APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A pro se defendant appeals the decision of the trial court denying his motion to set aside a domesticated foreign judgment on the grounds that the foreign court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the case and that the judgment of the foreign court was obtained fraudulently. We affirm the trial court because the foreign court had jurisdiction, the judgment was not the product of fraudulent acts that were pled with specificity, and the judgment does not violate Tennessee public policy.
 

The first time this case was before us, see Tennessee Rand, Inc. v. Automation Industrial Group, LLC, No. E2009-00116-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3852317 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., filed Sept. 29, 2010) (“Rand I”), we reversed that portion of the trial court’s judgment decreeing that Automation Industrial Group, LLC (“Automation”) was not entitled to recover on its counterclaim due to its fraud and we reinstated the trial court’s earlier judgment awarding Automation $2,270,759.22 plus prejudgment interest of $256,705.19. The trial court had entered its earlier judgment against Tennessee Rand, Inc. (“Rand”) on Automation’s counterclaim, and then set it aside on Rand’s motion to alter or amend. Although the parties had not addressed in the first appeal the prejudgment interest portion of the trial court’s earlier judgment, we, without extended discussion, reinstated the prejudgment interest as originally calculated by the trial court. What the parties did not put at issue or otherwise stress in the first appeal was the fact that Rand had challenged, in its motion to alter or amend, the accuracy of the trial court’s calculation of prejudgment interest. In that motion, Rand had argued that the trial court had obviously miscalculated prejudgment interest. In Rand I, we also reversed an award of discretionary costs to Rand because we concluded that Automation was the new prevailing party. Upon remand following our decision in Rand I, Rand asked the trial court to correct the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Rand also asked the court to start the accrual of post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the trial court’s judgment on remand. Automation filed a motion for discretionary costs as the new prevailing party. The trial court on remand determined that it had miscalculated prejudgment interest but held that our opinion in Rand I prevented it from granting Rand any relief with respect to the miscalculation as well as with respect to the other relief requested by Rand. The trial court also denied Automation’s motion for discretionary costs, based, at least in part, on Automation’s substantial windfall award of prejudgment interest due to the miscalculation. Rand now appeals the denial of its motions, and Automation challenges the denial of its request for discretionary costs. Automation also asks us to determine an issue pertaining to interest on the unpaid portion of the judgment entered on remand. We conclude that, in the interest of justice, we must take corrective action pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 36 by granting Rand relief from the miscalculation of prejudgment interest. Since the erroneous and inflated award of prejudgment interest was one of the reasons given by the trial court for denying discretionary costs, we vacate that denial and remand for further consideration of Automation’s request. We affirm that part of the judgment, as modified by us, holding that Automation is entitled to post-judgment interest from the date of entry of the original judgment in its favor. Rand obtained a stay of collection of Automation’s judgment pending appeal upon posting a bond to cover interest accrued between the original judgment date and the date of the judgment on remand. The amount set by the trial court to obtain a stay did not include interest accrued on the unpaid portion of the judgment. We hold that Automation is entitled to recover post-judgment interest accrued on the judgment. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is vacated in part and modified in part. As vacated and modified, the judgment is affirmed.

This case arises from a dispute over an alleged partnership. Douglas Cofer (“Cofer”) filed suit in the Chancery Court for Bradley County (“the Trial Court”) against Donnie Harris and Marcia Harris (“the Harrises”, collectively). Cofer alleged that the Harrises were successors in a partnership established between Cofer and the Harrises’ father, Homer Harris, regarding the development of a trailer park on Homer Harris’s land. After a trial, the Trial Court found that, rather than a partnership, a lease relationship existed between the parties. The Trial Court awarded the Harrises damages for unpaid rent. Cofer appeals, raising various issues. The Harrises raise one issue on appeal concerning the calculation of damages. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in all respects.

