APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A jury convicted LaShawn Johnson (“the Defendant”) of aggravated burglary and attempted theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. On appeal, he raises two issues: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; and (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Defendant’s prior theft convictions would be admissible should he testify. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was injured on the job and was able to return to his pre-injury position. His initial workers’ compensation claim was settled after a benefit review conference. As a part of his settlement he retained a right of reconsideration pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1) (2008). Subsequently,he lost his employment. After an impasse at the benefit review conference, his employer filed this action to reconsider the employee’s benefits in the county where the injury occurred. The employee then filed a similar suit in the county of his residence. The employee filed a motion to dismiss the employer’s action, contending that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(B)(iv) does not permit an employer to file a reconsideration action. The employer contended that the statute did permit filing of a reconsideration action by an employer or in the alternative, the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court in the employer’s case granted the motion to dismiss and found the statute constitutional. The employer has appealed. We affirm the judgment.
 

The petitioner, Larry C. Pittman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

In this action, a Show Cause Order was issued by the Court on April 13, 2012, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant responded to the Show Cause and acknowledged that the Notice of Appeal was filed late.

The petitioner, Ricky Thomas Hughes, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief from his especially aggravated robbery conviction because the victim died instantly rather than suffering a serious bodily injury. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Bradley Scott, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury, under two separate indictments, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and two counts of aggravated rape and was sentenced to an effective term of life plus twenty-two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress DNA evidence and the statements given by him to the police; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted Michael L. Powell and Randall S. Horne (“the Defendants”) each of one count of aggravated burglary; six counts of aggravated robbery; four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping; two counts of aggravated assault; one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and one count of possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court subsequently merged several convictions of each Defendant and, after a hearing, sentenced each Defendant to an effective term of twenty-four years. In this consolidated appeal, both Defendants challenge the validity of their convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping. Horne also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all of his convictions, and Powell also challenges the trial court’s imposition of partial consecutive sentencing. Upon our careful review of the record and the recent Tennessee Supreme Court decision in State v. White, __ S.W.3d __, 2012 WL 758916 (Tenn. 2012), we hold that the Defendants’ convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. We also are constrained to find plain error with respect to the trial court’s instructions to the jury on the firearms offenses, and we must reverse those convictions and remand them for a new trial. Therefore, Powell’s challenge to his consecutive sentence is rendered moot. The Defendants’ remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed.

The defendant, Kevin Jamelle Baldwin, was charged with possession with intent to sell between ten and seventy pounds of marijuana after the narcotics were discovered in the trunk of his car during a traffic stop. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the stop and search of his vehicle were unconstitutional. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the indictment. The State appeals the trial court’s grant of the defendant’s motion to suppress, and after review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following appellant’s petition to eject from real property, appellees counterclaimed seeking a declaration of the boundaries between their properties and those of appellant, sole possession of their properties, a permanent injunction against appellant, and damages for libel or slander of title. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees and find this appeal to be frivolous.
 

Appellant, Christopher Schurman, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that he is entitled to credit for time served on probation under the supervision of community corrections and that the underlying probation revocation agreement violated his right to due process. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Dearick Stokes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which he received concurrent terms of life imprisonment and nine years, respectively. In this direct appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his felony murder conviction because the proof showed that the killing of the victim occurred during an attempted aggravated robbery, rather than an aggravated robbery, as alleged in the indictment. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiffs attempted to challenge annexation Ordinance 4321 via a complaint for declaratory judgment based upon alleged violations of the Open Meetings Act. Summary judgment was granted to the City of Memphis, but this Court reversed the grant and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, a trial was held and judgment entered in favor of the City. Because Plaintiffs failed to file a timely quo warranto action, which was the proper vehicle for Plaintiffs’ challenge, we dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the City and thus, we affirm the trial court’s upholding of Ordinance 4321.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Curtis Blackmon, was convicted in the Shelby County Criminal Court in case number 10-01211 of the November 18, 2009 unlawful sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, and possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and in case number 10-01212 of the November 19, 2009 unlawful sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with the intent to sell, and possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver. The trial court subsequently merged counts two and three with the first count of the indictment in each case and sentenced the defendant to two concurrent terms of eight years. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Homeowners filed this lawsuit against various individuals and entities shortly after purchasing their homes, when they discovered that their properties are affected by numerous sink holes. Original defendants identified a surveyor as a comparative tortfeasor, and the homeowners amended their complaint to add the surveyor as a defendant. The surveyor filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the homeowners’ claims were barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-114, which provides that all actions to recover damages against any person engaged in the practice of surveying for any deficiency, defect, omission, error or miscalculation shall be brought within four years from the date the survey is recorded on the plat, or else be forever barred. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs were subsequently granted permission by the trial court and this Court to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Finding that section 28-3-114 governs the homeowners’ claims, we affirm.

