APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The husband and wife had separated, and the wife then filed for an Order of Protection against the husband, which was granted by the Trial Court. The wife then filed a Complaint for divorce, which was ultimately granted and in the final divorce decree the Trial Court incorporated the Marital Dissolution Agreement which contained a mutual restraining order which restrained the parties from coming about, harassing or threatening or assaulting each other. Subsequently, the wife filed a motion in this case to extend the Order of Protection, and after an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court extended the Order of Protection for five years, as allowed by statute. The husband appealed, and on appeal argues that the divorce decree, voided the Order of Protection. We hold that the Trial Judge acted in accordance with the statute in extending the Order of Protection, and the divorce decree did not remove jurisdiction from the Trial Court to issue the extended Order of Protection.
 

An Obion County jury convicted the Defendant, Walter Andrew Ware, of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and aggravated child endangerment. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced him to sixteen years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented, which was circumstantial, is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court made an improper ruling during voir dire. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. While the appellant father was incarcerated, the child was taken into protective custody because of the mother’s drug use. The mother surrendered her parental rights. The father remained incarcerated. After a trial, the father’s parental rights were terminated on several grounds, including failure to comply with the permanency plan. The father appeals, and on appeal the State waives all grounds except for failure to comply with the permanency plan. After review of the record, we conclude that this ground for termination was not established because the record does not show clear and convincing evidence that the Department of Children’s Services made reasonable efforts to assist the father and to reunify parent and child. Therefore, we reverse.

The defendant, Deangelo M. Radley, pleaded guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, see T.C.A. § 39-17-1307 (2006), and attempted to reserve the right to appeal a certified question of law, see Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2), concerning the legality of the vehicle stop leading to his arrest. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant failed to properly certify a question of law that is dispositive of the case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The trial court granted a divorce to the parents of three minor children. The permanent parenting plan incorporated into the decree of divorce designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ twin sons and younger daughter and granted the father standard visitation. The parties lived in Warren County prior to the divorce, in close proximityto the school the children attended. Two years after divorce, Father filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan, and Mother moved to another county. The children all testified in chambers that they wanted to spend half the time with their father and to remain enrolled in the Warren County schools. The court concluded that there had been a material change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the two boys that their parenting be shared equally between the parties, with custody alternating weekly. The residential plan for the nine year-old girl was left unchanged. Mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in ruling that there had been a material change of circumstances, and she asks us to restore the previous parenting plan. We affirm the trial court, but modify the judgment to designate Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ sons.
 

The defendant, Arthur Donahue, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by basing its revocation decision on his mere technical violations of the sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Corey Hennings, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his attempted first degree murder conviction, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The petitioner, Jackie F. Curry, appeals the Johnson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

A Hardin County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Kenneth D. Hubanks, for possession with intent to sell more than .5 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to sell more than one-half ounce of marijuana, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, obtained by execution of a search warrant upon his residence, which the trial court denied. The Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendre to all of the charges but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the search warrant established probable cause to search his residence. After review, we conclude that the Defendant has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This is a parental termination case. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of mother and father on the grounds of persistence of the conditions that required the child’s removal and substantial noncompliance with the terms of the permanency plans. Both parents appealed. The mother and father argue the Department of Children’s Services did not clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination of parental rights and did not clearly and convincingly prove termination of parental rights was in the best interests of the child. The mother also argues the trial court erred in determining she waived her right to appear at the termination hearing. We affirm.

The defendant, Will Rogers Salmon, pled guilty in the Sevier County Circuit Court to DUI, first offense, and violation of the implied consent law and was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail, suspended to supervised probation following the service of forty-eight hours. As a condition of his guilty pleas, the defendant attempted to reserve the following two certified questions of law: (1) whether reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, justified his traffic stop and detention; and (2) whether the arresting officer’s intrusion into his vehicle constituted a custodial environment that required the suppression of any post-arrest statements pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Based on our review, we agree with the State that the trial court properly found that the traffic stop and detention were justified. We further agree that the defendant’s second certified question of law is not dispositive of his case and, thus, is not properly before this court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Paul Leon Cox, filed a motion to suppress evidence derived from a traffic stop conducted by a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) officer outside of TVA property. The trial court granted the motion, and the State appeals the trial court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Tobias Senter, a/k/a Toby Senter, was convicted by a Cocke County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a life sentence imposed by a federal district court. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Majid Farraj, pled guilty to theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to five years in the workhouse. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Valentino L. Dyer, was convicted by a Rhea County jury of especially aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, reckless endangerment, and aggravated assault. The trial court modified the conviction for especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary, merged the convictions for aggravated assault and reckless endangerment into the especially aggravated robbery conviction, and sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent terms of eight years at thirty-five percent for the aggravated burglary conviction and thirty-two years at 100 percent for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively to the defendant’s sentences in another case. The defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the indictment was defective for failing to state sufficient facts; (2) whether he adequately waived his right to testify in his own defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by disallowing evidence of the victims’ alleged activity as drug dealers to show their reputation for dishonesty; (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions; and (5) whether the trial court properly sentenced him as a Range II offender and whether the sentences were excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The losing candidate filed an election contest alleging that the election commission made a mistake byplacing the candidate who eventually won the election on the ballot. The election commission admitted iterred in determining thatthe candidate who later won had a sufficient number of valid signatures on her nominating petition. The trial court found that the losing candidate failed to carry his burden of proof and dismissed the case. He appealed. We affirm, finding that this was not a proper election contest and that a challenge to a person’s appearance on a ballot should ordinarily be filed before the election.
 

