APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, the former business partner of the appellee, appeals the trial court’s determination that the appellee did not breach their partnership agreement, as well as the trial court’s distribution of partnership profits. Appellant also appeals the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial. We affirm the trial court’s decision not to grant a jury trial as well as its determination that the appellee did not breach the partnership agreement. We adjust the amount of the court’s awards to account for $5,000 of an $8,000 sale which the appellee kept rather than depositing it into the partnership account.

The trial court imposed a constructive trust on a six-acre parcel of real property to carry out the intent of the father that his son and daughter would divide the property. The court ordered the sale of the property and division of the proceeds. We have concluded that the more appropriate equitable remedy is a resulting trust and have modified the judgment with regard to the disposition of the sale proceeds. Otherwise, we affirm the result reached by the trial court.

This case involves the plaintiff’s motion seeking an order holding her former husband in contempt for failing to make certain monthly payments of $1,071 from his military retirement as required by the terms of a marital dissolution agreement incorporated into the parties’ divorce judgment. The wife’s former spouse stopped making the payments after the wife remarried. The trial court denied the motion upon finding that the payments in question were alimony subject to modification rather than a property distribution as the wife contends. The court held that Mr. Cornwell “properly” stopped paying the “alimony” when his former wife remarried. The wife has appealed. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a hearing on the wife’s motion.

Flowmaster invited a professional driver to attend an exhibition in which such driver allegedly lost control of his vehicle, killing or injuring many spectators. The plaintiffs sued numerous defendants, including Flowmaster, and the trial court granted Flowmaster’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Flowmaster was not a member of a joint venture. However, we find that Flowmaster failed to negate the duty element of the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Flowmaster “engaged in” an ultrahazardous activity or “participated” in a “drag race,” and we remand on these issues.

Much aggrieved by his guilty-pleaded convictions of rape and introduction of drugs into a penal institution, the petitioner, Daniel Ewing, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered as a product of the ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of an order of  the trial court which failed to adjudicate all claims. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendant, Anthony M. Reliford, pled guilty to domestic assault and aggravated assault, receiving concurrent sentences of four years and eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served in confinement. The court further ordered that the defendant pay restitution to the victim in the amount of $830.19. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing a fully incarcerative sentence and (2) improperly ordering restitution. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences of incarceration but remand for reconsideration of restitution in light of the defendant’s ability to pay.

The defendant, Joshua W. Eads, was convicted by a Union County jury of facilitation of burglary, a Class E felony; theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor; and theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced to an effective term of six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in: (1) failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the defendant committed the instant crimes; and (2) charging the jury with the lesser included offense of criminal responsibility for facilitation of burglary because the evidence indicated that the defendant did not promote or assist in the crimes. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgments of conviction.

This post-divorce appeal involves parenting issues. The parties, parents of two minor children, divorced pursuant to a marital dissolution agreement. After post-divorce custody disputes arose, the parties went through mediation and arrived at an agreed parenting plan. The next day, the mother repudiated the agreement. The father then filed a motion to enforce the mediation agreement. The mother requested an evidentiary hearing on whether the parenting arrangement embodied in the mediated parenting plan was in the best interest of the children. The trial court declined to hear any evidence, and found that the mediated parenting plan was a valid, enforceable contract. It entered an order enforcing the mediated parenting plan. The mother now appeals. We reverse, holding that the trial court erred in applying contract analysis to the mediated parenting plan, and remanding for an evidentiary hearing on whether the parenting arrangement in the mediated parenting plan is in the best interest of the minor children.
 

The State appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s granting of the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during a sobriety checkpoint. The State claims that the trial court erred by concluding that the Defendant was unreasonably seized at the checkpoint due to the failure of the advance publicity to comply with Tennessee Department of Safety General Order 410-1. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s re-filed suit for failure to comply with the 60-day notice and certificate of good faith requirements set out in the Medical Malpractice Act. Because we find such requirements applicable to Plaintiff’s suit and no extraordinary cause to excuse her non-compliance, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

Following a bench trial, the defendant, Wayne Boykin, was convicted of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain goods with a value in excess of $60,000, which is punishable as a Class B felony. The Circuit Court of Madison County sentenced the defendant to ten years incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant maintains that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) his sentence was excessive. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants, Benjamin Patterson and Charles P. Yokley, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care facility in Count 1 and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a child care facility in Count 2. Following a jury trial, Defendants were both convicted as charged, and the trial court merged the delivery offenses with the sale offenses. Defendant Patterson was sentenced as a standard offender to serve three years incarcerated,and Defendant Yokley was sentenced as a multiple offender to serve seven years incarcerated. Both defendants raise several issues on appeal, including the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, alleged errors regarding the jury instructions, and the trialcourt’s refusal to exclude certain evidence. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Renwick A. Earls, Jr., pled guilty to one count of second degree murder and received a sentence of forty years as a Range II offender. He now appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the trial court did not have the authority to sentence him to forty years, rendering the judgment void. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his judgment is void or that he is otherwise entitled to relief, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

