APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Kenneth Rich, appeals from the habeas corpus trial court’s order dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, the petition for writ of habeas corpus relief filed by Petitioner. After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights and argues that the trial court erred in deciding the termination action while a de novo appeal of a dependency and neglect action was pending in circuit court. Finding no error in the actions of the trial court, we affirm.
 

In 1991, the parties divorced via a Final Decree which decreed that the husband was not the father of the wife’s expected child. In 2010, the State moved toestablish the husband’s paternity and for Rule 60.02 relief. The trial court denied the State’s requests finding the 1991 paternity determination res judicata. Because we find the paternity provision void as against public policy, we find the trial court erred in dismissing the State’s Motion to Establish Paternity and its motion for Rule 60.02 relief. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Appellant is a prisoner challenging a decision of the Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole. After the Board denied him parole, the appellant filed a common law writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court denied the appellant’s discovery motions and dismissed his petition with prejudice. We find no error in the trial court’s decision.
 

I agree fully with the majority’s conclusions in this case. I write separately only because I would use different reasoning for holding that the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of unclean hands.

A Sequatchie County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Steven Wayne Wilson, of first degree felony murder,see T.C.A.§ 39-13-202(a)(2),and especially aggravated burglary, see id. § 39-14-404. Following the jury’s verdicts, the trial court modified the especially aggravated burglary conviction to aggravated burglary by operation of law, see id. § 39-14404(d), and imposed an effective sentence of life in prison with the possibility of parole, also by operation of law, see id. § 39-13-208(c). On appeal, the defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress, (3) the trial court erroneously admitted and excluded evidence during Agent Mark Wilson’s testimony,(4) the trial court erroneously admitted expert  testimony via an unqualified witness,(5)the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence,(6)the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the elements of felony murder as charged in this case, (7) the trial court’s rulings and comments evinced judicial bias requiring recusal, (8) the trial court erroneously excluded as hearsay the statements of two witnesses, (9) the trial court erroneously admitted the autopsy report as an exhibit at trial, (10) the trial court erroneously admitted physical evidence without establishing a proper chain of custody, (11) the overall conduct of the trial deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial under the Tennessee Constitution, and (12) the cumulative effect of the trial errors deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Following an extensive review, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court committed no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Joshua Shell, appeals from the trial court’s order which revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve by incarceration his effective sentence of four years for one count of burglary, three counts of vehicle burglary, and four counts of theft. The State concedes error in the trial court’s proceedings and admits the case must be remanded for a probation violation hearing. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a probation violation hearing.

This appeal is from an order of the trial court entered February 23, 2012, which order denied the motion of the plaintiffs below, as later supplemented, seeking to amend, alter or set aside a prior order of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint. The order appealed from is not a final order. Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ appeal is hereby dismissed.

The defendants filed a notice of appeal in the trial court seeking to appeal the court’s order of May 11, 2012. That order is not a final judgment. Accordingly, the defendants’ putative appeal is hereby dismissed.

Defendant in a lawsuit filed in Williamson Countyappeals the dismissal of its separate action filed in Davidson County seeking a declaratory judgment; the Davidson County action was dismissed on the basis of prior suit pending. Finding no error, we affirm.
 

The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants to recover monies alleged to be due the plaintiff on two construction projections. The first complaint was involuntarily dismissed. The defendants averred that the plaintiff’s claims against them in the second complaint are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court found that the involuntary dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits. The defendants pursued this interlocutory appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Parents appeal the termination of their parental rights to three children, contending that the court erred in finding that the Department of Children’s Services complied with the notice requirements of Tenn. Code. Ann. § 37-2-403. We affirm the judgment terminating parental rights.
 

Charles Raymond Loveday and his wife, Virginia Hope Loveday (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), filed this action in January 2011 against Blount County and the Blount County School Board (collectively “the Defendants”) to recover for flood damage to their property allegedly caused by the construction of a new school next to the Plaintiffs’ property. The school was built in 2007. The Plaintiffs allegedly sustained “permanent” damage in 2008, 2009 and 2010. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the action was barred by the statute of limitations for a taking. The trial court granted the motion. The Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.

This case concerns a dispute over attorney’s fees. Attorney, who was hired to represent a client in connection with the probate of her uncle’s estate, sued his former client and the beneficiaries of the estate under theories of civil conspiracy and inducement of breach of contract. Court found in favor of attorney and held the attorney was entitled to $20,000 in damages. The court trebled the damages in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-50-109. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s holding regarding inducement of breach of contract, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
 

The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in this medical malpractice action where Plaintiff failed to attach a HIPPA compliant medical authorization to her notice to Defendants prior to filing her complaint as required by Tennessee Code Annotated  29-26-121. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate and remand for further proceedings.

This is an appeal of a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff in an action for misrepresentation and breach of contract. The jury returned a general verdict finding Defendant liable and awarding Plaintiff $62,083.18 in compensatory damages. Defendant appeals, asserting that the elements of misrepresentation are not supported by the evidence and that the jury was improperly instructed on the issue of damages. We hold there is substantial and material evidence in supportof a finding that Defendant breached the contract between the parties and affirm the jury’s verdict in all respects.
 

Terry Mullins (“the Plaintiff”) filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prohibit landowners (collectively “the Defendants”) to his south from using a driveway they constructed across his property. Following a bench trial, 1 the court dismissed the Plaintiff’s complaint. The court held that the proof established that the Defendants had a prescriptive easement over the Plaintiff’s property. The Plaintiff appeals. We remand to the trial court for the purpose of allowing that court to correct a defect in the record.

The City Commission terminated plaintiff as a police officer. He then filed a certiorari petition to the Chancery Court, where the Chancellor held that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard to the case, and the Chancellor reversed the Commission and ordered plaintiff to be reinstated as a policeman. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's ruling that the Commission applied the wrong legal standard to the facts of the case, but vacate the reinstatement of the officer and remand to the City Commission to apply the proper legal standards in a new trial in plaintiff's case.

Plaintiffs who own homes in Mallard Baye subdivision, brought this action against defendants who had constructed a septic system on several of the residential lots serving other properties, alleging that defendants acted in violation of the restrictive covenants of their subdivision. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court held that the defendants' construction of the septic system violated the subdivision restrictive covenants, and the defendants appealed. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Petitioner, Phedrek Davis, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that the coram nobis court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal one day past the deadline imposed by Rule 4 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss this appeal.

Petitioner, Tommy Lee Pendleton, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual battery and received concurrent sentences of fourteen years. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file a bill of particulars, by failing to obtain an expert witness to review the statements of the child victim, and by failing to spend adequate time investigating the case and preparing for trial. He further contends that his guilty pleas were involuntary because trial counsel’s errors tainted the plea process. Finally, he claims that the trial court should not have accepted his plea in light of his hesitance during the guilty plea hearing. Discerning no error in the proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery and for discovery sanctions, and stated that the order was final under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 54.02. Defendant did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of the trial court’s order. Plaintiff subsequently filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. Defendants filed a notice of appeal within 30 days of the trial court’s entry of an order of voluntary dismissal, and appeal the trial court’s award of discovery sanctions to Plaintiff. We hold that the order awarding sanctions was not an effective final judgment under Rule 54.02. Defendants’ appeal accordingly is timely. We vacate the award of sanctions and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Michael Jones, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder and resulting thirty-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.