APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Walter Thomas Godsey, Jr., was convicted by a Chester County Circuit Court jury of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is the second appeal arising from a disputed “temporary” conservatorship. Three issues are presented: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of the protection and supervision of the court; which party is responsible for the costs of the proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a); and which party is responsible for discretionary costs under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). The petitioner was appointed “Temporary Conservator” and served in this fiduciary capacity for thirty-one months until June of 2010, at which time the trial court terminated the conservatorship upon the finding that the respondent was no longer a “disabled person” as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-101(7). Over the objection of the ward, the trial court assessed the costs of the conservatorship against the respondent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a “fiduciary” was appointed, and discretionary costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2) upon the finding that the petitioner was the “prevailing party.” The respondent contends this was error because the conservator was merely appointed the “temporary conservator” and the petition to create the conservatorship was ultimately dismissed. We find the evidence presented to the trial court on November 14, 2007, clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservator of his person and property; we find no error with the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a conservator was appointed; and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs against the respondent under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). Thus, we affirm.

We granted the application of June Chastain Patterson (“the Proponent”), which sought permission to appeal an order of the trial court holding, as a matter of law, that the “will” of Thomas Grady Chastain (“the Deceased”) was not executed in compliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104 (2007). The Deceased signed the affidavit of attesting witnesses on September 4, 2004, which affidavit was attached to the purported will of the same date; he also initialed the bottom of the first page of the “will,” but did not sign the second page of the two-page “will.” The Proponent appeals. We reverse.

This appeal involves claims of defamation. After words were exchanged in the course of a parenting dispute, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant father of the plaintiff’s girlfriend’s daughter. A bench trial was held in which both parties were self-represented.
The trial court held in favor of the defendant father. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Opinion. I believe that the answer to the issue of “Whether the Will was signed in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-1-104” is a simple no. The majority, however, strives mightily to arrive at a conclusion that the Testator’s signature on a document other than the purported Will somehow satisfies the statutory requirement that the Testator signed the purported Will.

The Defendant-Appellant, Patsy Lynn McCoy, appeals the DeKalb County Criminal Court’s revocation of her probation in two cases. She originally pled guilty to aggravated burglary, burglary, and theft under $500. She received an effective seven-year sentence, all of which was suspended to probation after sixty days’ incarceration. On appeal, McCoy argues that (1)Tennessee’s statutory scheme allowing incarceration after a revocation of probation based on judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence is unconstitutional, and (2) the trial court erred in revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the sentences in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on her claims for statutory procurement of breach of contract, common law inducement of breach of contract, and tortious interference with business relationship. Finding that plaintiff failed to establish one or more essential element of each claim, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.
 

This appeal concerns the application of the locality rule in a medical malpractice case. The trial court excluded the testimony of the plaintiff’s medical expert, based on the locality rule. On this basis, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant physician. The plaintiff appeals. We vacate the order excluding the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert and the grant of summary judgment, and remand for reconsideration in light of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s recent decision Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011).

Defendant-Appellant, Justin Gibson, pled guilty to driving under the influence with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent or more, a Class A misdemeanor. He agreed to a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, all of which was suspended after seven days’ incarceration. Gibson entered a conditional plea agreement and attempted to reserve a certified question of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. The certified question of law addressed whether the search of Gibson’s home violated his constitutional rights and whether evidence obtained as a result should be suppressed. On appeal, he argues that the warrantless search was not justified by either consent or exigent circumstances. We conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the order stating the certified question was not filed until after Gibson filed his notice of appeal. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Kevin D. Buford, of felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of life for the felony murder conviction and ten years for the attempted especially aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This appeal involves a nuisance claim. The parties own adjoining homes in a neighborhood of zero-lot line homes. The defendant’s air conditioning condenser unit is outside his home, between the parties’ homes. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant, alleging that the noise of the defendant’s air conditioning unit constituted a nuisance, and seeking abatement of the nuisance, money damages, and injunctive relief. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff now appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff filed an action against the City of Murfreesboro pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, claiming a dangerous and unsafe roadway caused an automobile accident in which her son was killed. The trial court determined the City had no notice of an unsafe or dangerous condition, and entered judgment in favor of the City. Upon appeal, we reversed on the issue of notice, holding that previous accidents on adjacent areas of the roadway provided sufficient notice to the City of a potentially dangerous condition. Upon remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and assessed 60% fault to the City. We vacate and remand for further findings consistent with Rule 52 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

The defendant, Miguel Angel Salinas, entered a best-interest plea to one count of possession of marijuana, a Class D felony, and one count of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to sell over 300 grams, a Class B felony. Pursuant to the negotiated agreement, the defendant received an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. The only issue which remained undetermined by the agreement was whether the defendant’s ten-year sentence would be served concurrently with or consecutively to a twenty-five year Georgia sentence which he had received in 2004. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the separate sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant contends that this was error. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences.

