APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Andrew Hayes, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of felony murder and aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to police, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court committed plain error in its instructions to the jury. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Much aggrieved by his convictions of three counts of aggravated rape and one count of evading arrest, for which he received an effective sentence of 120 years  incarceration, the petitioner, Steve Allen Click, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief attacking the judgments based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel and other constitutional deprivations. Following the appointment of counsel, amendment to the petition, and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court ruled that the petitioner had failed to establish his claims by clear and convincing evidence and denied relief. The petitioner now appeals, claiming that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, George Lee Jones, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective term of ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, in which he challenged his 1981 Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated rape and aggravated robbery. In this appeal, he claims that his aggravated rape conviction and accompanying sentence of life imprisonment are void because that offense was not actually classified as a Class X felony by the general assembly at the time of his crime. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Heralal Nandlal, was indicted on one count of aggravated robbery. At the close of the State’s proof at trial, the trial court, out of the presence of the jury, sua sponte revoked the Defendant’s appearance bond. The jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated robbery, and the Defendant now appeals. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court demonstrated bias in its decision to revoke the Defendant’s bond. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction.

A Hamblen County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Earnest Laning, of driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as 135 days in jail and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce his blood test result into evidence because the State failed to establish the chain of custody. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Tomario Walton a.k.a. Quadricus Dean, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a nine-year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Walton presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the victim’s showup identification of him as the perpetrator of the offense, and (2) whether the evidence at trial, specifically that of Walton’s identity, was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Randy K. Wallace, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for one count of rape and one count of sexual battery. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of sexual battery. As a result, he was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court denied a motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and his sentence. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for sexual battery and that the trial court properly sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of eight years, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, David Weed, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of official misconduct, a Class E felony. Defendant pleaded guilty to the offenses charged and was sentenced by the trial court to two years in the Shelby County Workhouse for each count, with all but 90 days suspended, after which Defendant would be placed on probation for five years. Defendant’s sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. Defendant appeals his sentences and asserts that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion, or in the alternative, his request for full probation. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Corey Lynn Clark, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea conviction for second degree murder, arguing that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This is an appeal of the Chancery Court’s order upholding the Tennessee Department of
Labor and Workforce Development’s determination that ARI underpaid state unemployment
tax premiums. ARI appeals asserting its due process rights were violated in the
administrative hearing process and that there is not substantial and material evidence to
support the Department’s assessment. Finding no error, we affirm the Department’s
assessment of unpaid unemployment tax premiums.

This is an unemployment compensation case. Cynthia L. Vukich-Daw filed a claim for unemployment compensation following her termination from Westgate Resorts. The claim was originally granted by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and subsequently upheld by the Appeals Tribunal and the Board of Review. Westgate Resorts filed a petition for judicial review, and the trial court reversed the Board of Review’s decision, finding that Cynthia L. Vukich-Daw was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because she was a qualified real estate agent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-7-207. Cynthia L. Vukich-Daw and the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development appeal. We reverse the decision of the trial court.

Joseph Gunter ("the Petitioner") filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The Petitioner also sought DNA analysis of certain evidence introduced in his trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and denied the Petitioner’s request for DNA analysis. This appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, James Byron Wright, entered a guilty plea to violation of an habitual motor offender order and to driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) 6th offense, and received concurrent two-year sentences on the convictions to be served by incarceration. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-212, he was released from confinement and placed on supervised probation. A little less than two months later, a probation violation warrant was filed alleging that Defendant failed to report to his probation officer as required. The trial court, following a hearing, found Defendant had violated his probation, revoked his probation, and ordered him to serve the balance of the sentence by incarceration. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court’s disposition that Defendant serve the balance of his sentence by confinement is too harsh. After full review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.

