APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Defendant, James William Floyd, pled guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to the offense of robbery. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant received a sentence of four years to be served by split confinement with incarceration of 49 days and the balance on supervised probation. He was released from jail on June 3, 2011, to begin the probation portion of his sentence. On March 9, 2012, a probation violation warrant was issued. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence by incarceration. Defendant appeals, and does not challenge the revocation of probation, but argues that the trial court erred by ordering the entire sentence to be served by incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur with affirming the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority opinion’s reasoning. I believe the Petitioner’s expunction of his legal proceedings is not a legal impediment to his bringing a post-conviction action. On the other hand, the petition was filed late, and the decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), as to being advised of potential immigration consequences of a guilty plea has been held not to apply retroactively. See, e.g., Francisco Miquel Jose v. State, No. M2011-00295-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2012).

The petitioner, William Glenn Wiley, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and aggravated robbery, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial based on "the State’s systematic late-disclosures of exculpatory evidence," which rendered his trial counsel presumptively ineffective under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In the alternative, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard based on counsel’s inadequate response to the late-disclosed evidence and failure to call two exculpatory witnesses at his trial. Finally, the petitioner argues that he is entitled to a new post-conviction evidentiary hearing because of the post-conviction court’s denial of his request for a continuance and an order to have the potentially exculpatory fingerprint evidence analyzed. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Robert M. Deunes-Cruz, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of statutory rape by an authority figure and incest, Class C felonies. SeeT.C.A. §§ 39-13-532, 39-15-302 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of three years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Lavon Douglas Robertson, was convicted by a jury of one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years of supervised probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during a search of a one-room "dwelling" used by the Defendant and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Shavon Page, pled guilty to five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary, in exchange for an effective sentence of thirty years, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. On appeal, the Petitioner contends first that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his request, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615, to have his trial counsel excluded from the courtroom during the post-conviction hearing. He next contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate his case, which rendered the Petitioner’s guilty plea unknowingly and involuntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Respectfully, I would not engage in an analysis of standing relative to the dirt road leading from the public road to the defendant’s building.

Defendant was convicted after a trial by jury of two counts of sexual battery, Class E felonies. He was sentenced to eighteen months probation on each count, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by ruling that the defendant could not cross-examine the victim concerning her history of mental illness and use of prescription medications. After review, we conclude that the trial court did not err by limiting the scope of the defendant’s cross-examination of the victim. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly.

This is an action for legal malpractice against a court-appointed attorney in a criminal case. The Circuit Court of Knox County entered a judgment for the defendant. We affirm.

The defendant, Raymond Lee Swett, Jr., appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, second degree murder, and felony murder, claiming that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping, second degree murder, and felony murder; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial; (3) the trial court erred by effectively amending the indictment via the instructions to the jury; and (4) the sentence was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Perry Kirkman, pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and received concurrent sentences of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). Thereafter, he filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. Custodial Parents filed a petition for adoption and termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights to the Child. The trial court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support several statutory grounds of termination and that the termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the Child. The Parents appeal the court’s best interest finding. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jimmy Lee Whitmire, was convicted of one count each of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and aggravated burglary. He received an effective sentence of eighteen years. State v. Jimmy Lee Whitmire, No. M2007-01389-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2486178, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Aug. 13, 2009). He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting a hearing on the matter, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to properly advise him regarding testifying at trial. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel was ineffective or that if trial counsel was ineffective that he suffered prejudice from such. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The employee, a satellite dish installer, injured his head while installing equipment at the residence of a customer of the employer. When the employer denied workers’ compensation benefits for permanent partial disability, the employee filed suit. The trial court awarded temporary total disability benefits and a 70% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this appeal has been referred to a special workers’ compensation appeals panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because an employee is entitled to temporary total disability benefits only until he is able to return to work or reaches his maximum recovery, the trial court erred by awarding an additional fifty weeks of temporary total disability benefits. Otherwise, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellant, Ray Neil Thompson, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to twenty-seven years in incarceration as a Range III, persistent offender. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant initiated an appeal. On appeal, he argues: (1) that the trial judge improperly refused to recuse himself; (2) that the trial court improperly denied a motion to suppress Appellant’s statement; and (3) that the trial court improperly sentenced Appellant. After a review of the evidence and authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for recusal or the motion to suppress and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant. As a result, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

After he lost his job at the University of Tennessee, the plaintiff filed this action against UT and several of his coworkers. The complaint can be summarized thusly: the plaintiff had an intimate relationship with a female coworker and, after it ended, she and three of her friends, who were also coworkers of the plaintiff, set out to get him fired. He seeks to impose liability on the four individuals and UT under various theories. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss which the trial court granted. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend which the trial court denied. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The appellant, Bradley Hawks, pled guilty in the Crockett County Circuit Court to possession of .5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to sell and received an eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. As part of the plea agreement, the appellant reserved a certified question of law, namely whether exigent circumstances justified law enforcement’s searching his residence without a warrant. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that evidence of exigent circumstances does not exist in this case. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on four minor children (“the Children”) of the defendant, Tabitha W. (“Mother”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the Children into custody in July 2010 because of Mother’s continuing drug use and the Children’s truancy problems. DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Mother in July 2011, alleging that numerous grounds for termination exist. Following a bench trial, the court granted the petition after finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother was in substantial noncompliance with her permanency plan, and that the conditions originally leading to removal still persisted. The court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals. We affirm.

James Bostic (“the Claimant”), an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, filed a claim against the State of Tennessee and others seeking money damages. The claim against the State was transferred from the Division of Claims Administration to the Claims Commission pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(c) 2012). The State filed (1) a motion to dismiss raising several defenses and (2) the affidavit of Brenda Boatman. Based upon the affidavit, the Claims Commission granted the State summary judgment and dismissed the Claimant’s claim. We affirm.

A prison inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the chancery court, seeking review of a prison disciplinary action. Numerous respondents were listed in the complaint, and one respondent filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss because, among other things, the petition was not verified or sworn, and it did not state that it was the first application for the writ. The petitioner appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This appeal turns on whether a commercial lease agreement requires the tenant to pay the landlord’s Tennessee excise tax. We agree with the conclusion reached by the trial court that the lease does require the tenant to pay the excise tax.

The Defendant, Misty Lynn Nanney, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; one count of forgery, a Class E felony; one count of possession with intent to sell less than .5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony; two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -14-105(a)(2), -14-114, -16-503, -17-417(c)(2)(A), -17-425(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the Defendant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying her request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jermaine R. Carpenter, filed for post-conviction relief from his conviction of simple possession of cocaine and two convictions of the sale of .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Mershaun William Scott, was convicted in a bench trial by the Davidson County Criminal Court of simple possession of marijuana and received a thirty-day sentence, suspended to unsupervised probation, and a $250 suspended fine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-418 (2010). The Petitioner contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 The Petitioner, Brittany Scott Pye, appeals from the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. He was convicted of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and sentenced as a multiple offender to fifteen years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to communicate his acceptance of the State’s offer of settlement prior to trial. He also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to accept his guilty plea after a trial date had been scheduled. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.