A Washington County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Ryan Love, of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. He received a suspended sentence of two years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the element of serious bodily injury. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Insured was injured by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. Insured filed a claim with Insurer seeking uninsured motorist coverage benefits and settled for an amount that was less than his actual damages. Insured then sued Insurer seeking damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Act. Insurer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because Insured failed to allege sufficient facts to support any of his causes of action.

Appellant, the owner of several lots in a subdivision managed and maintained by the Appellee home owners association, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee on the question of whether Appellant owed an increase in dues and fees on his lots, and the denial of his counter-claims for fraud, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, outrageous conduct, and invalidity of the restrictive covenants on grounds that these causes of action were barred by the applicable statutes of limitation or the doctrine of laches. We conclude that the Appellee followed the correct procedure in amending its restrictive covenants to increase the amount of dues. However, because the trial court did not make findings, as required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.04, concerning the grounds for its application of laches, we cannot review the question of whether Appellant’s counter-claims were properly dismissed. Vacated and remanded.

On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s order denying his motion to reinstate probation. Upon review, we conclude that the appellant does not have a Rule 3, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, appeal as of right from the order. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Michael Harden, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s order granting the forfeiture of his automobile. The forfeiture proceedings were instituted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-33-101 through -111 following his guilty pleas to aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. On appeal, Harden argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the forfeiture because the delay in the institution of forfeiture proceedings constituted a violation of his due process rights. Upon review, we determine that Harden does not have an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

James E. Huddleston and his wife, Patricia M. Huddleston (“the Sellers”), sold their house to G. Kenneth Campbell and his wife, Teresa J. Campbell (“the Buyers’). The Buyers inquired of the Sellers as to whether there had been flooding in the house. The Sellers disclosed that there had been one flood in the basement to a depth of six inches. During the course of some later renovations, the Buyers became aware the Sellers had indicated, on a wall stud, that there had been a 1998 flood in the basement to a depth of 38 inches. They

A Wilson county jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony Whited, of second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a violent offender to serve twenty years at 100% in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erroneously ruled that the State could cross-examine the Defendant about two prior misdemeanor convictions if the Defendant chose to testify; (3) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to give evidence in the form of an opinion when (a) the State did not tender the witness as an expert and (b) the testimony was outside any area of expertise possibly attributable to the witness; (4) the trial court erroneously overruled the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (5) the trial court’s jury instructions illegally shifted the burden of proof to the Defendant; and (6) the trial court erred by using the Defendant’s prior convictions to determine the length of the Defendant’s sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, David Steven Austin, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence, second offense, and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation except for forty-five days. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Alvin Dortch, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of making a false report, a Class D felony. See T.C.A.§ 39-16-502(a) (2010). The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to three years, with 120 days’ confinement and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying judicial diversion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following the discovery by police of numerous materials commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine on property controlled by Defendant Randall Keith Smith, he was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Department of Correction for manufacturing methamphetamine and to a concurrent eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant Nicholas Ryan Flood, who was in the company of Defendant Smith when the materials commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine were discovered on the property, was convicted of a single count of manufacturing methamphetamine. Defendant Flood was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Smith claims that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence seized from his property under the auspices of a search warrant. Defendant Flood claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. After carefully reviewing the record and the defendants’ arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Daniel Decker, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of first-degree premeditated murder and is currently serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition because the proof presented established that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. More specifically, the petitioner alleges that the postconviction court erred in   multiple aspects, specifically: (1) that the courtheld that an expert witness had the duty and burden to present her opinions more completely at trial; (2) that the court erred by admitting a letter written by the petitioner to trial counsel after the conviction; (3) that the court should haverecused itself in the matter; (4) denying  relief because the petitioner met his burden of proof under the Strickland standard to establish ineffective assistance of counsel; (5) that the court erred by not reviewing trial counsel’s performance under the Cronic standard; and (6) that the court erred by failing to address all issues raised by the petitioner in its order denying relief. Following our review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of the petition.

This appeal concerns post-divorce parenting time. In the first appeal in this case, this Court reviewed the trial court’s denial of any parenting time for the appellant father with his daughter. This Court remanded the case for a hearing to determine whether parenting time
with the father would result in substantial harm to the parties’ daughter. On remand, the trial court held a hearing in which the evidence consisted of the mother’s testimony on her observations of the daughter’s reaction when the topic of the father arose. Based on this, the trial court again denied both supervised and unsupervised visitation to the father, and enjoined the father from contacting his daughter in any fashion. The father appeals. We find the evidence insufficient to support complete denial of parenting time, vacate the trial court’s order, and remand the case for further proceedings before a different trial judge.