The petition filed by the father asked that the father become primary residential parent of the child, and that child support be set pursuant to Tennessee child support guidelines. At an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Judge granted the father temporary custody of the child and gave the mother parenting time with the child on two weekends each month. The father's obligation of child support was suspended, and the Trial Court set the matter for further hearing five months later. At the conclusion of that hearing the Trial Court determined that the mother's income was "not less than $90,000.00 per year" and ordered child support and a back judgment pendente lite for child support. The mother appealed. We hold the Trial Court's Judgment should be modified because the evidence does not support income at the level set by the Trial Court. We modify the amount downward to $52,000.00 a year and remand for the purposes of establishing child support in accordance with these guidelines.
 

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. The jury entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The appellant, Willie Michael Richardson, pled guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to initiating a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, and evading arrest. The trial court merged the first two convictions and sentenced the appellant to twelve years in confinement. For the evading arrest conviction, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months, twenty nine days to be served consecutively to the twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that his twelve-year sentence is excessive and that consecutive sentencing is improper. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a dispute concerning a contract to execute mutual wills. Ina Ruth Brown(“Mrs. Brown”), and her husband, Roy Brown, Jr. (“Mr. Brown”), executed mutual wills as agreed by contract. After Mr. Brown’s death, Mrs. Brown executed a new will. Mrs. Brown died. Rockford Evan Estes (“Defendant”), Mrs. Brown’s son, submitted the new will for probate. Mr. Brown’s adult children, Roy E. Brown, III, Joan Brown Moyers, and Donna Brown Ellis (“the Plaintiffs”) filed this will contest suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County, Probate Division (“the Trial Court”), contesting the new will on the basis that, among other things, the mutual wills between Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown were irrevocable. Both the Plaintiffs and Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The Trial Court denied Defendant’s motion, granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and voided the new will created by Mrs. Brown. Defendant appeals. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion for summary judgment because the Trial Court did have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this will contest based on this breach of contract claim. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in granting the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment after also finding that the June 13, 2002 contract to execute mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Malcolm Dudley Thomas, of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by ruling that the State’s rebuttal witnesses could testify about the victim’s character for truthfulness and (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial by placing or attempting to place prejudicial and irrelevant facts before the jury. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State’s rebuttal witnesses to testify about the victim’s character for truthfulness. Therefore, the appellant’s conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

When Father failed to pay child support as ordered, the State filed a petition for contempt against him. The juvenile court found him in civil contempt based upon his willful nonpayment.  We affirm.

The defendant, Jason Wayne White, appeals the revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother and Father, the divorced parents of two minor children, filed a joint motion in the trial court to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court denied the joint motion and Mother appeals.

A pro se litigant failed to pay the court costs resulting from complaints he had filed, and the Circuit Court entered an order in 2006 that allowed it to refer future complaints by that litigant to a Special Master for screening. The court’s order directed the Special Master to determine whether the court costs had been satisfied and to file a written report recommending whether the complaint should be allowed to proceed or be dismissed. The trial court was empowered to dismiss the complaint without a hearing if the recommendation of the Special Master was that the case not proceed. In the appeal before us, the litigant appealed from a general sessions judgment that denied him any relief for the purchase of a lawn mower that he alleged was defective. The Special Master’s investigation revealed that the litigant had failed to pay any of the court costs previously assessed against him and that additional costs had accrued since then. In accordance with the Special Master’s recommendation, the court dismissed his complaint. We find that the trial court acted within its authority, and we accordingly affirm.