Petitioner, Melvin Crump, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder in perpetration of a rape, and felony murder in perpetration of larceny. The trial court merged Petitioner’s convictions, and Petitioner was sentenced by the jury to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. A summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s conviction can be found in this Court’s opinion in the direct appeal. State v. Melvin Crump, No. M2006-02244-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 723524 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, March 18, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn., Aug. 24, 2009). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied relief after an evidentiary hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Gregory O. Cherry, was indicted for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell; sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine; delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine; and possession of drug paraphernalia. After the denial of a motion to suppress, he was convicted by a jury of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia and sentenced to an effective sentence of eight years, to be served consecutively to two other sentences. This court dismissed the notice of appeal because it was filed before the trial court issued a final order from which to appeal. See State v. Gregory O. Cherry, No. W2006-00015-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 2155740, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 27, 2007). The defendant then filed a “Petition for Delayed Motion for New Trial,” which the trial court denied, and this appeal followed. On appeal, he challenges: (1) the denial of the motion to suppress his statement and the evidence obtained by a warrantless search of his vehicle; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the priority of two liens, a mechanic’s lien and a bank’s deed of trust.
We have determined that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the
bank. We have further determined that the mechanic’s lien is entitled to priority and that the
trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment on that issue.

A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner of possession of methamphetamine with intent to sell and/or deliver, possession of unlawful drug paraphernalia, reckless driving, and driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. The trial court sentenced him to an effective ten-year sentence. This Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Kenneth L. Davis, No W2008-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 160927, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 23, 2009), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2009). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his request to amend his petition a third time and when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude there exists no error in the post-conviction court’s judgment. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

An employee developed carpal tunnel syndrome. Before receiving medical treatment for that condition, he accepted an offer from his employer to resign in exchange for a lump sum payment of his retirement benefits. The offer was unrelated to the work injury. The trial court granted the employer’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008) limited the employee’s award of benefits to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment in light of his voluntary retirement. On the date scheduled for trial, the trial court declined to hear evidence or permit an offer of proof concerning the voluntariness of his retirement and the extent of his vocational disability. Judgment was entered awarding permanent partial disability of one and one-half times the medical impairment. The employee has appealed. We vacate the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for a determination on the merits of the case.

This appeal concerns a car dealership’s protest of Hyundai’s proposal to enter into a
franchise agreement with another dealership in the same market area. During the pendency
of a contested case proceeding, the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Commission issued a license
to the second dealership, which began doing business. Denied relief at the administrative
level, the protesting dealership filed a petition in chancery court. The chancellor found that
the motor vehicle commission had erred in dismissing the contested case proceeding of the
protesting dealership, but dismissed the petition based upon the conclusion that the matter
was now moot. We agree with the chancellor’s conclusion and affirm.

The Defendant, Nicole Starcher, pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and three counts of passing a worthless check, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -105, -121. Following a sentencing hearing, at which the trial court denied judicial diversion, the Defendant was sentenced to three years enhanced probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her application for judicial diversion. Because the trial court failed to adequately state upon the record the basis for its denial of the Defendant’s application for judicial diversion, we vacate the Defendant’s sentences and remand this matter for a new sentencing hearing and correction of the judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Xavier Bell, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range I, standard offender, to serve nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals his conviction, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred when it admitted recordings of the Defendant’s jail telephone conversations. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Rickey Benson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of burglary of a building and theft over $1000, both Class D felonies, based on his theft of cigarettes from a Memphis Kroger. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court as a multiple offender to concurrent terms of seven years for each conviction. He raises the following five issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; (2) whether there was a proper chain of custody and authentication for the admission of the store’s surveillance videotape; (3) whether the trial court erred by admitting the store’s inventory review documents; (4) whether his constitutional rights were violated by the prosecutor’s allegedly improper closing comments; and (5) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2005, the Petitioner, Tony Chandler, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, two counts of theft under $500, two counts of aggravated robbery, evading arrest in a motor vehicle, and burglary. For these convictions, the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of sixteen years. In 2011, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and for a writ of error coram nobis. The State filed a motion to dismiss because the petition was untimely filed. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that the petition was untimely filed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition without a hearing. Following our review of the record and the law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and sentenced to serve twenty-five years in prison. He appeals his conviction, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction and contending that the victim’s identification of him to the sexual assault nurse should have been excluded as hearsay. Because we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction and that the identification was properly admitted into evidence, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.