The Petitioner, Jason Kayser, appeals the Weakley County Circuit Court’s denial of postconviction relief from his conviction upon his guilty plea for second degree murder, a Class A felony, for which he is serving seventeen years as a violent offender. The Petitioner contends that he did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea and that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After more than seventeen years of marriage, Valerie Rochelle Evans Albertson (“Wife”) sued Matthew Scott Albertson (“Husband”) for divorce. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree of Divorce on December 17, 2010 nunc pro tunc to November 8, 2010. In the Final Decree of Divorce the Trial Court, inter alia, awarded Wife a divorce, awarded Wife transitional alimony, divided the marital assets and debts, entered a permanent parenting plan with regard to the parties’ minor child, and awarded Wife attorney’s fees. Husband appeals the property division and the award of alimony. The record on appeal contains no transcript or statement of the evidence. We affirm.

The Hamilton County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, William Toby Johnson, charging him with aggravated burglary, resisting arrest, and four counts of aggravated robbery. By agreement, count six of the indictment was amended to charge attempted aggravated robbery rather than aggravated robbery. It also appears that the resisting arrest charge was dismissed before trial. At trial, following the close of the State’s proof, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal regarding the aggravated robbery of Luis Lopez, and the charge was reduced to robbery. The jury convicted Defendant of aggravated criminal trespass, theft of property valued under $500 from Luis Lopez, and two counts of the lesser-included offense of robbery involving Edgar Perez and Valentina Soto Santizo. Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty nine days each for aggravated criminal trespass and theft, and fifteen years for each robbery conviction. The trial court ordered the two robbery sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other two sentences. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce an audio recording of the 911 call made by one of the victims at the time of the offenses; and (3) that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

We granted this appeal by the State to determine if the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder should be affirmed pursuant to State v. Mellons, 557 S.W.2d 497 (Tenn. 1977), despite insufficient evidence to support it. We hold that Mellons does not control the outcome of this case. We also hold that sufficient proof must support every element of the offense of which a defendant is convicted, even where the conviction offense is charged as a lesser-included offense and sufficient proof supports the greater offense. In this case, the trial court erred in charging the jury with second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first degree felony murder. Because the proof is not sufficient to support it, we must reverse and vacate the conviction of second degree murder. However, because the proof is sufficient to support the offense of reckless homicide, we remand this matter to the trial court for (1) entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction of reckless homicide, and (2) sentencing on reckless homicide. The defendant is entitled to no relief on his remaining issues. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

On August 6, 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty in case number 92306 to theft over $1,000, a Class D felony, in exchange for a sentence of two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant was released on December 20, 2009, and placed on supervised probation. On March 12, 2010, the defendant pleaded guilty in case number 91245 to theft over $10,000, a Class C felony, in exchange for a sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. The trial court suspended the defendant’s sentence in 91245 and placed the defendant on probation. On November 8, 2010, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in revoking the defendant’s probation, alleging that the record does not demonstrate that the defendant was in violation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff has appealed from an order granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss some, but not all, of the plaintiff’s claims. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the plaintiff’s claims or the defendants’ counterclaim, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentences were illegal. The habeas corpus court denied the petition. The petitioner now appeals, challenging the habeas corpus court’s ruling and the constitutionality of the 2009 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The defendant, Deandre Blake, appeals his two Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, claiming that the convicting evidence was insufficient, that the trial court erred by admitting prejudicial photographs into evidence, and that the court erred by overruling his pretrial motion to suppress his written statement to the police. We affirm both the conviction in count one of felony murder predicated upon aggravated child abuse and the conviction in count two of felony murder predicated upon aggravated child neglect. On remand, the judgment in count one must be amended, and the trial court should effectuate merger, in part, by vacating the judgment in count two.

I concur with the conclusion in the majority opinion that sufficient evidence supports the conviction in count one. I also concur with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction in count two and agree that the two felony murder convictions should have been merged into a single judgment. I write separately, however, to address a conflict between the language in the first degree murder statute and the language of the child abuse and child neglect statutes that the majority does not mention. I also note that the trial court erred by giving an incomplete instruction for count two, murder in the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, although I conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Defendant, Bryant K. Pride, pled nolo contendere to one count of felony possession of 26 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery in a Drug-Free School Zone, one count of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and one count of felony conspiracy to possess more than 26 grams of cocaine for sale or delivery in a Drug-Free School Zone. The Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(1) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments due to a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because it does not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

A Wilson County jury convicted the defendant of attempted unlawful photographing, a Class B misdemeanor; sexual battery, a Class E felony; attempted sexual battery, a Class A misdemeanor; and unlawful photographing, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, standard offender to one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony conviction. The court sentenced him to six months at 75% in the county jail for the Class B misdemeanor conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days at 75% for each Class A misdemeanor conviction. The court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for unlawful photographing and attempted unlawful photographing because the victim was in a public place where she had no expectation of privacy and (2) the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion for a continuance to give his attorney an opportunity to obtain the defendant’s medical records. Following our review, we reverse and dismiss the defendant’s convictions for unlawful photographing and attempted unlawful photographing. We affirm the defendant’s convictions for sexual battery and attempted sexual battery.