APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Mother’s parental rights to three children were terminated based on her abandonment, failure to comply with family permanency plans the Department of Children’s Services developed, and persistence of the conditions that required removal of the children initially. Mother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The trial court’s findings are supported by clear and convincing evidence.

The Petitioner, Charles Rice, appeals from the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and felony murder and imposed a sentence of death. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence on direct appeal. See State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646 (Tenn. 2006). On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the effectiveness of his counsel’s representation in both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. We hold that the post-conviction court properly found that the Petitioner received effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

A Dickson County grand jury returned an indictment charging the defendant with especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, first degree premeditated murder, and first degree felony murder. Later the same day, the grand jury returned a superseding indictment re-charging the defendant and her husband with the same offenses, but adding a charge of criminal conspiracy as to each. The prosecution subsequently granted immunity to the defendant’s step-daughter and issued a subpoena for her appearance, and the grand jury reconvened to hear her testimony. The defendant filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that the purpose of the testimony was to improperly acquire evidence to support the pending charges against her. The trial court denied the motion to quash. After the defendant’s step-daughter testified before the grand jury, a second superseding indictment was issued charging all offenses in the first indictment and adding a charge of accessory after the fact against the defendant’s husband. The defendant then filed motions to suppress any testimony by the defendant’s step-daughter at trial and to dismiss all pending indictments. The trial court denied each motion. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and first degree felony murder. After merging the convictions for attempted premeditated murder and felony murder, the trial court imposed a life sentence for the murder and concurrent sentences of twenty-five and six years, respectively, for the especially aggravated kidnapping and the aggravated burglary. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court should have dismissed the charges because of prosecutorial abuse of the grand jury process. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Insurance Company provided Trucking Company with a general liability insurance policy that included the MCS-90 endorsement required by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. A woman who was a passenger in the insured’s tractor made a claim against Insurance Company for injuries she sustained after the tractor turned over. Insurance Company paid the woman’s claim even though she had not filed a complaint or obtained a judgment against Trucking Company/Insured. Insurance Company then filed a complaint against Trucking Company seeking reimbursement for the amount it paid out. Trial court awarded Insurance Company reimbursement. We reverse because no judgment had been obtained against Trucking Company when Insurance Company paid the woman’s claim. The MCS-90 endorsement is not triggered unless an injured member of the public recovers a final judgment against a motor carrier/insured. Therefore, Insurance Company had no right of reimbursement.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Taiwan S. Hoosier, entered a guilty plea to three counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, in the Montgomery County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to five years each on two counts and six years on the third. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Hoosier claims the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Hardeman County jury convicted appellant, Jason Allen Cobb, of second degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred in admitting improper character evidence; (2) a witness’s false testimony violated his right to a fair trial; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (5) the trial court erred in ordering him to serve his sentence in this case consecutively to his sentence in another case. Upon review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellee, Jermaine Johnson, was indicted for one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free zone. The trial court granted in part and denied in part Johnson’s motion to suppress evidence. Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we granted the State’s interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s suppression of 14.5 grams of cocaine found near Johnson, and we granted Johnson’s cross-appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress 1.43 grams of cocaine found on him. Upon review, we affirm the partial denial of Johnson’s motion, reverse the court’s decision to suppress evidence, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Much aggrieved by his conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver, the petitioner, Huedel Sparkman, sought post-conviction relief in the Marshall County Circuit Court, alleging that, among other things, he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the petitioner contends that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to file two motions to suppress. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

In this post-trial dispute George Emrich and Mary Emrich (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the Trial Court’s order on Taylor Adams, Wanda Adams, and Adams Roofing Company, LLC’s (“Defendants”) emergency motion for relief from order and Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions, among other things. We find no error in the Trial Court’s March 9, 2012 order, and we affirm.

