APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the numerous deficiencies in counsel’s performance failed to prejudice the Petitioner cumulatively in his right to a fair proceeding and failed to call into question the reliability of the jury’s verdict. I agree with the majority’s conclusions regarding counsel’s deficiencies except its conclusion that counsel were not deficient in their pretrial investigation and trial preparation. The majority concludes that because the trial began one year and seven months after the Petitioner was indicted, counsel “would not have had time or resources to conduct the investigation performed by post-conviction counsel after the trial.” Although the majority is correct in noting the length of time it took for all the relevant witnesses to be found and presented at the post-conviction hearing, I simply cannot agree that counsel did not have adequate time to investigate and prepare for the trial.

This appeal concerns whether Tennessee courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over an Indonesian cigarette manufacturer whose cigarettes were sold in Tennessee through the marketing efforts of a Florida entrepreneur who purchased the cigarettes from an independent foreign distributor. From 2000 to 2002, over eleven million of the Indonesian manufacturer’s cigarettes were sold in Tennessee. After the manufacturer withdrew its cigarettes from the United States market, the State of Tennessee filed suit against the manufacturer in the Chancery Court for Davidson County,alleging that the manufacturer had failed to pay into the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Escrow Fund as required by Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-31-101 to -103 (2001 & Supp. 2012). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the trial court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Indonesian manufacturer. The Court of Appeals reversed, granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the applicable fines. State ex rel. Cooper v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co., No. M2010-01955-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 2571851 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 28, 2011). We find that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Tennessee courts lack personal jurisdiction over the Indonesian manufacturer. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(2).

This appeal concerns Mother’s reservation of a life estate in property she conveyed to Son pursuant to a warranty deed. After the initial conveyance in 1983, Son resided on the property for years before renting the property to others. Mother prohibited the use of the property by certain tenants, who complied with her demand to vacate. In 2008, Mother objected to the current tenant’s occupation and filed suit to enforce her right to possession of the property. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the claim was barred by a ten-year statute of limitations. Mother appeals. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The petitioner, Philander Butler, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for the writ of error coram nobis which challenged his 1989 and 1990 guilty pleas to sale of a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, and attempted possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell. The trial court dismissed the petition on grounds: (1) that it was filed outside the applicable statute of limitation; and (2) that the petition failed to state a cognizable claim. On appeal, he contends that the dismissal was erroneous. The petitioner also contends that the court erred in summarily dismissing his “Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Pursuant to Rule 59.04 and Motion to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60.02(2)-(3).” Following review of the record we discern no error and affirm the dismissal of the petition and motion.

In November of 1998, a number of American tobacco manufacturers and a majority of the states and territories of the United States, including Tennessee, reached a settlement in litigation over tobacco-related healthcare costs. The terms of the settlement permit the tobacco manufacturers that were involved in the litigation to withhold a portion of their liability under the settlement terms based upon loss of market share in a participating state, unless the state enacts a “qualifying statute” requiring manufacturers not party to the litigation to either participate in the settlement or pay an amount into a designated escrow fund based upon annual cigarette sales. The underlying purpose of requiring non-participating manufacturers to either join in the settlement or pay into the escrow fund is to assure “a level playing field” for all manufacturers selling cigarettes in the participating states and territories. In consequence, Tennessee adopted a qualifying statute, the Tennessee Tobacco Manufacturers’ Escrow Fund Act of 1999 (“Escrow Fund Act”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-31-101 to -103 (2001 & Supp. 2012), which requires “[a]ny tobacco product manufacturer selling cigarettes to consumers within the state of Tennessee” after May 26, 1999, to either become a party to the existing settlement agreement or make specified payments into a “qualified escrow fund.” Id. § 47-31-103(a).
 

