APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s determination of the amount of his monthly income, grant of alimony in futuro to Wife, amount of child support he was ordered to pay, and denial of the introduction of certain of Husband’s tax records; Husband also contends that the trial court erred in holding him in civil contempt for, inter alia, nonpayment of his spousal and child support obligations. We affirm the court’s determination of the amount of his monthly income and finding that Wife is entitled to alimony. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Wife cannot be rehabilitated, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand the case for the court to reconsider the nature and amount of alimony. We also remand the case for the court to reconsider the amount of child support and, as necessary, to make findings required by the child support guidelines. We affirm the holding that Husband was in civil contempt, but vacate the sentence of 180 days imprisonment. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
 

This is a divorce case of a marriage of approximately 34 years. After hearing the evidence, the Trial Judge awarded the divorce to the wife, "equally" divided the parties' marital property, ordered the husband to pay the wife permanent alimony of $500.00 a month, and awarded the wife $10,000.00 in partial payment of her attorney's fees. The husband appealed and contended inter alia that the wife was not entitled to permanent alimony, nor was she entitled to have an award of attorney's fees against him. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Courtenay D. Robertson, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his jury convictions of attempt to commit second degree murder, aggravated arson, and felony evading arrest on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

Husband appeals the trial court’s division of property and award of alimony in solido to Wife. We remand to the trial court for further findings.

Homeowner and Contractor entered into an agreement for the construction of a new house. The contract provided that no changes would be made to the terms and specifications of the contract without a writing describing the changes signed byboth parties. The parties ignored this provision and made changes without preparing change orders. Before the house was completed the parties had a dispute, and the homeowner contracted with someone else to complete her house. Homeowner alleged Contractor breached the contract by walking off the job and refusing to complete the house,and Contractor alleged Homeowner fired him and told him not to return to her property. Contractor sued Homeowner for breach of contract and sought to recover his damages, which included expenses he incurred for materials and labor that Homeowner refused to pay. Homeowner counterclaimed for breach of contract and sought to recover as damages the amount she paid other contractors to complete her house. The trial court found Homeowner committed the first breach and entered judgment for Contractor in the amount of $21,120.69. Homeowner appealed, arguing the evidence did not support the trial court’s judgment. Concluding the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects.
 

The Defendant, Scotty Lynn Edmonds, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and violation of the implied consent law, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-10-401, -406. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to 11 months and 29 days with all but 5 days to be served on probation. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, first offense. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Antonio Wicks, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of second degree murder, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the trial court’s limitation of cross-examination of a State witness, and the trial court’s imposition of a 25-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the court.

The Petitioner, James E. Kenner, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for five counts of aggravated burglary, five counts of theft of property valued at $1000 or more, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, for which he is serving an effective seventy-five year sentence as a career offender. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee sustained injuries to his right hip, knee, and ankle as a result of a fall while employed as a truck driver. Although he received medical treatment and briefly returned to work, the employee continued to have pain and eventually required knee surgery. After the employee recovered from the surgery, the employer was unable to return him to work. The treating physician assigned a permanent partial impairment of 2% to the right lower extremity. The employee’s evaluating physician assigned a 13% impairment rating. The trial court awarded 45.5% permanent partial disability to the right leg. The employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by utilizing the evaluating physician’s impairment rating and that the award of benefits is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This interlocutory appeal concerns the question of whether a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds. Appellant farmer allegedly entered into an oral contract to sell his cotton crop to Appellee cotton company. The farmer failed to deliver the cotton and the cotton company sued for specific performance. The farmer defended the suit by arguing that the alleged oral contract was unenforceable due to the Statute of Frauds. The cotton company countered that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the merchant exception to the Statute of Frauds. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the cotton company, finding that the farmer was a merchant for purposes of the Statute of Frauds. We hold that a farmer may be considered a merchant for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code Statute of Frauds, the determination of which is a mixed question of law and fact. However, because the question of whether this particular farmer qualifies as a merchant raises genuine issues regarding the inferences to be drawn from the facts, we reverse the grant of partial summary judgment and remand to the trial court for a trial on the merits.