The defendant, Bobby Joe Croom, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of three counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and three counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of fifty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to elect the particular instances of rape and sexual battery it was relying on for conviction and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we reverse and remand in part, and reverse and dismiss in part.

The Defendant, Keesha P. Washington, was found guilty by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of aggravated arson, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-302 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to eighteen years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by not holding a hearing to ensure that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her right not to testify and that her sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Robert Kenneth Dubose, appeals the decision of the Hardin County Circuit Court revoking his probationary sentence. The defendant pled guilty to rape, a Class B felony, and received a sentence of eight years. The sentence was to be suspended to supervised probation following the service of one year. Subsequently, a violation warrant was issued charging the defendant with multiple violations of the terms and conditions of his probation. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered the balance of the sentence be served in the Department of Correction. Following review, we conclude that the defendant has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the revocation or in imposing a sentence of confinement. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Jeffrey Wade Osborne, appeals his Williamson County Circuit Court bench trial conviction of felony failure to appear, see T.C.A. § 39-16-609, arguing that his trial should not have occurred while competency proceedings were still pending and that the trial court erroneously denied a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the State’s proof. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Randell Murphy, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary of an automobile; theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000; vandalism of property valued at $500 or more but less than $1,000; possession of burglary tools; and criminal impersonation. The defendant received an effective sentence of 21 and one-half years. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by rejecting his plea agreement with the State, by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, and by imposing an excessive sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Gail Lynn Padgett, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), fourth offense, a Class E felony, and driving on a revoked license. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to one year of incarceration for felony DUI with 150 days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to six months probation for driving on a revoked license, to be served concurrently with the DUI sentence. The trial court also revoked the Defendant’s license for five years, ordering the Defendant to attend DUI school. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for DUI, fourth offense; (2) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for the State’s failure to preserve evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by denying the Defendant’s Motion to Suppress evidence of her actions and statements to police due to the lack of probable cause to effectuate the arrest. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Thorne Peters, of one count of simple possession of marijuana, see T.C.A. § 39-17-418, and the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months and 29 days’ incarceration in the local workhouse; with respect to the manner of service, the judgment said,“[T]ime served.” On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to quash a subpoena of the former sheriff, and the trial court’s limitation of crossexamination of a witness. Discerning neither a paucity in the evidence nor reversible error committed by the trial court, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand for clarification of pretrial jail credit.

The appellant, Charles Edward Durham, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of possession of not less than one-half ounce but not more than ten pounds of marijuana in a school zone with the intent to sell and of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence that he alleges was discovered after he was illegally detained and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his drug conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Jeremiah L. Woods, was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. He contends that the evidence is insufficient only with regard to the element of premeditation. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence of premeditation in the record is overwhelming and, accordingly, affirm the conviction.

The defendant, James Drew Freeman, Jr., appeals from his White County Circuit Court jury conviction of second degree murder, claiming that the admission of the autopsy report via a witness who did not perform the autopsy violated his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, that the State engaged in improper and inflammatory closing argument, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Coffee County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant,Raleigh Kristopher Frye,of one count of third offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the trial court found the defendant guilty of violating the implied consent law. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained following the stop of his vehicle and the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claims that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to exercise four peremptory challenges and by permitting the indictment for the implied consent violation to be taken to the jury room, and contends that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial entitles him to a new trial. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.