Following a jury trial, Petitioner, Damien Clark, was convicted of second degree murder. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction in State v. Damien Clark, W2007-00651-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 890886 (Tenn. Crim. App. April 1, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 17, 2009). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was dismissed. Petitioner appeals, asserting that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jim George Conaser, contends (1) that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for harassment and (2) that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing was improper. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s harassment conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the sentence from that conviction to run consecutively to a prior, unserved sentence.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Neil Vader, was convicted of driving in violation of a motor vehicle habitual offender (MVHO) order, driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI), violation of the implied consent law, and driving on a revoked driver’s license. Defendant waived a jury trial to determine the number of his prior DUI convictions. The trial court found that Defendant had three prior DUI convictions and was guilty of DUI fourth offense. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve one year and nine months for counts one and two and eleven months and twenty nine days for count three. All of Defendant’s sentences were ordered to run consecutively. The trial court merged count four, driving on a revoked driver’s license, with violation of a MVHO order. On appeal, Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the trial court erred in excluding testimony offered as extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach a witness; (2) the prosecuting attorney engaged in misconduct during closing arguments; and (3) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s evidentiary error and prosecutorial misconduct constitutes reversible error. After thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a post-divorce order of protection. Several years after the parties’ divorce in another state, the appellant mother obtained an order of protection against the appellee father in a Tennessee general sessions court, to restrict his contact with her and the parties’ minor child. The parties’ out-of-state divorce decree was enrolled in the Tennessee chancery court, where the mother also sought a continued order of protection, contempt relief, and modification of the parties’ parenting arrangement. All matters, including the general sessions order of protection, were consolidated in the Tennessee chancery court. The chancery court held a hearing on the order of protection. It declined to extend the order of protection and dissolved it. All other matters before the chancery court remained pending. The mother filed a notice of appeal to this Court. We hold that the dissolution of the order of protection, with other matters still pending, is not a final and appealable judgment. We dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, and remand to the chancery court.

The defendant, Lewis Green, appeals the trial court’s decision to deny his request for alternative sentencing and judicial diversion. The defendant pled guilty to seven counts of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and one count of possession of marijuana with intent sell. He received an effective five-year sentence for the convictions. Following a hearing, the trial court ordered that the sentences be served in incarceration and denied the defendant’s request for judicial diversion. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentencing decisions of the trial court.

The Defendant, John Allen Hessmer, appeals pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. The trial court denied the Defendant’s request to proceed pro se during his pretrial hearings on the charges of aggravated burglary, arson of a structure, arson of personal property or real estate, harassment, and stalking. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the Criminal Court for Wilson County

A Davidson County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, DeShawn Lamar Baker, charging him with solicitation of aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and felony possession of a handgun. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, and felony possession of a handgun. Defendant was sentenced to ten years for the conspiracy charge, eighteen years for aggravated robbery, and four years for the handgun charge to be served concurrently for an effective eighteen-year sentence in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) that the State commited prosecutorial misconduct by failing to timely disclose the discovery of his wallet containing the victim’s driver’s license and that John Peoples would be called as a witness at trial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Douglass Leon Lyle (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twelve years for each offense, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) the State’s election of offenses was ineffective; (2) the trial court should have merged the two convictions; (3) the trial court erred in its ruling on a Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412 motion; (4) the jury charge was erroneous; and (5) his sentences are excessive. We hold that the State’s election of offenses was ineffective as to Count 2, and we reverse that conviction and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction and sentence as to Count 1.

Defendant, Deangelo Thompson, appeals from his conviction in the Shelby County Criminal Court for reckless aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II multiple offender to five years incarceration. In this direct appeal, Defendant asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court erred by sentencing him to five years in confinement for his conviction; and that certain comments and questions by the trial court constitute plain error. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant of the felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery of the victim, George Miller, Jr. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction with the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motions to suppress the results of a buccal swab and testimony regarding DNA test results. He also contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a claim for interest on inheritance and estate tax refunds. In 2002, the decedent’s estate filed a Tennessee inheritance tax return and paid an estimated amount of taxes due. Over the next several years, the estate was embroiled in litigation; the litigation expenses diminished the size of the estate. Once the litigation concluded, the estate became entitled to more deductions on its inheritance tax return. To obtain the benefit of the deductions, the estate filed two amended Tennessee inheritance tax returns, one in 2009 and one in 2010, claiming that it was entitled to substantial tax refunds based on its overpayment of inheritance and estate taxes in 2002. The defendant Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Revenue paid the refunds claimed in the estate’s amended returns, plus a pittance of interest on the refunds. The estate filed this lawsuit against the commissioner, claiming that it was entitled to additional interest on the inheritance and estate tax refunds under the applicable law. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; each agreed that the facts are undisputed and each claimed that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the commissioner. The estate now appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

