APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Davidson County jury convicted appellants, Alejandro Neave Vasquez and Nazario Araguz, of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone and possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. The trial court sentenced appellant Vasquez to an effective twenty-year sentence and sentenced appellant Araguz to an effective seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, both appellants argue that: (1) the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress; (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence regarding money recovered by law enforcement; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appellants’ requests for a special jury instruction and in granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Derron S. Guy, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he challenged his 2010 Shelby County Criminal Court convictions of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This is an appeal in a medical malpractice case. The original plaintiff, the decedent, filed the initial malpractice action against the defendant, but the case was dismissed after the decedent passed away during the pendency of the suit. Her sole surviving heir re-filed the action without complying with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 122, which require a plaintiff who files a medical malpractice suit (1) to give a health care provider who is to be named in the suit notice of the claim sixty days before filing the suit, and (2) to file with the medical malpractice complaint a certificate of good faith confirming that the plaintiff has consulted with an expert who has provided a signed written statement that there is a good-faith basis to maintain the action. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, and the trial court dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, Glen A. Forrest, was convicted of attempted cocaine delivery in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417 (2010). The trial court ordered six months of his sentence to be served in prison and the remaining five years and six months to be served on probation. The trial court subsequently found the defendant to be in violation of the terms of his probation and revoked the probation, ordering the defendant to serve the original sentence. The defendant appeals the trial court’s determination that he violated the terms of his probation. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court has committed no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner challenges the decision of the Tennessee Department of Transportation denying his application for a billboard permit because his proposed location was within 1000 feet of another permit location. He contends the Department erroneously deviated from its regulation requiring permit applications for locations within 1000 feet of each other to be considered on a “first come first served” basis, insisting he submitted a “complete” application before the applicant who was granted a permit for the nearby location. The Chancery Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Department’s decision to grant a permit to the other applicant. The court also found that the Department complied with its rules in issuing the permit to the other applicant and denying the petitioner’s application because petitioner’s location was less than 1000 feet away from the other applicant’s location. We affirm.

A Madison County Jury convicted Defendant, Jonathan Freeman, of possession of more than one-half ounce (14.175 grams) of marijuana with intent to sell and possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana with intent to deliver. Defendant waived his right to a sentencing hearing, the two convictions were merged, and he received an agreed sentence of two years, to serve ten days, and the balance on probation, including sixty hours of community service work. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rickey Dickerson, was convicted of two counts of second degree murder. He filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that his counsel was ineffective in failing to request a continuance and in failing to consult more thoroughly with the petitioner prior to trial. The post-conviction court denied the petition, finding neither deficiency nor prejudice. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant was placed on supervised probation in 2007 with the special condition that he not be involved in dog fighting or have more than two dogs in his home. The defendant’s probation was revoked and he was sentenced to another three years probation on the grounds that nine dogs were found in his home. Defendant appeals, claiming that the special condition placed on his probation was not reasonably related to his conviction and that the judge did not articulate sufficient grounds to place an additional special provision on his newly-imposed probation that he not be permitted to possess any dogs. We conclude that the special conditions affecting the defendant’s dog ownership are reasonably related to the purposes of his sentences and are not unduly restrictive or otherwise impermissible. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed accordingly.

The defendant pled guilty to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and theft of merchandise over five hundred dollars. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to three years on each count, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to apply certain mitigating factors and byfailing to grant probation or an alternative sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals, after declining to review the sentences because the defendant had failed to provide a transcript of the hearing on the guilty pleas, affirmed the judgment of the trial court based upon a presumption that the evidence was sufficient to support the sentences. After granting the defendant’s application forpermission to appealbecause of conflicting opinions bythe Court of Criminal Appeals as to whether the absence of a transcript of a guilty plea submission hearing precludes appellate review on the merits, we ordered that the record be supplemented. In this instance, the record was adequate for a meaningful review of the sentences either with or without the transcript of the hearing on the guilty pleas. By use of the recently adopted abuse of discretion standard for the review of sentences, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jeff Henson, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, 1 aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, attempted aggravated sexual battery, driving under the influence third offense, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner, as a Range I offender, to an effective sentence of twelve years of confinement followed by community supervision for life. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after holding a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because his trial counsel was ineffective and because his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Appellant takes exception to the trial court’s order, enforcing a settlement agreement. ollowing a judicial settlement conference, the parties signed a written agreement, which contemplated the execution of more formal settlement documents. When the formal documents were presented to Appellant, he refused to sign. Upon Appellees’ motion, the trial court enforced the settlement and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant, occupant of the property which had been foreclosed. Plaintiff held a deed of ownership. Plaintiff sued for possession and for damages for unlawful detainer of the property. The Trial Court granted plaintiff summary judgment for possession and damages for unlawful detainer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-120. On appeal, we affirm.

