APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of four counts of rape, Class B felonies, and three counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, Class C felonies. The defendant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the prosecution committed misconduct during closing argument, and that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentence on a single rape count consecutive to his remaining concurrent sentences. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the parenting plan adopted by the trial court, the award of child support, alimony and the allocation of the federal income tax dependent exemptions to Father. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the parenting plan and allocation of the federal income tax exemption.Finding error with the amount of income the courtimputed to Mother, and what appears to be an error regarding the cost of insurance, we reverse the award of child support and remand with instructions to impute Mother’s income based on the federal minimum wage and to recalculate the child support award in accordance with this opinion. We also hold that the trial court erred in denying Mother rehabilitative alimony,and therefore reverse and remand the issue of alimony to the trial court for a determination of the appropriate sum and duration of rehabilitative alimony.
 

In this case, the Trial Court initially granted plaintiff a default judgment against the defendant, and set a trial on the issue of damages. Defendant was given notice of the subsequent hearing, and defendant's attorney moved to set aside the default judgment, which the Trial Court granted and dismissed plaintiff's case. Plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Rebecca W. Ford (“Plaintiff”) sued the State of Tennessee (“State”) regarding a motor vehicle accident that resulted in the death of Plaintiff’s daughter, Lynsey M. Ford. After a bench trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that the State had not violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(I) or § 9-8-307(a)(1)(J), and that the actions of Zachary L. Robinson were the sole proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff appeals to this Court. We reversed the Trial Court’s judgment as to Zachary L. Robinson being solely at fault, and held that the State was 50% at fault for the Accident in our Opinion in Robinson v. State, docket No. E2011-01540-COA-R3-CV (“Robinson v. State”), released contemporaneously with this Opinion. We, therefore, remand this case to the Trial Court for the calculation of damages awarded to Plaintiff from the State for the death of Lynsey M. Ford.

Defendant, who was arrested for DUI and subsequently refused to submit to a blood test, appeals the revocation of his driver’s license, contending that he was not properly informed of the consequences of refusal to take the test. We hold that the defendant was adequately advised under the circumstances presented and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
 

The Hamilton County Criminal Court grand jury charged the defendant, Derrick Keith Walker, with one count of attempt to commit the premeditated first degree murder of the victim, Charles Vandergriff, and one count of the aggravated assault of the victim. The defendant and the State entered into a plea agreement calling for dismissal of the attempted murder count and a plea of guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, with a six-year Range I sentence to be served as 11 months and 29 days in confinement followed by supervised probation. The agreement provided for the defendant to pay $13,000 in restitution at the rate of $175 per month beginning on March 15, 2010. On December 17, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment that implemented the terms of the plea agreement. In August 2011, the State obtained a probation violation warrant claiming that the defendant garnered new arrests and had failed to pay restitution. Following a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him into confinement to serve the balance of his sentence. In this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by revoking the probation and by ordering him to fully serve his original sentence. Because the record supports the order of the trial court, we affirm the order.

The Defendant, Jason Peter Meeks, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI), violating the implied consent law, and leaving the scene of an accident, all misdemeanor offenses. The Defendant appeals pursuant to Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, contending that he should be granted a new trial because the State failed to record his trial. We disagree with the Defendant’s claim and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Victor Byndum, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for two violations of the Sexual Offender Registration and Monitoring Act and ordering him to serve his six-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from an order appointing a conservator for the adult son of divorced parents. The father contends that the evidence does not support the determinations that the son lacks the capacity to fully attend to his needs without assistance and that the appointment of a conservator is warranted; Mother contends that the father does not have standing to appeal. We affirm the court in all respects.

The Petitioner, Joseph A. Hale, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 2007 conviction for second degree murder and resulting seventeen-year sentence. He contends that his sentence is void because the trial court improperly sentenced him pursuant to the 2005 Sentencing Amendments when the offense date was 2004. The State has moved this court to affirm the trial court’s denial of relief by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion for a memorandum opinion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The plaintiff, a public official, sued the defendants for libel and false light invasion of privacy. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the truth of the statements. The plaintiff sought to complete discovery before the motion was heard. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion and plaintiff appealed. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the libel claims, but reverse the grant of summary judgment as to some of the false light claims.
 

An injured employee returned to work for his pre-injury employer. The employee was moved to a different area and worked fewer overtime hours because of his medical restrictions. The trial court held that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008) and awarded permanent partial disability benefits in excess of one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. The employer appealed. We hold that the employee had a meaningful return to work and that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) limits the employee’s recovery to one and one-half times the anatomical impairment. We therefore modify the judgment of the trial court.

Buyer purchased used automobile and signed contract stating the vehicle was being sold “as is” and without any warranties. After the transaction was completed and Buyer complained to Seller that the power steering was not working properly, Seller agreed to credit Buyer’s account with the cost of repairing the power steering. Buyer was unwilling or unable to pay for the repair out of his own pocket, and Seller ultimately repossessed the vehicle. Buyer sued Seller for breach of contract and trial court awarded Buyer damages. Seller appealed and we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Seller modified the parties’ original contract when it agreed to compensate Buyer for the cost of repairing the vehicle.
 