The Petitioner, Charles W. Elsea, Jr., appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to reopen his post-conviction proceedings. However, because the Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28 section 10 for seeking discretionary review of the denial of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

The appellant, Deon Marquett Boykins, pled guilty to two counts of introducing contraband into a penal institution and one count of possessing a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective five years on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

Petitioner, Derrick Lemon Goode, was convicted by a Bedford County jury of one count of the sale of .5 grams of cocaine and one count of the delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine. State v. Derrick Lemon Goode, No. M2009-02259-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4674298, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 17, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 13, 2011). After the merger of the convictions, Petitioner was sentenced to twelve years. He was unsuccessful on appeal. Id. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. After conducting a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial; failed to adequately prepare, interview and call witnesses for trial; and failed to properly investigate his addiction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not proven either that trial counsel’s representation was deficient, or that Petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel’s representation. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition.

In a joint trial, the Appellants, Alexis Mason and Terrence Harris, were convicted of various offenses by a Shelby County jury. Appellant Mason was found guilty of one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, for which she received an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. Appellant Harris was convicted of three counts of facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and one count of facilitation of criminally negligent homicide, a Class A misdemeanor, for which he received an effective sentence of twelve years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in the Department of Correction. In this consolidated appeal, both Appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions and the sentences imposed by the trial court. Appellant Harris additionally argues that the trial court erred in the following evidentiary rulings: admission of various out-of-court statements; admission of an autopsy photograph; exclusion of evidence of the deceased victim’s violent character; and the denial of jury instructions on self-defense and lesser included offenses. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This case concerns the liability for a collision involving a vehicle operated by one of the appellees and an ambulance operated by the appellant county. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded damages to appellee driver against the appellant. After a thorough review of the record, we reverse and remand.

Mother’s parental rights to three children were terminated based on her abandonment, failure to comply with family permanency plans the Department of Children’s Services developed, and persistence of the conditions that required removal of the children initially. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The trial court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

The Petitioner, Charles Rice, appeals from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and felony murder and imposed a sentence of death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2006). On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the effectiveness of his counsel’s representation in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. We hold that the post-conviction court properly found that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Dickson County grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, first degree premeditated murder, and first degree felony murder. Later the same day, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment re-charging the defendant and her husband with the same offenses, but adding a charge of criminal conspiracy as to each. The prosecution subsequently granted immunity to the defendant’s step-daughter and issued a subpoena for her appearance, and the grand jury reconvened to hear her testimony. The defendant filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that the purpose of the testimony was to improperly acquire evidence to support the pending charges against her. The trial court denied the motion to quash. After the defendant’s step-daughter testified before the grand jury, a second superseding indictment was issued charging all offenses in the first indictment and adding a charge of accessory after the fact against the defendant’s husband. The defendant then filed motions to suppress any testimony by the defendant’s step-daughter at trial and to dismiss all pending indictments. The trial court denied each motion. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and first degree felony murder. After merging the convictions for attempted premeditated murder and felony murder, the trial court imposed a life sentence for the murder and concurrent sentences of twenty-five and six years, respectively, for the especially aggravated kidnapping and the aggravated burglary. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court should have dismissed the charges because of prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury process. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Insurance Company provided Trucking Company with a general liability insurance policy that included the MCS-90 endorsement required by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. A woman who was a passenger in the insured’s tractor made a claim against Insurance Company for injuries she sustained after the tractor turned over. Insurance Company paid the woman’s claim even though she had not filed a complaint or obtained a judgment against Trucking Company/Insured. Insurance Company then filed a complaint against Trucking Company seeking reimbursement for the amount it paid out. Trial court awarded Insurance Company reimbursement. We reverse because no judgment had been obtained against Trucking Company when Insurance Company paid the woman’s claim. The MCS-90 endorsement is not triggered unless an injured member of the public recovers a final judgment against a motor carrier/insured. Therefore, Insurance Company had no right of reimbursement.