The defendant, Timothy Leon McKenzie, pled guilty to theft of more than $10,000 and forgery, receiving an agreed term of ten years probation in conjunction with a grant of judicial diversion. Also included in the plea agreement was a condition that the defendant pay the victim of the crimes $157,900 in restitution at a rate of $1315 per month. Thereafter, the defendant was found to be in violation of his probation based upon his failure to report to his probation officer and failure to pay restitution as ordered. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years, which the court ordered to be served in confinement. The court further reaffirmed restitution due in the amount of $156,000 and ordered that payment of such restitution be made a condition of the defendant’s parole. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of confinement; (2) the trial court lacked the authority to impose the special condition that ordered the defendant to make restitution when he was paroled; and (3) the court erred in imposing the full amount of restitution absent an inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial could did not err in ordering a sentence of confinement. However, the court did lack the authority to impose payment of restitution as a condition of parole and did fail to appropriately determine the amount of restitution in consideration of the defendant’s ability to pay. As such, remand is necessary for a determination of the proper amount of restitution in this case.

The defendant, Antonio Turner, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery, all Class A felonies, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to concurrent terms of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction for each conviction. The sole issue he raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The trial court modified a previous custody order and named father the primary residential parent. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding a material change in circumstances. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s decision.
 

The Petitioner, Aisha Wiggins, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post-divorce dispute over father’s obligation to help pay for the parties’ child’s college education. We conclude that, pursuant to the parties’ permanent parenting plan, father is contractually obligated to continue paying support in the amount of $790 a month until the child reaches the age of 21 as long as the child is in college. We affirm the trial court’s decision as modified.
 

Plaintiff sued to recover for injuries sustained while riding a mechanical bull in a bar owned byDefendant. Defendantappeals the trial court’s determination that it was 100% at fault and resulting judgmentfor plaintiff. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm.
 

The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights on the ground that Father abandoned the child by engaging in conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the child’s welfare. Father appeals, contending that the pleadings did not allege abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground upon which termination was sought; Father also asserts that the trial court erred in denying his counter-petition for custody. Because we have concluded that the petitioners failed to plead abandonment by wanton disregard as a ground for termination, we vacate the termination of Father’s parental rights on that ground and remand for consideration of whether Father’s parental rights should be terminated based on a ground alleged in the petition or supplemental petition; we affirm the trial court’s denial of Father’s counterpetition for custody.
 

This is a declaratory judgment action filed pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-14102.The petitioner, who was convicted of three felony drug offenses in Georgia, was granted a full pardon by the State of Georgia that expressly restored his right to possess a firearm, now resides in Tennessee and desires to purchase and possess firearms. Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) makes it a Class E felony offense for a person, who has been “convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of force, violence or a deadly weapon” or who has been “convicted of a felony drug offense,” to possess a firearm in Tennessee. Therefore, Petitioner filed this action seeking a declaration that he would not be in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) by purchasing or possessing a firearm in Tennessee. The State of Tennessee responded to the petition by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Second Amendment, and article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution.The chancery court ruled that it had subject matter jurisdiction and denied the State’s Rule 12.02(1); however, the chancery court granted the State’s Rule 12.02(6) motion finding that the petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-17-1307(b)(1)(B) as applied to him under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution; article I, section 26 of the Tennessee Constitution,the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The State raises one issue on appeal, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed for that reason. We affirm the chancery court’s finding that it has subject matter jurisdiction. As for the decision to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6), we have determined that the complaint for declaratory relief states facts sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an actual controversy concerning the matter at issue; therefore, the chancery court erred by granting the State’s motion pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) instead of rendering a declaratory judgment as the facts and law require. Accordingly, the complaint for declaratory relief is reinstated and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

The Petitioner, Lemar Brooks, appeals as of right from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel regarding his convictions for two counts of premeditated first degree murder. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call two potential witnesses; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction regarding voluntary intoxication; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to request a jury out hearing” regarding the State’s cross-examination about a witness’ gang affiliation; (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prejudicial remarks made by the State during closing arguments; (5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object “to the selective and vindictive prosecution by the State”; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on the “physical facts” rule;(7)appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the voluntary intoxication jury instruction issue on appeal; (8) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the State’s prejudicial remarks on appeal; (9) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the State’s “selective and vindictive prosecution” on appeal; (10) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the standard of review used by the trial court in denying the Petitioner’s petition for writ of error coram nobis; (11) the cumulative effect of trial and appellate counsels’ errors establishes that their performance was deficient and that the Petitioner was prejudiced by their performance. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Tracy Glenn, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her Class E felony theft conviction, arguing that she was denied a fair trial and received ineffective assistance of counsel because the jury was not instructed on facilitation as a lesser-included offense. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The parties agreed to submit the valuation of Defendants’ membership in Plaintiff LLC to arbitration. Following arbitration, Defendants moved to vacate the arbitrator’s award. The trial court denied the motion and entered final judgment in the matter. Defendants appeal. We affirm.
 

