APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

An employee suffered a partial amputation of his left index finger. Compensability of the injury was not contested. At trial, the employee argued that his disability award should be apportioned to the hand. His employer contended that the award should be limited to the index finger. The trial court agreed with the employee and awarded 52% permanent partial disability to the hand. The employer appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The employee injured her back at work and the injury required surgical treatment. The employee returned to work but was later terminated for violation of her employer’s attendance and absenteeism policy. The trial court found the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The trial court, however, adopted the impairment rating that the employee’s evaluating physician expressed and awarded 90% permanent partial disability benefits, the maximum award permitted by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d). The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by adopting the evaluating physician’s impairment rating, by its use of the six-times multiplier on the basis of facts not in evidence, and by finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We agree that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings concerning employee’s impairment and the six-times multiplier. Accordingly, we modify the award.

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion for a default judgment. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.
 

Plaintiff and others sustained injuries in a single car accident and sued defendant construction company and the Tennessee Department of Transportation, alleging that defendant construction company had recently completed work on that section of the highway where the accident occurred, and that a low point in the pavement caused plaintiff to lose control of his vehicle and wreck. Defendant answered, stating that they had completed the required construction on that section of the highway, and the State had accepted its work pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §12-4-501 et seq. which provides upon proper completion of the work the contractor "is discharged from all liability to any party". Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court granted and plaintiff appealed. We hold that summary judgment for the defendant in this case was proper, and affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal calls into question the proper procedure for obtaining judicial review of a local legislative body’s land use decision under the “Jackson Law,” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-211-701 to -707 (2011). The opponents of a coal ash landfill, approved by the Cumberland County Commission, filed a petition for a statutory writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Cumberland County seeking judicial review of the Commission’s decision. The trial court dismissed the petition because it was not verified as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-8-106 (2000). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Brundage v. Cumberland Cnty., No. E2010-00089-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3025538, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2010). We granted the petitioners’ application for permission to appeal because the Jackson Law does not specifically define the procedure for seeking judicial review of a local legislative body’s decisions. We have determined (1) that a local legislative body’s decision under the Jackson Law may be challenged either by a petition for a statutory writ of certiorari or by a complaint for declaratory judgment and (2) that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by failing to treat the statutory petition for writ of certiorari as a complaint for declaratory judgment.

The defendant, Charles Steven Shivers, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years at thirty percent for the attempted murder and to a consecutive eighteen years at one hundred percent for the especially aggravated robbery, for a total effective sentence of forty-three years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress the victim’s identification testimony,erred by having an ex parte meeting with a juror during deliberations, and erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After carefully reviewing the record and the parties’ arguments, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant Danita Lanette Wilson was convicted of two counts of aggravated child neglect (counts one and two),conspiracy to possess a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell (count three), possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell (counts four and eight), attempted aggravated child neglect (count six), reckless endangerment (count seven), tampering with evidence (count nine), resisting arrest (count ten), and possession of drug paraphernalia (count eleven). The trial court merged the two convictions for aggravated child neglect into a single count, referred to as “count one.” The trial court sentenced DefendantWilson to seventeen years for aggravated child neglect(count one); five years for conspiracy to possess a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell (count three); ten years for each conviction of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell (counts four and eight); ten years for attempted aggravated child neglect (count six); eleven months, twenty-nine days for reckless endangerment (count seven); five years for tampering with evidence (count nine); six months for resisting arrest (count ten); and eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia (count eleven). The trial court further ordered that Defendant Wilson’s seventeen-year sentence in count one, her ten-year sentence in count four, and her ten-year sentence in count six be served consecutively for an effective thirty-seven-year sentence. The jury convicted Defendant Tiffany Nicole Norman of two counts of child neglect (counts one and two), facilitation of conspiracy to possess a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell (count three), facilitation to possess .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell (count four), possession of drug paraphernalia (count five), and two counts of attempted aggravated child neglect (counts six and seven). The trial court also merged Defendant Norman’s convictions for child neglect into a single count, referred to as “count one.” The trial court sentenced Defendant Norman to four years for child neglect (count one); six years for facilitation of conspiracy to possessa Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell(count three); nine years for facilitation to possess .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell (count four); eleven months, twenty-nine days for possession of drug paraphernalia (count five); ten years for each conviction of attempted aggravated child neglect (counts six and seven). The trial court further ordered that Defendant Norman’s four-year sentence in count one,her nine-year sentence in count four, and her ten-year sentence in count six be served consecutively for an effective twenty-three-year sentence.