In this claim for workers’ compensation benefits, the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits to the employee for hearing loss. Her employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of the employee’s medical expert into evidence and by finding that her hearing loss was caused by her employment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Mary G. (“Foster Mother”) filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Putnam County (“the Trial Court”) to adopt Haily A. S. (“the Child”), then under the guardianship of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child’s paternal grandparents, Marvin S. and Sandra S. (“the Grandparents”), filed an intervening petition to adopt the Child and shortly thereafter filed a motion to intervene. DCS filed a motion to dismiss the Grandparents’ petition. After a hearing at which the parties’ respective counsels made their arguments, the Trial Court granted DCS’s motion to dismiss the intervening petition for adoption. The Grandparents appeal, arguing that the Trial Court should have permitted them to present evidence on the issue of the Child’s best interest. We hold that because DCS, the Child’s guardian, did not consent to the Grandparents’ adoption of the Child, the Grandparents’ intervening petition properly was dismissed. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

The Defendant-Appellant, Keisha M. Howard, was indicted for theft of property valued at $60,000 or more and for violating the Tennessee Computer Act, both Class B felonies. She entered guilty pleas to the offenses as charged in the Bradley County Criminal Court, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of her sentence as well as the amount of restitution, if any. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105(5), -602(a)(1) (2006). The trial court sentenced Howard as a Range I, standard offender and imposed concurrent sentences of eight years. Under the special conditions in the theft judgment, the court ordered that Howard “may apply to Community Corrections” and that she “owes $215,000 [and] cannot pay that amount but must pay no less than $200 a month.” Howard filed a motion to clarify the total amount of restitution owed, and the trial court, in determining that its previous judgment regarding restitution violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(c), ordered Howard to pay $1,000 per month for eight years, for a total of $96,000 in restitution. On appeal, Howard argues that the trial court’s order requiring her to pay $96,000 in restitution was unreasonable, given her financial resources and ability to pay. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s order that Howard pay $1,000 per month for eight years for a total of $96,000 in restitution, and we amend the judgments to show that the victim’s loss in this case is $156,951.30 and that the restitution, based on the proof established of Howard’s present ability to pay, is reduced to $48,000, which shall be paid at the rate of $500 per month for eight years. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgments are affirmed.

The great aunt and the great-grandmother of a little girl obtained an emergency order giving them temporary custody of the child when she was less than eight months old. The child’s mother was informed that she was entitled to appear at a preliminary hearing and an adjudicative hearing on a more permanent custody order, but she failed to appear for those hearings. The trial court found that the child was dependent and neglected, and awarded custody of the child to her two older relatives. They subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother on the grounds of abandonment and of persistence of conditions. The trial court found that both grounds were proved and granted the petition. We affirm the termination on the ground of persistence of conditions.
 

This case arose from a dispute between neighbors over the ownership of an elaborate stone and metal gate used for entry into both their residential properties. The predecessors-ininterest of the defendants installed the gate at their own expense, placing it on an easement over the plaintiffs’ adjoining lot. The plaintiffs decided to sell their house, and included a picture and a description of the gate in their real estate listing and advertisements. The defendants asserted that they owned the gate and compelled the plaintiffs’ realtor to remove all mention of the gate from sales materials. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to quiet title. After a bench trial, the court found that the gate belonged to the defendants and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court erred because the gate is a fixture and, thus, that it has become part of the plaintiffs’ property by operation of law. We affirm the trial court.
 

A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Bert Durand Hatmaker, of one count of reckless endangerment, one count of assault, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of two years for the reckless endangerment conviction, eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault conviction, and thirty days for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction, with sixty days to be served in jail and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless endangerment. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The issue presented in this divorce case is which parent should be designated as the primary residential parent of the parties’ minor children. The trial court named the Appellee/Mother primary residential parent, and Appellant/Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a wrongful death action involving numerous defendants. We dismiss the appeal as to two defendants for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. We dismiss the appeal as to the remaining defendants for lack of a final judgment.
 

This appeal involves a construction loan obtained by the plaintiffs for the construction of a new home. The loan proceeds were exhausted prior to the completion of the home. The plaintiffs then sued the lender bank for breach of contract, alleging that the bank had a duty
to inspect the construction prior to disbursing funds, and that its failure to complete inspections resulted in improper disbursement of the loan funds. The trial court granted summary judgment to the bank upon concluding that the bank had no contractual duty to
inspect the construction of the residence. The plaintiffs appealed. We affirm.

A Putnam County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Matthew Kinnard, charging him with one count of aggravated child abuse. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault. He received a sentence of three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation or some other form of alternative sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal in this matter. In the first appeal, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed the trial court’s judgment finding the employee permanently and totally disabled. The Panel held, however, that the trial court’s judgment should be reduced by the 272 weeks of benefits the employer had previously paid the employee. Therefore, the Panel remanded the case to the trial court for entry of a judgment consistent with its opinion. On remand, the trial court applied the 272-week credit as the Panel had directed. The trial court also reapportioned liability and modified the date on which the employee’s permanent total disability benefits began to accrue. The trial court’s modification effectively increased the employee’s award from the 496.86 weeks it had awarded the employee in the original appeal to 697.14 weeks. Employer has appealed, contending that the reapportionment of liability and the modification of the date upon which benefits accrued conflict with the mandate of the previous appeal. We conclude that employer’s contentions are correct and reverse the trial court’s judgment.
 

I do not believe the trial court went outside the parameters of its sound discretion when it increased father’s co-parenting time from 85 days to 143 days. Unlike many of the divorce cases we see, this one involves parents who, after the divorce, in the words of the majority opinion, “maintain[ ] a positive, cooperative relationship with one another regarding their co-parenting responsibilities.” Even more unique, this case presents a situation where father’s wife and his former spouse have a “positive relationship.”