APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Ricky Terrell Cox, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal arises out of a four-day trial over a boundary line dispute. Numerous surveyors and other witnesses testified at trial, and many maps, aerial photographs, survey plats, deeds, and other documents were entered into evidence. The chancellor personally viewed the property in question as well. Thereafter, the court established the boundary line as set forth in the survey plat prepared by the defendants’ surveyor.  The plaintiff contends that this was error. We affirm.

The defendant, Robert Earl Grady, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1,000, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to five years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying him an alternative sentence. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of confinement.

The defendant, Doris Miller, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of assault by provocative contact, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to three months in the county workhouse. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Don Allen Rodgers, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Milton Leon Simpson, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal on the grounds that the petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief.

Defendant, Steven Van Tucker, was convicted of the indicted charge of theft of property valued greater than one thousand dollars and less than ten thousand dollars, a Class D felony. Defendant was sentenced by the trial court to twelve years as a career offender. On appeal, Defendant asserts that 1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s objections to the State’s
challenges of three African-American jurors under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986); 2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support Defendant’s conviction; 3) the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes; and 4) the trial court improperly denied Defendant’s request to be sentenced to Community Corrections. After a careful review of the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights, claiming that the order failed to make sufficient findings regarding grounds for termination. We reverse in part, vacate and remand for the preparation of an order that contains the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The petitioner, Drew David Kirkman, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner stands convicted of two counts of first degree murder and one count of aggravated robbery and is currently serving an effective sentence of life in prison plus twenty years. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the postconviction court erred in denying him relief because he was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to adequately prepare for trial and communicate with the petitioner; (2) arguing the motion to suppress on the day before trial which precluded proper review by the trial court; (3) failing to strike two jurors from the panel; and (4) failing to perfect and present a mental defense. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition.

An Episcopal parish in Nashville asserted its intention to disassociate from The Diocese of Tennessee, causing the Diocese to file a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it or the local congregation owned and controlled the real and personal property where the local congregation worshiped. The trial court determined that The Episcopal Church is hierarchical, and based on the canons and constitutions of the Church and its Diocese, ruled that the local parish held the property in trust for the Diocese. The church appealed, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

The State appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s order granting habeas corpus relief to the Petitioner, Author Ray Turner, and allowing him to withdraw his guilty pleas. The State argues that the Petitioner is not entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas because the thirty percent release eligibility for his two aggravated rape convictions was not a material element of his plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s judgment allowing the Petitioner to withdraw his guilty pleas if he cannot reach an agreement with the State and remanding the case to the Davidson County Criminal Court for further proceedings.

In this extraordinary appeal, the State of Tennessee appeals the trial court’s decision to order a new trial for the defendant, Cordell Remont Vaughn, after a jury returned a guilty verdict of first degree (premeditated) murder and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The trial court, after a hearing, granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct. The State contends that the trial court abused its discretion because the court: (1) erroneously concluded that a State’s witness committed perjury at a suppression hearing based solely on the defendant’s submission of an affidavit that conflicted with that witnesses’ testimony at that hearing, and (2) erroneously concluded that the outcome of the defendant’s trial would have been different had this alleged perjury not occurred and had the defendant’s motion to suppress been granted. The defendant responds that the trial court properly considered the affidavit and reached the proper conclusion concerning whether the State’s witness committed perjury. Furthermore, the defendant contends that because the perjury at issue related to a constitutional right, the State was required to establish that the effect of the perjury was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and it failed to meet that burden. After careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct because it failed to make any finding that the prosecution had, in fact, engaged in any misconduct. Moreover, the defendant has failed to show any prejudice resulting from the alleged perjury. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court granting a new trial is reversed.

I concur with the majority opinion. As indicated in the opinion, I have criticized Summers v. Fortner, 267 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2008), for its holding that a habeas court, not the convicting court, is to determine from the existing record if a petitioner subjected to an illegal sentence should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea. I believe it misinterprets Smith v. Lewis, 202 S.W.3d 124 (Tenn. 2006). In Smith, a habeas corpus case, after the court concluded that an illegal sentence had been imposed, it determined from the guilty plea record that the plea to the relevant charge was not material to the “bargained-for” agreement and resulting effective sentence and held that the petitioner was not entitled to withdraw that guilty plea. Id. at 130. It distinguished the case from one in which the illegal sentence materially resulted from a plea agreement. See Henderson v. State ex rel. Lance, 419 S.W.2d 176, 178-79 (Tenn. 1967) (holding that defendant was entitled to withdraw guilty plea upon habeas corpus proceedings where he pled guilty in exchange for an illegal sentence).

