APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Jarvis Nichols, appeals the judgment of the Blount County Circuit Court, revoking his probation and imposing service of the remainder of his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering service of the balance of the sentence in confinement when less severe sanctions were available. Upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner, Billy Ray Irick, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, which challenged his 1987 convictions of felony murder and aggravated rape and resulting death sentence. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the coram nobis court erred by ruling that due process considerations did not toll the oneyear statute of limitations applicable to coram nobis petitions, see T.C.A. § 27-7-103 (2000), and that the newly discovered evidence “would not have” resulted in a different verdict had it been presented to the convicting jury. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Petitioner, Timmy Reagan, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. See State v. Timmy Reagan, No. M2002-01472-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1114588 (Tenn. Crim. App, at Nashville, May 19, 2004). The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed. See Timmy Reagan v. State, No. M2007-01396-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 230355 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 2, 2009). On appeal, this Court questioned the timeliness of the petition for post-conviction relief and remanded the case to the post-conviction court “for a determination of whether the petition was filed within one year of this court’s opinion affirming the petitioner’s conviction or whether due process requires the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations in this case.” Id. at *1. On remand, the post-conviction court first determined that Petitioner’s post-conviction petition was untimely. Then, the post-conviction court held that trial counsel failed to withdraw pursuant to Rule 14 of the Rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and that his failure to withdraw or pursue an appeal was a misrepresentation to Petitioner of his intent to seek permission to appeal. Id. Based on this finding, the post-conviction court determined that trial counsel’s actions denied Petitioner the opportunity to seek post-conviction relief in a timely manner. The post-conviction court held that the statute of limitations for filing Petitioner’s petition should have been tolled. Then the post-conviction court reviewed the post-conviction petition and the transcript from the previous post-conviction hearing as well as the trial record, and agreed with the prior determination of the post-conviction court that Petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief. On appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, we determine: that the post-conviction court properly determined that Petitioner’s petition was untimely but improperly determined that due process required the tolling of the statute of limitations for Petitioner’s post-conviction petition. Therefore, the post-conviction court improperly addressed the merits of the petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.

The petitioner, Brian Eric McGowen, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and attempted especially aggravated robbery and resulting effective sentence of life plus forty years to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A jury convicted the defendant, James Alton Walton, of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Christopher Jake Reynolds, was indicted by the Giles County Grand Jury in October of 2003 for two counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine. After a jury trial in June of 2005, Appellant was found not guilty of Count One and guilty of the lesser included offense of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell in Count Two. Appellant was sentenced to thirty years as a Career Offender. A motion for new trial was denied. Nearly one and a half years later, Appellant sought a delayed appeal and postconviction relief on the basis he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel had been disbarred. The trial court found that it was without jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s claims. Appellant seeks relief in this Court. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that he has failed to establish a reasonable explanation for the delay that would justify the tolling of the statute of limitations for purposes of a delayed appeal or post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal involves a will contest in which the trial court found that a will executed in 2005 was the product of undue influence and, as a consequence, admitted a will executed by the testator in 2004 to probate. The proponent of the 2005 Will appeals the finding of undue influence as well as the dismissal of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs to be paid from the estate. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

Mother appeals trial court’s decision to change the parties’ nonmarital child’s surname to that of the father. Finding that the father failed to meet his burden of proving that a name change was in the child’s best interest, we reverse.

The Defendant, Douglas Wayne Young, was convicted by a Sullivan County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; four counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305 (2010), 39-13-502 (2010), 39-13-102 (2006) (amended 2009, 2010), 39-14-403 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years’ confinement for especially aggravated kidnapping, twenty-five years’ confinement for each aggravated rape conviction, six years’ confinement for aggravated assault, and six years’ confinement for aggravated burglary. The kidnapping conviction was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining convictions, for an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of prior bad acts and by enhancing his sentence based upon enhancement factors not found by the jury or admitted by the Defendant. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Triplett McNeal, pled guilty to aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and especially aggravated robbery and agreed to an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court, and the habeas corpus court dismissed the petition. The Petitioner now appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief and, after a review of the record in this case, we conclude that the Petitioner’s notice of appeal is untimely. As such, we dismiss the Petitioner’s appeal.

This appeal is before the Court due to the failure of appellant to respond to a Show Cause Order in this Court as to why the appeal should not be dismissed as premature. Appellant failed to respond to this Show Cause Order, and we order this appeal dismissed as premature.

The petitioner, William Wilson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to adequately advise him of the consequences of not testifying at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Demetria Nance, was convicted of one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-210(c), -17-1307(d)(3). In this appeal, she raises the following issues for our review: (1) The State presented insufficient evidence to support her conviction for second degree murder; and (2) The trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial after a writing from the Defendant to the victim, which had not been given to the defense during pre-trial discovery, was mentioned in front of the jury. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment for the Defendant’s conviction of possession of a deadly weapon.

