APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves an unlawful detainer action. After foreclosure, the defendants refused to leave the subject property. The plaintiff filed this unlawful detainer action against the defendants, and ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, the defendants, acting pro se, filed documents suggesting fraud and/or unlawful foreclosure practices. The defendants filed no evidence to support their claims and no other response to the plaintiff’s motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants now appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

The Department of Children's Services filed a Petition inter alia, to terminate the mother's parental rights to her three minor children. Following trial on the issues, the Trial Court ruled there were several statutory grounds for terminating the mother's parental rights, including that the mother had failed to substantially comply with the permanency plan requirements, and abandonment of the children. The Court also determined that the evidence established that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the mother's parental rights. The mother has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

The petitioner, Bruce S. Rishton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his attempted rape and incest convictions, arguing that (1) he was constructively denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings against him; (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused him to enter unknowing and involuntary pleas; (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (4) the post-conviction court denied him a full and fair hearing; and (5) the trial court denied him a speedy trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Kevin Fritz Edwards, was indicted by the Unicoi County Grand Jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-504(a)(4). Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of attempted aggravated sexual battery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-504(a) (4). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery; (2) that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior false accusation of sexual battery; (3) that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of other prior allegations of sexual abuse and sexual abuse counseling pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 412; (4) that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing him to impeach the testimony of the victim’s mother; and (5) that the trial court erred by denying the Defendant an alternative sentence because it considered a psychosexual evaluation which was based on “unreliable scientific tests.” Following our review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery. Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss the judgment of the trial court. We will also address the remainder of the Defendant’s arguments so as not to pretermit his remaining issues. See State v. Parris, 236 S.W.3d 173, 189 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2007) (following a similar procedure).

On March 20, 2009, the defendant, Jonathan Wade Rosson, was convicted of solicitation of a minor to commit aggravated statutory rape, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to two years, with 120 days to be served in confinement in the county jail and the remainder to be served in community corrections as a condition of probation. The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence on numerous grounds, claiming that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) he was deprived of a fair trial by the State’s failure to preserve all of the videotape footage taken byall of the surveillance cameras located in the building where the incident occurred on the day in question; (3) the trial court erred by admitting copies of videotape footage preserved from two surveillance cameras into evidence; (4) the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied to him; and (5) a state law rendering him ineligible for work release programs while serving his sentence that was enacted after the commission of his offense violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution by virtue of retroactively increasing the punishment for his crime. After carefully reviewing the record, the relevant laws and precedent, and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Javoris Sparkman, of one count of first degree murder, two counts of felony murder,and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. For the first degree murder in count one, Sparkman received a sentence of life. The trial court merged the first degree felony murder in count two with the first degree murder in count one. For the first degree felony murder in count four, Sparkman received another life sentence, to be served consecutively to the sentence of life for the first degree murder in count one. For each attempted first degree murder, Sparkman received a sentence of fifteen years, to be served concurrently. In total, Sparkman received two sentences of life plus 15 years. On appeal, Sparkman argues the trial court erred in (1) failing to charge the jury with self-defense; (2) refusing to allow individual voir dire of prospective jurors; (3) refusing to excuse a juror with prior knowledge of the case; and (4) denying a motion for change of venue. Upon our review, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed, except for counts one and two which are vacated and the case is remanded for entry of a single judgment reflecting the merger of counts one and two.

The petitioner, Nichlous Maxwell, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to argue for a jury instruction on facilitation of a felony. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Appellant, Romalis Gray,pro se, filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court and Motions. On April 19, 2012 this Court ordered the appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed and recites that the record reveals that the Notice of Appeal was not filed within 30 days following the Final Judgment in the Trial Court.

The defendant, Ruby Graham, appeals from her White County Circuit Court jury conviction of the sale of morphine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-417(a)(3), claiming that the trial court erred by denying her request for a mistrial and by refusing her bid for judicial diversion. Because the defendant failed to prepare an adequate record for review of either issue, we must presume that the rulings of the trial court are correct, and we affirm.

Father filed petition to modify custody, and maternal grandmother objected to Tennessee court’s subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because she had cared for child in Indiana for preceding thirty months. Grandmother also sought to intervene in father’s action. The trial court concluded it had jurisdiction to determine the child’s custody pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-217(a) because both parents reside in Tennessee and the child has significant contact with Tennessee. The trial court allowed Grandmother to intervene only to protect her visitation rights. Grandmother appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. Grandmother’s only rights with respect to the child are any visitation rights she may be entitled to under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306.
 