A show cause order was entered in this case on November 21, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as premature. The appellant has responded to the show cause order within the time specified, but the argument presented in the response does not appear to present good cause for maintaining this case in this court. The review of the record reveals that the judgment to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3(a). Specifically, the order of dismissal does not address the counterclaims filed by the appellees below or finally resolve the award of attorneys’ fees to the appellees. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as premature.

 A jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, John C. Crim, of eight counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies, and six counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years old, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced him to an effective 212-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) his sentence is excessive. Upon our review, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and the judgments of conviction. We further agree with the state that the matter should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
 

Defendant-Appellant, Kenneth Ryan Mallady, was found not guilty by reason of insanity for the offenses of first degree premeditated murder, attempted first degree premeditated murder, and aggravated assault. He appeals the trial court’s order denying discharge from involuntary commitment under the terms of a mandatory outpatient treatment program. Mallady argues that the trial court’s finding that he was unsuitable for discharge was in error because it contradicted the clear weight of the evidence. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for the entry of an order discharging Mallady to mandatory outpatient treatment.

The Defendant, Sidney S. Stanton, III, appeals from the Warren County Circuit Court’s order denying the Defendant relief from the assistant district attorney general’s denial of pretrial diversion. After a hearing, the trial court affirmed the denial of diversion and found no abuse of prosecutorial discretion but granted the Defendant’s motion for this interlocutory appeal. The Defendant contends that the assistant district attorney general abused his discretion by denying the Defendant’s application for pretrial diversion and that the trial court erred in declining to grant certiorari, finding that there was no abuse of prosecutorial discretion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff and others sustained injuries in a single car accident and sued defendant construction company and the Tennessee Department of Transportation, alleging that defendant construction company had recently completed work on that section of the highway where the accident occurred, and that a low point in the pavement caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and wreck. Defendant answered, stating that they had completed the required construction on that section of the highway, and the State had accepted its work pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §12-4-501 et seq. which provides upon proper completion of the work the contractor "is discharged from all liability to any party". Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court granted and plaintiff appealed. We hold that summary judgment for the defendant in this case was proper, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The petitioner, Ronallen Hardy, filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his four felony convictions and the accompanying effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years, alleging that his counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant entered a negotiated best interest plea to three counts of theft over $1,000. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Defendant received an effective sentence of six years, to be served on probation, and the State dismissed other pending charges against him. The parties agreed to allow the trial court to determine whether the Defendant’s probationary status should be governed by the judicial diversion provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for diversion. The Defendant now appeals that judgment. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Randy Ray McFarlin, also known as Mac Ray McFarlane, appeals as of right his Rutherford County Criminal Court jury convictions of one count of first degree premeditated murder, see T.C.A. §39-2402(a) (1981), and one count of second degree murder, see id. § 39-2403(a), for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the indictment, that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by admitting (1) scenes from the movie Miller’s Crossing, (2) evidence of the defendant’s and victim’s participation in a 1982 robbery, (3) evidence of the defendant’s abusive treatment of his ex-wife, and (4) photographs of the victim’s partially decomposed body. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Randy Flippo (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief, alleging (1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his guilty plea to theft of property between five hundred and one thousand dollars; and (2) that his plea was not voluntarily made. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed solely as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Demeturus Alexander, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael V. Morris, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated robbery and resulting thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. Specifically, the petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to object to the trial court’s sentencing him in violation of ex post facto protections; that appellate counsel failed to address the lack of a written waiver of ex post facto protections;and that trial counsel failed to review discovery,namely a surveillance video of the robbery, with him. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.