him the ineffective assistance of counsel (1) by failing to object to hearsay statements and (2) by failing to obtain a Memphis Light, Gas and Water incident report. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was indicted on sixteen counts of animal cruelty for intentionally or knowingly failing to provide necessary food and care to horses on his farm in Warren County. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion, but the assistant district attorney general, acting for the district attorney general, determined that the defendant was not an appropriate candidate for pretrial diversion. The defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking a review by the trial court. The trial court found no abuse of discretion. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed.

This case involves the status of the parties with respect to a baby conceived pursuant to a surrogacy agreement. The juvenile court determined that there was a valid surrogacy agreement and denied the surrogate’s requests for relief from a final order ratifying the surrogacy agreement. We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.

The Petitioner, Ricky Ronell Jones, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury convictions. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to adequately investigate and prepare for trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.