APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Michael Young, pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery in exchange for an effective forty-year sentence. Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress petitioner’s statement to police based on his being a juvenile and by failing to ensure that petitioner understood the sentence alignment included in the plea agreement. He also contends that his guilty plea was rendered involuntary because of trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises from a dispute over post-settlement medical care. The employee alleged that he developed asthma as a result of exposure to welding fumes in the workplace. The employee and employer settled the workers’ compensation claim. The trial court’s order approving the parties’ settlement provided that the employer would pay employee permanent partial disability benefits and provide future medical care “for the work related injury described” in the order. The trial court also designated Dr. Robert Younger III as the treating physician. Following the settlement, a dispute arose between the parties regarding payment for Dr. Younger’s treatment. The employer refused to pay for continuing treatment for the employee’s asthma because he was no longer exposed to welding fumes. The employee sought to require the employer to pay for the medical treatment Dr. Younger provided. After reviewing the medical proof submitted by the parties, the trial court ordered the employer to pay for Dr. Younger’s recommended treatment. The employer has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Joshua Todd Crittenden, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of two counts of robbery, Class C felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-401 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to consecutive ten-year terms of confinement for an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The employee alleged she sustained a gradual injury to her cervical spine as a result of her job. Her employer denied her condition was work-related and contended that her claim was barred by her failure to provide timely notice of her claim and the operation of the statute of limitations. The employer also argued subsequent employers were liable per the last injurious injury rule. The trial court found for the employee and awarded benefits. On the employer’s motion to alter or amend, the trial court held that the employee’s award was capped at one and one-half times the anatomical impairment rate pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1). The employer appeals, contending the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning compensability and the statute of limitations. The employee asserts the trial court erred by capping her disability award. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, the doctors and clinic, on the basis that the Appellants’ only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29–26–115. Appellants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding their expert. Under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011), we affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s testimony and its grant of summary judgment. Affirmed and remanded.

Donald Hughes and Donna Hughes (“Plaintiffs”) sued Clifford R. Barbee and Anna Melissa Barbee (“Defendants”) seeking, among other things, an order restraining Defendants from obstructing an alleged public roadway. After a trial the Trial Court entered its order on May 29, 2012 finding and holding, inter alia, that the road at issue “was a public road which had been in existence (and used by the public) for a number of years,” that Defendants had failed to prove that the road had been abandoned, and that the road was to “be opened for use by the public.” Defendants appeal to this Court. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s findings, and we affirm.

An applicant for billboard permits sought judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the applications. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision upholding the Department’s denial.
 

The Petitioner, Jeffery Gaylon Douglas, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions for rape and sexual battery on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective by improperly advising him to testify at his trial. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a medical malpractice case. The trial court granted summary judgment to Appellees, the doctors and clinic, on the basis that the Appellants’ only expert witness was not competent to testify pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29–26–115. Appellants appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding their expert. Under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s holding in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011), we affirm the trial court’s exclusion of the expert’s testimony and its grant of summary judgment. Affirmed and remanded.

In this case, Plaintiff filed a petition for criminal contempt against Counsel, alleging that Counsel allowed Defendant to portray herself as unrepresented when Counsel assisted her with her testimony and pleadings. The court dismissed the petition, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion when Plaintiff had alleged an ethical violation that did not rise to the level of criminal contempt. The court also denied a subsequent motion to alter or amend its judgment and a motion for recusal. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

State of Tennessee filed petition under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act to enforce a child support order entered in a California divorce proceeding against the father of the children. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case focusing on Wesley S. (“the Child”), the minor child of Wesley K.S. (“Father”) and Kari F. (“Mother”). The parents were runaway teenagers when the Child was born in August 2007. Father was incarcerated several times during the Child’s first two years. Father’s latest incarceration began on May 14, 2009, and  he has been in jail continuously since that date. The Child was taken into custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on December 17, 2010. On May 31, 2012, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. The sole ground alleged was abandonment, based on his conduct prior to incarceration exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition upon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had abandoned the Child due to his pre- incarceration conduct. The court further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Father has appealed. We affirm.

An applicant for billboard permits sought judicial review of the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation to deny the applications. We have concluded, as did the trial court, that the grandfathering provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13-7-208 did not apply in this case. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision upholding the Department’s denial of the billboard permit applications.
 

The defendant, Ricky Earl Genes, pleaded guilty to three counts of aggravated assault, and the Hickman County Circuit Court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to a term of 18 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in its application of certain enhancement factors. In addition, the defendant challenges both the manner of service and the alignment of his sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court awarded Defendants summary judgment in this action for legal malpractice. We affirm based on expiry of the applicable statute of limitations.

Matthew Jackson ("the Petitioner"), acting pro se, filed for post-conviction DNA analysis after pleading guilty to two counts of aggravated rape, one count of aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated robbery, and one count of theft of property over $500. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. The Petitioner now appeals. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Doctor sued Seller of medical equipment for a refund of the purchase price of the equipment pursuant to a money back guarantee; Seller counterclaimed for attorney’s fees and litigation costs pursuant to a separate purchase agreement. The trial court granted Seller’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the guarantee on the basis that Doctor failed to meet a condition precedent; the trial court also granted Doctor’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to Seller’s request for fees and costs on the basis that the guarantee and the purchase agreement were separate contracts. Doctor and Seller appeal. Finding no error, we affirm both judgments.
 

