APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Bruce Turner, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (2010). He was sentenced to twentyfive years’ confinement and community supervision for life. On appeal, he contends (1) that he did not receive a unanimous jury verdict and that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim to testify about a sexual assault that occurred in Louisiana; (3) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to testify that she saw a handgun in the Defendant’s bedroom; and (4) that the trial court erred by allowing the victim’s mother to refer to herself as a hostage. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We accepted this appeal to clarify the procedures an inmate must follow to dispute the determination of parole eligibility when the inmate is serving consecutive determinate sentences imposed pursuant to the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (“1989 Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-35-101 to -505 (2010 & Supp. 2011). We clarify that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) governs an inmate’s challenge to the Tennessee Department of Correction’s (“TDOC”) calculation of a release eligibility date. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-101 to -325 (2011). Under the UAPA, an inmate must request a declaratory order from TDOC before filing a declaratory action in court. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-225(b). Petitioner failed to seek a declaratory order from TDOC; thus, the trial court properly dismissed his petition for common law writ of certiorari naming TDOC and TDOC officials. The UAPA does not govern an inmate’s challenge to a decision of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole (“Board”) concerning parole. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-5-106(c). Rather, the petition for common law writ of certiorari is the procedural vehicle for bringing such challenges. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-101 (2000). While Petitioner also named the Board and Board officials in his petition for common law writ of certiorari, the trial court properly granted their motions to dismiss because the allegations of the petition fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The method for calculating release eligibility and custodial parole discussed in Howell v. State, 569 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1978) is not applicable to inmates sentenced pursuant to the 1989 Act and serving consecutive determinate sentences for parole-eligible offenses. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the chancery court dismissing the petition is reinstated.
 

Former inmate challenged the calculation of his prison sentence, contending the Tennessee Department of Correction erred in failing to award him pretrial jail credit. The orders of judgment TDOC relied upon to calculate the prison sentence apparently did not indicate the inmate had earned pretrial jail credit. The former inmate filed a complaint against individuals employed by the prison and TDOC, contending they violated his constitutional rights and were liable to him for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). The trial court dismissed the former inmate’s complaint because the defendants calculated the former inmate’s sentence based on the judgments as they were required to do by statute. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

Upon petition by the State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services and following a trial, the Putnam County Juvenile Court terminated father’s parental rights to his three minor children. We affirm because there was clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s decision and because there was clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children’s best interest.
 

This is a termination of parental rights case.  Father/Appellant appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to the minor child at issue. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father had committed severe child abuse, had been sentenced to prison for the child abuse, and had been sentenced to confinement for more than ten years. The trial court also found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Affirmed

A police sergeant stopped a vehicle driven by appellant, Eric A. Martin, for violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-110(b), the statute requiring a vehicle license plate to be maintained free from foreign materials and in a clearly legible condition. He then determined that appellant was driving with a revoked driver’s license. A grand jury indicted appellant for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license and driving on a cancelled, suspended or revoked license, seventh offense. Appellant pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, fifth offense. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months twenty-nine days and revoked his driver’s license for one year. The trial court suspended all of the sentence except for twenty days and placed appellant on probation. As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law challenging the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-4-110(b). Following our review, we conclude that appellant failed to certify a question of law that is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant, Kevin L. Buford, Sr., was found guilty after a jury trial of facilitation of felony murder, a Class A felony, and attempted especially aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. On appeal, he raises numerous challenges to his convictions and sentencing, including claims that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by failing to suppress his pretrial statements to police; (3) his two convictions should have been merged; and (4) the trial court erred at sentencing by finding him to be a Range II offender, by imposing consecutive sentences, and by giving him excessive sentences on both counts. After a careful review of the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the testimony given by one of the defendant’s accomplices is sufficient to support his convictions and that this testimony is sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress because any police misconduct that may have occurred was unintentional and because the statements the defendant made to police were given after the defendant received repeated Miranda warnings and occurred several hours after he was taken into custody. We conclude that double jeopardy principles do not require the merger of the defendant’s two convictions because the statutes under which the defendant was convicted include different elements and therefore punish distinct offenses. Finally, after engaging in de novo review of the defendant’s sentencing, we conclude that the defendant was properly sentenced as a Range II offender,the sentences imposed by the trial court were not excessive, and that the trial court did not err by ordering them to be served consecutively. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendants, Rebecca and J. C. Draper, were each indicted for one count of manufacture of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §1 § 39-17-417(a)(1), - 425(a)(1). The Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result of a search of their manufactured home and backyard. The trial court denied the Defendants’ motion. The Defendants then entered into a plea agreement with the State and reserved a certified question of law for appellate review pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant Rebecca Draper pled nolo contendere to one count of possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days on probation. Defendant J. C. Draper pled guilty to one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to three years on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-433. In this appeal, the Defendants contend that the trial court erred by denying their motion to suppress the evidence against them. Following our review, we reverse, vacate the judgments of the trial court, and dismiss the charges.