Mark Demcovitz (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to sell and received an eight year sentence. The trial court entered a judgment reserving two certified questions of law. On appeal, the Defendant asks that this Court answer the following certified questions: 1. Whether the stop of the defendant for “following too close” violated the
defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights when the statute is absent any objective criteria for the officer to base his determination on, thereby granting the officer unbridled discretion in determining when a violation occurs? 2. Whether the stop of a defendant for a minor “cite and release” traffic violation which provided for a fine only, the detention of the defendant exceeded the reasonable length and scope to effectuate the purposes of the stop, placement of the defendant in the secured area of the officer’s patrol car, the use of a drug dog “run” around the defendant’s vehicle, and the subsequent search of defendant’s vehicle violated the rights of the defendant under the federal and state constitutions and, therefore, all evidence resulting from the seizure and search should be suppressed? After a thorough review of the record, we answer each question in the negative and hold that the Defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Charles E. Orange, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition without appointing counsel or giving him an opportunity to amend his petition. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Larry Holmes, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post conviction relief from his convictions for four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary, and resulting effective sentence of seventy years. The trial court merged the aggravated robbery convictions with the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions. The Petitioner contends that he was denied due process when the trial court failed to dismiss the kidnapping convictions and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Michael Blaine Ward, II, appeals the Coffee County Circuit Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, attempted second degree murder, aggravated spousal rape, aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary, and resulting effective sentence of  twenty-one years. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (1) adequately investigate and prepare for trial, (2) give proper written notice of an alibi witness, (3) present material evidence at the trial, (4) object to inadmissible evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, (5) require the State to elect a single means by which the charged offenses were committed, (6) object to improper jury instructions, (7) preserve issues for appeal, and (8) object to his prosecution under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Timothy C. Watson, pro se, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus from his 2009 conviction for sale of cocaine over one-half gram and resulting fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he was denied the right to counsel at his trial and that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This petition was filed pursuant to the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. The petitioner seeks judicial review of an administrative decision by the Tennessee Civil Service Commission to uphold the termination of her employment with the Tennessee Department of Labor. On motion by the petitioner, the entire administrative record was struck from the record in the judicial proceedings. Having no administrative record upon which to review the Department’s decision, the trial court dismissed the petition. We affirm.
 

The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether a notation in the prosecutor’s file written by an assistant prosecutor expressing her opinion as to the lack of credibility of two of the State’s witnesses is newly discovered evidence on which the defendant may base a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Over fifteen years after the defendant’s conviction for first degree murder became final, he filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that he had recently discovered a note written by the assistant prosecutor before his murder trial in which she expressed her opinion that it was a “good case but for most of Ws are juveniles who have already lied repeatedly.” The petition alleged that the note was exculpatory, newly discovered evidence and that the State’s failure to produce it before trial affected the outcome of the trial and undermined the reliability of the verdict. The trial court tolled the one-year statute of limitations on due process grounds, but summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s petition, concluding that the State had waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense, and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. We hold that the State did not waive the statute of limitations defense and that the trial court did not err in tolling the statute of limitations. We further hold that the handwritten note expressing the assistant prosecutor’s opinion as to the witnesses’ credibility was attorney work product. As such, it was neither discoverable nor admissible. Accordingly, the note was not newly discovered evidence on which a petition for writ of error coram nobis could be based. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition is reinstated.
 

This is a GTLA action against a city and city official following a construction accident in which an exterior wall of a building collapsed,causing serious injuries to one of the plaintiffs and causing the death of the other plaintiff. The building was being demolished and the plaintiffs were employed by a private company that was to disconnect gas utilities on the privately owned building. The plaintiffs claim the collapse was caused, in part, by the failure of the city and the city manager to enforce certain OSHA regulations and provisions of the municipal building code. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the city and the city official on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on governmental immunity. We affirm.
 

The petitioner, Jeffery Ratliff, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner stands convicted of six counts of rape of a child, six counts of incest, one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. He is currently serving an effective sentence of one hundred twelve years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition because: (1) he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel; (2) his convictions violate the principle of double jeopardy; and (3) the State’s Notice of Intent to Seek Enhanced Punishment failed to comply with statutory requirements. Following review of the record, we conclude that there was no error in the post-conviction court’s decision and affirm the denial of relief.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. A surgeon performed a procedure on an infant to repair a birth defect at the defendant hospital. The infant sustained permanent injuries after the surgery. The parents filed suit on the infant’s behalf against the hospital for failing to adhere to the expected standard of care. At the conclusion of trial, the hospital moved for a directed verdict on all claims, with only the claims for informed consent and post-operative negligence being denied. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the infant. The hospital has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
 

In this appeal, the defendants seek a review of the trial court’s decision to award the plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of inadequate maintenance of the cemetery where the plaintiff’s son was buried. To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was either intentional or reckless, was so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society, and caused a serious mental injury to the plaintiff. The primary question presented is whether the plaintiff in this action proved the requisite serious mental injury to support the trial court’s award of compensatory and punitive damages. We hold that the plaintiff’s proof was deficient. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
 

Husband appeals an order denying his motion to set aside a default judgment and the final judgment entered in his divorce action. On the facts presented, we hold that the default judgment should have been set aside; accordingly, we reverse the order denying Husband’s motion to set aside, and the case is remanded.
 

This suit arises as a result of the installation of tile flooring in a home. Homeowners sued the contractor for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The trial court awarded $106,103.92 to homeowners and assessed $4,252.00 in discretionary costs. Contractor appeals asserting that, in finding liability, the trial court failed to apply the standard of performance set forth in the contract and that the court erred in calculating and measuring the damages. We have determined that the trial court applied an implied warranty or workmanship rather than the contractual standard; however we have reviewed the evidence de novo and modify the judgment to hold that the contractor breached the contractual standard. We remand the case for a determination of the appropriate amount of damages.
 

Mother argues that the divestment of custody of her child from the Department of Children’s Services to a relative in another state constitutes de facto termination of her parental rights. We find no merit to this argument since the parent-child relationship was not terminated by the court’s custody decision.
 

Defendant Collins challenges his conviction for criminal contempt, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to convict him and that the use of certain evidence violated his constitutional rights. We affirm the conviction.