Petitioner, Marquette Houston, an inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the petition was timely filed. The State concedes that the petition was timely filed because Petitioner delivered his petition to the appropriate prison official for mailing within the applicable limitations period. Following a review of the record, we agree and accordingly reverse the order of dismissal and remand this case to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition for postconviction relief.

The petitioner, Nigel Marlin Reid, Sr., filed in the Hamblen County Criminal Court various motions, including a motion to reopen, which the court treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the post-conviction court properly dismissed the petition. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

In this appeal we must determine whether the Statute of Frauds, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-2101(a)(4) (Supp.2011),applies to a settlement agreement requiring the transfer of an interest in real property; and, if so, whether emails exchanged by the parties’ attorneys satisfy the Statute of Frauds under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (“UETA”), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-10-101 to -123 (2001 & Supp. 2011). We hold that the Statute of Frauds applies to settlement agreements requiring the transfer of an interest in real property and that the emails, along with a legal description of the propertycontained in the cross-claim, satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals enforcing the settlement agreement.
 

The petitioner, Julius Perkins, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his 2002 jury conviction of first degree felony murder on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, trial court errors, and prosecutorial misconduct. Determining that the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Lakky Phosy, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The employee had degenerative disk disease for a number of years prior to April 2009, when she reported to her employer that she was experiencing significantly increased neck pain and symptoms, and she sought treatment. The employer denied the employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court credited the testimony of the employee and of one of the treating physicians and awarded the employee 28.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer appeals, asserting that the employee’s injury was not caused by her employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

A Carter County jury convicted the Petitioner, Connie Hughes, of first degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and forgery under $1000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment for the first degree murder and to two concurrent one-year sentences on the remaining convictions. The Petitioner appealed her convictions, and this Court affirmed her convictions. State v. Connie Hughes, No. E2006-00062-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1319373, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, May 7, 2007), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2007). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney at trial “opened the door” for the petitioner’s incriminating statements to be admitted into evidence at trial. The post-conviction court denied her request for relief after a hearing on the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed her petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

A mother and father were jointly tried on two counts of felony murder and three counts of aggravated child abuse as a result of the death of their child. Only the mother testified in her own defense. During direct examination, the mother did not testify about prior incidents in which the father assaulted her. On cross-examination, father’s counsel asked the mother whether she believed the father was capable of “hurting” the victim. The trial court ruled sua sponte that counsel for the father had “opened the door” to cross-examination about the father’s assaults against the mother. The father was convicted of two counts of felony murder and three counts of aggravated child abuse, and the trial court merged the felony murder counts. The mother was convicted of two counts of facilitation of felony murder and two counts of aggravated child abuse, and the trial court merged the facilitation of felony murder counts. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed one aggravated child abuse count against the father but affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all other respects. Only the mother appealed. We hold that the evidence of prior assaults by the father was inadmissible and that the parties did not open the door to cross-examination about the father’s assaults against the mother. We reverse the mother’s conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
 

This appeal arises out of dependency and neglect proceedings regarding three minor children. The circuit court found all three children dependent and neglected, and it found the youngest child had been severely abused. We affirm the dependency and neglect finding and the severe abuse finding with regard to Mother. However, we reverse the severe abuse finding with regard to Father.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in a medical malpractice case. Virginia Mise was admitted to Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge following complaints of abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. She was diagnosed with chronic renal failure. Several days later, she died following a medical procedure. Her sons filed suit, alleging that Virginia Mise’s treating physicians and nurses failed to comply with the requisite standard of care, causing her death. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge and the treating physicians filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment. We affirm the grant of the motions for summary judgment.

The petitioner, Leon Goins, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his Dyer County Circuit Court jury conviction of possession with intent to sell or deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine and resulting 25-year sentence. In this appeal, he asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s determination of the amount of his monthly income, grant of alimony in futuro to Wife, amount of child support he was ordered to pay, and denial of the introduction of certain of Husband’s tax records; Husband also contends that the trial court erred in holding him in civil contempt for, inter alia, nonpayment of his spousal and child support obligations. We affirm the court’s determination of the amount of his monthly income and finding that Wife is entitled to alimony. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Wife cannot be rehabilitated, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand the case for the court to reconsider the nature and amount of alimony. We also remand the case for the court to reconsider the amount of child support and, as necessary, to make findings required by the child support guidelines. We affirm the holding that Husband was in civil contempt, but vacate the sentence of 180 days imprisonment. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.