This appeal involves a lawsuit against a bank. Representing himself, the plaintiff customer filed this lawsuit against the defendant bank. The defendant bank filed a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff customer filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied the customer’s motion for summary judgment and granted the bank’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff customer now appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In suit to recover rent due and owing under a lease agreement in which a corporation was named as tenant, trial court entered judgment in favor of landlord against individual who had signed the lease in the space in the signature box designated “Tenant.” Individual appeals, contending that his signature on the lease is not sufficient to bind him personally to the obligations under the lease. Landlord appeals award of damages. We affirm the holding that the individual’s signature on the lease renders him personally liable and remand the case for a determination of whether the landlord is entitled to an award of prejudgment interest and for an award of attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal.
 

 This appeal arises from a prolonged divorce action. On appeal, Father challenges the trial court’s determinations regarding parenting time, child support, alimony, and the division of the marital estate. Father further challenges the trial court’s decision finding him in both civil and criminal contempt. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Mother appeals the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child, the parenting plan, and the division of marital property. The trial court found that the majority of the factors set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106 weighed equally in favor of both parents but designated Father as the primary residential parent primarily because the court awarded Father the marital residence, which provides stability for the child. The trial court, however, did not make any findings concerning a wealth of evidence of physical and emotional abuse by Father, some of which Father admitted, and we have determined that the preponderance of the evidence established that Father was abusive of Mother, sometimes in the child’s presence. Because Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-406(a) mandates that a parent’s parenting time shall be limited if the parent is found to have engaged in abuse, we reverse the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, as well as the parenting plan adopted by the court, and remand with instructions to designate Mother as the primary residential parent and establish a new parenting plan considering all applicable factors. As for the division of the marital estate, the trial court awarded Father 68% of the marital estate and Mother 32%, which Mother contends is inequitable. She asserts the inequitable distribution is due to Father being awarded the marital residence, which was unencumbered and valued at $216,000, with Mother receiving $55,000, being 26% of the equity, as her share of the marital residence. Considering the length of the marriage, that each spouse contributed substantially to satisfying the mortgage on the residence, and the relatively equal earning capacities of the parties, inter alia, we have determined it is inequitable to award Father 74% of the equity in the marital residence, the result of which awards him 68% of the marital estate. Therefore, we remand with instructions to modify the award by ordering Father to pay Mother $97,200, instead of $55,000, for her interest in the marital residence. As for attorney’s fees, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Father’s request for his attorney’s fees at trial and we deny each party’s request for attorneys’ fees on appeal.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Charles D. Sprunger, was convicted of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I offender to eight years at 100%. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

General contractor filed breach of contract action against homeowners, alleging the homeowners failed to pay invoices on an extensive home renovation project. The homeowners denied there were outstanding invoices and filed counterclaims for breach of contract and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act against the general contractor and its owner, in his individual capacity, who contractually agreed to supervise the project for an additional fee. The homeowners alleged the general contractor failed to perform the contract in a workmanlike manner; they also asserted a claim against the owner asserting that he agreed to personally supervise the project for a percentage of the contract and that he breached his agreement by failing to properly supervise the work. The trial court, Judge Barbara Haynes presiding, awarded summary judgment to the homeowners on all claims and counterclaims. On the homeowners’ counterclaims, Judge Haynes also awarded treble damages, attorney’s fees, and costs, pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The counter-defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the decision as to the counterclaims; however, Judge Haynes retired before ruling on the motion. The case was then assigned to Judge Hamilton Gayden and, following a hearing, he denied the motion to alter or amend. The counter-defendants appealed. We affirm the summary dismissal of the general contractor’s breach of contract claim for it is undisputed the homeowners paid the contract amount in full. As for the homeowners’ counterclaims, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners on their breach of contract claim against the general contractor and the award of damages for failing to perform the contract in a workmanlike manner. We also affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of the homeowners against the supervisor for failing to properly supervise the work; however, we find the evidence insufficient to establish the damages that proximately resulted from the supervisor’s breach as distinguished from the damages resulting from the general contractor’s breach. As for the homeowners’ claims that the general contractor and the supervisor violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, we have determined there are material facts in dispute concerning whether the contractor or the supervisor used or employed unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of the TCPA; therefore, summary judgment as to the TCPA claims was not appropriate. We, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment on the TCPA claims as to the contractor and the supervisor and remand these claims, and the determination of damages for failing to properly supervise, for further proceedings.

Two inmates in the custody of the Department of Correction have filed a notice of appeal from an order entered on January 4, 2013, denying their post-judgment motions. Because the inmates did not file their notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.
 

The Petitioner, Charhela Wilson, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that her pleas of nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated child neglect, a Class B felony, were not knowingly and voluntarily entered into due to the ineffective assistance of her trial counsel. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402. However, the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely filed. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.