APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this case involving serious injuries sustained in a collision between a school bus and a pickup truck, the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We must, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
 

This case involves the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages in General Sessions Court, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court. Within ten days of the General Sessions Court judgment, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. § 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). The plaintiff did not file any further bond at that time. The plaintiff’s uninsured motorist insurance carrier filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff had not complied with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. § 27-5-103. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on that basis. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the appeal from General Sessions Court in light of our recent decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), and remand for further proceedings.

Tirrone Akillia Simpkins ("the Petitioner") pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of fifteen years to be served at 100%. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. The Petitioner now appeals, arguing that his plea was constitutionally invalid and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with the plea submission hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to his child, who was born addicted to drugs and with extensive medical needs, on the ground of persistence of conditions; Father, who was incarcerated when the child was born, appeals, contending that the termination of his rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We have determined that the evidence shows that the Father’s lack of participation in the care of the child and the treatment of the child’s medical needs constitutes neglect; that the neglect persists and is reasonably probable to continue; that it will not be remedied; and that continuation of the relationship would put the child at further risk, thereby diminishing the child’s complete integration into a safe and stable home. Consequently, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Wesley Jones, appeals his conviction for first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a witness to be recalled to testify, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This case involves an alleged agreement about funds distributed from a reopened estate. The decedent father died years ago, leaving three daughters and an estranged wife. The father’s estate was probated and closed. Long afterward, the petitioner daughter discovered unclaimed funds in the father’s name held by the State. Another daughter, the executrix of the father’s estate, reopened the father’s estate. Finding no claims against the estate, the probate court distributed the funds to the executrix, in accordance with the father’s will, and closed the estate. The daughter who discovered the unclaimed funds filed the instant petition in chancery court, asserting that the sisters had agreed that the funds would be split among them in accordance with their mother’s will. Based on the probate court’s adjudication of the father’s reopened estate, the chancery court granted summary judgment in favor of the executrix daughter, holding that res judicata barred the chancery court action. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to allegations in the chancery court petition that the probate court should have distributed the funds differently. We reverse the grant of summary judgment as to the remainder of the chancery court petition, finding that the petition also asserts claims based on an alleged separate oral agreement among the sisters, and hold that the respondent executrix sister has not conclusively established the defense of res judicata as to these remaining claims.

This is a dependency and neglect case focusing on Jaycee W. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Ellie H. (“Mother”) and Jerry W. (“Father”). At age five weeks, the Child suffered a suspicious broken leg. Further examination revealed multiple other broken bones. The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) immediately took the Child into protective custody and filed a dependency and neglect petition alleging that the Child was severely abused in the custody of her parents. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the juvenile court found that the Child was dependent and neglected and that both parents had committed severe child abuse. Both appealed to the trial court. Following a trial de novo, the trial court made the same findings. Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that she is guilty of severe child abuse. We affirm.

Petitioner, Shundell Lynn Dickerson, appealed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief, and this court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court. Shundell Lynn Dickerson v. State of Tennessee, No. M2011-00644-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 2564376 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, filed July 3, 2012). In that opinion, Petitioner raised the issue of whether his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on direct appeal. We acknowledged that pursuant to our supreme court’s decision in State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d 883 (Tenn. 2011), appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence must be undertaken with respect to the offense for which a defendant was convicted rather than the greater offense with which he or she was charged. We were precluded, however, from fully considering the issue because the summary of the facts contained in our opinion in the direct appeal was not adequate to allow for review of the issue, and, through no fault of Petitioner, the appellate record in the direct appeal was destroyed in the historic Nashville flood in May, 2010. Therefore, this court could not determine from the record whether Petitioner suffered prejudice by appellate counsel’s deficient performance in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence on appeal. Since the filing of that opinion, this court has granted Petitioner’s petition to rehear the issue of the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel, and Petitioner has supplemented the record with copies of the trial transcript. Both parties have filed supplemental briefs. After a review of the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The mother of the minor child at issue appeals the termination of her parental rights. The juvenile court found several grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the child. We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.

A Dickson County grand jury indicted appellant, Howard B. Lewis, III, for especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and domestic assault. He entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault, and the State dismissed the remaining charges. The parties agreed to submit the length of the sentence and any alternative sentencing decision to the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Appellant now challenges the trial court’s findings, alleging that the trial court impermissibly enhanced his sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant pled guilty to eleven counts of observation without consent, Class A misdemeanors, two counts of stalking, Class A misdemeanors, one count of phone harassment, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of theft of property worth less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and ten counts of criminal trespass, Class C misdemeanors. The defendant was sentenced to the maximum sentence on all counts—eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the Class A misdemeanors and thirty days on each of the Class C misdemeanors. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve all sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of almost sixteen years. In addition, the trial court placed a special condition on each judgment that "further ordered that the defendant shall not receive good time credit or work release" on any of his sentences. On appeal, the defendant claims the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences and ordering that he not receive "good time" credit. After careful review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering the defendant to serve all of his sentences consecutively. However, the trial court was without authority to order the denial of the defendant’s statutory "good time" credit. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgments with respect to the special condition directing that the defendant be denied "good time" credit and remand the case for entry of judgments deleting this special condition. We otherwise affirm the judgments.