A Hamilton County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Petitioner, Frederick A. Miller, of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life plus sixty years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective by failing to object to the “show-up” identification procedure, failing to preserve and pursue the Petitioner’s speedy trial motion, and failing to properly cross-examine and impeach the State’s witnesses. Further, the Petitioner alleged that the State denied the Petitioner’s due process rights by failing to disclose the results of fingerprint analysis and gunshot residue tests. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The plaintiffs have appealed from an order upholding a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and two of the defendants. Because the order appealed does not resolve the plaintiffs’ claims against all the defendants or the two defendants’ cross claim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This case stems from the suspension and later termination of David G. Young (“Young”) from his position as City Administrator for the City of LaFollette (“LaFollette”). Young filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court of Campbell County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court ruled in favor of Young and annulled the LaFollette proceedings that resulted in Young’s suspension and termination. The Trial Court also awarded Young, as the prevailing party, certain discretionary costs. LaFollette appeals. We hold that LaFollette did not act fraudulently, illegally, or arbitrarily in its termination of Young’s employment. We reverse.

The Defendant, Eugene Taylor, entered a plea of guilty to possession of cocaine for resale and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the Defendant received concurrent terms of four years as a Range I, standard offender for these convictions. As part of the plea agreement, the Defendant reserved a certified question of law challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence resulting from his traffic stop. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the Hamilton County Criminal Court. We remand for the entry of a corrected judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Virgil Campbell, was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(e)(1). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to five years for each count and ordered that the terms run consecutively. In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues: (1) The trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever the two offenses; and (2) The trial court erred when it sentenced him to consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal raises the issue of whether a contract for the sale of an interest in a corporation and related indemnity agreements are unenforceable because they are contrary to public policy. The sellers of the corporate interest filed suit against the purchasers in the Chancery Court for Williamson County seeking damages for the purchasers’ alleged breach of their indemnity agreement. The purchasers counterclaimed asserting, among other things, that the sellers had fraudulently induced them to purchase the interest in the corporation. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded a $201,715.50 judgment to the sellers and dismissed the purchasers’ counterclaim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on its own motion, invalidated the stock purchase agreement and the related indemnity agreements on the ground that they were contrary to the public policy reflected in Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-16-208 (2002). Baugh v. Novak, No. M2008-02438-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2474714 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2009). We granted the sellers’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal and now find that the Court of Appeals erred by finding that the agreements at issue in this case were contrary to public policy. We have also determined that the evidence fully supports the trial court’s decision to dismiss the purchasers’ counterclaim for fraudulent inducement.

The defendant, Mario Antowine Middlebrooks, was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of aggravated robbery, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and theft under $10,000. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed sentences of ten years for the robbery, ten years for each kidnapping, ten years for the possession of a firearm, and two years for the theft. The court further determined that partial consecutive sentencing was warranted and imposed an effective sentence of forty years to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant has raised three issues for our review: (1) whether his convictions for aggravated kidnapping violate due process and are, thus, precluded under State v. Dixon; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his kidnapping convictions; and (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following review of the record, we conclude that the defendant’s three aggravated kidnapping conviction are violative of due process principles and, thus, must be vacated. Moreover, we conclude that the trial court did not follow the mandates of our caselaw in its imposition of consecutive sentencing. As such, the case is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of consecutive sentencing.

The Defendant, Dyron Norm Yokley, was convicted of second degree murder, for which he received a thirty-five-year sentence as a Range II, violent offender. The Defendant appeals, contending that (1) the evidence is not sufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his four pretrial statements, (3) the State violated his due process rights by failing to update its discovery responses, (4) the trial court erred in allowing the jury to view the scene, (5) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s affiliation with the Vice Lords gang, and (6) the trial court erred in imposing a lengthy sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Danny A. Stewart, a prisoner serving multiple sentences, some concurrently and some consecutively, filed a petition for certiorari naming as respondents the Commissioner of the Department of Correction and heads of various other agencies allegedly responsible for determining his eligibility for parole (collectively referred to as “TDOC”). He alleges TDOC is incorrectly calculating his eligibility for parole in that it is basing its calulation on the aggregate consecutive sentences of 42 years, whereas the correct method is to calculate eligibility on each separate sentence so that he would start serving his next consecutive sentence as an “in custody” parolee of his earliest consecutive sentence. The trial court dismissed the case based on Stewart’s failure “to exhaust his administrative remedies,” i.e., by seeking a “declaratory order from TDOC before filing the present action.” Stewart appeals. We vacate the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

A Marshall County jury found the Petitioner, Thomas J. Tucker, guilty of facilitation of aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Ricky Johnson, aka Russell Wellington, #122766, appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1989 convictions for burglary of an automobile and grand larceny. He claimed that his convictions were void because venue in the convicting county was not proved. Because the Petitioner has not shown that he is restrained of his liberty as a direct consequence of these convictions, we affirm the order of the Johnson County Circuit Court dismissing the petition.

The Defendant, Carlton Horton, aka Carlton Leavon Horton, pleaded guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court to domestic aggravated assault as a Range I, standard offender. After a sentencing hearing, he received a five-year sentence. The trial court ordered him to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days; the sentence thereafter to be suspended, and the Defendant placed on probation for a period of eight years. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to pay $4,048.10 in restitution to the victim. The Defendant now appeals the restitution award, arguing that the trial court did not consider the Defendant’s financial resources or ability to pay as required by statute. We conclude that the trial court made inadequate findings concerning the Defendant’s financial resources and his future ability to pay. We therefore reverse and remand for reconsideration of the restitution award based upon the required findings.