This case concerns the termination of Lawrence F. Goodine (“Goodine”) from his job as a police officer for the City of Chattanooga (“Chattanooga”). Goodine was terminated from his job based on certain incidents that resulted in police internal affairs investigations and charges. Goodine appealed his termination to the Chattanooga City Council (“the City Council”), which upheld his termination. Goodine then filed an application for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”). Goodine sought reversal of the City Council’s decision and his reinstatement as a police officer. The Trial Court affirmed the City Council’s decision. Goodine appeals, raising a number of issues. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

The order appealed in this matter is not a final judgment. Appellant failed to respond to this Court's Order permitting Appellant to obtain entry of a final judgment or else show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of a final judgment.  Consequently, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

In this post-conviction appeal Petitioner Leonard Edward Smith challenges his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 death sentence for the Webb murder. We affirm Smith’s conviction and sentence for the Pierce murder, holding that Smith’s post-conviction claims in the Pierce case were barred by the statute of limitations and that the statute should not be equitably tolled. We affirm Smith’s conviction for the Webb murder, holding that Smith did not demonstrate that he suffered prejudice resulting from his counsel’s ineffective assistance in failing to adequately question the potential jurors during voir dire at his 1989 trial in the Webb case regarding their past experiences either as a victim or with a victim of crime. We vacate Smith’s death sentence, holding that Smith’s counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to adequately investigate and present evidence supporting his motion to recuse the judge at his resentencing hearing, which resulted in a denial of Smith’s due process right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. We further hold that Smith is entitled to a new hearing on the question of whether he was intellectually disabled at the time of the Webb murder because the post-conviction court and the Court of Criminal Appeals applied an incorrect legal standard in determining Smith’s functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) under the principles recently espoused in Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221, 230 (Tenn. 2011).

A Monroe County jury convicted the Defendant, Todd Joseph Sweet, of two counts of forgery and two counts of criminal simulation, and the trial court sentenced him to sixteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss for failing to try him within 180 days of his transfer, as proscribed by the Interstate Compact on Detainers; (2) the trial court improperly denied his request for severance; (3) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial based on the State’s introduction of evidence of the Defendant’s other crimes; (4) the trial court improperly refused to strike the State’s “Notice of Intent to Seek Enhanced Punishment and/or Notice of Impeaching Convictions”; (5) the trial court improperly refused to excuse six jurors who had media knowledge of other crimes the Defendant allegedly committed; (6) the trial court improperly allowed the State to re-call witness A.J. Smith in order to prove venue; (7) the State failed to prove venue; (8) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury; (9) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (10) the State failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 when it failed to provide the Defendant’s trial counsel with letters written by the Defendant and intercepted by the Monroe County Sheriff’s Department; and (11) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a  thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is a parental rights termination case in which Karen C. and Raymond C. (collectively the “Grandparents”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Valerie H. (“Mother”) and Ronnie H. (“Father”) to minor children, Dylan H. and Jade H. (collectively the “Children”). Temporary custody of the Children was awarded to the Grandparents in July 2007. The Grandparents, alleging abandonment, persistence of conditions, and failure to adhere to a permanency plan, filed a petition to terminate parental rights in February 2010. Following a bench trial, the court dismissed the petition as to Father but found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment and that it was in the best interest of the Children to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals. We do not believe the Grandparents proved by clear and convincing evidence that Mother abandoned the Children. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as may be necessary.

A Shelby County jury found the Petitioner, Theron Davis, guilty of attempted second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the convictions in State v. Theron Davis, No. W2002-00446-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 21339000, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 28, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 6, 2003). The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Roderick Baldwin, appeals the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court revoking his community corrections sentence for his convictions for aggravated criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor, and two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentences in confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an action to recover uninsured motorist benefits following a motor vehicle collision involving the plaintiff and another vehicle. The driver of the defendant vehicle left the scene and has not been identified.The owner of the vehicle was subsequently identified, but denied knowing the identity of the driver and claimed no one had permission to operate the vehicle at the time of the accident. The named defendants in this action are the owner of the vehicle and John Doe, the unknown driver. Plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist insurance carrier, Nationwide Insurance Co., is an unnamed defendant. The defendant owner has liability insurance coverage through State Farm Insurance Co. The plaintiffs settled all claims against the defendant-owner and State Farm for $90,000, $10,000 less than the uninsured motorist limits with Nationwide. Thereafter, the plaintiffs continued to pursue their claims against Nationwide for uninsured motorist benefits, insisting the settlement with the owner of the vehicle did not bar their claims against the uninsured John Doe driver. Upon motion for summary judgment by Nationwide, the trial court found that because the owner of the vehicle had $100,000 of liability insurance, there was not an “uninsured motor vehicle.” Based on this finding, the trial court summarily dismissed the plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist claim against Nationwide. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
 

The plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against not only the manufacturer, but also the dealership, as seller. Later, the plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to the seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer. Over one year after the order granting nonsuit, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy, and, in 2009, the plaintiff again sued the seller, alleging both negligence and strict liability in tort. The seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion but granted an interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. This Court granted the seller’s application for permission to appeal to consider the application of the saving statute to these unique circumstances. We hold that the plaintiff may proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent. Because, however, the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of the seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations is a bar to recovery under that theory. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for trial.
 

The petitioner, Kevin Joel Hernandez, appeals the Davidson CountyCriminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone and resulting fifteen-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. The appellant contends thathe received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel (1) failed to investigate his case adequately, consult with him, or prepare for trial and (2) failed to request a jury instruction on facilitation. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court

I concur in the judgment of the Court, but I do not join the majority’s conclusion that a product liability action based on strict liability does not accrue against a non-manufacturing seller until the manufacturer “has been judicially declared insolvent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-106(b) (2000). Rather, I would hold that a product liability cause of action accrues “on the date of the personal injury,” as provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-104(b)(1) (2000). However, I would hold that, with respect to claims against a non-manufacturing seller based on strict liability, the one-year statute of limitations is tolled until the manufacturer “has been judicially declared insolvent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-106(b).
 

The Petitioner, Mannaka Oung, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2000 conviction for aggravated assault and resulting three-year suspended sentence. Oung filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to advise him of the plea’s possible effects on his immigration status and potential deportation. The post-conviction court concluded that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed the petition. On appeal, Oung argues that his claim is based on a constitutional right that did not exist at the time of his plea, such that the statute of limitations does not bar his claim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Davidson CountyCriminalCourt jury convicted the appellant, Jamar Ed-Wae Scott, of two counts of first degree felony murder, two counts of second degree murder, and two counts of attempted robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of life plus eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by allowing a witness to testify about a statement made by a co-defendant pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(1.2)(E), the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted the defendant of two counts of aggravated assault, one count of burglary of a vehicle, and two counts of theft under $500. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant as a Range I standard offender to three years on each of the aggravated assault convictions; one year on the burglary conviction; and eleven months, twenty-nine days on each of the misdemeanor theft convictions. The trial court ordered the sentences on the felony convictions to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of seven years. On appeal, the defendant claims five errors: (1) the trial court wrongfully deprived him of his right to counsel; (2) the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objections to the defendant’s case; (3) the trial court erred in its handling of one of the jurors; (4) the jury failed to follow its instructions; and (5) the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion and in failing to apply mitigating factors when imposing sentence. We hold that the defendant is entitled to no relief and affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order revoking the community corrections sentence of the Defendant, Montarius A. Williams, and ordering him to be incarcerated. The Defendant contends (1) that some of the proof offered in support of revocation should have been suppressed as the result of an illegal search and (2) that the evidence is not sufficient to support the trial court’s decision. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Gibson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, David Hooper Climer, Jr., of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of life and two years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the premeditated murder conviction and shows he was insane when he abused the victim’s corpse, (2) the trial court should have granted his motion to sever, (3) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress his statements to police, (4) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, and (5) the trial court should have dismissed a prospective juror for cause. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of first degree premeditated murder but that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The appellant’s first degree murder conviction is reduced to second degree murder, and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The appellant’s conviction of abuse of a corpse is affirmed.

Ricky Nelson (“the Petitioner”) filed a motion for post-conviction deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, requesting DNA analysis of a knife used in the perpetration of a rape. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After reviewing the record, we have determined, in light of the recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 56 (Tenn. 2011), that a remand of the case to the postconviction court is necessary for the post-conviction court to consider and rule upon whether the Petitioner has satisfied the first of four factors necessary for the Petitioner to demonstrate his right to DNA analysis and to address whether the Powers decision would affect the postconviction court’s analysis and finding on the second of the four factors.

This is a dispute between two neighbors over the use of land. The plaintiff, Carol Phillips, charged the defendant, Todd Shrader, with trespass. She sought an injunction and damages, along with removal of encroaching structures. The trial court dismissed Ms. Phillips’s action, finding it barred by Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-103. Ms. Phillips appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.