A subcontractor on a large project in Texas sued the general contractor claiming the general contractor breached an agreement the parties made regarding claims both had against the owner of the Texas project. The parties agreed the subcontractor would be entitled to a pro rata share of the settlement or judgment amount if the subcontractor’s claims were not itemized. The settlement agreement between the general contractor and the owner did not include an itemization of the subcontractor’s claims. The subcontractor had been given a prepayment of its claim against the owner in the amount of $300,000, and applying this to the subcontractor’s pro rata share, the general contractor determined the subcontractor was not entitled to anything more. The trial court deducted the $300,000 from the subcontractor’s claim and awarded the subcontractor its pro rata share of the difference. Both the subcontractor and general contractor appealed, the subcontractor claiming it was not awarded enough and the general contractor claiming the subcontractor was awarded too much. We reverse the trial court’s award and hold the $300,000 the subcontractor received as a prepayment was more than it was entitled to pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement. Accordingly, the contractor did not breach its agreement, and the subcontractor was not entitled to any damages.
 

Ann C. King (“Wife”) filed a motion seeking to renew a 2001 judgment against David M. King (“Husband”). After a hearing, the Chancery Court for Anderson County (“Anderson Chancery Court”) entered an order renewing the judgment. Husband appeals to this Court raising issues regarding whether the Anderson Chancery Court lacked jurisdiction and whether the renewal of judgment complied with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 69.04. We hold that the Anderson Chancery Court had jurisdiction and did not err in renewing the judgment.

The Petitioner, Christopher Turner, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2008 conviction for attempted aggravated robbery and his effective nine-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that counsel provided the ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and interview witnesses adequately and by failing to request that his case be severed from his codefendant’s case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her complaint to recover for personal injuries sustained in a fall at the Davidson County Correctional Development Center. Finding no error, we affirm.

This is a negligence case in which Passenger sued ETHRA and Driver for injuries she sustained when exiting an ETHRA public transit vehicle. The trial court dismissed the claim against Driver but denied ETHRA’s motion for summary judgment. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the claim against ETHRA, holding that Passenger failed to prove that Driver was negligent. Passenger appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Carl Bond (“the Defendant”) was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated robbery. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to seventeen years, to be served in confinement at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in its ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes, and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiff sued the defendant for damages in General Sessions Court, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court. Within ten days of the General Sessions Court judgment, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). The plaintiff did not file any further bond at that time. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the Circuit Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff had not complied with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. § 27-5-103. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on that basis. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse in light of our recent decision in Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC, No. W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 593911 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2013), and remand for further proceedings.

Post-conviction petitioner, Demario Johnson, challenges his 2008 conviction of first degree murder and resulting sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he alleges the following claims of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) failure to investigate and present evidence of his mental health history; and (2) failure to challenge the medical examiner’s opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Appellee uninsured motorist carrier for failure to properly and timely serve the alleged tortfeasor. After a careful review of the record, we affirm.

The petitioner, Christopher Martin, was convicted in 1997 for rape of a child and received a twenty-five-year sentence. He was also convicted in Georgia of similar offenses and received a twenty-year sentence. The Georgia and Tennessee sentences were to be served concurrently. The petitioner filed a motion in the trial court, seeking to remove a Tennessee detainer against him. He asserted that the detainer prevented him from being eligible for parole in Georgia. The trial court denied the motion, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we conclude that the appellant does not have an appeal as of right from the order. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

In this workers’ compensation appeal, it is undisputed that the employee sustained a compensable injury, that the employer was providing medical care as required by the workers’ compensation statute, and that the employee sought and received a spinal fusion treatment without informing or consulting with his employer. The trial court ordered the employer to pay for the unauthorized treatment, and the employer has appealed from that decision. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Donald R.S., Jr. (“Father”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W. , and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 102(1)(A)(iv) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Father appeals to this Court. We affirm.

The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded this case to us for consideration in light of its opinion in Shipley v. Williams. In the original appeal of this medical malpractice case, this court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the basis that the plaintiff’s only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115. On remand we conclude the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiffs’ expert was not competent to testify and consequently, the plaintiffs created genuine issues of material fact, making summary judgment for defendants inappropriate. We reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand the case back to the trial court for further proceedings.
 

The Defendant, Eddie Leroy Rowlett, was convicted by a Stewart County jury of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges (1) the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the entry into his home and his subsequent detention and arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights; (2) the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions; (3) several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of certain photographs and limitations on establishing a "criminal trespass" defense; and (4) the jury instructions, arguing that a special instruction should have been given for the State’s failure to disclose the deputy’s telephone records, and that instructions on self-defense and defense of others should have been included in the final charge to the jury. Because the evidence of serious bodily injury was insufficient, the Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault is reversed and modified to a conviction for Class A misdemeanor assault. The judgment for resisting arrest is affirmed. The case is remanded for resentencing.