This is a libelous defamation case that was dismissed on grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellees, a newspaper and its reporter. Appellant, who was a then-incarcerated inmate, filed the instant lawsuit, purportedly in forma pauperis. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on grounds that: (1) Appellant’s failure to pay all fees and costs in other lawsuits, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-21-812, required dismissal of the lawsuit; (2) Appellant could not renounce his indigency in order to avoid the operation of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-21-812; (3) Appellant failed to issue service of process on the newspaper, thus requiring dismissal of this Defendant/Appellee; (4) the allegedly defamatory statement was protected by the fair reporting privilege. After review, we hold that: (1) because there is no Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 29 uniform affidavit of indigency in this record, we cannot conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated Section 41-21-812 was triggered; (2) having failed to establish in the record that he was, in fact, proceeding as a pauper in this case, Appellant’s attempt to renounce his indigency was a nullity; (3) Appellee newspaper was properly dismissed from the lawsuit for lack of service of process; and (4) it was error for the trial court to rule on the motion for summary judgment without first lifting the stay on discovery to allow Appellant to conduct discovery. Vacated in part, reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.

In 2004, the petitioner, Toney Jason Hale, pled guilty before the Bedford County Circuit Court to three counts of automobile burglary, a Class E felony. He received an effective sentence of three years as a Range I, standard offender, to be served consecutively to a previously imposed Marshall County sentence. Seven years later, in 2011, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, alleging that his convictions violated double jeopardy protections. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition after a hearing. The petitioner argues on appeal that the court erred in denying him relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This extraordinary appeal arises from the trial court’s order granting Wife’s motion for disclosure of Husband’s psychological records. After thorough consideration, we conclude that the trial court erred by failing to consider Husband’s claims that his psychological records were protected from disclosure by the psychologist-client privilege, and that he did not waive the privilege. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

Defendant employer moved for summary judgment in this common law retaliatory discharge action on the grounds that Plaintiff employee was not an employee-at-will and that Plaintiff had failed to identify any law or clear public policy allegedly violated by Defendant. The trial court denied the motion. We granted permission for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Defendant raises the issue of whether the courts lack jurisdiction under the ministerial exception. We hold that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. We also hold that Plaintiff was not an at-will employee, and therefore cannot establish a prima facie case of common law retaliatory discharge. The trial court’s judgment denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is reversed.

I concur with the majority opinion in this case, and submit this separate concurrence only to make an additional point.