Nelson Keith Foster (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of driving on a revoked or suspended license and driving on a revoked or suspended license, second offense. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended upon serving thirty days’ incarceration. The Defendant  ppeals, asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during an illegal traffic stop; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in denying defense counsel’s motions for  ithdrawal; and (4) the trial court erred in denying a motion to recuse. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

Father appeals the trial court’s decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction and to transfer his petition to modify custody to a Florida court pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Matthew Edwin Thompson, pled guilty to two counts of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103,-105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to eight years’ confinement for each conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentences are excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Ricardo Davidson, of possession of more than 300 grams of cocaine with intent to sell within a Drug Free School Zone, possession of over ten pounds of marijuana with intent to sell within a Drug Free School Zone, conspiracy to possess over 300 grams of cocaine within a Drug Free School Zone, and conspiracy to possess and deliver over ten pounds of marijuana in a Drug Free School Zone. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence that he says was obtained pursuant to an invalid search warrant. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This post-divorce appeal concerns the classification and division of property, namely a house Wife owned prior to the marriage and a house purchased during the marriage. Following the grant of Wife’s request for divorce, the trial court classified the pre-marital house as Wife’s separate property and the house purchased during the marriage as marital property. The court ruled that Husband had dissipated the proceeds from the sale of the pre-marital house and ordered Husband to reimburse Wife. The court awarded Wife two-thirds of the equity in the marital house, leaving one-third of the equity to Husband. Husband appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Leroy Dowdy, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by recklessness, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and driving on a revoked license. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years and six months for the vehicular homicide conviction, two years for the leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death conviction, and six months for the driving on a revoked license conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The only issue before the trial court was the apportionment of liability between the employer and the Second Injury Fund. The employee had two compensable injuries prior to the injury that rendered her permanently and totally disabled. The trial court found that those injuries had caused 85% permanent partial disability. Based on that finding, it held the employer liable for 15% of the award and the Second Injury Fund liable for 85% of the award. We find that the trial court incorrectly applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6208(a)(1)(2008), and modify the award accordingly.
 

This appeal involves a post-divorce petition to modify child support. The trial court reduced Father’s child support obligation from $4,500 monthly to $2,500. Mother appeals. Finding that the trial court erred in the calculation of Father’s income and the number of days of his parenting time, we vacate the child support award and remand for a redetermination of the appropriate award under the Child Support Guidelines.
 

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee suffered a fractured wrist as a result of  workplace accident. He contended that he also sustained a neck injury and post-traumatic tress disorder from the accident. The trial court awarded benefits for the wrist injury only, and the employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment.

The only issue in this case is whether a divorced wife was entitled to continue to receive alimony after the untimely death of her former husband. The wife argued that the support award was in the nature of alimony in solido, which is for a fixed total amount that does not abate upon the death of the obligor. She relies upon an Agreed Interim Order that provided that the husband would pay the wife “spousal support in the amount of $500 per month for a period of three years. . . .” The executrix of her former husband’s estate contended that the terms of the Agreed Interim Order were irrelevant, because the order was superseded by the Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA), which was incorporated into the final decree of divorce. The MDA included the $500 per month alimony provision, but provided that the husband’s alimony obligation would end if the wife remarried, and it did not mention the three year period or any other time limitation. The executrix accordingly argued that the MDA award was in the nature of alimony in futuro, which abates upon the death of the obligor by operation of law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). The trial court found that the omission of the three year period from the MDA was an inadvertent oversight, that the parties intended the alimony award to be in solido, and that the wife was accordingly entitled to receive support from her former husband’s estate. We reverse, because the MDA establishes the award and provided for alimony in futuro.
 

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Monte Hull, and Co-Defendant, Johnny Williams, charging them with aggravated robbery. Following a consolidated jury trial, Defendant and Co-Defendant Williams were convicted of the offense. However, Co-Defendant Williams is not part of this appeal. Defendant received a sentence of eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, the biological father sought to revise the permanent parenting plan to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The child had been conceived during illegal sexual contact meeting this State’s definition of statutory rape; the mother, however, allowed the father to have a relationship with the child. Upon remand after an earlier appeal by the father, the trial court determined that the mother, now married and living in Florida with the child, was in contempt for failing to cooperate with the father regarding certain co-parenting issues. Despite this finding, the court refrained from imposing any punishment on the mother. The court additionally denied the father’s request to modify custody, made a modest award of attorney’s fees to the father, and held that further proceedings relating to the child be conducted in Florida. The father appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Charles Thompson, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his three separate petitions for post-conviction relief in case numbers P-24665, -22149, and -27258. Petitioner was convicted, following guilty pleas, of the first degree murder of Eddie Johnson and attempted first degree murder of Brenda Hampton. Following jury trials, he was convicted for the aggravated assault, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping of Paloy Finnie, see State v. Derrick M. Vernon, et al., No. W1998-00612-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 490718 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Apr. 25, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2001); and the first degree murder of Dedrick Taylor, see State v. Charles Thompson, No. W1998-00351-CCA-R10-CD, 2001 WL 912715 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Aug. 9, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 31, 2001). In his brief, Petitioner asserts that the indictments in the three cases above were defective. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court.

The Department of Human Services determined that Plaintiff’s available resources exceeded he resource limit for purposes of Medicaid benefits in the Qualified Medicare Beneficiary category. The trial court affirmed the Department’s determination. We affirm.