The Petitioner, Dakota Cisneros, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions upon guilty pleas for aggravated sexual battery and three counts of aggravated robbery and his effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by finding that his guilty pleas were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

An employee suffered multiple injuries in a work-related accident in November 2006 when a fan located in a boiler in which he was working suddenly deployed, causing him to lose his footing and fall. After providing medical treatment, the employer denied the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and the employee sought additional medical treatment. The trial court found the claim to be compensable and awarded the employee permanent total disability benefits. The trial court imposed no liability on the Second Injury Fund. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Cheatham County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Eugene M. Hogbin, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 20 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges both the length and the alignment of the trial court’s sentencing determination. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Frances G. Rodgers, as next friend of minors Julia Amber Noll and Joshua Aidan Noll (“Plaintiff”) sued John Adam Noll (“Defendant”) for the alleged wrongful death of their mother, Lori Bible Noll (“Deceased”). During discovery, Defendant filed multiple motions alleging discovery violations. After a hearing the Trial Court entered its order on April 25, 2012, which, among other things, imposed sanctions for certain discovery violations and then dismissed Plaintiff’s case due to discovery violations. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We find and hold that dismissal was too severe a sanction for the discovery violations found. We reverse the dismissal; remand to the Trial Court for a more appropriate award of sanctions; and affirm the remaining specific sanctions awarded by the Trial Court and the remainder of the Trial Court’s April 25, 2012 order.

The Petitioner, Lance Vogel, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession of over half a gram of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver, initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, possession of a controlled substance, and habitual traffic offender, for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. In this appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Elgene Porter ("the Petitioner") was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range I, violent offender to an effective sentence of forty-two years’ incarceration at 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this post-divorce appeal, Husband appeals the trial court’s imputation of income to him for the purpose of setting his alimony and child support obligations, the determination of parenting time, and the award of a retirement account to Wife. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court.
 

The defendant, Gretchen Rochowiak, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of judicial diversion for her convictions of conspiracy to introduce contraband into a penal institution and introduction of buprenorphine into a penal institution. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Shelton Hall, appeals the revocation of his Rutherford County Circuit Court community corrections sentence. Following his revocation hearing, Hall was ordered to serve consecutive sentences of eight years for his two convictions for the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and twelve years for his convictions for the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school zone in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Hall argues that (1) his probation officer wrongfully violated his community corrections sentence without just cause, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in declining to appoint counsel, in determining that he had waived his issues, and in failing to consider his "Motion for Reconsideration of Judgment Orders" and "Motion for Modification of Judgment Orders." Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Jose L. Hidalgo, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of four counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, one count of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. Thereafter, the aggravated child neglect conviction was merged with the aggravated child abuse conviction. The Defendant received sentences of four years for each count of sexual battery by an authority figure, twenty years for the aggravated rape conviction, and ten years for the aggravated child abuse conviction. The trial court ordered each of the four-year sentences to run concurrently with one another but consecutive to the remaining sentences of twenty and ten years, which were likewise to be served consecutively, resulting in a total effective sentence of thirty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify in rebuttal as to when the victim reported the sexual abuse to her; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his aggravated child neglect conviction; and (3) whether partial consecutive sentences were appropriate. Following our review, we affirm the jury’s verdicts of guilt for each offense and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. However, we remand for entry of corrected judgment of conviction forms to properly reflect the counts as numbered in the amended indictment and the merger of the aggravated child neglect conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction. The judgments are affirmed in part and vacated in part, and this case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Father seeks additional time with the children, alleging that a failed attempted reconciliation created a material change in circumstances. The trial judge found no material change in circumstances. We affirm.
 

Petitioner in a proceeding to modify child support filed a motion for recusal with the trial judge alleging that the judge was a personal friend and had a business relationship with the father of one of the parties. The trial judge denied the motion and the petitioner then filed this interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B. We affirm the denial of the motion for recusal.
 

The Petitioner, Timmy Charles McDaniel, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for habeas corpus relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner alleges that his convictions are void because (1) his indictment failed to state that the Grand Jurors issuing the indictment were from the county in which the offenses occurred, (2) his convictions violate the principles of double jeopardy, and (3) his dual convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated burglary violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d) (2010). Upon review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

A Madison County grand jury indicted appellant, Timothy Baxter, for one count of aggravated assault. A jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years as a persistent offender. Appellant contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault based on serious bodily injury. Specifically, he alleges that evidence of extreme physical pain did not support the determination of serious bodily injury by the jury. See Tenn. Code Ann.§ 39-11-106(a)(34) (2010). He also contends that the statutory definition of serious bodily injury is unconstitutional because it is vague and thus violates due process. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Juan D. Hall, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of possession with intent to sell cocaine, possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and coercion of a witness, for which he received an effective sentence of thirteen years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in determining that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and carrying a handgun as a felon, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years for the aggravated assault and to a consecutive term of six years as a career offender for carrying the handgun as a felon. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.