Appellant, Edward L. Baird, entered guilty pleas without recommended sentences to three felony offenses involving distribution of controlled substances. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered appellant to serve an effective sentence of ten years in confinement. Appellant contests the manner of service of his sentence, arguing that the trial court should have ordered split confinement. Finding no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Justin Parliment, appeals from his Hickman County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution, see T.C.A. § 39-16201(b)(2) (2006), claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury, that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for the marijuana introduced into evidence, that the fine imposed bythe jury is excessive, and that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In February 2011, the Petitioner, Fred Ratliff, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, wherein he challenged his 1976 conviction for first degree murder. The Petitioner claimed that he had “compelling” new evidence of his innocence because the State failed to disclose a key prosecution witness’s juvenile record in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). After an evidentiary hearing, the coram nobis court first dismissed the petition as time-barred, finding that due process did not require tolling of the one-year statute of limitations. Then, addressing the merits of the Petitioner’s Brady claim, the coram nobis court concluded that the Petitioner had not shown that the new evidence may have resulted in a different judgment had it been presented at trial. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the Scott County Circuit Court.

The petitioner, Randy Bray, appeals from the Grundy County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After trial, a jury convicted him of two counts of first degree premeditated murder. In this appeal, Bray argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to file motions to suppress (1) a shotgun, (2) his statement to police, and (3) a 911 call. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

This common law writ of certiorari was filed by an inmate, who asserted that the parole board violated his rights by returning him to jail for violating his parole. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice because the inmate failed to pay any portion of the initial filing fee or to issue a summons to the parole board. Affirmed.
 

The Defendant-Appellant,Antonio D.Alexander,was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of attempted aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, second degree murder, first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon. The jury sentenced Alexander to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree felony murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced him to a consecutive ninety-year sentence for the remaining convictions. On appeal, Alexander argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the jury erred in unanimously finding the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the aggravating circumstance that “[t]he defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim murdered, during the act of murder”; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Terry Maurice Thomas, appeals from the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The defendant, Dontrel D. Pittman, appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order revoking his 12-year community corrections sentence and ordering service of the sentence in the custody of the Department of Corrections. He argues that no substantial evidence supports the trial court’s order and that the sentence imposed is excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Dickson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Horace Hollis, of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court merged the convictions of aggravated sexual battery into the convictions of rape of a child and imposed a sentence of 40 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

An employee was terminated by a local power board after a detective sent his employer a letter stating the employee sold narcotic drugs from the truck the employee used during his shift and that the employee admitted selling the drugs. The employee denied selling illegal drugs or making such an admission to the detective, but the administrative law judge in charge of the evidentiaryhearing determined the statements inthedetective’sletterweretrue. The employee later filed suit against the detective who authored the letter, his supervisors, and the county employing the individual defendants. The former employee asserted causes of action fordefamation,negligence,false lightinvasionofprivacy,and intentionalinfliction of emotional distress. The trial court concluded the former employee was collaterally estopped from relitigating the veracity of the statements in the detective’s letter leading to the former employee’s termination and dismissed the complaint in toto. We affirm. All of the employee’s causes of action were based upon statements the detective made in his letter to the employer, which the employee alleged were false. Because the employee is estopped from denying the truth of those statements, he has no basis on which to pursue any of the causes of action set forth in his complaint.
 

This case involves the sufficiency of notice given to an incarcerated party in a divorce proceeding. Wife filed for divorce and sent Husband notice of a hearing for approval of Wife’s temporary parenting plan. Although Father was not present at the hearing, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce in favor of Wife, assigning the majority of the marital debt to Husband. Husband appealed, asserting that he was not properly notified that the hearing would concern issues other than a temporary parenting plan. Vacated and remanded.

This is a medical malpractice case wherein a patient suffered permanent neurological impairment after delay of surgery to correct a ruptured disc in her spine. The patient sued the doctor who treated her at a minor medical clinic, and a neurological clinic, alleging that both failed to ensure that the patient was treated promptly. The jury found that the doctor did not breach the standard of care, but awarded damages against the neurological clinic. The neurological clinic moved for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the patient failed to prove causation. The trial court granted the motion, as well as a conditional motion for new trial as to the neurological clinic only. The trial court concurred in the jury verdict in favor of the doctor. We reverse the grant of the motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict and affirm the grant of a new trial as to the neurological clinic only. The jury verdict in favor of the minor medical clinic doctor, as concurred in by the trial court, is affirmed. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.