In this case the Trial Court entered a "Final Judgment". The Judgment did not resolve defendant's Counter-Claim. On appeal, we hold we are without jurisdiction to consider the Appeal and dismiss the Appeal.

This matter involves a disagreement between an insurer and an insured over the proper classification of employees for the purpose of workers’ compensation insurance. The decision of the Department of Commerce and Insurance was in favor of the insurer. The insured appealed to the trial court, which affirmed the Department. We find that the decision of the Department of Commerce and Insurance is supported by substantial and material evidence and affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, James E. Gayles, appeals the Johnson County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends that his convictions are void because he was sentenced in direct violation of Tennessee statutory law. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas court properly denied the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

This case arises out of the sale of a tractor. The plaintiff purchaser bought a tractor online from the defendant company, which specializes in the sale of tractors. The company advertised the tractor as having many fewer hours of use than it actually had. After taking possession of the tractor and learning the tractor’s true condition, the purchaser filed this lawsuit against the company, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, rescission, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the purchaser, and awarded compensatory damages and attorney fees. The company now appeals, arguing inter alia that the evidence does not support an award of compensatory damages under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. We affirm.

This appeal involves a claim filed by the Administrator of Decedent’s estate to recover monetary assets that were misappropriated from Decedent prior to her death. Administrator alleged that the Kidds depleted Decedent’s monetary assets, thereby breaching a confidential relationship they held with her. The trial court agreed and issued a judgment against the Kidds with prejudgment interest. We affirm the judgment against Wife as modified but reverse the judgment against Husband. The case is remanded.

A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jimmy Jackson, of one count of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone and one count of delivering .5 grams or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, Class B felonies. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him as a Range II offender to fourteen years. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by ruling he could not question a State’s witness about conduct involving dishonesty pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) and that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on facilitation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on facilitation and that the error was not harmless. Therefore,the appellant’s convictions are reversed,and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

This is an interpleader action resulting from competing claims to the proceeds of a life insurance policy. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Insured’s mother, finding that, because she was the only named beneficiary of the policy, she was entitled to the proceeds. Insured’s husband appeals, arguing that, because Insured’s mother was only named as a contingent beneficiary, the default provisions of the policy remained in effect, resulting in him being the primary beneficiary of the policy. Husband also appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his bad faith claim against the insurer. We affirm the dismissal of the bad faith claim, but conclude that the contract at issue is ambiguous and the issue in this case is not properly decided on summary judgment. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

The trial court determined that the minor children in this case were dependent and neglected upon finding that one of the children was the victim of severe child abuse. Mother appeals. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court entered a order 11/21/12 in the case of State vs. Jeremy Keeton vacating the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanding the case to the trial court for supplementation of the record in the case of   State vs. Jeremy Keeton M2009-1928-CCA-R3-CD filed 6/26/12.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 51. The employee injured his neck in the course of his employment in 2005. He returned to work for his pre-injury employer and settled his claim subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap. In 2009, the employer entered into a new collective bargaining agreement in which the hourly wages of all production workers were reduced. Thereafter, the employee sought reconsideration on his earlier settlement pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(B) (2008). The trial court held that the across-the-board wage reduction did not trigger the right to reconsideration and denied the employee’s claim. We affirm the judgment.

In this action a Petition was filed and a conservator was appointed for Dr. Maurice M. Acree,
Jr., and William Acree was made a party to that proceeding. Five years after a conservator
was appointed, William Acree filed a "Complaint" in that action. The Trial Court determined
that a complaint could not lie in that action, and treated it as a Rule 60 Motion and denied
William Acree any relief. William Acree has appealed to this Court and we affirm the Trial
Court's Judgment, but modify the Judgment on the basis that the record reveals plain error
which should be addressed because the trusts remain active.

This appeal involves the interpretation of a will. The named residuary beneficiary predeceased the testatrix. The executrix of the decedent’s estate argued that a survivorship requirement in the will applies to the named residuary beneficiary, so her interest lapsed. The issue of the residuary beneficiary argued that the survivorship requirement did not apply to the residuary beneficiary, so Tennessee’s anti-lapse statute operates to pass the beneficiary’s interest to her issue. The trial court held for the executrix, construing the will so as to apply the survivorship requirement to the residuary beneficiary. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the will, and so affirm.

The mother brought a petition to modify support and for contempt, alleging that the father
had willfully understated his income during an earlier proceeding to modify support. The
juvenile court judge found that the mother had proved her allegations and awarded her a
judgment of over $26,500 for back child support as well as attorney fees of over $12,800.
We hold that the statutory prohibition against retroactive modification of child support
disallows the award of pre-petition support. Accordingly, we are compelled to vacate the
trial court’s award of support for the time prior to the date on which the mother filed her
petition to modify child support. We affirm the prospective modification and the award of
child support from that date.